Columbus Ohio Electronic Voting Machines - You won't like this

[meisje]

Columbus, Ohio uses the Danaher Controls ELECTronic 1242 Voting Machine in all of it's precincts, not sure about the rest of Ohio. Here is a little information I Googled:

Danaher Guardian is owned by billionaire brothers Steven M. and Mitchell P. Rales, who were described by columnist Jack Anderson in 1988 as "a pair of corporate raiders out of Washington DC." Again, Danaher-Guardian appears to only sell formerly Shouptronic voting machines.

November 2000: Tennessee. In Fayette County (Oakland, TN), problems, including double counting of some ballots, were resolved after borrowing a tabulation machine from a neighboring county.

November 1998: Ohio. In Franklin County, “Votes for congressional candidates were incorrectly tabulated in 95 of the county's 735 voting precincts because memory cartridges did not match ballot faces for 371 voting machines.”

June 1992: Ohio. 40 out of 758 machines used in Franklin County had problems that required service. Seven memory cartridges could not be read and were entered in by hand. Finally, there were problems combining DRE results with hand-entered lever machine results.



Below I've pasted an archived(2003) message posted on Free Republic, the comments are intersting:

Free Republic
Home · Browse · Search News/Activism
Topics · Post Article


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Skip to comments.

Electronic Voting Machines discovered to be "easily hacked"...(2008 ALERT!)
Blackbox Voting ^ | FR Post 8-24-2003 | The research and activism arm of BlackBox Voting.com


Posted on 08/27/2003 5:34:38 PM PDT by vannrox






The research and activism arm of BlackBox Voting.com
CONTENTS
Introduction
Part 1 - Can the votes be changed?
Part 2 - Can the password be bypassed?
Part 3 ? Can the audit log be altered?
*************

Introduction

According to election industry officials, electronic voting systems are absolutely secure, because they are protected by passwords and tamperproof audit logs. But the passwords can easily be bypassed, and in fact the audit logs can be altered. Worse, the votes can be changed without anyone knowing, even the County Election Supervisor who runs the election system.

The computer programs that tell electronic voting machines how to record and tally votes are allowed to be held as "trade secrets." Can citizen's groups examine them? No. The companies that make these machines insist that their mechanisms are a proprietary secret. Can citizen's groups, or even election officials, audit their accuracy? Not at all, with touch screens, and rarely, with optical scans, because most state laws mandate that optical scan paper ballots be run through the machine and then sealed into a box, never to be counted unless there is a court order. Even in recounts, the ballots are just run through the machine again. Nowadays, all we look at is the machine tally.

Therefore, when I found that Diebold Election Systems had been storing 40,000 of its files on an open web site, an obscure site, never revealed to public interest groups, but generally known among election industry insiders, and available to any hacker with a laptop, I looked at the files. Having a so-called security-conscious voting machine manufacturer store sensitive files on an unprotected public web site, allowing anonymous access, was bad enough, but when I saw what was in the files my hair turned gray. Really. It did.

The contents of these files amounted to a virtual handbook for vote-tampering: They contained diagrams of remote communications setups, passwords, encryption keys, source code, user manuals, testing protocols, and simulators, as well as files loaded with votes and voting machine software.

Diebold Elections Systems AccuVote systems use software called "GEMS," and this system is used in 37 states. The voting system works like this:

Voters vote at the precinct, running their ballot through an optical scan, or entering their vote on a touch screen.

After the polls close, poll workers transmit the votes that have been accumulated to the county office. They do this by modem.

At the county office, there is a "host computer" with a program on it called GEMS. GEMS receives the incoming votes and stores them in a vote ledger. But in the files we examined, which were created by Diebold employees and/or county officials, we learned that the Diebold program used another set of books with a copy of what is in vote ledger 1. And at the same time, it made yet a third vote ledger with another copy.

Apparently, the Elections Supervisor never sees these three sets of books. All she sees is the reports she can run: Election summary (totals, county wide) or a detail report (totals for each precinct). She has no way of knowing that her GEMS program is using multiple sets of books, because the GEMS interface draws its data from an Access database, which is hidden. And here is what is quite odd: On the programs we tested, the Election summary (totals, county wide) come from the vote ledger 2 instead of vote ledger 1, and ledger 2 can be altered so it may or may not match ledger 1.

Now, think of it like this: You want the report to add up only the actual votes. But, unbeknownst to the election supervisor, votes can be added and subtracted from vote ledger 2. Official reports come from vote ledger 2, which has been disengaged from vote ledger 1. If one asks for a detailed report for some precincts, though, the report comes from vote ledger 1. Therefore, if you keep the correct votes in vote ledger 1, a spot check of detailed precincts (even if you compare voter-verified paper ballots) will always be correct.

And what is vote ledger 3 for? For now, we are calling it the "Lord Only Knows" vote ledger.

*************

Detailed Examination Of Diebold GEMS Voting Machine Security ( Part 1)

CAN THE VOTES BE CHANGED?

Here's what we're going to do: We'll go in and run a totals report, so you can see what the Election Supervisor sees. Then we'll tamper with the votes. I'll show you that our tampering appears in Table 2, but not Table 1. Then we'll go back and run another totals report, and you'll see that it contains the tampered votes from Table 2. Remember that there are two programs: The GEMS program, which the Election Supervisor sees, and the Microsoft Access database that stores the votes, which she cannot see.

Let's run a report on the Max Cleland/Saxby Chambliss race. (This is an example, and does not contain the real data.) Here is what the Totals Report will look like in GEMS:



As it stands, Cleland is stomping Chambliss. Let's make it more exciting.

The GEMS election file contains more than one "set of books." They are hidden from the person running the GEMS program, but you can see them if you go into Microsoft Access. You might look at it like this: Suppose you have votes on paper ballots, and you pile all the paper ballots in room one. Then, you make a copy of all the ballots and put the stack of copies in room 2.

You then leave the door open to room 2, so that people can come in and out, replacing some of the votes in the stack with their own.

You could have some sort of security device that would tell you if any of the copies of votes in room 2 have been changed, but you opt not to.

