Here is the entire script. In it, Clarke comes out as more of a "dove" but really compared to Richard Perle who wouldn't? He made some good points but he is still pushing for imperialism, still saying we need to convince our allies to give us legitimacy. Still FOR the war. Still very clear that it would be in our interest to get international support and that we should spend more time trying
but that it's still our divine right as Americans to do whatever we feel we need to. What is that if not Pax Americana?
I'll ignore your statement about Rovian talking points and being "duped". It's too silly.
I'll try to drag up old, pre-agenda discussions about this, back from 2002. People weren't cutting either Perle or Clarke much slack.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
Hearing Before the
House Armed Services Committee
September 26, 2002
OPENING STATEMENT OF
DUNCAN HUNTER
A Representative from California HUNTER: The committee will come to order.
Today, the Committee on Armed Services continues its review of United States policy toward Iraq. This morning's hearing marks the fourth in a number of planned public sessions designed to educate and inform the committee and the American people on the various issues surrounding Iraq's continued violation of numerous United Nations resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, the Middle East, and the international community.
The committee has received a classified briefing from the intelligence community in each of the last three weeks, which we also opened to all members of the House in the last several weeks. We also heard from former UNSCOM inspectors about Iraq's illicit weapons programs and Saddam Hussein's persistent efforts to thwart U.N. inspections and we heard from an Iraqi defector who was a leader in Saddam's nuclear weapons program.
He told us how the Iraqis built and sustained their weapons of mass destruction programs through the acquisition of Western technology and how the United States own export control system may have contributed to the problems we are now facing with Iraq, and I thought most interestingly he told about how even as our inspectors were on the ground in '93 a few miles away, they were moving the weapons program with great efficiency. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld appeared before the committee last week to discuss and defend the administration's policy toward Iraq, and yesterday morning the committee met behind closed doors with several retired generals to hear their views on this critical issue with a special focus on military options.
The committee is planning on holding another hearing next week, next Wednesday on the topic of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Today, however, we will hear from two well-known gentlemen who have distinguished themselves in the world of foreign and defense policy. The Honorable Richard Perle is a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and Chairman of the Defense Policy Board, and General Wesley Clark, United States Army (ret.) is Managing Director Merchant Banking at the Stephens Group, Inc., and a former commander- in-chief of the United States European Command, and gentlemen we greatly appreciate you being with us this morning and sharing your wisdom and your viewpoints.
We want to thank you for being with us, and I also want to inform the full committee that this very robust schedule of hearings, both public hearings and classified hearings, are being done at the direction of the chairman of the full committee, Bob Stump. It was his feeling that we needed to educate not only members of the committee but as many members of the House as we possibly could on this issue so that they can make an informed judgment when it comes time to vote, and I might let folks know that I think now we've had about 120 non-committee members appear and listen in on the classified briefings that we've been holding.
So, we're going to continue with these hearings and our goal is to see to it that every single member of the House who desires to have a classified briefing on this issue before this vote has an opportunity to do it, as well as to attend, of course, our public hearings.
Before we begin, I want to turn to my good friend, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, the ranking member, to offer any comments he might have.
STATEMENT OF
IKE SKELTON
A Representative from Missouri SKELTON: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I welcome Mr. Perle, General Clark. We look forward to your testimony.
And, Mr. Chairman, to shorten the hearing just a bit, I ask that my prepared statement be entered in the record, and state that this is a very crucial and critical time for us in this country regarding proposed action against Iraq.
The president has made it clear to Congress, the United Nations, and the American people that he has a determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power, and there are a number of questions that need to be answered in my opinion such as what can still be done before we must compel Iraq with use of force? What's the threshold beyond which the United States can no longer wait for Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions?
To me the aftermath and all of us know and understand and appreciate the high capability of the American fighting force. What do we do in the aftermath? This, in my opinion, looms as the Damocles sword over whatever might be successful de-weaponization of that Iraqi regime.
So where do we go from here? And I hope our witnesses can give us the benefit of their wisdom on these and the other issues that come forth surrounding this very, very important issue that we in America face.
Thank you.
HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.
And, Mr. Perle, great to see you. I'm glad that Washington traffic, while it held you up, didn't totally block you from getting into the city. Thank you for being with us. You've been with us many times, and I know all the members have appreciated your wisdom and insight. The floor is yours, sir.
STATEMENT OF
RICHARD N. PERLE
Resident Fellow of the
American Enterprise Institute for Public PolicyPERLE: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for including me in today's hearing. As we confront issues of war and peace, our country is strongest when the Congress and the Executive Branch act in concert. In all the talk of a need for a coalition to confront Saddam Hussein, the coalition that matters most is to be found here in Washington at opposite ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. The president, Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld, and most recently British Prime Minister Blair have all spoken in recent days about the urgency of dealing with the threat posed to the American people and others by Saddam Hussein.
In what may well be the most important speech of his presidency, President Bush has argued eloquently and in my view persuasively to the United Nations in New York that Saddam's open defiance of the United Nations and his scornful refusal to heed its many injunctions is a challenge to the credibility of the United Nations itself and he has rightfully asked the United Nations to approve a Security Council resolution that would force Saddam to choose between full compliance with the many resolutions he has scorned and violated and action to remove his regime from power.
Saddam's response calculating, deceitful, and disingenuous, moves only slightly in the direction of U.N. inspections of Iraqi territory and not at all toward the disarmament that is what really matters. The statement issued in his name that he will accept inspections unconditionally is anything but unconditional. It is hedged as to the allowable types of inspection and the rules under which inspections will be conducted. As I understand it, Saddam is demanding an inspection regime in which advanced notification is required, and in which certain places are off limits to the inspectors who would be limited in number, mobility, and armament.
Even from a government whose cooperation we can count on, these conditions would be unacceptable, but from Saddam Hussein, who has gone to enormous lengths to conceal his weapons program from previous international inspectors and continues to lie about them now, the sort of inspection regime that Kofi Annan has negotiated with Saddam would be a farce, not simply inadequate, Mr. Chairman, a farce.
