Israel ignores the lessons of history

[Violet_Crumble]

The belief that security can be provided by walls and physical barriers is as old as the most ancient walled city. But that city is Jericho and any Israeli schoolchild can tell you what happened to its defensive walls once the ancient Israelites emerged from their desert exodus. They came tumbling down.

Walls and barriers meant to provide lasting security never ultimately work. They have a habit of cracking, falling, being breached, circumvented, written on or even ignored altogether. That's why Hadrian's Wall, The Great Wall of China, the Maginot Line and the Berlin Wall, among others, are now better remembered as monuments to failure than as monuments to lasting peace and security.

<snip>

Those who profess concern for Israeli security are dangerously mistaken if they believe that building a combination of concrete walls and electrified fences around Palestinians in the West Bank will end suicide bombings and enhance Israel's overall security. In fact, as history has shown, it will likely lead to even more, not less, daring and devastating forms of violence.

The most glaring problem with the barrier from an Israeli security perspective is its disturbing location and path, which has no basis in genuine security considerations. Amnesty International has just documented that 90 percent of Israel's barrier is being built on Palestinian land inside the internationally accepted 1967 border between Israel and the West Bank. Moreover, the barrier loops and zigzags around Palestinian areas and dissects others, leaving nearly 200,000 Palestinians on Israel's side, making it the antithesis of a clean and effective security partition.

Yet the most dangerous aspect of Israel's current barrier is that it will likely threaten Israel's long-term security by fueling Palestinian desperation and incentive for even more destructive forms of terrorism.

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/183962_wall29.html

The mention of the Maginot Line got me thinking. One of the reasons it failed was because it only covered France's border with Germany, not the border with Belgium. Building a wall between Israel and the West Bank wouldn't provide security unless Israel continued it along its entire border...

[Gimel]

1. Each situation is unique

The lessons of history have to be modified to the situation.

Changes in the route of the planned fence have been made. This article does not even relate to that. The fence is only 1/3 completed, and he is talking as if it is fait accompli.

There are no more destructive forms of terrorism than suicide bomb attacks, barring perhaps airplane hi-jacking, and that is unlikely in this situation.

[Stockholm]

2. Walls or fences will never protect Israel in the long run

There is no reason to "modify" any lessons of history to understand this.

The only thing that will guarantee Israels security is by removing what motivates terrorists in the first place and the only thing that can bring that about and that is proper peace.

Until that day Israel can build as many walls as they like. The Israelis justifiable defence of their citizens only creates more generations of terrorists.

[Gimel]

3. Complying with terrorists

No, that is not the answer. That would mean the destruction of Israel, as that is their stated goal.

If they really cared about their own people, you wouldn't see them using children as human shields as they did in Gaza a few weeks ago, or in bringing the conflict into the children's homes.

[el_gato]

5. the IDF terrorists murdering Palestinian children and bulldozing homes

It's funny how you ignore the Isreali terrorist activities.

[Gimel]

6. Lump everything together

There has been no intentional murder of children by the IDF, Individual soldiers who have acted improperly have faced trial and if found guilty have been sentenced.

The IDF works to safe-guard the lives of Israeli children. The Hamas activists should safe-guard theirs and not use them as shields and gun-runners.

[Matilda]

7. Try these for starters:

None of these articles is from an "anti-Israel" source:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,970652,00.html

http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1220635,00.html

http://www.worldrevolution.org/article/1427

http://news.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE150552004?open&of=ENG-ISR

http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/WO0303/S00356.htm

http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/11/26/65334.shtml

http://www.ccmep.org/hotnews2/defence040102.html

These articles are all talking about the deliberate targeting of
children, whose worst crime is throwing stones.

Apart from targeted killings, many small children have known nothing
else but the terror of daily/nightly attacks by soldiers, the
bulldozing of their homes, the terrors of enforced poverty and
daily humiliation of their parents. Yes, Israeli children have also
been killed in suicide bomb attacks, and this is a tragic occurrence,
but they have never been deliberately picked off by a soldier with
a gun pointing directly at them. Neither have Israeli children
died in anything approaching the numbers of Palestinian children.

And it's no coincidence that this is happening with greater frequency
now, on Ariel Sharon's watch.

[Djinn]

10. bullshit

"There has been no intentional murder of children by the IDF"

if a 12 year old throws a rock at an armoured car containing armoured soldiers and they open fire it's deliberate murder. When a missile is fired into an apartment building in which children (and innocent adults) are living it's deliberate murder. When a tank fires on kids riding their bikes it's deliberate murder

How is it that so many Palestinian kids get shot by the IDF are they THAT bad, THAT nervous and trigger happy?

