Catch Shares: Using Profits and New Regulations to Save the Oceans

[BrentWil]

I found this to be an interesting concept in saving our seas from over fishing. It has had tremendous success in overcoming the tragedy of the commons in the Oceans. What do you think?


http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=3332

In the 1970s, starting in Australia, New Zealand and Iceland, a new approach to managing fisheries began to take hold.

Known as "catch shares" or Limited Access Privilege Programs (LAPPs), this type of system dedicates a secure share of fish to an individual fisherman, community or fishery association. Each year before the season begins, fishermen know how much fish they are allowed to take of the fishery's Total Allowable Catch (TAC).

Fishermen are usually allowed to buy and sell shares in order to maximize their profit. This helps drive the fishery to an efficient level and rewards innovative fishermen who can lower costs and deliver a quality product that will fetch a good price on the market.

LAPPs foster better fishing practices, higher prices and less waste
With a secure share of the catch, fishermen no longer need to race: incentives change from spurring fishermen to capture the most fish they can, to spurring them to maximize the value of their share instead. As the fishery becomes more efficient, fewer boats and gear are needed and seasons lengthen.

With a slower pace of fishing, fishermen can more effectively plan their fishing, delivering fish when the market demands, staying ashore when conditions are unsafe and avoiding bycatch. With catches controlled, regulators are able to relax many of constraints on fisheries.

Like stockholders, fishermen want their shares to go up, so they protect their fishery
Evidence shows that catch shares overcome the "tragedy of the commons" by providing a clear economic rationale for conserving resources. In much the same way shareholders in a company want the business to excel so their shares gain value, fishermen in catch share systems need the fishery to remain sustainable.

In addition, landing unmarketable species, such as bycatch, or spending the time to deploy excess gear can be costly. Under catch shares, fishermen have the incentive to avoid any additional costs. One 'stick' in this carrot-and-stick approach is that if fishermen exceed their share of the catch, they have to buy additional quota on the market. If no quota is available, stiff penalties often ensue.