What would a robust inspection regime look like? It would at a minimum include tens of thousands of inspectors with Americans in key leadership and decision making roles distributed throughout Iraq; possessing an independent capability to move anywhere from dispersed bases to any site in the country without prior notification or approval; the right to interview any Iraqi or Iraqi resident together with his family at a safe location outside Iraq; appropriate self defense capabilities for the inspectors so they could overcome efforts to impede them and the like.
And let me just observe in passing that the inspection team that is being readied has significantly downgraded the presence and the role of Americans. The senior most American as I understand it is in charge of training. The critical function of activity evaluation, that is to say what to make of the bits and pieces of evidence that may fall into the hands of the inspectors is in the hands of a Chinese official, so one has, I think, good reason to worry about whether an inspection arrangement even if it is put in place will in itself have the capability and the integrity that one would associate with a robust inspection arrangement.
Iraq is a very large country. My own view and I'm speaking personally throughout but especially in this, my own view is that even with a large and intrusive force, it is simply not possible to devise an inspection regime on territory controlled by Saddam Hussein that could be effective in locating, much less eliminating, his weapons of mass destruction. In any case, the inspection regime known as UNMOVIC doesn't even come close. Its size, organization, management, and resources are all hopelessly inadequate for the daunting task of inspecting a country the size of France against Saddam's determined program of concealment, deception, and lying.
The simple truth is that the inspectors will never find anything the location of which has not been discovered through intelligence operations. Unless we can obtain information from defectors or by technical means that points the inspectors to specific sites, we are most unlikely to find what we are looking for. We know, Mr. Chairman, that Saddam lies about his program to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
We know that he has used the years during which no inspectors were in Iraq to move everything of interest with the result that the database we once possessed, in adequate though it was, has been destroyed. We know all this, yet I sometimes think there are those at the United Nations who treat the issue, not as a matter of life and death, but rather more like a game of pin the tail on the donkey or an Easter egg hunt on a sunny afternoon.
The bottom line is this: Saddam is better at hiding than we are at finding and this is not a game. If he eludes us and continues to refine, perfect, and expand his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, the danger to us which is already great will only grow. If he achieves his Holy Grail and acquires one or more nuclear weapons, there is no way of knowing what predatory policies he will pursue.
Let us suppose that in the end a robust inspection arrangement is put in place, and after a year or two it has found nothing. Would we conclude from the failure to unearth illegal activity that none existed? Of course not, all we would know is that we had failed to find what we were looking for, not that it was not there to be found, and where would that leave us?
Would we be safer or even more gravely imperiled? There would be a predictable clamor to end the inspection regime and, if they were still in place, to lift the sanctions. Saddam would claim, not only that he was in compliance with the U.N. resolutions concerning inspections, but that he had been truthful all along. There are those who would believe him.
Given what we know now know about Saddam's weaponry, his lies, his concealment, we would be fools to accept inspections even an inspection regime far more ambitious than anything the U.N. contemplates as a substitute for disarmament. That is why, Mr. Chairman, the president is right to demand that the United Nations promptly resolve that Saddam comply with the full range of United Nations resolutions concerning Iraq or face an American-led enforcement action.
I returned last night from Europe where the issues before you were being widely discussed. Perhaps the most frequently asked question put to me by various Europeans is why now? What is it about the current situation that has made action to deal with Saddam urgent? He's been there for a decade. My answer is that we are already perilously late. We should have acted long ago and we should certainly have acted when Saddam expelled the inspectors in 1998.
Our myopic forbearance has given him four years to expand his arsenal without interference, four years to hide things and make them mobile, four years to render the international community feckless and its principal institution, the United Nations, all but irrelevant. We can, of course, choose to defer action.
Some counsel that, to wait and hope for the best. That is what Tony Blair's predecessors did in the 1930s. That is what we did with respect to Osama bin Laden. We waited. We watched. We knew about the training camps and fanatical incitement and the history of acts of terror. We knew about the Cole and the embassies in Africa. We waited too long and 3,000 innocent civilians were murdered.
If we wait, if we play hide and seek with Saddam Hussein, there is every reason to expect that he will expand his arsenal further, that he will cross the nuclear divide and become a nuclear power. I urge this committee, Mr. Chairman, to support the president's determination to act before it is too late. Thank you.
HUNTER (R-CA) : Thank you, Mr. Perle. I appreciate your statement.
And, General Clark, you have been a very well-respected leader of the U.S. military through some difficult times for the United States and we appreciate your service and thank you very much for being with us on this very challenging issue. The floor is yours, sir.
CLARK: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Representative Skelton, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
This is a committee that's been very strongly supportive of the men and women in uniform, and I want to thank you personally for the support that so many of you have given to me during some very, very tough times when I was in uniform, and on behalf of all the men and women and their families, we really appreciate this committee.
Your commitment, your willingness to give us your own time to come out and visit with the troops, your determination toward interests on the behalf of the troops and families when there is nothing but your duty as representatives of the people on the line, and we recognize it and we appreciate it and we're grateful for it.
I want to tell you also that I'm very honored to be here because I believe that in our democracy, discussion of critical, strategic issues, and this is certainly one, at an historic time strengthen the United States. They don't weaken us. Public information, public dialogue, and public discussion is what this country is all about, and certainly when we're considering a course as fraught with uncertainty as that which appears to be unfolding before us, we need the wholehearted understanding and resolution of the American people.
And I'm particularly honored, Mr. Chairman, that you would ask me as a retired military officer to come back and appear before you and that you will consider my opinions and concerns relevant to the issue at hand, even though that I've left the United States Army and I'm not engaged in another profession which is under question, investment banking, and so I'm delighted to be with you, sir. I have submitted a written statement but I would like to summarize.
HUNTER: Welcome back, General.
