**Help me debunk the Touchscreen Early Voting Faq Sheet**

[EFerrari]

put out by the L.A. County Clerk!

It's a pdf so I don't know how to copy/paste it here or if I can. Prepare for your head to explode when you read it.

I'd like to line up the blatant LIES and start an action to flood Connie's office (and our friendly media outlets) with the debunkation.

:nuke:

http://www.lavote.net/VOTER/PDFS/TEV_FAQS.pdf

/typo

[madeline_con]

1. Copy/ Paste. No problem. Here...

TOUCHSCREEN EARLY VOTING
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
WHAT IS TOUCHSCREEN EARLY VOTING?
Touchscreen Early Voting is an optional method of casting a ballot during a ten-day period prior to each countywide election. During the early voting period, Los Angeles County voters may vote in person at any one of the designated daily voting locations using touchscreen voting equipment. Voters touch the screen to register their votes rather than marking paper ballots. Touchscreen early voting is authorized by the California Secretary of State and conducted in compliance with the regulations established by that Office on voting equipment tested and certified for use by Federal and State authorities.
HOW ARE VOTES CAST AND COUNTED?
After the voter touches “Cast Ballot” on the touchscreen machine, the vote is saved on both the hard drive, a removable cartridge and the voter-verified paper audit trail. All equipment is returned to the Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk’s headquarters in Norwalk immediately after the early voting period ends. Subsequently, on Election Day and/or during the vote canvass period, the votes are tabulated from the cartridges at the Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk headquarters..
I THOUGHT THE NEW MACHINES GAVE VOTERS A PAPER RECEIPT. WHY DON’T VOTERS GET TO TAKE THAT RECEIPT HOME?
After voting, but before hitting the “Cast Ballot” button, each voter may review his or her selections on both the screen and/or the voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT). The VVPAT is not a receipt, but rather a printed record of how each voter casts his/her vote. By law, it must be retained with the voting equipment as part of the audit of the election.
HOW DO I KNOW THE VVPAT IS SECURE IN THE PAPER CANISTER?
After the VVPAT paper roll is installed in the canister, the canister remains closed and locked.
WHAT PREVENTS SOMEONE FROM VOTING ON MORE THAN ONE MACHINE OR GOING TO ANOTHER EARLY VOTING SITE TO VOTE?
The Voter access card issued to each voter can only be used once by that voter. After a voter finishes voting and touches “Cast Ballot,” that voting card is de-activated and ejected from the Touchscreen machine. Also, when the voter access card is issued to a voter, that action automatically updates the voter registration database confirming that the voter has cast his/her ballot which prevents any attempt to create another card for that same voter.
WHAT PREVENTS SOMEONE FROM VOTING AGAIN ON ELECTION DAY?
After each early voter has been issued a voter access card and voted, the voter database is automatically marked showing that voter has already cast a ballot in the election. Early voting ends several days prior to election day and the roster of early voters is provided to every Election Day voting precinct showing those persons who have already voted via touchscreen. In addition to this thorough detection process, it is important to note that any attempt to vote twice in an election is a felony.
IS A TOUCHSCREEN VOTE A SECRET BALLOT?
Yes. The voter access card only instructs the touchscreen machine which contests to display for the districts and electoral contests in the area where the voter lives. It contains neither confidential voter information nor a record of how anyone voted. Nothing in the Touchscreen machine links personal information to how the ballot was cast.
ARE VOTES LOST DURING A POWER FAILURE?
No. Each touchscreen machine has a battery backup.. In the event of a power failure, early voting staff will allow voters to continue voting using battery power. All voting information is stored on both the hard drive, the cartridge and the voter-verified paper audit trail, none of which is erased during a power failure.
HOW DO I KNOW MY VOTE IS SECURE?
Management, operational and legal measures are in place to protect voting machine security, including:
• The AccuVote TSX units are stand-alone machines. They are not connected to the Internet and cannot be accessed from any other computer.
• County election officials maintain control over ballot creation, source codes, and management systems.
• County election staff thoroughly tests equipment prior to and after Election Day.
• Preparation of equipment includes sealing all access ports with tamper-evident seals that are monitored by early voting staff for any signs of tampering.
• All computer software and hardware have passed rigorous security requirements of the Federal and State governments prior to certification for use.
Each touchscreen voting site is physically surveyed by election staff to make note of access points and existing security systems. Throughout early voting, election staff have exclusive use of the rooms during and after voting hours until all touchscreen equipment has been removed from the sites at the end of the early voting period. All equipment at the sites are safeguarded by secured storage, access control devices, inventory controls and tamper-evident seals.
Another important safeguard is the law - tampering with voting equipment is a felony. California Elections Code Section 18564 states in part:
Any person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to four years who tampers with, interferes with, or attempts to interfere with, the correct operation of, or willfully damages in order to prevent the use of, any voting machine, voting device, voting system, vote tabulating device, or ballot tally software program source codes.
HAS THE STAFF OF THE EARLY VOTING SITES BEEN TRAINED TO WORK THE MACHINES?
Yes. Each site has trained staff, a complete early voting instruction handbook, and immediate access by telephone to election authorities at the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk’s Office should further assistance be needed.
For information on Touchscreen voting dates, times, and locations, visit www.lavote.net