Now, suppose you want to count the votes. Should you count them from room 1 (original votes)? Or should you count them from room 2, where they may or may not be the same as room 1? What Diebold chose to do in the files we examined was to count the votes from "room2." Illustration:

If an intruder opens the GEMS program in Microsoft Access, they will find that each candidate has an assigned number:



One can then go see how many votes a candidate has by visiting "room 1" which is called the CandidateCounter:



In the above example, "454" represents Max Cleland and "455" represents Saxby Chambliss. Now let's visit Room2, which has copies of Room1. You can find it in an Access table called SumCandidateCounter:



Now let's put our own votes in Room2. We'll put Chambliss ahead by a nose, by subtracting 100 from Cleland and adding 100 to Chambliss. Always add and delete the same number of votes, so the number of voters won't change.



Notice that we have only tampered with the votes in "Room 2." In Room 1, they remain the same. Room 1, after tampering with Room 2:


Now let's run a report again. Go into GEMS and run the totals report. Here's what it looks like now:



Now, the above example is for a simple race using just one precinct. If you run a detail report, you'll see that the precinct report pulls the untampered data, while the totals report pulls the tampered data. This would allow a precinct to pass a spot check.

*************

Detailed Examination Of Diebold GEMS Voting Machine Security ( Part 2)

CAN THE PASSWORD BE BYPASSED?

At least a dozen full installation versions of the GEMS program were available on the Diebold ftp site. The manual, also available on the ftp site, tells that the default password in a new installation is "GEMSUSER." Anyone who downloaded and installed GEMS can bypass the passwords in elections. In this examination, we installed GEMS, clicked "new" and made a test election, then closed it and opened the same file in Microsoft Access.

One finds where they store the passwords by clicking the "Operator" table.



Anyone can copy an encrypted password from there, go to an election database, and paste it into that.

Example: Cobb County Election file

One can overwrite the "admin" password with another, copied from another GEMS installation. It will appear encrypted; no worries, just cut and paste. In this example, we saved the old "admin" password so we could replace it later and delete the evidence that we'd been there. An intruder can grant himself administrative privileges by putting zeros in the other boxes, following the example in "admin."



How many people can gain access? A sociable election hacker can give all his friends access to the database too! In this case, they were added in a test GEMS installation and copied into the Cobb County Microsoft Access file. It encrypted each password as a different character string, however, all the passwords are the same word: "password." Password replacement can also be done directly in Access. To assess how tightly controlled the election files really are, we added 50 of our friends; so far, we haven't found a limit to how many people can be granted access to the election database.



Using this simple way to bypass password security, an intruder, or an insider, can enter GEMS programs and play with election databases to their heart's content.

*************

Detailed Examination Of Diebold GEMS Voting Machine Security ( Part 3)

CAN THE AUDIT TRAIL BE ALTERED?

Britain J. Williams, Ph.D., is the official voting machine certifier for the state of Georgia, and he sits on the committee that decides how voting machines will be tested and evaluated. Here's what he had to say about the security of Diebold voting machines, in a letter dated April 23, 2003:

"Computer System Security Features: The computer portion of the election system contains features that facilitate overall security of the election system. Primary among these features is a comprehensive set of audit data. For transactions that occur on the system, a record is made of the nature of the transaction, the time of the transaction, and the person that initiated the transaction. This record is written to the audit log. If an incident occurs on the system, this audit log allows an investigator to reconstruct the sequence of events that occurred surrounding the incident.

In addition, passwords are used to limit access to the system to authorized personnel." Since Dr. Williams listed the audit data as the primary security feature, we decided to find out how hard it is to alter the audit log.

Here is a copy of a GEMS audit report.



Note that a user by the name of "Evildoer" was added. Evildoer performed various functions, including running reports to check his vote-rigging work, but only some of his activities showed up on the audit log.

It was a simple matter to eliminate Evildoer. First, we opened the election database in Access, where we opened the audit table:



Then, we deleted all the references to Evildoer and, because we noticed that the audit log never noticed when the admin closed the GEMS program before, we tidily added an entry for that.



Access encourages those who create audit logs to use auto-numbering, so that every logged entry has an uneditable log number. Then, if one deletes audit entries, a gap in the numbering sequence will appear. However, we found that this feature was disabled, allowing us to write in our own log numbers. We were able to add and delete from the audit without leaving a trace. Going back into GEMS, we ran another audit log to see if Evildoer had been purged:



As you can see, the audit log appears pristine.

In fact, when using Access to adjust the vote tallies we found that tampering never made it to the audit log at all.

Although we interviewed election officials and also the technicians who set up the Diebold system in Georgia, and they confirmed that the GEMS system does use Microsoft Access, is designed for remote access, and does receive "data corrections" from time to time from support personnel, we have not yet had the opportunity to test the above tampering methods in the County Election Supervisor's office.

From a programming standpoint, there might be reasons to have a special vote ledger that disengages from the real one. For example, election officials might say they need to be able to alter the votes to add provisional ballots or absentee ballots. If so, this calls into question the training of these officials, which appears to be done by The Election Center, under the direction of R. Doug Lewis. If election officials are taught to deal with changes by overwriting votes, regardless of whether they do this in vote ledger 1 or vote ledger 2, this is improper.

If changing election data is required, the corrective entry must be made not by overwriting vote totals, but by making a corrective entry. When adding provisional ballots, for example, the proper procedure is to add a line item "provisional ballots," and this should be added into the original vote table (Table 1). It is never acceptable to make changes by overwriting vote totals. Data corrections should not be prohibited, but must always be done by indicating changes through a clearly marked line item that preserves each transaction.

Proper bookkeeping never allows an extra ledger that can be used to just erase the original information and add your own. And certainly, it is improper to have the official reports come from the second ledger, which may or may not have information erased or added.

But there is more evidence that these extra sets of books are illicit: If election officials were using Table 2 to add votes, for provisional ballots, or absentee voters, that would be in their GEMS program. It makes no sense, if that's what Diebold claims the extra set of books is for, to make vote corrections by sneaking in through the back door and using Access, which according to the manual is not even installed on the election official's computer.

Furthermore, if changing Table 2 was an acceptable way to adjust for provisional ballots and absentee votes, we would see the option in GEMS to print a report of both Table 1 totals and Table 2 so that we can compare them. Certainly, if that were the case, that would be in the manual along with instructions that say to compare Table 1 to Table 2, and, if there is any difference, to make sure it exactly matches the number of absentee ballots, or whatever, were added.

Using Microsoft Access was inappropriate for security reasons. Using multiple sets of books, and/or altering vote totals to include new data, is improper for accounting reasons. And, as a member of slashdot.org commented, "This is not a bug, it's a feature."