CLARK: Thank you, sir. I would like to summarize just a few points from it. I think there's no question...
(UNKNOWN): And, General, without objection your statement will be taken into the record.
TESTIMONY OF
GENERAL WESLEY CLARK, (RET.)
United States Army
Managing Director, Merchant Banking,
The Stephen's Group, INC.,
and
Former Commander and Chief, U.S. European Command
CLARK: Thank you, sir. There's no question that Saddam Hussein is a threat. I was in the joint staff in October of 1994. I think the date was -- I think it was the 8th of October. It was a Thursday morning. The intelligence officer walked in and said, "Sir, you're not going to believe this. Here are the pictures. You can't be believe it. This is the Republican Guard. They're right back in the same attack positions that they occupied four years ago before they invaded Kuwait and here are the two divisions and there are signs of mobilization and concerns north, and we can't understand it."
And General Peay was the commander of CENTCOM. Shalikashvili, I think was, visiting Haiti at the time with Secretary of Defense Perry, and we rushed together, we put together a program. General Peay deployed some 15,000 American troops and aircraft over to block it and after a few days, Saddam Hussein recognized what a difficult position he put himself in and withdrew the troops. But, we had not expected it. It was an unanticipated move. It made no sense from our point of view for Saddam Hussein to do this but he did it. It was signaled warning that Saddam Hussein is not only malevolent and violent but he is also to some large degree unpredictable at least to us.
I'm sure he has a rationale for what he's doing, but we don't always know it.
He does retain his chemical and biological capabilities to some extent and he is, as far as we know, actively pursuing nuclear capabilities, though he doesn't have nuclear warheads yet. If he were to acquire nuclear weapons, I think our friends in the region would face greatly increased risks as would we. Saddam might use these weapons as a deterrent while launching attacks against Israel or his other neighbors.
He might threaten American forces in the region. He might determine that he was the messenger of Allah and simply strike directly at Israel, or Israel weighing the possibilities of blackmail or aggression might feel compelled to strike Iraq first. Now, Saddam has been pursing nuclear weapons and we've been living with this risk for over 20 years. He does not have the weapons now as best we can determine. He might have the weapons in a year or two if the control for the highly-enriched uranium and other fissionable materials broke down. I think his best opportunity would have been to go to his friend Slobodan Milosevic and ask for those materials during the time of the Kosovo campaign, since there was active collusion between the Serbs and the Iraqis, but apparently if he asked for them he didn't get them because the Serbs have turned them over for us.
If he can't get the highly-enriched uranium, then it might take him five years or more to go through a centrifuge process or gaseous diffusion process to enrich the uranium, but the situation is not stable. The U.N. weapons inspectors who, however ineffective they might have been and there's some degree of difference of opinion on that, nevertheless provided assistance in impeding his development programs. They've been absent for four years, and the sanction regime designed to restrict his access to weapons materials and resources has been continuously eroded, and therefore the situation is not stable.
The problem of Iraq is not a problem that can be postponed indefinitely, and of course Saddam's current efforts themselves are violations of international law as expressed in the U.N. resolutions. Our President has emphasized the urgency of eliminating these weapons and weapons programs. I strongly support his efforts to encourage the United Nations to act on this problem and in taking this to the United Nations, the president's clear determination to act if the United States can't -- excuse me, if the United Nations can't provides strong leverage for under girding ongoing diplomatic efforts. CLARK: But the problem of Iraq is only one element of the broader security challenges facing our country. We have an unfinished worldwide war against Al Qaida, a war that has to be won in conjunction with friends and allies and that ultimately will be won as much by persuasion as by the use of force. We've got to turn off the Al Qaida recruiting machine. Now some 3,000 deaths on September 11th testify to the real danger from Al Qaida, and I think everyone acknowledges that Al Qaida has not yet been defeated.
As far as I know, I haven't seen any substantial evidence linking Saddam's regime to the Al Qaida network, though such evidence may emerge. But nevertheless, winning the war against Al Qaida and taking actions against the weapons programs in Iraq, that's two different problems that may require two different sets of solutions. In other words, to put it back into military parlance, Iraq they're an operational level problem. We've got other operational level problems in the Middle East, like the ongoing conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Al Qaida and the foundation of radical extremist fundamentalist Islam, that's the strategic problem.
We've got to make sure that in addressing the operational problem we're effective in going after the larger strategic problem. And so, the critical issue facing the United States right now is how to force action against Saddam Hussein and his weapons programs without detracting from our focus on Al Qaida or our efforts to deal with other immediate mid and long-term security problems.
I'd like to offer the following observations by way of how we could proceed. First of all, I do believe that the United States diplomacy in the United Nations will be strengthened if the Congress can adopt a resolution expressing U.S. determination to act if the United Nations can not act. The use of force must remain a U.S. option under active consideration.Such congressional resolution need not, at this point, authorize the use of force. The more focused the resolution on Iraq, the more focused it is on the problems of weapons of mass destruction. The greater its utility in the United Nations, the more nearly unanimous the resolution, the greater its utility is, the greater its impact is on the diplomatic efforts under way.
The president and his national security team have got to deploy imagination, leverage, and patience in working through the United Nations. In the near term, time is on our side and
we should endeavor to use the United Nations if at all possible.
This may require a period of time for inspections or the development of a more intrusive inspection regime such as Richard Perle has mentioned, if necessary backed by force. It may involve cracking down on the eroding sanctions regime and countries like Syria who are helping Iraq illegally export oil enabling Saddam Hussein to divert resources to his own purposes. We have to work this problem in a way to gain worldwide legitimacy and understanding for the concerns that we rightly feel and for our leadership. This is what U.S. leadership in the world must be. We must bring others to share our views not be too quick to rush to try to impose them even if we have the power to do so. I agree that
there's a risk that the inspections would fail to provide evidence of the weapons program. They might fail, but I think we can deal with this problem as we move along, and I think the difficulties of dealing with this outcome are more than offset by the opportunities to gain allies, support, and legitimacy in the campaign against Saddam Hussein.