[EFerrari]

2. Thank you! I hate sending people to a bare link and I couldn't

figure it out. :hi:

[rumpel]

22. Also, what hapens on the last day of early voting?

I was wondering whether they will be distributed to the precincts - or back to McCormack - who will guard it until it's ready for tabulation - are they going to start tabulating/ When?
Every day?

County election officials maintain source code? I thought they were propritary and McCormack signed a non-disclosure agreement.

[EFerrari]

25. Sounds like they're trying to slide on what "source code" is. nt

[jarnocan]

3. if it does keep a paper record

that's good, now we still have to be vigilent that no one looses these paper records.
I'll have to go study more, and will try to follow the replys here.
I know receipts are not considered a good idea by some because people could be threatenned or bribed to vote a certain way and then show their receipts as proof.

[EFerrari]

7. Last I heard, these units had printers that jammed. Is there an update?

[nicknameless]

27. Yes, in the famous test of July 2005, about 1/3 of them failed.

http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6257

Excerpt:

On the strength of paper jams alone, two-dozen critics of electronic voting rallied in front of the Alameda County administrative offices Tuesday and demanded that county supervisors withdraw from negotiations to buy the machines. Homemade signs accused the McKinney, Texas-based maker of voting machines, of "stealing" elections and called on Alameda County to "dump Diebold."

"There have been serious problems for years now, and it's time for the board to take responsibility," said Judy Bertelsen, a Berkeley leader in an umbrella group, the Voting Rights Task Force.

Nineteen machines had 21 screen freezes or system crashes, producing a blue screen and messages about an "illegal operation" or a "fatal exception error." A Diebold technician had to restart the machine for voting to resume. Ten machines had a total of 11 printer jams. Almost one-third of all machines in the mock election had a problem.

[SmokingJacket]

4. Please do debunk!

I'm in NY and we don't have these machines yet -- but the fact that there's what they claim to be a paper trail might convince a lot of people to go along with them.

What are the lies?

[EFerrari]

5. Hang on - I'm going to see how many even I can spot and will

update this post:

• County election officials maintain control over ballot creation, source codes, and management systems.

(Oh, yeah?)


Touchscreen early voting is authorized by the California Secretary of State and conducted in compliance with the regulations established by that Office on voting equipment tested and certified for use by Federal and State authorities.

(This seems to me to be a half truth re Federal standards:.)

• County election staff thoroughly tests equipment prior to and after Election Day.
(Do they test EVERY machine?)


ARE VOTES LOST DURING A POWER FAILURE?
No. Each touchscreen machine has a battery backup.. In the event of a power failure, early voting staff will allow voters to continue voting using battery power. All voting information is stored on both the hard drive, the cartridge and the voter-verified paper audit trail, none of which is erased during a power failure.

(Well, this isn't what we saw on these machines during the primaries, is it? Or, am I remembering wrong?)


• Preparation of equipment includes sealing all access ports with tamper-evident seals that are monitored by early voting staff for any signs of tampering.

(Where was it that election reform activists found seals that had been tampered with? Does "early voting staff" SLEEP with these machines? What is the provision for chain of custody?)

• All computer software and hardware have passed rigorous security requirements of the Federal and State governments prior to certification for use.

(Does anyone know if this is TRUE?)