One more time....

Using Microsoft Access was inappropriate for security reasons. Using multiple sets of books, and/or altering vote totals to include new data, is improper for accounting reasons. And, as a member of slashdot.org commented, "This is not a bug, it's a feature."





--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOPICS: Business/Economy; Constitution/Conservatism; Crime/Corruption; Culture/Society; Extended News; Government; News/Current Events; Politics/Elections; Technical; US: California; US: Florida; US: Texas
KEYWORDS: ACCUTOUCH; ACCUVOTE; CLINTON; COMPUTER; DIEBOLD; DNC; ELECTION; ELECTIONSYSTEMS; FRAUD; FRAUDBYDESIGN; GEMS; GLOBAL; HACK; HART; HILLERY; INTERCIVIC; SEQUOIA; TOUCHSCREEN; VOTEFRAUD; VOTEHERE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"This is not a bug, it's a feature."

1 posted on 08/27/2003 5:34:39 PM PDT by vannrox
< Post Reply | Private Reply | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox



2 posted on 08/27/2003 5:36:56 PM PDT by vannrox (The Preamble to the Bill of Rights - without it, our Bill of Rights is meaningless!)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
And at least that is harder to do than simply breaking the lever listed as Republican.

3 posted on 08/27/2003 5:38:34 PM PDT by Paul C. Jesup
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
Diebold - The Face Of Modern Ballot Tampering
Tuesday, 12 November 2002, 1:06 pm
Opinion: Guest Opinion

Diebold - The Face Of Modern Ballot Tampering

by Faun Otter
From: http://www.bartcop.com/diebold.htm

You can't vote them out if....
You never voted them in.
The lack of any exit polling on November 5 has been oddly ignored by the media. Those pesky tracking polls leading up to the elections have been explained away by a ?late surge to the Republicans? caused by.... hmmmm, how about sun spot activity? With no exit polls, there was no other feedback to conflict with the "official" results, this allowed the Diebold touch screen machines to change the way election fraud is carried out.

Previously, election cheating was a complex matter of ballot tampering combined with sample skewing. That is to say, you screwed up ballots for your opponent with under or over votes, made sure that people likely to vote against you wouldn't even get that chance (the program of voter disenfranchisement in Florida) and padded your own vote total with such things as falsified absentee ballots.

In the much more high tech world of Diebold electronics we are seeing a wonderfully efficient vote rigging system, the long proposed 'black box' technology. Imagine a black box in which you cannot see the workings. The only things you can discern are an input and an output; in this case votes go in and collated totals come out. There is no paper record of each individual vote cast to enable any cross check of the collated output. The only information you can know for sure is the total number of votes cast on the machine. Each vote is stripped of any information as to who cast that ballot to guarantee anonymity for the voters. You now have a system in which you have no way to check vote recording, vote collation and transmission of the collated totals out of the black box.

The perfect crime?

Not quite. Let me suggest an experiment. We take two ?markets? with similar socioeconomic mixtures and a well established record of moving in the same political direction. We provide them with candidates from party X and party Y. We then expose them to similar news stories, we spill TV and radio ads over between the markets to make the effects less ?local? and give them identical weather on election day. The differences between the markets are 1. the candidates and 2. the method of casting and counting the votes. We then take a series of tracking polls on the gap between the candidates leading up to election day.

If we express the tracking poll data as the relative preference for the candidates (12 point lead by X, down one point from last week etc.), any substantial discrepancy between the forecast and actual election outcomes should arise from major news changes, the weather effects on turn out or a a social tendency to misrepresent voting intent. Since both groups get the same news, the same weather and have the same social tendencies, any difference between tracking poll and actual poll data should be in the same direction and of a similar magnitude.

Sooooo...... how come the South Carolina elections had the Democrats doing much better than the tracking poll data showed and the Georgia elections, in an area with the same weather, same news and same social values, had a massive swing in a single day after the last tracking poll, in the opposite direction? Could it be the Diebold touch screen machines in use across the entire state of Georgia but not used at all in SC?

Of course, such a perfect method of mischief has been attempted before,

http://www.votescam.com/frame.html -- Go to the link marked "Chapters" and read all about it. Watch how few lines pass before the names Bush and Sununu come up.

You can trim the wheels in mechanical voting machines but that is easier to spot than a computer program set up to be date sensitive so it causes only to ?misfunction? on November 5. The current problem with virtual ballot tampering was apparent as long ago as 1989. Jonathan Vankin made this warning in "Metro: Silicon Valley's Weekly Newspaper," of Sept. 28, 1989

?A single, Berkeley- based firm manufactures the software used in the machines that compile more than two-thirds of the nation's electronically-counted votes. Analysts describe the software as "spaghetti code," tangled strands of instructions indecipherable to outsiders. The experts say the code could be manipulated without detection. In fact, that may have happened already.?

http://www.conspire.com/vote-fraud.html

After systematic punch card fraud was revealed in the 2000 election, touch screens were proposed as a panacea and have been rapidly adopted against the warning of experts,

?Critics warn local election officials could be trading one set of problems for another potentially as bad, or worse, than last year's election debacle. They vigorously argue that fully electronic systems pose data-security problems and lack a paper trail. "There's no way to independently verify that the voter's ballot as cast was actually the ballot being recorded by the machine,'' said Rebecca Mercuri, a computer scientist and visiting lecturer at Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania.?

http://www.kioskcom.com/article_detail.php?ident=1021

It would be interesting to impound a few machines from the heaviest leaning Democratic areas in Georgia and reset the date in the machine to November 5, 2002. A hand counted series of inputs could be made to the machines. Note to James Baker: hand counting is the gold standard against which we check machine counting efficiency. An input of 500 or so ?dummy? votes could then be tabulated and the outcome checked against the inputs. Of course, you could just check the software code. Except for one problem; the company refuses to let anyone see their code on the grounds that is a trade secret.

