http://blogs.computerworld.com/cybersecurity_expert_on_why_voting_systems_are_inherently_insecureSecurity expert Stephen Spoonamore outlines in this video what I was trying to drive home in my recent column: Because individual votes must be anonymous, lack of a paper trail by definition makes any voting system unsafe.
It's not a matter of tin-foil hats, partisan politics, evil intent or ineptitude. This is an issue of basic computer system design. By definition, a touch-screen ATM s going to be more secure than a touch-screen voting machine, because for each ATM transaction, both parties know who did what. If there's a dispute about a check deposited, for example, there's a paper trail. (That's not the case for cash deposited, which is why I still will only deposit cash at a teller window.) If there's a dispute about a deposit or withdrawal, at least you're starting at the point where each side knows what they think should happen.
With a voting system, each individual transaction must remain anonymous to the government. No system is perfect, but a paper receipt is the best way that voters can be sure the machine will start off by correctly acknowledging their intent. Anything can happen to a paperless electronic vote in a way that won't occur with a non-anonymous ATM transaction.
If you're a centrist, please try to ignore the politics ("stop Karl Rove! The GOP are crooks!") and even the name (Velvet Revolution) of the interviewing organization, and focus on what Spoonamore's saying, because it's important.
more at link above, including a video
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