The Problems with DRE Voting Machines- from OVC
http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/ad/shamos-rebuttal.pdfA Deeper Look: Rebutting Shamos on e-Voting
Ronald E. Crane, J.D., B.S.C.S.1
Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D.2
Alan Dechert3
Edward Cherlin4
David Mertz, Ph.D.5
May 2005
A Deeper Look: Rebutting Shamos on e-Voting
Abstract
In his article Paper v. Electronic Voting Records – An Assessment,6 Professor Michael I. Shamos7
surveys a variety of objections to Direct Recording Electronic (“DRE”) voting systems. While
acknowledging and validating some of the most pressing, he breezily dismisses many others, often by
packaging them as straw men or by impugning objectors’ maturity, reasoning ability, or thoughtfulness. In
so doing, Prof. Shamos sidesteps not only key technical issues, but also important issues of
transparency, accountability, and the nature of the American democratic republic.8
Our paper identifies Shamos’s most significant errors, and also considers electronically-based voting
systems’9 security more broadly, especially compared to that of other electronic systems, such as
financial systems and gambling devices. We focus mainly on the possibility of vendor-sponsored fraud,
since vendors’ access to and knowledge of their voting systems, and their ability to keep their inner
workings secret by force of law, gives them unique power over how votes are solicited, recorded, and
counted10.
We hope that our paper dispels some of the unjustified trust currently placed in opaque, unverified, and
unverifiable e-voting systems.
1 A Taxonomy of Error
Shamos’s errors are of two main types: philosophical and implementational.