If the efforts to resolve the problem by using the United Nations fail, either initially or ultimately, then we need to form the broadest possible coalition including our NATO allies and the North Atlantic Council if we're going to have to bring forces to bear. We should not be using force until the personnel, the organizations, the plans that will be required for post conflict Iraq are prepared and ready. This includes dealing with requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance and preparations for a transitional governing body and eventual elections, perhaps even including a new constitution.
Ideally, the international/multinational organizations will participate in the readying of such post conflict operations, the United Nations, NATO, other regional organization, Islamic organizations, but we have no idea how long this campaign could last, and if it were to go like the campaign against the Afghans, against the Taliban in which suddenly the Taliban collapsed and there we were.
We need to be ready because if suddenly Saddam Hussein's government collapses and we don't have everything ready to go, we're going to have chaos in that region. We may not get control of all the weapons of mass destruction, technicians, plans, capabilities; in fact, what may happen is that we'll remove a repressive regime and have it replaced with a fundamentalist regime which contributes to the strategic problem rather than helping to solve it.
So,
all that having been said, the option to use force must remain on the table. It should be used as the last resort after all diplomatic means have been exhausted unless there's information that indicates that a further delay would represent an immediate risk to the assembled forces and organizations. And,
I want to underscore that I think the United States should not categorize this action as preemptive. Preemptive and that doctrine has nothing whatsoever to do with this problem. As Richard Perle so eloquently pointed out, this is a problem that's longstanding. It's been a decade in the making. It needs to be dealt with and the clock is ticking on this. Obviously once initiated, a military operation should aim for the most rapid accomplishment of its operational aims and prompt turnover to follow on organizations and agencies, and I think if we proceed as outlined above, we may be able to minimize the disruption to the ongoing campaign against Al Qaida.
We could reduce the impact on friendly governments in the region and even contribute to the resolution of other regional issues, perhaps such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iranian efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and Saudi funding for terrorism. But there are no guarantees. The war is unpredictable. It could be difficult and costly and what is at risk in the aftermath is an open-ended American ground commitment in Iraq and an even deeper sense of humiliation in the Arab world which could intensify our problems in the region and elsewhere.
The yellow light is flashing. We have a problem. We've got to muster the best judgment in this country. We've got to muster the will of the American people and we've got to be prepared to deal with this problem, but time is on our side in the near term and we should use it. Thank you.
HUNTER: Thank you, General Clark. General Clark, when we went into Desert Storm, our best estimate and the United Nations' best estimate was that Saddam Hussein was three to five years away from having a nuclear system. That information to some degree was the basis upon which very distinguished Americans, like Sam Nunn, said what you've just said today, which is time is on our side, and they offered a policy that involved sanctions over a long period of time.
When we arrived, we found that he was, according to the United Nations and inspectors who have testified before this committee, six months away from having a nuclear weapon, meaning that the judgments and the time is on our side argument was one that was greatly in error, and had we taken it, we would have been perhaps suffered disastrous consequences.
Now, we've had inspectors appear before this committee who have said that they were turned away when they were close to things that they thought were important. They were held off in parking lots. They were ushered into a lot of empty rooms. They never met with the weapons community and out of the 200 and some odd inspections that they made; almost none of them were a surprise.
The upshot of their testimony was that if Saddam Hussein wants to keep us from seeing his chemical, biological, and nuclear complex, and he denies even that he has a chemical or biological complex, he will succeed. We then followed that testimony with that testimony of an Iraqi nuclear engineer who was very much at the forefront of Saddam Hussein's programs who said essentially while you Americans were inspecting in 1993, we were continuing to move aggressively not far away with a weapons program right under your noses basically.
Now, everything that you've told us with respect to the time is on our side argument is based on the presumption that these inspections can be successful. What can you offer us in terms of how we could have more effective inspections and how we could, against the will of Saddam Hussein, actually walk into a room and have a large piece of evidence of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons program in front of us on the table when our inspectors arrive? Please tell us how we can do that, what we haven't been able to do before.
CLARK: Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all I'm not making my case on the presumption that inspections will necessarily be effective. That's not the case. I think an inspection program will provide some impedance and interference with Saddam's efforts. I think it can undercut the legitimacy and authority of his regime at home. I think it can provide warning of further developments. I think it can establish a trigger. I think it can build legitimacy for the United States.
Ultimately, it's going to be inadequate in the main but as far as the intelligence is concerned and the time available, I don't know how to make sense of the intelligence. I mean we've heard six months from the CIA. We've heard the latest British estimate of a couple of years. We've heard other people say a year. We've heard Iraqi defectors saying it's ready. All he has to do is just machine the plutonium if he can get his hands on it.
The honest truth is that
the absence of intelligence is not an adequate reason to go forward to war in and of itself, and so what we have to do is we have to build a program that builds, that encourages other nations to share our perspective. We can do it relatively quickly. We should not discard inspections. They have done some measure of good, otherwise Saddam wouldn't object to them so strongly. So, if we take...
HUNTER: But now, General Clark, if we embark on these inspections and we accept inspections as the answer, as the end, and we embark on these inspections and we must presume that Saddam Hussein is as successful as he's been in the past at hiding the evidence from the inspection teams, evidence that we knew existed, how are we going -- you've mentioned that if we do these inspections, we're somehow going to galvanize the community of nations on our side.
Now if we do inspections and we don't find that which we know is there, but Saddam Hussein has allowed us to come into the country and absorb the inspectors successfully, how does that galvanize a community of nations to rally behind the United States?
