WH press briefing yest:Of 2 sources of NK bomb-fuel, Clinton shut off

[ProgressiveEconomist]

by far the more important one COMPLETELY, and also apparently slowed down substantially a minor, less observable, process for acquiring enriched uranium. But Dubya DID NOTHING when the North Koreans turned the MAJOR source of plutonium back on in 2002.

Why did this fact not get mentioned in more than a dozen questions and responses about NK nuclear proliferation in Tuesday's press conference (transcript at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061010-5.html )?

Who does research for the White House "press corpse"? I was dismayed when NBC's star national reporter David Gregory allowed Tony Snow to distort the record at Tuesday's press briefing without asking effective follow-ups. Gregory just let Snow distort, time after time. Snow made it appear that NK now has sufficient plutonium for bombs because Bill Clinton allowed NK to "cheat" substantially on an agreement negotiated for Clinton in 1994 by Jimmy Carter.

Snow said, "It became clear (in 2002) that there was uranium enrichment going on".

But apparently, Snow ignored the major source of NK atomic bomb materal, reprocessed spent fuel rods that were locked away under Clinton. According to the May 2004 Washington Monthly article excerpted below, there were TWO sources of NK fissile material, one minor (uranium enrichment), and one major (reprocessing spent fuel rods into plutonium). Under Clinton, the major source was locked in an internationally-inspected storage facility under 24-hour video surveillance. When in 2002, on Dubya's watch, the North Koreans kicked out the inspectors, broke open the storage facility, and started reprocessing the fuel rods into bomb-grade plutonium, Dubya's administration did NOTHING.

NK nuclear tests apparently have been just a matter of time since then. But no national WH media representative asked Snow about fuel-rod reprocessing Tuesday. Are the media THAT ill-informed?

See also a login-required story at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-wrong10oct10,1,3420849.story?coll=la-news-a_section .

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From http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0405.kaplan.html :

"Rolling Blunder: How the Bush administration let North Korea get nukes.

By Fred Kaplan; May 2004

On Oct. 4, 2002, officials from the U.S. State Department flew to Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, and confronted Kim Jong-il's foreign ministry with evidence that Kim had acquired centrifuges for processing highly enriched uranium, which could be used for building nuclear weapons. To the Americans' surprise, the North Koreans conceded. It was an unsettling revelation, coming just as the Bush administration was gearing up for a confrontation with Iraq. This new threat wasn't imminent; processing uranium is a tedious task; Kim Jong-il was almost certainly years away from grinding enough of the stuff to make an atomic bomb.

But the North Koreans had another route to nuclear weapons--a stash of radioactive fuel rods, taken a decade earlier from its nuclear power plant in Yongbyon. These rods could be processed into plutonium--and, from that, into A-bombs--not in years but in months. Thanks to an agreement brokered by the Clinton administration, the rods were locked in a storage facility under the monitoring of international weapons-inspectors. Common sense dictated that--whatever it did about the centrifuges--the Bush administration should do everything possible to keep the fuel rods locked up.

Unfortunately, common sense was in short supply. After a few shrill diplomatic exchanges over the uranium, Pyongyang upped the ante. The North Koreans expelled the international inspectors, broke the locks on the fuel rods, loaded them onto a truck, and drove them to a nearby reprocessing facility, to be converted into bomb-grade plutonium. The White House stood by and did nothing. Why did George W. Bush--his foreign policy avowedly devoted to stopping "rogue regimes" from acquiring weapons of mass destruction--allow one of the world's most dangerous regimes to acquire the makings of the deadliest WMDs? ... President Bush made the case for war in Iraq on the premise that Saddam Hussein might soon have nuclear weapons--which turned out not to be true. Kim Jong-il may have nuclear weapons now; he certainly has enough plutonium to build some, and the reactors to breed more. Yet Bush has neither threatened war nor pursued diplomacy. ...

The pattern of decision making that led to this debacle--as described to me in recent interviews with key former administration officials who participated in the events--will sound familiar to anyone who has watched Bush and his cabinet in action. It is a pattern of wishful thinking, blinding moral outrage, willful ignorance of foreign cultures, a naive faith in American triumphalism, a contempt for the messy compromises of diplomacy, and a knee-jerk refusal to do anything the way the Clinton administration did it...."

[ProgressiveEconomist]

1. Thank you, mysterious first recommender ...

[ProgressiveEconomist]

2. Shocking timeline of Bush Misadministration inaction on NK nukes

From http://news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=150800 :

"North Korea nuclear crisis timeline

Monday Oct 9 13:43 AEST

Oct. 2002: Top State Department envoy James Kelly confronts Pyongyang with evidence Washington says points to a covert uranium-enrichment programme. North Korea says "it is entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons but other types of weapons more powerful than them in defence of its sovereignty in face of the U.S. threat".

