|
Edited on Mon Nov-10-03 03:47 PM by Aidoneus
I don't feel quite ambitious enough to go into anything except direct answers to your specific points with a small amount of deviation.. perhaps later. This may end up as the 11th of my last 16 long posts to be ignored, but I don't mind that really.
Somewhat disorganized and several rules of grammar will be broken, please keep this far from the sight of any English Professors, or if there are any reading this please resist the urge to judge the errors made in the course of these scattered observations crammed in with little thoughts towards organization. :)
Do you think Egypt kicked out the UN observers and massed its troops in the Sinai as a show of support for Israel?
No, rather as a show of support for Syria. The Israelis had been threatening to invade Syria and carry out "regime change" in Damascus. Months previous to the June war, a pattern of minor hostilities reached a more serious stage with the bombing of Siqufiya, in which Syrian civilians were killed. What caused this? The kibbutzim of the area sought to possess the farmland on Syria's side of the border, and consistantly engaged in a little game of provocations to turn the heat up. Quite deliberately and for no legitimate reason, they would drive armoured vehicles & tractors deep into Syrian territory just to provoke a response, which lead to a counter response--the most serious being Siqufiya and the IAF shooting down several Syrian jets over Damascus itself. Throughout the period, there were also small-scale Israeli attacks against Palestinians & Jordanians in the West Bank (as-Samu in late '66, for example), with some reciprocating actions in response, as well as al-Fatah and other independent Palestinian activities on the side.
The Soviets had informed Nasser that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border; this suspicion was confirmed in their eyes by the observation that the years' "Independence Day" military parade was missing any displays of armour. At the time Nasser had a very signifigant portion of the Egyptian army fighting a proxy war against the Saudis & British in Yemen, but still sent a division or two to the border in a show of support for the threats facing its fellow-UAR member Syria, then under the radical left Prime Minister Dr. Yusef Zayyain (overthrown by Aflaq's "moderates" in the military a short while after the loss, who in turn were overthrown by Asad acting on Aflaq's example). This was a veiled threat by Nasser to lay off of Syria, but not a sizeable enough force to move against the well-prepared Israelis.
Shortly before the war broke out, the Soviets had convinced Nasser that the Israelis were not going to start any trouble, and demanded that Nasser not start anything either. Whether this was a naive mistake on the part of the Soviets or a plot against Nasser is open for discussion, but their assurances tied his hands and assured that nothing would be begun by the Egyptian/Syrian side. In addition to them, Jordan was bound to them by a mutual defense pact and was uncomfortable at the attacks in the runup to the war. The moves to the border on the Egyptian side are better pegged as nervous political posturing rather than any conspiratorial threat.
It can be read in interviews made after the war by luminaries such as Rabin, that the Israeli camp in truth leaned towards expecting no real threat, and rather seized upon an opportunity they had obviously long planned for. The large call-up of reserves was draining economic sectors and would either have to be quickly acted on or withdrawn; the Israeli leadership opted for the former and went on the offensive, destroying the Egyptian air force in a sneak attack, the war progressing from there with the neighboring Arab lands being occupied in course.
Despite a ceasefire being signed, Israeli attacks on Syria continued, with eventually some 130,000 Arab refugees ejected from the Golan. Some 200,000 more Palestinians fled to the eastern bank of the River Jordan. In '68, there was a moderate Israeli invasion of Jordan (East Bank) that was stopped by joint PLO/PLA/PFLP fighters at heavy loss. Around 100,000 Arab inhabitants were driven out of the immediate River Jordan valley in this period (West Bank), as the first Jewish colonies were established in Hebron.
Or that Egypt, Syria, and Jordan's promises to push the Jews into the sea were just a little joke?
“just a little joke”, no, “typically shrill, bombastically blind, and self-defeating outbursts of petty nationalist rhetoric” on the part of them, yes.
1967, just like 1948 and 1956 before it, as well as 1973 afterward, was the result of Arab aggression and publicly stated intention to destroy the 1% of the Middle East that Jews are permitted to live.
'48 is a thorny bit I do not wish to get into, one that I personally do not point to any camp as wholly anything, but including '56 is just ridiculous. At the time, Israel refused Nasser's offer of peace and conspired with European imperialists in an assault on Egypt and independent Arab nationalism as a whole. The Israelis moved in and seized Gaza and Sinai while the French & British invaders attempted to take control of Suez. It was most shameful adventurism, and very likely permanently shut the door on any potential for cooperation between Israel & the Arabs--it could perhaps be said that the collaboration with the hated European imperialists in a blatent aggression against Egypt revealed the true face of what Israel would be to the region, that it would just be used as a proxy hammer by European (and later American) imperialists to bash up independent Arab nationalism with and thus keep secure the puppet oil colonies on the Gulf for “western” domination. That single fact is the overriding source of the “special relationship”--forget every lobby, forget “Jewish conspiracies” some sectors like to think up, forget even pandering for votes on election day, that is the most useful task Israel has and continues to provide to the US (intertwining ties to the enormous black hole of “defense industries” & the global arms market would be the #2 on that list).
Now, '73 was the one major event that could truly be called an "Arab aggression" in 50 years of history. But even then it was wholly confined towards retaking land that Israel had occupied in its previous aggression, and again took place after the Israelis arrogantly spit on another reconciliation offer by the Egyptians (’71, by Sadat).
It is good that you left out '82, '87, '93, and '96.
|
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(633 posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