Oddly enough, Diebold aren?t the only Republican partisans who ?helped? select our candidates for office yesterday:

?According to his press office, in 1995 Chuck Hagel resigned as CEO of American Information Systems (AIS), the voting machine company that counted the votes in his first Senatorial election in 1996. In January 1996 Hagel resigned as president of McCarthy & Company, part of the McCarthy Group that are one of the current owners of Election Systems and Software (ES&S), which itself resulted from the merger of AIS and Business Records Corporation. According to publicist/writer Bev Harris, Hagel is still an investor in the McCarthy Group. ES&S is now the largest voting machine company in America. One of its largest owners is the ultra-conservative Omaha World-Herald Company.?

http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Articles/Landes_Ambush.htm

For more background reading on who gets to play with your ballot, see:

http://www.talion.com/election-machines.html

Who are Diebold? The corporate officers are as thick as thieves with the Republican hard right religious nut division. For those who have been lucky enough to forget, Senator Faircloth was the protege of Jesse Helms in NC. It looks like the board and the directors were all putting up money for a Faircloth victory when Edwards took that senate seat. I wonder if they conspired to put things right.....?

http://www.diebold.com/

Board of Directors
Louis V. Bockius III (2,4,5)
6/28/00 $15,000.00
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE - RNC
11/3/00 $10,000.00
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE - RNC
10/9/97 $1,000.00
VOINOVICH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE
10/9/97 $1,000.00
VOINOVICH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE

Christopher M. Connor
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The
Sherwin-Williams Company
5/22/00 $1,000.00
VOINOVICH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE
3/30/00 $1,000.00
DEWINE FOR US SENATE
Gale S. Fitzgerald (2, 6)
President and Chief Executive Officer , QP Group, Inc.
7/12/00 $500.00
NEW YORK REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
10/12/98 $200.00
FRIENDS OF JOHN LAFALCE
10/18/99 $1,000.00
BUSH FOR PRESIDENT INC
Donald R. Gant (1,3,5)
Senior Director, The Goldman Sachs Group, L.P.
L. Lindsey Halstead (2,3,6)
Retired Chairman of the Board, Ford of Europe
12/22/98 $500.00
RNC REPUBLICAN NATIONAL STATE ELECTIONS COMMITTEE
1/23/97 $500.00
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE - RNC
5/27/97 $200.00
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE - RNC
10/31/97 $500.00
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE - RNC
12/28/99 $500.00
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE - RNC
3/7/01 $300.00
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
6/12/01 $200.00
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
11/27/01 $200.00
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
1/24/02 $500.00
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Phillip B. Lassiter (1,3,6)
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Ambac Financial Group, Inc.
4/16/98 $250.00
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
CONTRIBUTIONS
9/21/98 $250.00
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
CONTRIBUTIONS
John N. Lauer (1,4,5)
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Oglebay Norton Co.
10/10/00 $1,000.00
DEWINE FOR US SENATE
8/23/00 $250.00
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE - RNC
3/17/97 $1,000.00
VOINOVICH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE
Walden W. O'Dell
Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer, Diebold
2/14/01 $2,015.00
RNC REPUBLICAN NATIONAL STATE ELECTIONS COMMITTEE
12/17/97 $1,000.00
VOINOVICH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE
1/30/01 $3,950.00
RNC REPUBLICAN NATIONAL STATE ELECTIONS COMMITTEE
8/16/01 $500.00
VOINOVICH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE
12/17/97 $1,000.00
VOINOVICH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE
6/30/00 $1,000.00
DEWINE FOR US SENATE
Eric J. Roorda
Former Chairman, Procomp Amazonia Industria Eletronica, S.A.
W.R. Timken Jr. (2,3,4)
Chairman , The Timken Company
6/23/00 $50,000.00
RNC REPUBLICAN NATIONAL STATE ELECTIONS COMMITTEE
6/8/01 $100,000.00
2001 PRESIDENT'S DINNER - NON-FEDERAL TRUST
3/14/01 $10,000.00
RNC REPUBLICAN NATIONAL STATE ELECTIONS COMMITTEE
8/19/99 $15,000.00
RNC REPUBLICAN NATIONAL STATE ELECTIONS COMMITTEE
11/3/00 $15,000.00
RNC REPUBLICAN NATIONAL STATE ELECTIONS COMMITTEE
2/22/02 $1,000.00
RELY ON YOUR BELIEFS FUND
6/12/02 $1,000.00
OHIO'S REPUBLICAN SALUTE
Corporate Officers
Walden W. O'Dell
Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer, Diebold (See above)
Wesley B. Vance
Chief Operating Officer
8/16/01 $500.00
VOINOVICH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE
Michael J. Hillock
President, Diebold International
11/18/97 $500.00
FAIRCLOTH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE 1998
David Bucci
Senior Vice President, Customer Solutions Group
11/18/97 $500.00
FAIRCLOTH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE 1998
James L.M. Chen
Vice President and Managing Director, Asia-Pacific
Warren W. Dettinger
Vice President, General Counsel and Assistant
Secretary
11/18/97 $300.00
FAIRCLOTH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE 1998
1/30/97 $250.00
DEWINE FOR U S SENATE (2000)
Donald E. Eagon, Jr.
Vice President, Global Communications & Investor
Relations
11/18/97 $300.00
FAIRCLOTH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE 1998
Charee Francis-Vogelsang
Vice President and Secretary
Larry D. Ingram
Vice President, Procurement and Services
1/30/97 $250.00
DEWINE FOR U S SENATE (2000)
11/18/97 $300.00
FAIRCLOTH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE 1998

Dennis M. Moriarty
Vice President, Customer Business Solutions
11/18/97 $300.00
FAIRCLOTH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE 1998

Anthony J. Rusciano
Vice President, National Accounts
11/18/97 $300.00
FAIRCLOTH FOR SENATE COMMITTEE 1998
--- Hey Tony! Listing yourself as ?retired? and using
your vacation home address to avoid campaign donation
limits is a tad naughty don?t you think?


Home Page | Headlines | Previous Story | Next Story

Copyright (c) Scoop Media



4 posted on 08/27/2003 5:40:59 PM PDT by vannrox (The Preamble to the Bill of Rights - without it, our Bill of Rights is meaningless!)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 2 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
GEMS system does use Microsoft Access
Hol-eee Cow! As much as I love MS, this is about the biggest boneheaded move anybody ever made. Using Access for something like this. Insane.


5 posted on 08/27/2003 5:41:01 PM PDT by TomServo ("It says that one time this big lobster came and attacked a lady, but Mr. Ed saved her.")
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: Paul C. Jesup
Most states don't have lever-based systems anymore. It's much easier to cheat at this than many of the paper-based alternatives.


6 posted on 08/27/2003 5:41:20 PM PDT by GulliverSwift
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 3 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: Paul C. Jesup
Not really.

