Peter Boone and Simon Johnson: The Real Geithner Plan, a ‘Nuclear Option’

[ProSense]

March 31, 2009, 7:31 AM ET

Guest Contribution: The Real Geithner Plan, a ‘Nuclear Option’

By Guest Contributor

The Obama administration is seeking broad new resolution authority for banks, Peter Boone and Simon Johnson argue that the powers should be approved by Congress and used quickly and decisively. Boone is chairman of Effective Intervention, a U.K.-based charity, and a research associate at the Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, and Johnson is a former IMF chief economist, and is currently a professor at MIT Sloan School of Management and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. They run the economic crisis Web site http://BaselineScenario.com.


The Obama administration last week proposed draft legislation for a “resolution authority” that would effectively permit the government to liquidate or restructure large systemic financial institutions. If passed by Congress, these powers would allow the governments to treat nonbank financial institutions more like regulated deposit-taking banks. This authority offers a clear path to recapitalize institutions without using taxpayer money and therefore avoiding some dimensions of moral hazard but, if implemented poorly, the existence of this “nuclear option” can cause panic in financial markets and substantially delay recovery. This fear may be with us already — despite all of the material and moral support already on the table, the market is pricing in the highest ever risk of default for Citigroup senior debt, i.e., about a one in three chance over the next five years. (See the credit-default spreads for major banks.)

Imagine what happens when these powers are passed. The U.S. Treasury and FDIC would immediately have the tools need to walk into America’s largest financial institutions, such as Citibank or Bank of America, and liquidate them, or rewrite their contracts and capital structures. Such powers are clearly useful: if the banks are undercapitalized, and private money is not available, then the government could force creditors to swap claims into equity, thus instantly recapitalizing the banks while avoiding use of taxpayer funds. With such steps, the problem of moral hazard, where creditors to banks are bailed out by taxpayers, would at once be forgotten. Shareholders in banks would lose through dilution, some (unsecured?) creditors would lose with debt-equity swaps, while the nation would be better off having a well-capitalized banking system. The banks would remain private but now be controlled by (ex)creditors.

However, today these powers don’t exist, and none of us know exactly how this authority would be used if it ever lands on Mr. Geithner’s desk. We’ll now have a healthy debate in Congress and then see revised versions passed and signed into law. But as this debate proceeds, creditors and shareholders in all such institutions will be nervous. We’ll be giving the Treasury a “nuclear option” and no one can be sure who is safe. A natural reaction by clients and investors of these banks will be to edge towards the exit immediately and to stay away until the dust has settled. It won’t matter whether institutions are solvent: Due to the uncertainty and risk of losses, investors and clients may run. We’ve seen repeated waves of such panics over the last year, and we can live through them, but each successive one hurts the institutions we are trying to save and delays recovery.

What should the administration do to prevent the panics that can ensue from this legislation? First, if they plan to use it soon, they need to pass this legislation quickly. There is good logic behind requiring creditors to bear part of the cost of restructuring, but we can’t afford to have this hanging over credit markets for months to come.

Second, once passed, the new authority should be used. There is no point in incurring the political and financial costs of passing this legislation now unless it is really needed.

Third, as in any major crisis, the aim should be to use this weapon once and decisively. If the government first hits one “weak” institution then another, and piecemeal restructures the sector, then investors and creditors will constantly “game” the system. This will drive down share and debt prices, forcing the government into action, gradually moving down the chain of institutions. We’ve seen this with successive panics at Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG, Citigroup, etc. The most solvent institutions today could be made insolvent through higher credit costs brought on by the uncertainty, and the recession will be deeper.

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[ProSense]

1. No comment? n/t

[Telly Savalas]

2. I saw this at "Self Evident"

He concluded his post with this interesting question:

Here is a little thought experiment. If this (Boone and Johnson's proposal) were already the Administration’s plan, how would their public statements and actions differ from what they are saying and doing presently?

https://self-evident.org/?p=517

I am beginning to buy into the argument that scarce administrative resources are an impediment to any sort of quick nationalization strategy. I've read at a number of sources that the Treasury Department is ridiculously understaffed. I don't think it's necessary to have thousands of people to replace every management level person at all the banks, but I imagine you'd need at least several dozen high level people who really know their shit to oversee taking banks into receivership. And I doubt they have such people are on board at the Treasury Department yet.

So Obama and Geithner may very well be planning something like this, or they may just be playing a wait and see strategy with the PPIP program while holding the nationalization card close to their chest. We'll see what happens.

[cottonseed]

3. Thanks for posting. I'm partial to believing they are working towards this.

It takes some time. And it'll be a hell of a fight (I think folks at the top like the way things are). Isn't this closing in on the receivership that people are talking about? As opposed to bankruptcy.

[ProSense]

4. Agree, but we'll see. n/t