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If a person doesn't want to understand, they won't. That's been made abundantly clear in this campaign.
"You've got to go the UN completely, not in this phony way that the President’s getting them to sign off just because of the games they play, but in a real transfers of authority to the UN for the civil development, for the governance, and for the humanitarian programs. Then it’s possible to have a broader, multination force come onto the ground, relieve the pressure from the American force, reduce the sense of American occupation and take the target off of American soldiers. Once you do both of those things, you can train the Iraqi military and police faster, and you can set a date for the transfer of full authority for Iraq back to the Iraqis. If all of that were done simultaneously, you’d have a much faster transition of authority in Iraq and you’d make the ground much safer for American forces, and you begin to reduce the number of American forces who are overcommitted and overextended, and you could bring them back to the United States much more rapidly."
1. Share the military risk and cost. Show leadership at the United Nations by leading the creation of a UN military force under U.S. Command. The U.S. Military will still be in charge, but other big nations will send troops – they've said so – to relieve our overstretched soldiers.
2. Share the cost and responsibility of reconstruction. Show that we understand real partnership by reaching out to our allies, rebuilding the good will we squandered, and asking the UN to do what it has done well from Kosovo to East Timor by putting Iraqi governance and reconstruction under UN authority. It's not necessary for the U.S. to go it alone on rebuilding Iraq's institutions and meeting humanitarian needs – and we shouldn't have to.
3. Get going to train and equip a serious Iraqi security force. Just recruiting untrained soldiers and police does not create security – in fact, it creates insecurity. Extensive training and monitoring is vital, just as they are for new officers in any city police force. And reliable Iraqi forces are the key to minimizing the risks to U.S. forces while allowing for the successful reconstruction of the country – there's no way around it. Again, we don't have to do this without help from our friends – but we do have to ask our friends for help.
4. Give a clear timetable of benchmarks for turning power back to Iraqis quickly. Like anyone else, Iraqis want to know what the future holds. Washington should tell them – with a phased transfer of responsibility as Iraqi leaders and institutions are ready for it. Those institutions may not be perfect, but Iraqis will own them – and thank America.
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