Another important safeguard is the law - tampering with voting equipment is a felony.

(I feel so much better now. :sarcasm: )


(What this DOESN'T say is important, too. Aren't these the systems with the messed up printers that jam? I believe they are. And, what about those removable memories? Are they tamper proof? No, they're not.)

That's what I could spot. What did I miss or get wrong? :)

[SmokingJacket]

6. Thanks -- I will take note. nt

[EFerrari]

8. There are DUers who know this cold -- I'm the civilian here.

Maybe they will weigh in so we can know for sure.

What I do know for sure is that the L.A. County Clerk is dirty. So, it's time to follow the slime.

[stellanoir]

9. Thoroughly hackable tabulation units

and a wider than 3-5% margin of victory insures that the paper is never reviewed or scrutinized.

That's precisely why the slimmest edges in so many pre election polls drive me utterly bananas.

It's like * dissing the Lancet's figures of dead Iraqis today.

How can he get away with "we don't agree with their methodology" (or whatever BS he said today) when General Franks had said in '03 so humanely (sarcasm) "we don't count dead Iraqis?" oh nevermind.

The wingnuts just don't count anything and say everyone who does bother to do so is just plain wrong, wrong, wrong.

"We don't need no stinkin' science and we don't need no stinkin' math."

Sorry, didn't mean to derail.

Now about those machines. . .

[EFerrari]

10. Well, notice NOTHING as usual about the tabulators.

They don't exist! Poof!

I have to go take my "stay sane" walk -- if it isn't too late already. :silly:

I'll be back. TIA!

[jarnocan]

11. good point really he can discount a scientific study

so glibly. Yet, all the FACTS, professional computer, math -scientist's studies of the fraudulent elections- were ignored by most of our mainstream media. It is just so wrong. I'm so angry I want to scream- again.

[stellanoir]

19. Welp did screaming help. . .?

This may sound totally bonkers to some but with a similar seemingly intractable situation in the past, an invocation structured like the one that follows had a profoundly AMAZING impact for our national well being, for a while anyway.

Now, take a DEEP breath and repeat after me. . .

"I'm co-creating with spirit that any malicious code implanted or secreted in the vote tabulation software be neutralized in the upcoming elections, so that the true will of the electorate will be revealed, and true justice may at long last be restored."

Repeat whenever irked especially until 10/18 at 1:17 am (any time zone) and perhaps even further until the true vote tally is reported next month. Feel free to alter or abbreviate the invocation as you see fit.

If you don't like this idea pullease don't flame me, just suggest a more readily effective plan instead that may possibly fix everything in less than a month. Okay. . .?

It'll take a confluence of efforts on many levels but this could have an influence on all the misinformation surrounding this totally mired issue and is at least something that anyone can do anytime or anywhere pretty much. (though probably not recommended for intimate situations at all. . .I've lost friends that way)

If they can rig 'em we can fix 'em through the only expedient, and (I think) still legal means possible. That would be with our conscious minds and intense focus.

It's better than screaming or projecting hatred and vitriol ad nauseam, I swear. I figure it's worth a shot and probably far easier on your throat and soul.

I'm not at all joking about this approach though.

If they can create reality by repeating lies over and over and over again just imagine the power of truth and how that trumps the media's distortions energetically by light years.

(pm me if you want details on the previous situation in which this technique remedied another HUGE national debacle or if you want details on why I feel "until 10/18" is especially significant. No details will be made available about how I lost friends in intimate situations from '02-'04 by obsessing about EVM's though-THAT's PROPRIETARY. . .okay? )

Peace

[EFerrari]

20. Easier on your throat? Are you sure?

And does it work for paper training puppies? That's been pretty hard on my throat and on several area rugs. :)

[stellanoir]

21. Awww too cute

What's his or her name? Is it a golden or yellow retriever? Some goldens are very fair when they're puppies so it's kinda hard to tell.

Either way I've never, ever, ever met a mean golden but I've met plenty of yellow labs who weren't exactly Einsteins but always friendly and sometimes soulful.

Black and brown labs though. . .woh. . .way too much inbreeding with some of those and they can be hyper, hyper, hyper.

Sorry I guess I thought I got lost in the pet forum. . .don't even know if there is a pet forum actually.

But no you'd need a different invocation to expedite house training.