7 posted on 08/27/2003 5:43:15 PM PDT by seamole (Beware of diplomats bearing papers.)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 3 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
This is important bump!!!!

8 posted on 08/27/2003 5:43:44 PM PDT by CPT Clay
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
This is just so completely idiotic.
What's worse is that some people actually TRUST the machines to work accurately.


9 posted on 08/27/2003 5:44:43 PM PDT by seamole (Beware of diplomats bearing papers.)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: Paul C. Jesup; vannrox
Not sure who added 'HART' as a keyword - and I assume you're referring to Hart Intercivic here in Austin - but this is trouble.
Eek.


10 posted on 08/27/2003 5:45:52 PM PDT by txflake
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 3 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
I prefer paper ballots. The kind you have to mark with a pen or pencil and that have to be counted in front of election judges from both parties. I would like it even better if we had to sign our ballots and put our names and addresses on them. It would provide an audit trail and make cheating much harder.
What's so sacred about a "secret ballot", is it in the constitution?

Yes, I know there are Libertarians, Greens, Socialists, QueerVote and so on. They don't count. If they ever pull 5% then they will matter.


11 posted on 08/27/2003 5:47:08 PM PDT by LibKill (Heaven frowns on all things french.)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comment #12 Removed by Moderator

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
Every leftie European hacker must be salivating at the prospect of getting rid of GWB...

13 posted on 08/27/2003 5:48:32 PM PDT by Windcatcher
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: Windcatcher
Right...the big question in that crowd is who will replace Chelsea Clinton after the 2030 elections.

14 posted on 08/27/2003 5:50:14 PM PDT by seamole (Beware of diplomats bearing papers.)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 13 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox; Publius; CyberCowboy777; Eala
BTTT Frightening, but not surprising, computer vote fraud possibilities...

15 posted on 08/27/2003 6:00:59 PM PDT by Libertina
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
Fraud by design?

16 posted on 08/27/2003 6:01:21 PM PDT by Darksheare ("I sense something dark." No you don't!)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
an intruder opens the GEMS program in Microsoft Access
I think access is the key word here.


17 posted on 08/27/2003 6:05:17 PM PDT by Flyer (If you can read this you are posting too close)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
PING!

Your One Stop Resource For All The California Recall News!



Want on our daily or major news ping lists? Freepmail DoctorZin.


18 posted on 08/27/2003 6:06:31 PM PDT by DoctorZIn
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
The fact that this thing uses Microsoft Access to store mission-critical data tells you everything you need to know.
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/


19 posted on 08/27/2003 6:07:53 PM PDT by E. Pluribus Unum (Drug prohibition laws help support terrorism.)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: E. Pluribus Unum
I have to admit, I really find it difficult to believe that it actually uses MS Access to store data.

I think it's safer to say that the author is just using Access as a graphical display for the tables involved.

Although sometimes it's hard to believe otherwise, nobody's that stupid.

20 posted on 08/27/2003 6:27:31 PM PDT by altayann
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 19 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: altayann
Well, I stand correct. They really are that stupid, they are using MS Access to store totals.

My God. Don't they know that *anybody*, and I mean *ANYBODY*, can get past MS Access's password protection?

It's like using a deadbolt on your front door made of plasticine. Hell, it's like having a front door made from plasticine.


21 posted on 08/27/2003 6:30:29 PM PDT by altayann
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 20 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: Libertina
Thanks for the ping (and noted for detailed read later). What was frightening right off was this:
The computer programs that tell electronic voting machines how to record and tally votes are allowed to be held as "trade secrets."

Cryptography guru Bruce Schneier has long maintained that the worst form of security in cryptography is in hiding the algorithm. It gets no review, it gets no test, and as all too many real-life situations show (including the cracking of the Nazi Enigma machine, which though being quite powerful had a subtle weakness amplified by certain usage patterns), it's the things the developer doesn't foresee that become the weakness. (The most superior key in the world is still worthless if you continue "hiding" it under the front door mat.)

In my position as a humble but vaguely technically aware techie, this voting system cannot be considered secure or safe unless *everything* except the keys (passwords) are made completely public and subjected to intensive review in an open forum.

Any piece of code that remains hidden -- that could be the back door that isn't supposed to exist. But how would you know unless you could examine it, and rebuild the identical executable software yourself from the source?


22 posted on 08/27/2003 6:39:34 PM PDT by Eala (Annoy PETA -- try the Atkins diet.)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 15 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
No voting system should be trusted unless the act of voting creates an indelible record of the vote. Electronic voting would be okay if the machines were constructed to be inspectable but tamper-evident, and if the votes were stored indelibly in some medium such as a bipolar PROM. I have yet to hear of any machine that actually does that, however.
Any reasonable system should be proof against attacks by someone who knows everything there is to know about it. None of the electronic voting systems I've seen even come close.


23 posted on 08/27/2003 6:40:32 PM PDT by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: Eala
In my position as a humble but vaguely technically aware techie, this voting system cannot be considered secure or safe unless *everything* except the keys (passwords) are made completely public and subjected to intensive review in an open forum.
Slight disagreement: a voting system should only be considered secure and safe if its integrity would not be compromised by publicizing everything INCLUDING all encryption keys .

In a normal encryption scenario, the guy who creates the keys is presumed trustworthy. In a voting system, by constrast, nobody is deemed trustworthy.


24 posted on 08/27/2003 6:45:13 PM PDT by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 22 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
All of this "research" was based on files that were supposedly downloaded from an open ftp on Diebold's web site and posted to the internet by an activist. Diebold has already stated that this software is not currently in use in any of its machines. For all we or the researchers know this could have just been code that was used for a demo or a design mock-up. I would be surprised if Diebold used Access as the database engine and expected it to be secure without some additional precautions.
One of the researchers, Avi Rubin, technical director of the Information Security Institute at John Hopkins, was revealed to have been on an advisory board and held stock options with Diebold's competitor VoteHere, Inc. This sounds like a hit piece but it deserves a full and open investigation.


25 posted on 08/27/2003 6:46:27 PM PDT by eggman (Social Insecurity - Who will provide for the government when the government provides for all of us?)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: supercat
In a proven secure one-way key system I'd quite agree with you. But the thing that quite annoys me is that the code itself is not reviewable.