CLARK: Well,
I think you have to have an echelon series of inspections. I think you start small and I think you expand the intrusiveness, the scope and the scale of the inspections, and I think you do that until you are either satisfied and the nation which brings the complaint to the United Nations, i.e. the United States, is satisfied, or you cross and trip a red line in which Saddam says no and you move to the next stage. But I'm not presuming that inspections will be successful. What I'm asking you to consider is the United States overall leadership responsibilities in the world and how we move ahead collectively with our allies and friends around the world to deal with this problem. What inspections are useful in doing is they're useful in highlighting the nature of the Iraqi regime, and we may deter him, impede him, undercut him, get warning and establish a trigger and build our legitimacy from this, and this is one way of proceeding.
HUNTER:
Would you recommend very aggressive, very intrusive inspections, which would be accompanied by forces which could, in cases where inspectors are denied entry, literally force their way into Iraqi facilities?
CLARK: I would like to see a program like that established but it would not be the initial program. HUNTER: But what if the United Nations does not end up ordering those inspections but nonetheless, but instead orders inspections which to some degree replicate those that went in the past, those which were not successful in removing this program? What would you recommend at that point?
CLARK:
I think we need to give the president the strongest possible leverage to get the right program put in place at the United Nations, and that leverage... HUNTER:
But that would require consensus from other members of the United Nations. That's not a unilateral instrument for the United States.
CLARK: That's correct and one of the difficulties that we have... HUNTER: Let me finish my question. Don't you think that it is not reasonable to expect that the United Nations is going to produce an extremely aggressive, backed by force, inspection regime?
CLARK: I think that the president's determination has given us strong leverage to get the kind of commitment from the United Nations that we need, but every country has its own domestic problems, and this requires the energy and imagination of our diplomats to work through this. I don't consider this case lost at this point. I think it's very much up in the air. I think the actions of this body are very important to determining the outcome.
But I will say this, that the administration has not proceeded heretofore in a way that would encourage its friends and allies to support it. One of the problems we have is the overhang from a number of decisions taken by the administration which have undercut its friends and allies around the world and given the impression that the United States doesn't respect the opinions of other.
So, we're swimming a little bit upstream on this, but I think a strong resolution from this body sent up promptly with broad support and narrowed the focus on the problems of weapons of mass destruction would give additional leverage, and I would urge that it be adopted.
HUNTER: Mr. Skelton.
SKELTON: Thank both of you for your excellent testimony. We do appreciate it. As I see it, there are four basic elements to this whole issue. Number one is the diplomacy which you have discussed a la the United Nations, exhausting that all the way if at all possible.
Number two, establishing the real goal, and that goal in my opinion is the disarmament of that country and I'm convinced that along with that the Saddam Hussein regime will fold. Third is how we fight and get it done should that happen, and fourth is the one that personally troubles me the most because that's what we have to live with.
General, in your prepared statement you said that force should not be used until the personnel and organizations to be involved in post-conflict Iraq are identified and ready to assume their responsibilities and I couldn't agree with you more. You further say this includes requirements for humanitarian assistance, police, and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance, preparation for a transitional governing body, eventual elections perhaps, even including a new constitution.
Suppose everything works out smoothly, including the military action and we do have a first-rate military. We all agree on that. Tell us more than what you have here of the potential dangers that are out there. The Kurds are sitting up there in the north. The Iranians are not going to be idly bystanders. The country is made up of some 60 percent Shiite, and we all know the Baath Party and Saddam Hussein are all Sunnis.
What chance is there for anarchy? What do you do with the henchmen that would be on the secondary tier of a regime that have carried out the unspeakable orders of Saddam Hussein and his people? What do you do with the scientist engineers, or is there a possibility of a true peaceful transition to a responsible state in addition thereto? What about the other countries like Syria, and I mentioned Iran, and their influence on this whole post-conflict Iraq? And, I would also ask the same question of Mr. Perle -- General.
CLARK: This is a very important question and particularly because we're trying to not only eliminate the weapons of mass destruction but end up with a situation in which we're net better off than we are today. We have to look at this question very seriously. I think much depends on the circumstances of the military operation itself as to what the impact will be and how long it will take. I think the broader the coalition, the stronger the preparations in advance, the smoother the operation is likely to be, the more rapid Saddam's army will collapse, and the less humanitarian hardship is likely to be imposed.
That having been said once we move into the area, what we can expect is a complete breakdown of governmental authority. It's not only Saddam Hussein but it's the people who, as you suggested, the henchmen and all of the people who are complicit in that regime who have illegally confiscated land, carried out his orders for executions and torture, and forced name changes and identity changes. Revenge will be exacted.
We've already seen a replay or a (inaudible) to this in what happened in 1991 with the Shia rebellion in southern Iraq when they thought we were coming in to help them liberate Iraq, and so we have to imagine a complete breakdown of order. That will be accompanied no doubt by a breakdown in the distribution of services, water, food. It's possible that Saddam Hussein may use biological weapons. If so, it's very possible he would use them against his own people. In an effort to impede our advance, he might very well try to solve the problem of the Shias in the south through the use of biological weapons.
And so, we really don't know what we're going to face. So in the immediate aftermath, there's going to be the possibility of a chaotic environment that's going to require a substantial American presence as well as a vast humanitarian governmental structure to meet the needs of the 23 million Iraqi people.
Then we're dealing with the longer mid term, the mid term problems. Will Iraq be able to establish a government that holds it together or will it fragment? There are strong factionary forces at work in Iraq and they will continue to be exacerbated by regional tensions in the area. The Shia in the south will be pulled by the Iranians.
The Kurds want their own organization. The Kurds will be hemmed in by the Turks. The Iraqis also, the Iranians also are nervous of the Kurds. But nevertheless, the Kurds have a certain mass and momentum that they've built up. They will have to work to establish their participation in the government or their own identity.
There's a question of the nature of a successor regime. Will it, if it's a strong man, will it be any better? Will we really get rid of the weapons of mass destruction or will someone emerge in this chaos who says "Look, I've overthrown Saddam. You Americans can deal with me. I'm the guy in charge right now. Here you can have your weapons of mass destruction. We're not interested." Then how do we know we've really got all the weapons of mass destruction out of there?