Dec. 2002: North Korea says it plans to restart Yongbyon reactor, disables International Atomic Enegy Agency (IAEA) surveillance devices at Yongbyon and expels IAEA inspectors.

Jan. 2003: North Korea says it is quitting the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with immediate effect. l At talks between U.S. team led by Kelly and North Koreans and China in Beijing, American officials say North Korea told the United States that it has nuclear weapons and might test them or transfer them to other countries.

Aug. 2003: First round of six-way talks between North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the U.S. on the nuclear issue takes place in Beijing. North Korea threatens to test nuclear bomb and test-fire new missile.

Oct. 2003: North Korea says it has enhanced its "nuclear deterrent" with plutonium reprocessed from thousands of nuclear fuel rods. Pyongyang says it is willing to display the deterrent.

..."

[leveymg]

3. The Pakistan-supplied centrifuges may have actually delayed the NK nuke

program. They already had enough plutonium on hand for 2-5 nukes, produced during the 1970s and 1980s in graphite reactors acquired from the Soviet Union.

The side-deal with A.Q. Khan to start up a highly-enriched uranium (HEU) process required the purchase and construction of an entirely different production process. In order to pursue the Pakistani bomb plans, NK had to purchase components for thousands of expensive gas centrifuge machines, on top of the cost of keeping North Koreas's old Soviet-era reactors going.

By 2002, when the Bush Administration broke the Clinton agreement that locked away the plutonium rods under IAEA seal, Pyonyang had spent hundreds of millions starting up HEU production -- which produced little weapons grade material -- money that could have been spent on upgrading its proven Russian-designed graphite reactors.

Bush actually jump-started the NK nuclear program.

[ProgressiveEconomist]

4. Do you know anything about the yield of U-235 from isotope

separation, versus the plutonium yield from reprocessing spent fuel rods?

And do you know how much U-235 is required for the same explosive power as a pound of plutonium?

In other words, what is the "bang for the buck" of the two processes for producing bomb fuel?

[leveymg]

6. It depends upon the baseline technology.

NK had graphite reactors which were upgraded in the 1970s along with similar of their type by the Soviets so as to be efficient producers of plutonium.

Given that background, it was far more cost effective for NK to produce plutonium rather than HEU. There are some advantages to HEU, primarily dispersal of the centrifuges makes that part of the production cycle less likely to be knocked out by a single loss, such as a reactor fire. Also, basic uranium bombs are much simpler to design and manufacture than plutonium bombs.

You have to look at the entire production cycle to determine which is more cost-effective. In the case of NK,they would likely not have put much into HEU had it not been for the their reactors being put off-limits by the IAEA inspections agreement with Clinton.

In turn, the CIA analysts were quite well aware of the cost-benefit ratio of the processes, and could foresee that NK would incur high start-up costs if Khan could sell them on "his" HEU production package.

[ProgressiveEconomist]

7. Thanks. NK may have the capacity for 30 plutonium weapons a year

eventually when their reactors are fully operational, according to Congressional Research Service Issue Briefs for Congress on NK I just found at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9566.pdf (4/02) and http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf (3/03). The later one has details of amounts of fissile material at various points and details of reactor sizes and numbers of spent fuel rods (see the excerpt below).

Clinton's Ambassador Robert Gallucci feared NK had a current capacity eventually to produce 30 PLUTONIUM WEAPONS A YEAR from spent fuel rods!

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From http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk24.pdf :

"Congressional Research Service  The Library of Congress

Issue Brief for Congress Received through the CRS Web; Order Code IB91141

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program

Updated March 17, 2003

Larry A. Niksch Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

In 1992, North Korea rebuffed South Korea regarding implementation of the denuclearization agreement, but it did allow the IAEA to conduct six inspections during June 1992-February 1993. In late 1992, the IAEA found evidence that North Korea had reprocessed more plutonium than the 80 grams it had disclosed to the Agency. In February 1993, the IAEA invoked a provision in the safeguards agreement and called for a "special inspection" of two concealed but apparent nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon. The IAEA believed that a special inspection would uncover information on the amount of plutonium which North Korea had produced since 1989. North Korea rejected the IAEA request and announced on March 12, 1993, an intention to withdraw from the NPT....

In May 1994, North Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect the 8,000 fuel rods, which it had removed from the five megawatt reactor. In June 1994, North Korea's President Kim Il-sung reactivated a longstanding invitation to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to visit Pyongyang. Kim offered Carter a freeze of North Korea's nuclear facilities and operations. Kim took this initiative after China reportedly informed him that it would not veto a first round of economic sanctions, which the Clinton Administration had proposed to members of the U.N. Security Council. The Clinton Administration reacted to Kim's proposal by dropping its sanctions proposal and entering into a new round of high-level negotiations with North. This negotiation led to the Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994.

