"The son-of-bitch won't stop until he has his fucking war."
Hangloose opinion
The recent appointment of Victor Cha as Asia Director in the National Security Council portends a more aggressive approach towards North Korea during President Bush's second term. Long an advisor to the Administration, as Asia Director, Cha will hold responsibility for developing U.S. policy towards North Korea, and it will be he who maps out the approach to the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK--North Korea) in the coming months.
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President Bush came very close to actually launching an attack on North Korea in the spring of 2003. In March the U.S. moved a fleet of ships to the region, including the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson with its 75 aircraft. In preparation for the attack, 6 F-117 Stealth bombers were sent to South Korea and 25 F-15 Fighters and 24 B-1 and B-52 bombers were stationed in Guam. Plans to conduct air strikes were in place, Bush admitted to South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Pan Ki-Mun one year later. The danger of war was averted during the U.S.-South Korean summit in Washington in May 2003, when South Korean officials strenuously objected to the plan.As in 1994, the American public never knew just how close the U.S. came to war on the Korean Peninsula in 2003. South Korean opposition to military action only strengthened the Bush Administration's conviction that it would be necessary to demonstrate the futility of negotiations before it could win the support of regional allies. It felt it could best accomplish that goal by presenting an image of negotiating without actually doing so.
In each of the first two six-party talks with North Korea, James Kelly, head of the U.S. delegation, was instructed not to negotiate.As a result, the meetings were little more than an exercise in futility. Russian, Chinese, South Korean and Japanese diplomats expressed their displeasure with Washington's stubborn refusal to engage in real negotiations. China's deputy foreign minister, Zhou Wenzhong, appealed to the U.S. to stop using its accusation of a North Korean uranium enrichment weapons program as an excuse for obstructing negotiations. "We know nothing about the uranium program," Zhou said. "We don't know whether it exists. So far the U.S. has not presented convincing evidence of this program." Zhou pointed out that if such a program did exist, then it should be included in any agreement, but that the U.S. should stop making accusations unless it could offer conclusive proof.
The North Korean position, as articulated by its foreign minister, Paek Nam-Sun, was that if the United States would produce evidence, then the DPRK "would certainly show" suspected sites, "as was the case with the Kumchangni incident." The reference was to an occasion in 1999 when the U.S. claimed to have solid evidence that a nuclear weapon facility was operating in a cave located at Kumchangni, and charged the DPRK with violating its treaty obligations.The U.S. pressured North Korea into allowing inspectors into the area, only to find nothing more than an empty cave.
Examples such as this, as well as the deliberate lies about Iraqi weapons programs used to justify invasion tended to leave third parties skeptical of overheated accusations and claims of evidence which are never produced.One Asian diplomat, requesting anonymity, said what was on the minds of many. "We think the U.S. claims are a little exaggerated, not as much as with Iraq, but still we have to be careful of what the U.S. says." Cognizant of the perception that it was as an obstacle to progress, the Bush Administration decided that it should present a plan.Administration officials admitted privately that the chaos in Iraq had changed the dynamics of the nuclear dispute with North Korea and that it was necessary to be seen by its allies as submitting a serious offer, even one that included conditions they knew the DPRK would refuse. One U.S. official admitted, "They may say no--and in that case they will have failed the test," confirming that the Administration viewed the process as a means of convincing its allies that talks were useless and that more hostile measures would eventually be necessary.
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