Or, has he knowing this is the Middle East, he's dealing with an Iranian neighbor who has weapons of mass destruction. He's dealing with Syria who has weapons of mass destruction does he decide to hang onto a nuclear and chemical last resort capability as a trump card? So, you have the question of the successor regime and then you have the problem of the long-term presence of the American forces in the region. One of the things that we've seen is that when you put American forces into a region, we tend to be a lightning rod.
In the case of Kosovo, we're the strongest element there and the Albanians look to us for protection. In the case of Iraq, we're going to be infidels in a Muslim land, and one of the things that's going to happen when you break the authority of Saddam Hussein is that you're going to have a resurgence of support for the Muslims in the region by the radical elements, both Sunni -- or both Wahhabi and Shia and they will be in there and they will be preaching anti-Americanism.
And, as we take the necessary actions with our force in the occupation or some have termed it the liberation of Iraq, we're going to put Americans in a position where they have to exercise authority. We're not going to enforce Islamic law, so there are a number of fundamental issues that are troublesome in the long run. We need to put together the right organizations and people to think through these issues and be ready to deal with them because you could look at a potential requirement to implement this plan less than two weeks after the initiation of hostilities.
SKELTON: Thank you.
HUNTER: Mr. Saxton.
PERLE: Did you want my comment on that?
HUNTER: Oh, Mr. Perle.
PERLE: Let me first observe that when it comes to inspections that are so obviously flawed, my friend and colleague is wildly optimistic. When it comes to dealing with problems that we're quite right to anticipate, he's wholly pessimistic and I think the only conclusion you can draw is that he's come down on the side of waiting, of resorting to the dream that inspections will solve this problem.
It is absolutely right to be concerned about what follows the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power. On this I'm rather more optimistic than General Clark, first of all because Iraq, unlike Afghanistan for example or some other countries in the region, has a highly-educated and sophisticated population that has suffered horribly under Saddam Hussein, that is in my view desperate to be liberated from Saddam Hussein, and that has begun to show quite remarkable unity among the opponents of Saddam Hussein as the prospect of action to remove him has become more real.
Sure there are lots of potential divisions. I was in London the other day and dropped in on a meeting of some of the Iraqi opposition and arrayed around that table in serious discussion were representatives of all the groups that General Clark referred to as in conflict with one another.
Now, that doesn't guarantee that there won't be some confusion. It doesn't guarantee that individual groups will not depart from what they now say they pledge themselves to, but I've been impressed with the ability of the Iraqi National Congress to bring together around a table representatives of the Shia in the south, the Kurds in the north, even the Sunni in the center of the country.
I think nearly 30 years of Saddam Hussein's rule will inspire in the Iraqi people a desire for a decent, humane government, and with help from us, I see no reason to assume (inaudible) that that can't be done. I think it can be done and I think the chances of success in that regard are infinitely greater than the likelihood that we will find the weapons of mass destruction that even a good inspection regime would be incompetent to unearth.
HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Saxton.
SAXTON (R-NJ): Mr. Perle, General Clark indicated a few minutes ago that he wasn't sure -- I'm sorry, I don't want to mischaracterize what General Clark said but something to the effect that we don't have information that Al Qaida and the Iraqi regime are connected. Is that a fair characterization, General Clark?
CLARK: I'm saying there hasn't been any substantiation of the linkage of the Iraqi regime to the events of 9/11 or the fact that they are giving weapons of mass destruction capability to Al Qaida, yes sir.
SAXTON: OK, now that has been a widely held view, at least in some quarters, and I suspect that one of the difficulties that we've had in addressing this subject comes because of the difficulty of collecting intelligence in that region of the world for all the reasons that we know.
However, yesterday the president's national security adviser began to talk about this subject in a different light. She said we clearly know that there were in the past and have been contacts between senior Iraqi officials and member of Al Qaida going back for a long time. We know too that several of the Al Qaida detainees, in particular some high-ranking detainees have said that Iraq provided some training to Al Qaida in chemical weapons development.
Now I suspect that it would be difficult for someone to say that if they didn't have information to back it up and she also suggested that the details of the contacts would be released at a later to date and from my knowledge of intelligence work, which is sketchy, but from what I know it's difficult sometimes to disclose details because you endanger sources.
And so, I think this is a subject that certainly there are beginning to be indications that there are -- as a matter of fact, other bad guys have gone to Iraq. Abu Nidal died there recently, and when you couple all this with the notion that Saddam has been very determined to act out against his neighbors and the West and seems to stop at nothing, to draw the conclusion based on evidence that is beginning to emerge that there is no contact and no general theme of cooperation between Saddam and officials or the leadership of Al Qaida is a stretch, and I think a dangerous conclusion to come to. Richard Perle, would you give us your opinion?
PERLE: Yes, thank you, Mr. Saxton. I think you've identified an important issue and a serious problem. It is true that it is difficult to collect intelligence in these areas but the bigger problem in my view has been a stunning lack of competence among our own intelligence agencies. They've simply proved incompetent in this area and I've testified on this theme several times over the last ten or 15 years.
What we are now beginning to see is evidence that was there all along. It simply wasn't properly assessed, and the reason why it wasn't assessed in my view is that a point of view dominated the intelligence community, the CIA in particular and that point of view held that a secular Baathist regime like that of Saddam Hussein would not cooperate with religious fanatics like Al Qaida.
This was a theory. There was nothing to support it except the speculation of the intelligence officials who held that view, and as a result they simply didn't look for evidence that there might be a connection. Now that we are aware of the strange ways in which terrorists cooperate all over the world, we're beginning to find significant evidence.
There is no logical basis for the IRA cooperating with terrorists in Columbia and yet we've caught them red handed doing it. There's a kind of professional trade craft involved in which people engaged in the business of terrorism work with one another for mutual convenience, sometimes for exchanges of money and the like.
So there is, in fact, evidence of relations between Saddam and Al Qaida and I believe that the more intensively we scrutinize databases of information available to us in the past, the more evidence of that we're going to find.