They're either incompetant or it's murder

[Violet_Crumble]

11. Apparently reckless killing is acceptable...

Children killed in demonstrations and as a result of reckless IDF fire

During the first months of the intifada children were mostly killed during stone-throwing demonstrations, though in many cases they appear to have been bystanders during these demonstrations.

Sami Fathi Abu Jazzar. On 10 October 2000 Amnesty International delegates witnessed the aftermath of a stone throwing demonstration in Rafah on the southern edge of the Gaza Strip. Israeli soldiers shot at a crowd of some 400 people, mostly primary schoolchildren, who were throwing stones at an Israeli military post. Sami Fathi Abu Jazzar was shot in the head; a live bullet entered his forehead above his left eyebrow, went through the skull diagonally and exited at the back of his head. He died the following day, on the eve of his 12th birthday. Six other children were injured by live fire in the same incident. Amnesty International delegates, including an expert in riot policing, concluded that the lives of Israeli soldiers were not in danger and that their use of lethal force was unjustified, as their position was not only heavily fortified, but there were also two wire fences between the post and the stone throwers, who were some 200 metres away.

Muhammad Ibrahim Hajaj, Ahmed Suleiman Abu Tayah and Ibrahim Reziq Omar, all 14 years of age, were shot dead and several other children were wounded on 1 November 2000 by the IDF in the Gaza Strip, on the road between Netzarim junction and the Karni crossing into Israel, in a place which over the past two years has been a regular demonstration site for children who gather to throw stones at IDF tanks and/or at the IDF tower. Muhammad Ibrahim Hajaj was shot in the neck and Ahmed Suleiman Abu Tayah and Ibrahim Reziq Omar were shot in the head and chest. All three died immediately. Several other children were wounded, including two 10-year-olds who were shot in the abdomen and in the right shoulder. According to eyewitnesses and to medical records, the children were fired on with live ammunition from a distance of about 150 metres.

Fifteen-year-old Muhammad Musbah Isma’il Abu Ghali was shot in the chest from an IDF jeep at Tuffah checkpoint in Khan Yunis, in the Gaza Strip, on the afternoon of 8 November 2000. Two UN staff members who were on their way back from the Mawasi area witnessed the shooting. According to one of them: "There was a group of children standing around the rubble of the demolished houses by the Tuffah checkpoint but they were not throwing stones or demonstrating. Two IDF jeeps arrived and after a moment a soldier fired a single shot which hit Muhammad in the chest and he fell. I knew the boy and I approached him and he said 'My bicycle key is in my pocket'. I asked him if he was OK and he didn't reply and pulled from his pocket the key, three photos and three shekels and then slumped back. The ambulance arrived to take him to hospital and he died on the way."

Khalil Ibrahim al-Mughrabi. On 7 July 2001 three children were shot by IDF sniper fire as they were flying kites and playing soccer in an open space near the border fence at Rafah. Khalil Ibrahim al-Mughrabi, age11, was killed by a high-velocity bullet in the head. Ibrahim Kamel Abu Sussain, age 10, and 13-year-old Suleiman Turki Abu Rijal were also shot and both sustained serious injuries in the abdomen and in the testicles, respectively. The shots came from an IDF post about 800 metres away, and the boys were in a large, open space. According to testimonies given to Amnesty International by Ibrahim Kamel Abu Sussain and by other children who were present at the time of the incident, there were no disturbances or clashes in the area at that time. The IDF claimed that there had been rioting and throwing of fragmentation grenades in the area at the time, but confidential IDF records showed that this was untrue. On 8 November 2001, the IDF informed the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem that it had decided not to initiate an investigation of the incident because there was no suspicion of criminal behaviour by the soldiers. However, a file was attached to the IDFs response, apparently in error, which contained internal records of the IDFs operational de-briefings and the opinions of the IDF Southern Command Judge Advocate and of the Chief Military Prosecutor. These documents, which have been made public by B'Tselem, show that the IDF, in spite of the evidence, decided not to order a Military Police investigation and cleared the soldiers who killed Khalil al-Mughrabi and injured the two other children, and that in its response to B’Tselem the IDF deliberately presented an incorrect version of the incident.(8)

http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engMDE020052002?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES%5CISRAEL/OCCUPIED+TERRITORIES

[Gimel]

14. Obviously not! n/t

[Stockholm]

9. Sorry was not condoning terrorist activities committed

by the Palestinians. In this particular conflict IMHO it is useless to play the blame game - "to much blood under the bridge".