26 posted on 08/27/2003 6:49:40 PM PDT by Eala (Annoy PETA -- try the Atkins diet.)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 24 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: vannrox
Have you seen any updates on this:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/956097/posts
Experimental Web Program Opens Voting to Overseas Military

"Online voting, will become a reality when the Department of Defense employs its Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (search) next year." - if I remember correctly majority owned by SAUDI INTERESTS.


27 posted on 08/27/2003 6:53:26 PM PDT by getgoing
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: LibKill
I prefer paper ballots. The kind you have to mark with a pen or pencil and that have to be counted in front of election judges from both parties.
I'm with you buddy... I like the personal touch in voting, and I don't care if it takes multiple hours to tally the votes. The audit trail is critical.


28 posted on 08/27/2003 7:01:00 PM PDT by ken in texas
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 11 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: eggman
All of this "research" was based on files that were supposedly downloaded from an open ftp on Diebold's web site and posted to the internet by an activist. Diebold has already stated that this software is not currently in use in any of its machines.
The fact remains that it is physically possible, in all of the systems I've seen, for a sufficiently-knowledgeable person to alter the memory cards from voting machines to report whatever election results the person wants. Encryption won't change that keys have to be stored somewhere and a knowledgeable person would know how to get them.

If the electronic-voting people are actually interested in security, they're going about it all wrong. The right approach isn't to use all sorts of new fancy technology, but instead to use much more old-fashioned technology such as bipolar PROMs which, if burned with suitable cross-checking patterns, cannot be altered without the alteration being obvious. If the PROMs are written in records of 32 bytes or less, one byte of cross-checking data per record will suffice to prevent alteration. Otherwise, two bytes of cross-checking per record will protect records up to 8Kbytes; three bytes of cross-checking will protect up to 2Mbytes.


29 posted on 08/27/2003 7:01:01 PM PDT by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 25 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: ken in texas
How about this: each poling place has an optical-scan ballot box, a collection of marking stations, and one or more electronic machines. A person who wishes to vote manually goes to a marking station, does so, and inserts his ballot into the optical-scan ballot box. A person who wishes to vote with the electronic machine makes his selections, punches "done", and then takes a freshly-completed optical scan ballot from the machine and places it in the ballot box (optionally inspecting it first).
Aside from the recurring cost of paper ballots (fairly small in the scheme of things), is there any way in which this approach is not as good or better than using DRE for everything?


30 posted on 08/27/2003 7:08:24 PM PDT by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 28 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: supercat
I don't see why the machine has to handle the arrays in PROM, or any ROM, for that matter. What's wrong with fixed-length records sent for tabulation after collection?
Like an ATM? Your voting record goes off (from the flat-screen device) in flat ASCII, to allow officials to use whatever totalling code they wish?

And like an ATM, the voter would get a unique trans ID number so that privacy is maintained?


31 posted on 08/27/2003 7:14:56 PM PDT by txflake
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 30 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: Eala
You are correct about events unforseen by the programmer being the weakness, and it would be safer for coding to be open. but even then I see it as a problem... How many people can understand the code? Atleast with pieces of paper, they are understood by most. What I don't understand is why the Rs stay silent on this issue of voting fraud in general, and high-tech voter security specifically.

32 posted on 08/27/2003 7:16:59 PM PDT by Libertina
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 22 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: txflake
I don't see why the machine has to handle the arrays in PROM, or any ROM, for that matter. What's wrong with fixed-length records sent for tabulation after collection?
If the votes aren't stored in an unalterable medium, a knowledgeable person with physical access to the media on which the votes are stored would be able to make any desired change.

Like an ATM? Your voting record goes off (from the flat-screen device) in flat ASCII, to allow officials to use whatever totalling code they wish?

In what form are votes stored?


33 posted on 08/27/2003 7:19:40 PM PDT by supercat (TAG--you're it!)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 31 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: supercat
Five or six drives - not RAIDed, discrete - per machine, with no outside physical (net, etc) access to the machine until they physically move the drives to the tabulation center?

34 posted on 08/27/2003 7:23:39 PM PDT by txflake
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 33 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: Eala
<!> <!>
Voting Machines - A High Tech Ambush
by Lynn Landes
Dissident Voice

October 29, 2002

<!> <!>

<!> <!>

"I'm mad as hell!" says Charlie Matulka.

<!> <!>

It looks like a high-tech ambush. But Matulka isn't going down without a fight. The feisty construction worker is running for Nebraska's U.S. Senate seat against incumbent Republican Senator Chuck Hagel. Matulka's "war chest" is less than $5000. But campaign financing isn't his biggest concern. Who owns the voting machines and how easily they can be rigged or "malfunction" is what's got him all riled up. He's calling press conferences... demanding to be heard.

<!> <!>

That might be difficult. Omaha's largest newspaper is part of the only company in Nebraska certified to count votes on election day. And Chuck Hagel has been an intrinsic part of that company for a long time.

<!> <!>

According to his press office, in 1995 Chuck Hagel resigned as CEO of American Information Systems (AIS), the voting machine company that counted the votes in his first Senatorial election in 1996. In January 1996 Hagel resigned as president of McCarthy & Company, part of the McCarthy Group that are one of the current owners of Election Systems and Software (ES&S), which itself resulted from the merger of AIS and Business Records Corporation. According to publicist/writer Bev Harris, Hagel is still an investor in the McCarthy Group. ES&S is now the largest voting machine company in America. One of its largest owners is the ultra-conservative Omaha World-Herald Company.

<!> <!>

A call to the Office of Integrity, Voting Rights Division, Department of Justice (DOJ) in Washington D.C. regarding this extraordinary conflict-of-interest, earned this writer a terse "no comment." That makes sense. In over 40 years of voting machine "malfunctions" and election malfeasance, the DOJ still treats voting machine companies and their owners with kid gloves.

<!> <!>

Charlie Matulka is just the latest target of America's thoroughly corrupted voting system.

<!> <!>

In a groundbreaking effort, Bev Harris and this writer are compiling extensive information on the voting machine companies operating in the United States. Voting machine companies are privately held and extremely secretive. They form a web of overlapping ownership, financing, staff, and equipment that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to separate one from the other.