CLARK: Representative Saxton, if I could just tag along on that.
I think there's no question that, even though we may not have the evidence as Richard says, that there have been such contacts. It's normal. It's natural. These are a lot of bad actors in the same region together. They are going to bump into each other. They are going to exchange information. They're going to feel each other out and see whether there are opportunities to cooperate. That's inevitable in this region, and I think it's clear that regardless of whether or not such evidence is produced of these connections that Saddam Hussein is a threat. So I think that, you know, the key issue is how we move from here and what do we need to do to deal with this threat? But I think what's also clear is that the way you deal with the threat from Iraq is different than the way you deal with the threat from Al Qaida. And so, my contention has been we need to look at different means for dealing with these threats. We need to take advantage of all the resources at our disposal, not just the military.
If I could say with respect to the inspections issue, as well as the comments of my friend and colleague Richard Perle, I'm not either optimistic or pessimistic. I practiced weapons inspection. I've been involved in diplomacy at the United Nations, and I've been involved in setting up the plans for a number of post conflict situations, including Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo, so I'm only giving you the best judgment from my own perspective. I don't label it. So, Richard, if I could just in a friendly way say if you won't label me, I won't label you.
PERLE: No, no. Wes, what I was labeling was the unavoidable conclusion that you think inspections can work, and I think the overwhelming evidence is that they can't.
CLARK: No, I've been very clear. I don't have any expectation ultimately that the inspections will work in the sense of finding and eliminating every weapons of mass destruction program. What I'm suggesting is that the inspections are useful in pursuing America's security concerns and we should be endeavoring to pursue those concerns with every means at our disposal, one of which is inspections.
PERLE: Well, if I may say so, if the inspections fail to achieve their purpose, that is finding Saddam's weapons, then I think they are not only not helpful, they're quite damaging because the failure to find those weapons will make it very difficult to sustain the inspections regime itself beyond a certain point to keep sanctions in place and to take action that might actually be effective in removing those weapons of mass destruction.
SAXTON: Mr. Chairman, if I may just reclaim my time for 30 seconds, I would just...
HUNTER: Mr. Saxton, do you want back into this conversation? Go right ahead.
SAXTON: I just wanted to thank General Clark for clarifying his position. I thought you had said there had been no contacts and now you do know as we do that there have been contacts between Saddam and Al Qaida and so thank you for clarifying that.
CLARK:
I'm expecting it. I'd say no substantiation of it. It has to be going on. It has to be.
SAXTON: Well, thank you. I'm glad that you and Condoleezza Rice are on the same track. I was worried there for a while. But, General Clark, maybe you could just respond to the last point in your interchange, which as I understand was if we find -- if the inspectors find a bunch of empty rooms, are shown a bunch of empty rooms in this next inspection regime, how does that rally the world then to the United States' goal of disarming Iraq?
CLARK: Well, I think this goes into the design and the development of the inspections program itself, and as I indicated earlier, I have not sketched this out in great detail. I could present something in writing to the committee if you'd like, but there can be an inspection program set up which is echeloned in the sense of starting narrow and going broader and broader and more intrusive until the concerns of the state which bring forward this requirement, i.e. the United States, are satisfied, and in the process we're either going to push this far enough that we gain some other ins or we're going to hit a red line in which we'll get the trigger. But what I want to also make clear is that the difference I think between what Richard was saying...
SAXTON: But maybe you could explain how you get the trigger if they absorb us and they allow enough inspections to find empty rooms but nothing else, and at that point you want to see a galvanized world community behind the United States. Why would they galvanize behind an America which has gotten inspections, been absorbed by Iraq, and found nothing?
CLARK: Well first of all, I think we need to look very carefully at the composition of the inspection team, its authorities, and the information sources it uses. That's why I say it's echeloned. It may start narrow and go broader. Secondly, I think that the experience of the inspection team is as they begin to work they do find some levels of information and as we put people in there more and more on the ground, they will eventually find things.
But I think the fundamental question is this, is the purpose of the inspection team, is the value of it only in finding the weapons of mass destruction, or does it not also have value in impeding Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program, undercutting his authority, providing warning, establishing a trigger, and I think it has these broader impacts.
And so, I think we should not be driven by excessive fear at this point that the inspections may come up dry from trying to work an inspection program that meets the broader purposes that serve the United States and our goals.
SAXTON: The stated goal is none of the above. It's to disarm Iraq, at least according to the administration.
CLARK: And this is one of the difficulties. We're in open session and I don't mean to be anything other than direct and straightforward but I think we know that programs like inspections have consequences that are beyond their stated purpose and certainly Saddam Hussein recognizes this and this is why he didn't want the inspectors there, not that he couldn't fool them, but he couldn't be sure he could fool them all the time with enough energy left over to pursue his aims and still do everything else.
So,
even though the inspections may have been not full usefulness in terms of stopping his program, they provided other benefits and we should pursue those benefits within the time available as a way of building legitimacy for the United States and our concerns. HUNTER: Mr. Allen.
ALLEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you both for being here. We've had a lot of conversation about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and where we're going. I'm concerned about what we're doing right now as a country and I wanted to focus on a couple things.
If our goal is to win allies for dealing with Saddam Hussein, both here at home and abroad, it seems to me we've made some mistakes, and let me call attention to a couple of things. First of all, it seems to me that we can deal with Iraq without making into doctrines applicable to other countries and other times the, you know, whatever it is we plan to do here.
Example number one, regime change, it hasn't been enough for this administration to say we need to replace Saddam Hussein. We have to create a doctrine of regime change that for what are now called, the phrases keep changing, but they're not called terrorist states, we have the right to change those regimes.
The second component is preemptive strikes. It's not enough to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, which is real. It may not be immediate but it's not that far in the future. It's very serious. But instead we have a new doctrine put down on paper that allows, that says we claim the right to strike preemptively at other countries.