"I am co-creating with spirit that this puppy (insert puppy's name here) be house trained ASAP."

Squirting them on their noses with a water pistol can help as well.

Happy puppy training. You may want to consider getting a table top Christmas tree this year. . .just saying. . .:)

[jarnocan]

37. lovely but I feel your pain-been there nt

[yurbud]

12. FAQ text:

TOUCHSCREEN EARLY VOTING

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

WHAT IS TOUCHSCREEN EARLY VOTING?

Touchscreen Early Voting is an optional method of casting a ballot during a ten-day period prior to each countywide election. During the early voting period, Los Angeles County voters may vote in person at any one of the designated daily voting locations using touchscreen voting equipment. Voters touch the screen to register their votes rather than marking paper ballots. Touchscreen early voting is authorized by the California Secretary of State and conducted in compliance with the regulations established by that Office on voting equipment tested and certified for use by Federal and State authorities.

HOW ARE VOTES CAST AND COUNTED?

After the voter touches “Cast Ballot” on the touchscreen machine, the vote is saved on both the hard drive, a removable cartridge and the voter-verified paper audit trail. All equipment is returned to the Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk’s headquarters in Norwalk immediately after the early voting period ends. Subsequently, on Election Day and/or during the vote canvass period, the votes are tabulated from the cartridges at the Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk headquarters..

I THOUGHT THE NEW MACHINES GAVE VOTERS A PAPER RECEIPT. WHY DON’T VOTERS GET TO TAKE THAT RECEIPT HOME?

After voting, but before hitting the “Cast Ballot” button, each voter may review his or her selections on both the screen and/or the voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT). The VVPAT is not a receipt, but rather a printed record of how each voter casts his/her vote. By law, it must be retained with the voting equipment as part of the audit of the election.

HOW DO I KNOW THE VVPAT IS SECURE IN THE PAPER CANISTER?

After the VVPAT paper roll is installed in the canister, the canister remains closed and locked.

WHAT PREVENTS SOMEONE FROM VOTING ON MORE THAN ONE MACHINE OR GOING TO ANOTHER EARLY VOTING SITE TO VOTE?

The Voter access card issued to each voter can only be used once by that voter. After a voter finishes voting and touches “Cast Ballot,” that voting card is de-activated and ejected from the Touchscreen machine. Also, when the voter access card is issued to a voter, that action automatically updates the voter registration database confirming that the voter has cast his/her ballot which prevents any attempt to create another card for that same voter.

WHAT PREVENTS SOMEONE FROM VOTING AGAIN ON ELECTION DAY?

After each early voter has been issued a voter access card and voted, the voter database is automatically marked showing that voter has already cast a ballot in the election. Early voting ends several days prior to election day and the roster of early voters is provided to every Election Day voting precinct showing those persons who have already voted via touchscreen. In addition to this thorough detection process, it is important to note that any attempt to vote twice in an election is a felony.

IS A TOUCHSCREEN VOTE A SECRET BALLOT?

Yes. The voter access card only instructs the touchscreen machine which contests to display for the districts and electoral contests in the area where the voter lives. It contains neither confidential voter information nor a record of how anyone voted. Nothing in the Touchscreen machine links personal information to how the ballot was cast.

ARE VOTES LOST DURING A POWER FAILURE?

No. Each touchscreen machine has a battery backup.. In the event of a power failure, early voting staff will allow voters to continue voting using battery power. All voting information is stored on both the hard drive, the cartridge and the voter-verified paper audit trail, none of which is erased during a power failure.

HOW DO I KNOW MY VOTE IS SECURE?

Management, operational and legal measures are in place to protect voting machine security, including:

• The AccuVote TSX units are stand-alone machines. They are not connected to the Internet and cannot be accessed from any other computer.
  
• County election officials maintain control over ballot creation, source codes, and management systems.
  
  
• County election staff thoroughly tests equipment prior to and after Election Day.
  
  
• Preparation of equipment includes sealing all access ports with tamper-evident seals that are monitored by early voting staff for any signs of tampering.
  
  
• All computer software and hardware have passed rigorous security requirements of the Federal and State governments prior to certification for use.

