Synthese (2010) 177:449–469 DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9792-5
Conceptual analysis and special-interest science: toxicology and the case of Edward Calabrese
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
Published online: 20 October 2010 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract
One way to do socially relevant investigations of science is through conceptual analysis of scientific terms used in special-interest science (SIS). SIS is science having welfare-related consequences and funded by special interests, e.g., tobacco companies, in order to establish predetermined conclusions. For instance, because the chemical industry seeks deregulation of toxic emissions and avoiding costly clean- ups, it funds SIS that supports the concept of “hormesis” (according to which low doses of toxins/carcinogens have beneficial effects). Analyzing the hormesis con- cept of its main defender, chemical-industry-funded Edward Calabrese, the paper shows Calabrese and others fail to distinguish three different hormesis concepts, H, HG, and HD. H requires toxin-induced, short-term beneficial effects for only one biological endpoint, while HG requires toxin-induced, net-beneficial effects for all endpoints/responses/subjects/ages/conditions. HD requires using the risk-assessment/ regulatory default rule that all low-dose toxic exposures are net-beneficial, thus allow- able. Clarifying these concepts, the paper argues for five main claims. (1) Claims positing H are trivially true but irrelevant to regulations. (2) Claims positing HG are relevant to regulation but scientifically false. (3) Claims positing HD are relevant to regulation but ethically/scientifically questionable. (4) Although no hormesis con- cept (H, HG, or HD) has both scientific validity and regulatory relevance, Calabrese and others obscure this fact through repeated equivocation, begging the question, and data-trimming. Consequently (5) their errors provide some undeserved rhetorical plausibility for deregulating low-dose toxins.
For more than 20 years, Walter Allen was a maintenance worker at Baton Rouge General Hospital. His duties included replacing cylinders containing ethylene oxide (ETO), a compound used to sterilize medical/surgical devices. After Allen died of brain cancer, in 1996 his widow and son sued the sterilizer manufacturer for wrongful death and claimed Allen’s exposure to ETO contributed to his brain cancer. Their law- suit should have been an “easy win.” After all, the International Agency for Research on Cancer had showed ETO is a potent carcinogen and genotoxin. Acting directly on the genes, it causes chromosomal and genetic damage in both humans and other mammals. Because of its small size, ETO directly penetrates cell DNA and crosses the blood–brain barrier (IARC 1994, p. 73; APEC 1996).
The court granted a judgment against the Allens and denied them a jury trial. Why? Making false evidentiary inferences, the pretrial judge claimed workplace ETO did not contribute to Walter Allen’s brain cancer. The judge admitted ETO can cause human stomach cancer and leukemia but said “no epidemiological study had established” a link between ETO and brain cancer (Cranor 2006, p. 20; see pp. 18–20, 324–325)...
http://www.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/ksf-2010-calabrese-synthese.pdf"Nuclear Waste, Knowledge Waste"
Science 329, no. 5993 (13 August): 762-63; with Gene Rosa et al.
Vol. 329 no. 5993 pp. 762-763 DOI: 10.1126/science.1193205
Policy Forum
Nuclear power is re-emerging as a major part of the energy portfolios of a wide variety of nations. With over 50 reactors being built around the world today and over 100 more planned to come online in the next decade, many observers are proclaiming a “nuclear renaissance” (1). The success of a nuclear revival is dependent upon addressing a well-known set of challenges, for example, plant safety (even in the light of improved reactor designs), costs and liabilities, terrorism at plants and in transport, weapons proliferation, and the successful siting of the plants themselves (2, 3).
http://www.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/final-ksf-science-2010-article-Rosa-master-final.pdfMIT discussed extensively here:
"Climate Change, Nuclear Economics, and Conflicts of Interest,"
Science and Engineering Ethics, 17:75-107.
Abstract
Merck suppressed data on harmful effects of its drug Vioxx, and Guidant suppressed data on electrical flaws in one of its heart-defibrillator models. Both cases reveal how financial conflicts of interest can skew biomedical research. Such conflicts also occur in electric-utility-related research. Attempting to show that increased atomic energy can help address climate change, some industry advocates claim nuclear power is an inexpensive way to generate low-carbon electricity. Surveying 30 recent nuclear analyses, this paper shows that industry-funded studies appear to fall into conflicts of interest and to illegitimately trim cost data in several main ways. They exclude costs of full-liability insurance, underestimate interest rates and construction times by using “overnight” costs, and overestimate load factors and reactor lifetimes. If these trimmed costs are included, nuclear-generated electricity can be shown roughly 6 times more expensive than most studies claim. After answering four objections, the paper concludes that, although there may be reasons to use reactors to address climate change, economics does not appear to be one of them.
Introduction
For many years bioethicists have recognized that conflicts of interest can skew biomedical research. An Annals of Internal Medicine study recently showed that 98% of papers based on industry-sponsored studies reflected favorably on the industry’s products. A Journal of the American Medical Association article likewise concluded that industry-funded studies were 8 times less likely to reach conclusions unfavorable to their drugs than were nonprofit-funded studies. Does something similar happen in electric-utility-related science?
Jonathan Porritt, chair of the UK Sustainable Development Commission and advisor to Gordon Brown, says it does. “Cost estimates from the industry have been subject to massive underestimates—inaccuracy of an astonishing kind consistently over a 40-, 50-year period” (Porritt, Chair of the UK Sustainable Development Commission 2006). A UK-government commission agrees, claiming virtually all nuclear-cost data can be “traced back to industry sources” (UK Sustainable Development Commission (UK SDC) 2006). University of Greenwich business professor, Stephen Thomas, says nuclear-industry sources “are notoriously secretive about the costs they are incurring” (Thomas 2005)....
http://www.nd.edu/~kshrader/pubs/ksf-2011-climate-change-econ-conflicts-interest-see.pdf