The point I was trying to make was that a wall can never defend Israel from their enemies.

In my view - if it´s not on occupied territory go ahead and build as many walls as they like. But it will always only amount to a false sense of security.

[Djinn]

12. you're kidding right?

"there are no more destructive forms of terrorism than suicide bomb attacks barring perhaps airplane hi-jacking"

I can think of several - or does state terrorism not count

[HawkerHurricane]

4. The Maginot line was a success...

since it's purpose was to force any attack on France by Germany to go through Belgium...
France knew it was outnumbered by Germany, to even up the odds they needed England and Belgian troops... part of the reason France kept backing down to Hitler was that they were outnumbered; they needed outside support and couldn't get the members of the alliance to meet thier treaty obligations. The Belgians were afraid another war would be fought on thier soil, the English didn't want to lose thier army to defend France, and America didn't want to get involved.

The problem, then and now, is even if the wall succeeds, someone will figure out how to use it against Isreal. The money would be better spent on police/intelligence.

[Stockholm]

8. Correction Maginot line was a temporary sucess... n/t

[Lithos]

13. Your history has faults

The Maginot line was an attempt by France to fight the previous war. It was a failure in that it was a liability when it came to fighting the new war. The French and the English had more tanks and more men then the Germans, they didn't need the Belgians. (note: It wasn't the Belgians which they thought would stop the Germans, but the Ardennes which they felt was impassable.)

What the Maginot Line did was make the French not believe in a mobile warfare, so conversely they did NOT organize their armour into large mobile units integrated with mobile infantry. They opted to keep them distributed in small units and supporting the infantry (note: the Germans took the opposite approach, the infantry supported the tanks) where they were destroyed piecemeal by the Germans.

The British too suffered similar myopia - their MBT's (Matilda's) were slow and while effective when used in mass against the lighter German tanks, were usually deployed in small groups which allowed the Germans to destroy them piecemeal.

The story in the air was similar. The British and French aircraft were good, but not designed initially to integrate with the Mechanized advance.

However, with this defeat came the seeds for victory. The US too suffered from the same myopia and would have been similarly decimated had they entered into combat at that time. The lessons learned by the British and French were taken to heart by the arming Americans who used them to develop the core of the US armoured divisions, mechanized infantry, and tactical fighter bombers (P-38, P-47, B-25, B-26, P-61 and the P-51) which were key to the success of the Arsenal of Democracy.

[The Magistrate]

15. A Few Other Points, Sir, Nor Generally Appreciated In This Matter

First, the principle of infantry co-operation was built into French tanks by design. They were not machines suitable for use as mobile striking elements in a fluid engagement. It is not widely realized that French tanks were generally better armored and armed than German tanks, but that is not sufficient for victory. French tanks were deliberately geared for slow speeds, not much above the running pace of an infantryman. They had minimal crews, in which one man only was responsible for aiming and loading the cannon, as well as commanding the tank. They had no radios, and had to communicate by flag signals, which this one man in the turret was also responsible for flying and reading. All German tanks save the earliest machine-gun armed Panzer I had a seperate commander who could view the battle and direct a gunner, and many of their cannon armed tanks had a seperate loader to assist the gunner. Platoon leaders of most cannon-armed units had radios in their tanks, and so could easily co-ordinate their actions without reference to line of sight. English tank design was oddly bifurcated, into Cruiser and Infantry lines, and England had experimented with all-armor mobile formations between the wars. Cruiser tanks were built for speed, and were well armed and adequately crewed but lightly armored: they were intended as mobile exploitation forces, to operate without any reference to infantry. Their cannon, the two-pounder gun, had no explosive shell, however, and so they proved unable to suppress anti-tank gun fire. Infantry tanks, of which the heavy Matilda II was the best example, were geared slow like the French vehicles, and very heavily armored. The Matilda II was crewed on the German pattern, and radio equipped.

Second, a great proportion of German armored striking power in the period of classic Blitzkrieg derived not from German design and manufacture, but from Czechoslovakian. It is often stated that Munich brought time for critical Allied re-armament, but it probably benefited the Germans much more, by enabling them to absorb Czech equipment and manufacturing facilities. Czech tanks already in service by Munich, the T-35 and T-38, had cannon armament and two-man turrets, as well as adequate armor and good speed. Those already built were taken over by the Germans on the occupation of that country, and large numbers were built in the subsequent two years. These comprised the majority of German tanks armed with cannon in the spring of 1940, and without them, the effectiveness of German armored forces would have been greatly reduced.