<!> <!>

ES&S, the largest voting machine company in America, claims to have counted 56% of the vote in the last four presidential elections. Again, it's owned by the ultra-conservative Omaha World-Herald Company, the McCarthy Group, and former owners of Business Records Corporation. ES&S was created from a merger between American Information Systems (AIS) and Business Records Corporation. Bob and Todd Urosevich founded AIS in the 1980's. Bob is now president of Diebold-Global, while brother Todd is a vice president at ES&S. Business Records Corp. was partially owned by Cronus, a company that seems to have a lot of connections to the notorious Hunt brothers from Texas, as well as other individuals and entities, including Rothschild, Inc.. Right wing Republicans Howard Ahmanson (who financed AIS) and Nelson Bunker Hunt have both heavily contributed to The Chalcedon Institute, an organization that mandates Christian "dominion" over the world.

<!> <!>

Sequoia Voting Systems appears to be the second largest voting machine company, accounting for about 1/3 of the voting machine market. As of May 2002, Sequoia was purchased by Great Britain's De La Rue from Ireland's Jefferson Smurfit Group, who retain a 15% share. Smurfit was just bought by Madison Dearborn Partners, a private equity investment firm. De La Rue owns 20% of the Great Britain's national lottery. In 1995 the Security and Exchange Commission filed charges against four employees of Sequoia, alleging that they inflated revenue and pre-tax profits. In 1999 the Justice Department filed federal charges against employees of Sequoia alleging that during a 10-year period $8 million in bribes were paid out. Louisiana's Commissioner of Elections Jerry Fowler had run up some big gambling debts in Atlantic City, according to reporter Daniel Hopsicker. In all, 22 people were indicted, 9 plead guilty. Fowler went to jail, but big fish Pasquale "Rocco" Ricci of New Jersey got one year of home detention.

<!> <!>

Advanced Voting Solutions is the new name of another scandal-ridden voting company, Shoup Voting Solutions. Their current top management, Howard Van Pelt and Larry Ensminger, were executives for Diebold-Global until late last year. Officers of Shoup Voting Machine Co. were indicted for allegedly bribing politicians in Tampa, Florida in 1971, according to the San Francisco Business Times. Ransom Shoup was convicted in 1979 of conspiracy and obstruction of justice related to an FBI inquiry into a lever machine-counted election in Philadelphia. Shoup got a three-year suspended sentence. Meanwhile, Philadelphia has bought new voting machines from Danaher-Guardian, which appears to only sell voting machines formerly known as the "Shouptronic."

<!> <!>

Danaher-Guardian is owned by billionaire brothers Steven M. and Mitchell P. Rales, who were described by columnist Jack Anderson in 1988 as "a pair of corporate raiders out of Washington DC." Again, Danaher-Guardian appears to only sell formerly Shouptronic voting machines.

<!> <!>

Diebold-Global's current president, Bob Urosevich, was the co-founder of American Information Systems which became ES&S. As mentioned before, Diebold-Global's top managers, Howard Van Pelt and Larry Ensminger, recently moved to Advanced Voting Solutions-Shoup.

<!> <!>

And so it goes. We have an voting system that appears to be in a constant state of name change and rotating management, but always under the private control of the rich and infamous. Meanwhile, Congress has just passed a law that effectively throws hundreds of millions of dollars at voting machine companies that have a record that includes partisanship, bribery, secrecy, and rampant technical "malfunctions."

<!> <!>

Personally, I'll never vote on a machine again if I can help it. For the next election, I'll vote "absentee" (i.e., through the mail). In fact, Oregon has wisely rejected voting machines altogether and handles its entire election through the mail. The state of Washington offers that option, and Colorado is considering mandatory mail-in voting.

<!> <!>

Maybe those states are like Charlie Matulka. They know an ambush when they see one.

<!> <!>

Lynn Landes is a freelance journalist specializing in environmental issues. She writes a weekly column which is published on her website www.EcoTalk.org and reports environmental news for DUTV in Philadelphia, PA. Lynn's been a radio show host and a regular commentator for a BBC radio program.

<!> <!>

Links:

<!> <!>

* http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingSecurity.htm

* http://www.talion.com/Hagel.html

* http://www.csd.cq.com/senate_mem/s0531.html


35 posted on 08/27/2003 7:25:56 PM PDT by vannrox (The Preamble to the Bill of Rights - without it, our Bill of Rights is meaningless!)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 26 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: Eala
<!> <!>
Voting Machines - A High Tech Ambush
by Lynn Landes
Dissident Voice

October 29, 2002

<!> <!>

<!> <!>

"I'm mad as hell!" says Charlie Matulka.

<!> <!>

It looks like a high-tech ambush. But Matulka isn't going down without a fight. The feisty construction worker is running for Nebraska's U.S. Senate seat against incumbent Republican Senator Chuck Hagel. Matulka's "war chest" is less than $5000. But campaign financing isn't his biggest concern. Who owns the voting machines and how easily they can be rigged or "malfunction" is what's got him all riled up. He's calling press conferences... demanding to be heard.

<!> <!>

That might be difficult. Omaha's largest newspaper is part of the only company in Nebraska certified to count votes on election day. And Chuck Hagel has been an intrinsic part of that company for a long time.

<!> <!>

According to his press office, in 1995 Chuck Hagel resigned as CEO of American Information Systems (AIS), the voting machine company that counted the votes in his first Senatorial election in 1996. In January 1996 Hagel resigned as president of McCarthy & Company, part of the McCarthy Group that are one of the current owners of Election Systems and Software (ES&S), which itself resulted from the merger of AIS and Business Records Corporation. According to publicist/writer Bev Harris, Hagel is still an investor in the McCarthy Group. ES&S is now the largest voting machine company in America. One of its largest owners is the ultra-conservative Omaha World-Herald Company.

<!> <!>

A call to the Office of Integrity, Voting Rights Division, Department of Justice (DOJ) in Washington D.C. regarding this extraordinary conflict-of-interest, earned this writer a terse "no comment." That makes sense. In over 40 years of voting machine "malfunctions" and election malfeasance, the DOJ still treats voting machine companies and their owners with kid gloves.

<!> <!>

Charlie Matulka is just the latest target of America's thoroughly corrupted voting system.

<!> <!>

In a groundbreaking effort, Bev Harris and this writer are compiling extensive information on the voting machine companies operating in the United States. Voting machine companies are privately held and extremely secretive. They form a web of overlapping ownership, financing, staff, and equipment that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to separate one from the other.