Each touchscreen voting site is physically surveyed by election staff to make note of access points and existing security systems. Throughout early voting, election staff have exclusive use of the rooms during and after voting hours until all touchscreen equipment has been removed from the sites at the end of the early voting period. All equipment at the sites are safeguarded by secured storage, access control devices, inventory controls and tamper-evident seals. Another important safeguard is the law - tampering with voting equipment is a felony. California Elections Code Section 18564 states in part: Any person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to four years who tampers with, interferes with, or attempts to interfere with, the correct operation of, or willfully damages in order to prevent the use of, any voting machine, voting device, voting system, vote tabulating device, or ballot tally software program source codes.

HAS THE STAFF OF THE EARLY VOTING SITES BEEN TRAINED TO WORK THE MACHINES?

Yes. Each site has trained staff, a complete early voting instruction handbook, and immediate access by telephone to election authorities at the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk’s Office should further assistance be needed.

For information on Touchscreen voting dates, times, and locations, visit www.lavote.net

[galloglas]

13. Check the copyright...

I'm sure the thing has been authored by some flack from Diebold. Look for a name, or proof of authorship.

I've never yet seen an ED or County Clerk who knew enough to write that.

Or check for the Public Relations agency who contracts for either the ED or the company.

It's either the PR company, the manufacturer, or an ex-employee. No one in elective office can tap dance that well.

[EFerrari]

17. Good point. Maybe I'll just call and ask if there's no attribution

and there probably won't be.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

14. Rebecca Mercuri says they HAVEN'T passed rigorous testing

See this article

DREs -- Designed for Failure
By Rebecca Mercuri, Notable Software
October 05, 2006


“To date, no electronic voting system has been certified to even the lowest level of the U.S. government or international computer security standards (such as the ISO Common Criteria or its predecessor, TCSEC/ITSEC), nor has any been required to comply with such. No voting system vendor has voluntarily complied with these standards (although voluntary compliance occurs within other industries, such as health care and banking), despite the fact that most have been made aware of their existence and utility in secure product development.”


http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1851&Itemid=26

[rumpel]

33. this is perfect

thanks I use this also in my newest post here on the response to working assets.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

15. Tales of Toilet Paper Ballot - Mecklenburg Co NC

Poll workers are not being told this VVPAT is for voters to verify.
They are told it is a backup audit log.

Poll workers put the paper in backwards and it doesn't create a printout.

Machines run out of paper.

Some votes couldn't be uploaded.


Charlotte Observer
May. 04, 2006 Few voting glitches pop up
Results not affected by minor malfunctions in new machines

- Printers on 10 machines had paper put on backwards, and poll workers
didn't realize the printers weren't working properly, Dickerson said.
He said the machines still recorded votes electronically and they were tallied properly,
but the backup audit log did not print.

- One precinct had trouble setting up the new machines, and instead asked voters to use paper ballots meant for curbside voting until midmorning.
Dickerson said the poll workers should have called election officials for help,
but everyone who came to the precinct was able to vote.

- One precinct at Davidson Town Hall had machines run out of printer paper at roughly 7:10 p.m.,
20 minutes before the polls closed. Dickerson said precinct workers then had about 10 voters
use the paper curbside ballots instead of the machines....
He said he will conduct more training sessions before November's election, and will make sure someone at each precinct can load paper when machines run out.

- Fewer than 30 votes on two machines couldn't be downloaded Tuesday night,
probably because of human error, Dickerson said.

http://www.charlotte.com/mld/observer/news/local/14495690.htm

Using ES&S iVotronic with RTAL printer.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

16. Essay - The Problems With Touchscreen Paper Trail

heres two for you

The Problem With The Touchscreen Paper Trail
http://www.triadblogs.com/NCVoter/1612/

Touchscreen Paper Trails & Why We Still Worry
http://www.triadblogs.com/NCVoter/1744/

[EFerrari]

18. Thank you!

:hi:

[kster]

23. They tip over to easy

CLEVELAND -- A 61-year-old man was arrested after an alleged poll rage incident, NewsChannel5 reported.

Officials said Marc A. Fenster was arrested after he knocked over two voting machines worth $2,700 each.









http://www.newsnet5.com/politics/9146477/detail.html }(

[EFerrari]

24. LOL! I remember that gent.

[rumpel]

31. yes, ooops!

[JimDandy]

26. If this FAQ sheet was from Utah it would be easy to debunk several points.

HAS THE STAFF OF THE EARLY VOTING SITES BEEN TRAINED TO WORK THE MACHINES?

