Forgive me if this has already been posted, I haven't been on DU yet today and didn't see it yet.
David Sirota, who worked on the Lamont campaign in CT, offers the first - but probably not the last - of insider perspectives on the Connecticut Senate race. I'm not always a fan of David Sirota - I think he's hit or miss, wise one day and shrill the next. But this piece is worth reading because of its insider perspective and because the conclusions he draws have ramifications beyond this race in 2006.
Article here:
http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article_two/2917/It's all worth reading, but here are some notable paragraphs:
What Really Happened
Ned Lamont lost by 10 points. Such a margin indicates that something structural was happening that could not have been addressed by any of the tactical or rhetorical tweaks either side says made the difference. Some of those structural problems were unique to this particular race, some were more generic, but together, they steepened the climb for Lamont in ways that made victory almost impossible. The challenges included:
* Abandonment of the Democratic nominee by the Democratic Party: The story of the national Democratic Party’s abandonment of Lamont will likely be written more fully in the coming weeks, with explanations of both how this happened and even more importantly, why. But the broad strokes are obvious: Almost every major figure in national Democratic politics save John Kerry, Ted Kennedy, Wes Clark and John Edwards refused to seriously help the Lamont campaign. We saw this coming when, right after Lieberman lost the primary, he was welcomed with a standing ovation back to the Senate club by his Democratic colleagues. Subsequently, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid indicated that Lieberman’s seniority would be preserved if he won reelection, despite the fact that he officially abandoned the party. To understand how much this abandonment affected the race, consider that Lieberman bragged in October to the Associated Press that he was actively using Reid’s promise of seniority to promote his key “experience and seniority” argument—and that such an argument was helping him win over voters. On Election Day, Lieberman appeared on Fox News to thank the national Democratic Party for refusing to help Lamont, the Democratic nominee.
* Refusal by outside groups or lawmakers to serve as surrogates for Lamont: Lieberman had, among others, right-wing radio, the national Republican Party, and the President and Vice President of the United States repeatedly attacking Lamont on his behalf. He also had various Republican and Democratic senators at his side, lending credibility to all of his negative attacks on Lamont, and more generally to the legitimacy of his general election candidacy that was, at heart, an affront to the democratic primary process.
Lamont, by contrast, had none of that. It wasn’t just that people like Illinois Sen. Barack Obama (D-Ill.) and former President Bill Clinton refused to campaign for Lamont even though they had both whispered official endorsements of him. It was that most of those who did nominally help the campaign only agreed to voice positive statements about Lamont, but refused to forcefully take on Lieberman for attacking the Democratic Party or violating campaign finance disclosure laws. Take, for instance, the behavior of the major government watchdog groups. Except for Public Campaign Action Fund, not one of them made a peep after the New Haven Register exposed Lieberman for abusing campaign finance law to create an illegal $380,000 slush fund. Similarly, other than Wes Clark who filmed an ad going after Lieberman by name or Kerry who issued a press release nailing Lieberman for his Iraq position, not one national surrogate really went after the incumbent senator.
There has been a rather disturbing pattern of party centrists in positions of power sticking the shiv into the backs of their liberal colleagues who bring up issues, such as Iraq, that they would just as soon not have to go on the record confronting. If the new Democratic Congress hopes to convince the American public that it will be more effective at governing than Republicans, it must not succumb to the pressure from "party leaders" to muzzle the issues on which Democrats are strongest in order to appease the weak and dying neoconservative movement.