"the role of nuclear energy in reducing U.S. oil-import dependence in the short to medium term will be modest"
"Public acceptance of expansion of nuclear power will require not only that all of the foregoing conditions be met but also that the public be confident they have been met."
"Of the first four conditions, the most difficult to address adequately and the one most likely to undermine public acceptance and the ultimate expandability of nuclear energy, in my view, is
proliferation resistance."
"Reprocessing spent fuel for recycle of its plutonium -- and breeder reactors that depend on this -- go in the wrong direction in all of these respects: they make fission energy more complex, costlier, riskier, more
proliferation-prone, and, correspondingly, more controversial."
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/3244/improving_us_energy_security_and_reducing_greenhousegas_emissions.html"Improving US Energy Security and Reducing Greenhouse-Gas Emissions: The Role of Nuclear Energy"
Testimony
July 25, 2000
Author: John P. Holdren, Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program
Belfer Center Programs or Projects: Science, Technology, and Public Policy; Managing the Atom
Written Testimony
ORAL TESTIMONY
IMPROVING U.S. ENERGY SECURITY
AND REDUCING GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS:
WHAT ROLE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY?
TESTIMONY OF
JOHN P. HOLDREN
FOR THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC
JULY 25, 2000
Mr. Chairman, Members, Ladies and Gentlemen: I thank you for the opportunity to appear today. My biography and written statement -- with references to more extensive materials available on the web -- have been submitted for the record. The views I am expressing today are my own, not necessarily those of the organizations I am associated with. In this oral statement, I will summarize those views in seven brief points.
<snip>
4. Nuclear energy from fission today provides 17% of the world's electricity, 6% of total energy. The percentages for the United States are only slightly larger. The expandability of nuclear energy for the future is clouded by concerns and uncertainties about cost, safety, radioactive wastes,
links to nuclear weapons, and (connected to all of these) public acceptance. Faced with the choice of "fix it or forget it", the prudent thing to do is to try to fix it.
5. My written statement explains why
the role of nuclear energy in reducing U.S. oil-import dependence in the short to medium term will be modest; discusses the possibilities for a larger role for nuclear energy in reducing climate-change risks over the longer term; and summarizes the recommendations of the 1997 and 1999 PCAST energy studies for increased Federal R&D -- and increased international cooperation -- to improve nuclear fission and develop nuclear fusion.
6. A key point is that the chances of getting an expanded contribution from nuclear fission will be enhanced by making fission energy systems as simple, cheap, safe,
proliferation resistant, and noncontroversial as possible. Reprocessing spent fuel for recycle of its plutonium -- and breeder reactors that depend on this -- go in the wrong direction in all of these respects: they make fission energy more complex, costlier, riskier, more
proliferation-prone, and, correspondingly, more controversial. And there will be no sound economic or resource-availability justification for reprocessing or breeding for the next few decades, at least. Accordingly, the United States should continue to defer reprocessing and commercialization of breeder reactors, and should increase its efforts to persuade other countries to defer these steps also. The time gained by postponement can be used to
strengthen the institutions of nonproliferation and to try to develop technologies that can make reprocessing and recycle less expensive,
more proliferation resistant, and less emisions- and waste-intensive.
<snip>
WRITTEN TESTIMONY
IMPROVING U.S. ENERGY SECURITY
AND REDUCING GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS:
WHAT ROLE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY?
TESTIMONY OF
JOHN P. HOLDREN
FOR THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC
JULY 25, 2000
<snip>
Proliferation resistance of nuclear energy systems must be increased by a combination of technical and institutional means. In the short term, this will involve avoiding use of highly enriched uranium, minimizing inventories of separated plutonium (by minimizing reprocessing and maximizing disposition), and improving protection and safeguards for all stocks of these materials. In the longer term, it will require either (a) avoiding plutonium recycle indefinitely (using, e.g., uranium from sea water), or (b) developing recycle technologies that do not separate plutonium completely from fission products, and/or (c) placing all enrichment and reprocessing facilities in internationally operated and guarded complexes.
Public acceptance of expansion of nuclear power will require not only that all of the foregoing conditions be met but also that the public be confident they have been met. This in turn requires that the institutions operating and regulating nuclear power cultivate a culture of competence, responsibility, honesty, and transparency, and that the opportunities for public participation in nuclear decision-making be increased.
Of the first four conditions, the most difficult to address adequately and the one most likely to undermine public acceptance and the ultimate expandability of nuclear energy, in my view, is
proliferation resistance. I believe, further, that in order to minimize the chance of
proliferation disasters linked to fission energy in the short run it would be best if all nuclear-energy-generating countries agreed to postpone reprocessing of spent fuel and recycle of plutonium for at least the next few decades. (The Carter Administration decision to advocate this position, much reviled by many nuclear-energy proponents then and since, was right then and is even more right now.) There is no sound economic, resource-availability, waste-management, or nonproliferation argument for reprocessing now or soon - and
very strong nonproliferation reasons not to do so. The time gained by postponement can and should be used both to
strengthen nonproliferation institutions and to explore advanced technologies that would make reprocessing less
proliferation-prone as well as less emissions- and waste-intensive (or that would postpone the need for it indefinitely, as would the demonstration of economic extraction of uranium from sea water).
Many arguments are heard in favor of reprocessing and recycle - particularly from the Europeans, Japanese, and Russians (all of whom are either doing it or hoping/planning to do it) - but I do not believe any of these arguments are persuasive. Here is my capsule analysis:
<snip>