Yes. Each site has trained staff, a complete early voting instruction handbook, and immediate access by telephone to election authorities at the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk’s Office should further assistance be needed.

Hey, LA ROV: send those instruction books to Utah -- they desperately need them. I've been trying to get any sort of written rules, guidelines, procedures, policies or training on early voting from the Salt Lake County Clerk's Office since August 2005. After multiple requests, including one this last March in which the election's director said "we're waiting for Diebold to give us their part of the procedures, so we can print a manual" I was told, in June, on the FIRST DAY OF EARLY VOTING, that they still had no written procedures for how to conduct early voting. On asking how did the county employees running the early elections know what to do, I was told that they had verbally trained them and shown them the procedures.

Dang! What outstanding employees to have such phenomenal memories.

[nicknameless]

28. These were some of the problems cited by Bowen back in March:

http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=985&Itemid=113

Excerpts:

Today’s hearing involved the proposed certifications of voting systems from ES&S, Hart InterCivic, Sequoia, and Populex. The Secretary of State did hold a hearing on the Diebold re-certification request on November 21, 2005. However, that hearing was held before the February 17, 2006, release of a report from the Secretary’s Voting Systems Technology Assessment Advisory Board (VSTAAB) that identified 16 security flaws in the Diebold machines, and before the February 28, 2006, release of a report from the independent testing authorities (ITA) that identified three security flaws in the Diebold machines and recommended code changes.

<snip>

February 22, 2006 – Senator Bowen writes to Secretary McPherson, calling on him to reverse his February 17 decision to re-certify the machines. The letter states the Secretary’s decision is: 1) Contrary to his August 3, 2005, promise not to certify machines that don’t comply with all federal guidelines and regulations; 2) Contrary to his December 20 statement to wait for the ITA to act; 3) Contrary to state law requiring any machine that’s certified for use in the state to also be federally certified (although technically the Diebold machines have a federal certification number from October 3, 2005, the Secretary himself pointed out on December 20, 2005, that the certification didn’t review the Diebold memory cards, which is why the Secretary sent them back for review); 4) Contrary to the state law requiring all direct recording electronic voting machines to have an accessible voter verified paper trail that provides a visually-impaired voter with an audio read-back of what’s recorded on the paper trail; and 5) Out of compliance with the law requiring a public hearing on a voting system because the report upon which the Secretary’s approval was based wasn’t prepared or released until nearly three months after the original public hearing.

February 28, 2006 – Secretary McPherson releases the ITA report – dated February 23, 2006 – from CIBER on the Diebold memory cards. The report notes the Diebold system uses interpreted code – something banned by the FEC standards the Secretary said on August 3, 2005, he would follow. The report also identifies at least three security vulnerabilities and a number of requirement violations. The report notes, “Certain vulnerabilities in this report may require a portion of the code to be modified in order to correct the vulnerabilities identified. To ensure that the efforts to correct vulnerabilities do not introduce new vulnerabilities, CIBER strongly recommends retesting of the remediated code prior to its migration to a production environment.” The report also states, “Error handling appears to be adequate for a system that executes in a perfect running environment. However, the interpreters do not have the proper degree of effort checking to identify or recover from key failures in a damaged, altered or dysfunctional environment. Our reasoning for increasing the security on the code is because the object code traverses potentially untrustworthy hands . . . Since the object code is on the memory cards being distributed, it is a prime target for potential tampering.”

I don't remember hearing that any of these issues were resolved. But I do recall reading that additional problems were discovered.

[EFerrari]

29. Figures! Thank you.

:)

[Kurovski]

30. Kick.(nt)

[rumpel]

32. On security

see garybeck's post - Diebold techs

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x452697

[nicknameless]

34. Memory packs "losing" votes.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x452249

[EFerrari]

35. I was mapping the congressional districts and the counties

they encompass to get a fix on the systems in use in each district.

Connie has her paws on 16 of our 53 districts. If they steal it, won't it be in L.A. County?

/52->53

[nicknameless]

36. McCormack is, unfortunately, just one of the Registrars to look out for.

Unscrupulous Registrars + DREs (in particular) seem to be the combination of concern.

But McCormack's County is very heavily populated, so you're probably correct.