<!> <!>

ES&S, the largest voting machine company in America, claims to have counted 56% of the vote in the last four presidential elections. Again, it's owned by the ultra-conservative Omaha World-Herald Company, the McCarthy Group, and former owners of Business Records Corporation. ES&S was created from a merger between American Information Systems (AIS) and Business Records Corporation. Bob and Todd Urosevich founded AIS in the 1980's. Bob is now president of Diebold-Global, while brother Todd is a vice president at ES&S. Business Records Corp. was partially owned by Cronus, a company that seems to have a lot of connections to the notorious Hunt brothers from Texas, as well as other individuals and entities, including Rothschild, Inc.. Right wing Republicans Howard Ahmanson (who financed AIS) and Nelson Bunker Hunt have both heavily contributed to The Chalcedon Institute, an organization that mandates Christian "dominion" over the world.

<!> <!>

Sequoia Voting Systems appears to be the second largest voting machine company, accounting for about 1/3 of the voting machine market. As of May 2002, Sequoia was purchased by Great Britain's De La Rue from Ireland's Jefferson Smurfit Group, who retain a 15% share. Smurfit was just bought by Madison Dearborn Partners, a private equity investment firm. De La Rue owns 20% of the Great Britain's national lottery. In 1995 the Security and Exchange Commission filed charges against four employees of Sequoia, alleging that they inflated revenue and pre-tax profits. In 1999 the Justice Department filed federal charges against employees of Sequoia alleging that during a 10-year period $8 million in bribes were paid out. Louisiana's Commissioner of Elections Jerry Fowler had run up some big gambling debts in Atlantic City, according to reporter Daniel Hopsicker. In all, 22 people were indicted, 9 plead guilty. Fowler went to jail, but big fish Pasquale "Rocco" Ricci of New Jersey got one year of home detention.

<!> <!>

Advanced Voting Solutions is the new name of another scandal-ridden voting company, Shoup Voting Solutions. Their current top management, Howard Van Pelt and Larry Ensminger, were executives for Diebold-Global until late last year. Officers of Shoup Voting Machine Co. were indicted for allegedly bribing politicians in Tampa, Florida in 1971, according to the San Francisco Business Times. Ransom Shoup was convicted in 1979 of conspiracy and obstruction of justice related to an FBI inquiry into a lever machine-counted election in Philadelphia. Shoup got a three-year suspended sentence. Meanwhile, Philadelphia has bought new voting machines from Danaher-Guardian, which appears to only sell voting machines formerly known as the "Shouptronic."

<!> <!>

Danaher-Guardian is owned by billionaire brothers Steven M. and Mitchell P. Rales, who were described by columnist Jack Anderson in 1988 as "a pair of corporate raiders out of Washington DC." Again, Danaher-Guardian appears to only sell formerly Shouptronic voting machines.

<!> <!>

Diebold-Global's current president, Bob Urosevich, was the co-founder of American Information Systems which became ES&S. As mentioned before, Diebold-Global's top managers, Howard Van Pelt and Larry Ensminger, recently moved to Advanced Voting Solutions-Shoup.

<!> <!>

And so it goes. We have an voting system that appears to be in a constant state of name change and rotating management, but always under the private control of the rich and infamous. Meanwhile, Congress has just passed a law that effectively throws hundreds of millions of dollars at voting machine companies that have a record that includes partisanship, bribery, secrecy, and rampant technical "malfunctions."

<!> <!>

Personally, I'll never vote on a machine again if I can help it. For the next election, I'll vote "absentee" (i.e., through the mail). In fact, Oregon has wisely rejected voting machines altogether and handles its entire election through the mail. The state of Washington offers that option, and Colorado is considering mandatory mail-in voting.

<!> <!>

Maybe those states are like Charlie Matulka. They know an ambush when they see one.

<!> <!>

Lynn Landes is a freelance journalist specializing in environmental issues. She writes a weekly column which is published on her website www.EcoTalk.org and reports environmental news for DUTV in Philadelphia, PA. Lynn's been a radio show host and a regular commentator for a BBC radio program.

<!> <!>

Links:

<!> <!>

* http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingSecurity.htm

* http://www.talion.com/Hagel.html

* http://www.csd.cq.com/senate_mem/s0531.html


36 posted on 08/27/2003 7:26:00 PM PDT by vannrox (The Preamble to the Bill of Rights - without it, our Bill of Rights is meaningless!)
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 26 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: supercat
Or is that not snazzy enough?

37 posted on 08/27/2003 7:26:26 PM PDT by txflake
< Post Reply | Private Reply | To 33 | View Replies >

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: plusones
Stuffing ballot boxes is old fashioned, to steal big - you gotta use computers ! (Scroll down for updates)


on Thursday, July 24, 2003, notes in:

Politics:
Diebold is a blue chip voting software company responsible for programming about 33,000 ballot casting machines across this land of ours. In the first large test of its software "by recognized computer security experts," reports the New York Times , "serious flaws that would allow voters to cast extra votes and permit poll workers to alter ballots without being detected" were discovered. LINK: Computer Voting is Open to Easy Fraud --- if the link expired, our cache is located: (here)

"'We found some stunning, stunning flaws,' said Aviel D. Rubin, technical director of the Information Security Institute at Johns Hopkins University, who led a team that examined the software from Diebold Election Systems, which has about 33,000 voting machines operating in the United States."
"The systems, in which voters are given computer-chip-bearing smart cards to operate the machines, could be tricked by anyone with $100 worth of computer equipment, said Adam Stubblefield, a co-author of the paper."
"A spokesman for Diebold, Joe Richardson, said the company could not comment in detail until it had seen the full report. He said that the software on the site was 'about a year old' and that 'if there were problems with it, the code could have been rectified or changed' since then. The company, he said, puts its software through rigorous testing.
You will hear much more about this story in the weeks and months to come.
UPDATES:

Md. Voting System's Security Challenged -- Electronic Cheating Too Easy, Study Says

By Brigid Schulte, Washington Post Staff Writer, Friday, July 25, 2003; Page B01, (here)

A touch-screen voting system that Maryland has just agreed to buy for $55 million and install in every precinct in the state is so flawed that a 15-year-old with a modicum of computer savvy could manipulate the system and change the outcome of an election, computer scientists at Johns Hopkins University said yesterday.
An analysis by the Information Security Institute suggests that voters could cast their ballots repea

[meisje]

1. lkuid

[Fiendish Thingy]

2. just a kick- thanks for posting!

[SoCalDemocrat]

3. What we need is precinct by precinct data

Get us data on the precincts, the machines used, and the raw data.

We can figure it out from that.