NOMINATION OF ROBERT M. GATES, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
(Senate - November 05, 1991)
Page: S15905
... I do wish to recall for the record the testimony of Charles Allen, the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism, who met with Mr. Gates on October 1, 1986, and informed him of Allen's suspicions that funds generated by the covert sale of arms to Iran were being diverted to covertly fund the Contras in Nicaragua.
Mr. Allen testified, and I quote his testimony at some length:
I recall discussing the Iranian initiative with Mr. Gates on 1 October 1986 and expressing deep concern over this White House-directed effort. I had been deeply troubled since mid-August over a number of aspects of the initiative and conveyed these concerns in some detail to Mr. Gates during the * * * meeting ...
Mr. Allen also testified that in the context of this October 1 meeting he `distinctly recalls'
Mr. Gates telling him that `in the past he had admired Colonel North because of his work in crisis management and things of this nature, but that this was going too far, and asked that I see the Director.' ...
Mr. Gates testified that he has `no recollection' of making these statements ...
Page: S15909
FROM THE BALTIMORE SUN, SEPT. 29, 1991
... How credible is the nominee when he claims he cannot remember conversations about the Iran-contra affair that are specifically recalled by close associates at the Central Intelligence Agency?
How good is his judgment in light of his admitted failure to perceive weakness in the Soviet Union, his supposed area of expertise, and the way his anti-Communist zeal resulted in positions that were more advocacy than analysis?
What about the integrity of the advice he gives the government when one considers the allegations of CIA insiders that during his tenure as deputy CIA director he slanted reports and analyses to conform to the political views of President Reagan and the late CIA chief, William J. Casey? ....
FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, OCT.18, 1991
... The testimony of others puts Mr. Gates, on at least two occasions, very much in the loop. He supervised preparation of Director William Casey's deceitful testimony to Congress about the <Iran-contra> scandal. And one C.I.A. analyst, Charles Allen, says he informed Mr. Gates, before it came to light, of three unforgettable details: Oliver North's involvement, the markup of prices of arms sold surreptitiously to Iran, and diversion of the proceeds into a fund for covert operations. In a telling lapse of his reputedly formidable memory, Mr. Gates could not recall the details when Congress asked two months later ...
Page: S15910
FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, NOV. 4, 1991
... The confirmation hearings did little to dispel doubts that Mr. Gates misled Congress during the Iran-contra scandal. They reinforced suspicions that he tailored intelligence estimates to please his superiors. And they raised questions about his role during the Iran-Iraq war ...
Page: S15912
... It appears Mr. Gates' cleverness led him to slant intelligence information in order to conform to the particular policy agendas of his boss and mentor, William Casey ...
Because such actions are a direct threat to U.S. national security. They place in danger the lives of millions of American men and women who serve our country in the military, foreign service, and other official capacities overseas.
The Senate Intelligence Committee chose to investigate four instances of such alleged slanting. These are a 1985 intelligence estimate maintaining that the Soviet Union was gaining influence in Iran; a 1985 memorandum arguing that the Soviets were behind the attempted assassination of the Pope in 1981; a 1986 speech by Mr. Gates which advanced the case for the strategic defense initiative; and a series of Inspector General reports exploring charges of politicization in the Agency's Soviet division.
The hearing record in all four areas--and those four areas are by no means inclusive--points to a dangerous melding of intelligence and policymaking under Robert Gates' watch ...
Page: S15920 - Page: S15921
December 14, 1984.
Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence.
From: Deputy Director for Intelligence.
Subject: Nicaragua.
... 6. Once you accept that ridding that Continent of this regime is important to our national interest and must be our primary objective, the issue then becomes a stark one ...
7. The alternative to our present policy--which I predict ultimately and inevitably is leading to the consolidation of the Nicaraguan regime and our facing a second Cuba in Central America--is overtly to try to bring down the regime ... It seems to me that this effort would draw upon the following measures: ...
... the use of air strikes to destroy a considerable portion of Nicaragua's military buildup (focusing particularly on the tanks and the helicopters).
10. ... Without US funding for the Contras, the resistance essentially will collapse over the next year or two ...
Page: S15923
... April 9, 1984.
Hon. William J. Casey,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC.
Dear Bill: All this past weekend, I've been trying to figure out how I can most easily tell you my feelings about the discovery of the President having approved mining some of the harbors of Central America.
It gets down to one, little, simple phrase: I am pissed off! ...
Sincerely,
Barry Goldwater,
Chairman.
Page: S15926
... Robert Gates said that politics never entered into his decision, his analyses.
Draw your own conclusions. In 1984, he said air strikes would be necessary to defeat the Sandinistas, and he went on in a memo to Bill Casey in 1984 and said: `Hopes for a more pluralistic government are essentially silly and hopeless,' referring to Nicaragua.
Does that sound like somebody giving you intelligence, or does that sound like somebody running for office on an anti-Communist platform? That is advocacy, pure and simple.
Further on Nicaragua he said, `Any negotiated agreement will simply offer a cover for the consolidation of the Sandinista regime.'
And then he said: `It is time to stop fooling ourselves about what is going to happen in Nicaragua.'
He was right, but he was the one who was fooled ...
Page: S15927
... Now, lets turn to Iraq. In the mid-80s even as the Iran-Contra operation was playing out, the U.S. tilted more and more forcefully toward Iraq. The following are things that are publicly known: First, the Reagan and Bush Administration approved export licenses for $1.5 billion worth of dual-use items--i.e. items that had a military application such as helicopters (not very much unlike the ones used in the invasion of Kuwait) and equipment that could help the Iraqi nuclear program.
Second, they muffled criticism of Iraqi's gassing of Kurds;
Third, they extended hundreds of millions of dollars in Ex-Im and agricultural loan guarantees; and
Fourth, in 1989, the Bush Administration opposed naming Iraq a terrorist state and when Congress did so anyhow, the President waived it's restrictions on agriculture and Ex-Im credits to Iraq.
In this atmosphere of cozying up to Iraq and remaining fixated by the Soviet specter, Mr. Gates did not refocus sufficient intelligence resources on the emerging Iraqi threat.
Specifically, after Iraq routed Iran unexpectedly in 1988, it clearly increased its military advantage over all its neighbors and intensified its pursuit of technology for strategic and nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding these danger signs, Mr. Gates did far too little to ensure that U.S. policy would be well informed of Iraqi strategic activities, including ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction ...
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