We've developed a theory; I think the administration has a theory of unilateralism as a fundamental approach to the world. All of this, I can tell you back home just in my district, creates unnecessary anxiety and hostility to what the administration is trying to do and that is nothing compared to the reaction overseas.
And, I think that the question you pose, General Clark, about how do we move from here in a way that takes account not just of the military challenges but the political challenges is important. I want to begin with Mr. Perle and then have you respond too. Mr. Perle on September 10th, there was an article in The Boston Globe and basically there was the suggestion that some of the, you know, we're used the hawks and the doves kind of language now.
But there was the suggestion in the piece that according to the hawks in the administration, Iraq is just the first piece of the puzzle, and I quote: "After an ouster of Hussein they say the United States will have more leverage to act against Syria and Iran, will be in a better position to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and will be able to rely less on Saudi oil." And then there was another comment in here that among the more extreme version here was the view elaborated in a briefing in July by a Rand Corporation researcher to the Defense Policy Board, which you chair, Mr. Perle.
That briefing urged the United States to deliver an ultimatum to the Saudi government to cut its ties to militant Islam or risk seizure of its oil fields and overseas assets. It called Iraq "The Tactical Pivot," and Saudi Arabia "The Strategic Pivot."
So, my question to you, Mr. Perle first, is if you could kind of both on the doctrines of preemption and regime change and then on the briefing that either you or your policy board heard, and with respect to that component, I'd really be interested in whether you think that kind of threat against Saudi Arabia is the way the administration ought to move, and then I'd just like General Clark to respond. Thank you.
PERLE: Well, thank you, Mr. Allen.
First, on the question of doctrines, I think we sometimes do ourselves a disservice by discussing in doctrinal terms the specifics of the situation that may be unique, and indeed in these matters there are almost never two situations that are exactly alike. So, I'm not in favor of developing a doctrine of regime change. I am in favor of removing Saddam Hussein from power, and I can imagine others posing a similar threat where one would also wish to see them removed but I don't think a doctrine is necessarily helpful and I agree with you on that.
With respect to preemptive strike, again I don't think it makes much sense to develop this into a doctrine, although I think it is important to point out that waiting until one is struck first is not always the best way to protect ourselves, and in this instance I happen to think that idea applies. And as for the theory of unilateralism, I haven't heard that advocated as such. I've never known any official of this or any other administration that would not much prefer to have broad support internationally for anything that we attempt to do.
What I think is at issue here is the question of how prepared we should be to act alone when, for whatever reason, we are unable to gather the support of other countries, and I think what you're seeing here is a reaction to some years in the previous administration where there was a great emphasis placed on multilateral activity on negotiating multilateral agreements and acting in a multilateral context.
And I think there's a sense that we went too far in that direction and maybe we need to assert the particularism that is appropriate for a country that is unique and perhaps uniquely a target, and therefore is bound to differ from time to time with other countries, but I certainly share your view that we shouldn't make things more difficult for ourselves by elevating specific contingencies to broad general principles.
With respect to the briefing on Saudi Arabia, let me say first that the Defense Policy Board is an unusual institution. It is a group of people who come together from time to time, receive briefings, discuss the contents of those briefings, and eventually discuss their reflections with the secretary of defense. This usually takes place over two days.
We have encouraged a very broad approach in the sense that we want all points of view and there's no censorship. Nobody asks the briefer beforehand what he's going to say. An expert who is working hard to understand the complex issue that the board is trying to understand may well be invited to come and present to us and that particular briefing was a very interesting briefing.
It was not as portrayed in the press. Whoever thought it was a good idea to turn over the slides from that briefing and the speaker's notes, I think was probably not present when the briefing was given and therefore assumed that everything in the speaking notes was said in the meeting. That isn't the case and some of the more inflammatory quotations from the speaker's notes were, in fact, never presented.
Different members of the board had different reactions to that briefing but I don't know anyone who stood up and said now we have found an appropriate policy for dealing with Saudi Arabia, but it was a provocative briefing and produced an interesting discussion among members of the board.
My own view is that we are quite right to say to the Saudi government, the substantial amounts of money that you have been distributing through extremist organizations is producing around the world a number of people, often young people, who are being driven to hatred of the United States and the West in general, and they pose a threat to us.
They are the breeding ground for the recruitment of Al Qaida and other terrorists and we would be very grateful if you would stop that. We would not foment that sort of attitude against you and we would be grateful if you wouldn't foment it against us.
In my view, we can deal with the Saudi government, to government to government. We have a mixed relationship with them. There are some positive elements. This is a negative element and I think we ought to be discussing it with them and not threatening them in the way that it was wrongly reported that briefing propose that we do.
CLARK: I think your question about doctrine are very important questions but as you observe and I agree,
there's no requirement to have any doctrine here. I mean this is simply a longstanding right of the United States and other nations to take the actions they deem necessary in their self defense. Every president has deployed forces as necessary to take action. He's done so without multilateral support if necessary. He's done so in advance of conflict if necessary. In my experience, I was the commander of the European forces in NATO. When we took action in Kosovo, we did not have United Nations approval to do this and we did so in a way that was designed to preempt Serb ethnic cleansing and regional destabilization there. There were some people who didn't agree with that decision. The United Nations was not able to agree to support it with a resolution. Nevertheless, we did go to the United Nations, and as Ambassador Holbrooke so well explained in an op-ed piece I think three weeks ago, going to the United Nations was a very important part of building legitimacy for the action that we ultimately had to take. But
the responsibility to deploy force is ultimately the responsibility for the United States and its leaders alone, for no one else. So, I think in this case that the doctrine of preemption and regime change had been actually counterproductive in trying to make the case against Saddam Hussein because they tend to be misinterpreted. We've always talked within the military circles about the possibility of preemption. We've always worried about it. We worried about how you get the specific information you needed. We worried about whether the action could be effective or not.
We worried about what the consequences of that would be, but it was discussed behind closed doors in
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