Third, the outcome of the air battle over France that spring was largely rooted in two elements; first, the very poor state of the French aircraft industry, and second, the English reluctance to commit any great number of fighter planes to the continent. French aircraft manufacture remained more a craft industry than a tool for mass production, so that a very long time passed between design and commencement of manufacture, which then proceeded by fits and starts in small batches. Thus, the principal French fighter design, the Morane 406, although begun about the same time as the Spitfire and the Me 109, had not been as well developed by 1940, and some superior machines, that might have been in wide service if French industry worked at an English or German or Soviet tempo, were only beginning to be produced at the critical juncture. England had sent over with the BEF only the less valuable of its modern fighters, the Hurricane, which was much easier to produce than the Spitfire, and only in numbers sufficient to equalize the disparity between French and German fighter strength. When the situation on the ground began to deteriorate rapidly, the English decided to maintain their fighter strength safe for protection of the homeland, rather than hazard their own security against the increasingly dubious prospect of pulling the French chestnut out of the fire.

The Maginot Line was certainly an attempt to re-fight the last war. M. Maginot, the driving force behind its construction, had been a sergeant at Verdun, where the tremendous value of fortification in an artillery struggle had been amply demonstrated. Budgetary constraints, as much as anything, rendered it ineffective in the event. The original plan had been to run the fortifications clear to the Channel along the French border, but that was far beyond the fiscal capability of France in the depression years. Had that proved feasible, or been driven through despite looming bankruptcy, the system of fortification might have stood in history with a better name. While the Germans were able, with specially trained paratroop detachments, to neutralize some critical and formidable Belgian fortifications (with some assistance from unreadiness of the garrissons), this means would probably have fallen short of breaching decisively such a system of fortifications as was envisioned for the Franco-Belgian border, and the Germans would have had to blast a way through, at a cost of time, and predictability of their lines of advance.

[HawkerHurricane]

16. It was, indeed, an attempt to fight the previous war...

By forcing Germany to attack through Belgium, it guarenteed (at least) Belgian participation, and increased the chance of British assistance.

France did have organized armor divisions, but they were poorly employed and far too few. The French plan was simple; since Germany could not attack through the Maginot line directly into France, they would have to fight through Belgium in a replay of WW1... too bad they didn't plan on the German attack being a feint... even worse, the French knew that the Ardeness could be held with only a few men, assumed that the Germans knew it, and then assumed that the Germans wouldn't go that way 'knowing it could be held by only a few men', so they didn't put ANY men there.
The French also had a interesting theory that with enough anti-tank guns the German armor would be stopped cold. They even purchased enough guns to (theoretically) do this. Since they (theoretically) could stop any armor offensive, these guns were never deployed, and were captured in their warehouses by the Germans, who would use them against the Russians.

For tank battles, read about Arras, where the British armor almost cut off the German spearheads... except that the tanks had no infantry support, and Rommel turned his anti-aircraft guns (the dreaded 88mm) on the British. The French half of this offensive was was led by Charles DeGaulle, commanding the 2nd ACR... an armored division in all but name.

France's problem before and during the war was one of politics; the Left wanted to stop the Germans and the Right didn't want to pay for it. When the final collapse came, the Left wanted to keep on fighting and the Right wanted to use the defeat to install thier own fascist/corparatist style of government, which they did at Vichy.

As for air power...
Germany attached thier air force directly to the ground force, with great results. The British and French followed the theories of the Italian theorist Douhet of strategic bombing... and so built no aircraft suitable for ground support.

American air forces built few aircraft as ground support, but rather pressed fighters (over engined for high speed and thus heavy bomb loads) into the frey... The P-38 lightning was a high altitude intercepter poorly designed for ground support, the P-47 was a robust escort fighter, the P-51 a reengined dive bomber, none intended when built for ground support work, but easily used in that roll. The B-25 and 26 were built as cheap back ups for the B-17 and 24, and were also pressed into ground support (and antishipping) rolls, with much field modification. The P-61 was a night fighter, and while used for ground support was not designed for it.

American mechinization was more from having more vehicles than they could shake a stick at, and not intentional.

The ability to improvise, something of a American trait, has more to do with it than anything else. That and the ability to build aircraft and tanks faster than they could be destroyed.

[number6]

17. the wall,... still evil

:(

[number6]

18. oh,..btw ...kick

interesting discussion about Maginot line ...