The heart of the Agreed Framework and the amending accords is a deal under which the United States will provide North Korea with a package of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits; in return North Korea will halt the operations and infrastructure development of its nuclear program. The Agreed Framework commits North Korea to "freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities" with the freeze to be monitored by the IAEA. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, who negotiated for the United States, stated that "related facilities" include the plutonium reprocessing plant and stored fuel rods. According to Gallucci, the freeze includes a halt to construction of the 50 and 200 megawatt reactors and a North Korean promise not to refuel the five megawatt reactor. The Agreed Framework also commits North Korea to store the 8,000 fuel rods removed from the five megawatt reactor in May 1994 "in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK (North Korea)." Clinton Administration officials reportedly said that a secret "confidential minute" to the Agreed Framework prohibits North Korea from construction of new nuclear facilities elsewhere in North Korea.

Gallucci and other officials emphasized that the key policy objective of the Clinton Administration was to secure a freeze of North Korea's nuclear program in order to prevent North Korea from producing large quantities of nuclear weapons grade plutonium through the operations of the 50 and 200 megawatt reactors and the plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. Gallucci referred to the prospect of North Korea producing enough plutonium annually for nearly 30 nuclear weapons if the 50 and 200 megawatt reactors went into operation. The Administration's fear was that North Korea would have the means to export atomic bombs to other states and possess a nuclear missile capability that would threaten Japan and U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean."

[ProgressiveEconomist]

9. Great Democratic talking-point kick

[ProgressiveEconomist]

10. kick

[ProgressiveEconomist]

11. kick

[ProgressiveEconomist]

5. 2 kinds of fissile material for atomic fission bombs: plutonium and U-235

While most modern nuclear fission weapons use plutonium, the most common kind of fissile material for atomic bombs, cruder weapons can be made just by painstakingly separating isotopes of natural uranium to produce enriched uranium-235, the other kind of fissile material.

From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium-235 :

"The (1945) Little Boy atomic bomb was fueled by enriched uranium. Most modern nuclear arsenals use plutonium as the fissile component, however U-235 devices remain a nuclear proliferation concern due to the simplicity of the design."

[ProgressiveEconomist]

8. Tony Snow did use the cryptic phrase "unlocked Yongbian" once

Tuesday, referring to the more significant source of NK bomb fuel. His use of this phrase proves that Snow knew about the two sources, and that Snow's distortions apparently were deliberate. But Gregory did not follow up or even seem to know what Snow was talking about. Gregory allowed Snow to imply that unobservable "enriching uranium" was the source of the bomb material exploded this weekend, not the fully observable (before late 2002) thousands of easily reprocessed spent fuel rods that were locked away under IAEA seals and video surveillance until about two years into Dubya's watch.

The transcript of the press briefing is at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061010-5.html :

"October 10, 2006; Press Briefing by Tony Snow; 11:50 A.M. EDT

Q Tony, in 2003, the President said very clearly that we will not tolerate North Korea with nuclear weapons.

MR. SNOW: Right.

Q And here we are in 2006 operating on the assumption, as the government is, that, in fact, they tested a nuclear devise. So what went wrong?

MR. SNOW: I'm not sure anything went wrong. The failed diplomacy is on the part of the North Koreans because what they have done so far is turn down a series of diplomatic initiatives that would have given them everything they have said they wanted ... And yet they've walked away from all of it. So if there's a failure in diplomacy, it's on their part.

But what also has happened, David, is that over that period of time you have seen the six-party talks continue to evolve ... So rather than having something going wrong, what you really have is the emergence of a process ...

Q In 2002, though, and since then, this President likes to focus on results. So here's the result: In 2002, the President said that he didn't want the so-called "axis of evil", the worst regimes in the world, to get the most dangerous weapons, WMDs. And here we are in 2006; this President has invaded a country that had no nuclear weapons, and there is a country that in that process has been able to acquire more nuclear weapons.

MR. SNOW: Well, it's an open question about what the status -- as you know, there was speculation even back in the Clinton years, did they have six, did they have eight nukes, and the intelligence on that, I think, has always been a little varied. The fact is that the North Koreans --

Q You dispute the idea that they have more today than they had when you came into office?

MR. SNOW: I don't know, I honestly don't know. And I think intelligence analysts will tell you that they're teasing through the question, as well. You'll have to ask a technical question of whether they've had the capability to build additional weapons since they unlocked Yongbian a couple years ago. Don't know. But I think the most significant -- so let's set a couple of benchmarks. Number one, going back to the 1990s, it was clear that the North Koreans were attempting to try to put together a nuclear program. That was why you had the agreed framework back in 1994 under the Clinton administration. The idea was, you provide the carrots, maybe they'll back off. It was -- it made a lot of sense, but it didn't work because the North Koreans cheated on it and were trying on the sly to enrich uranium.

So it is not -- so what has happened in recent days, at least in terms of an announced or desire by the North Koreans to develop a nuclear weapon, that's not new. They've been trying to do this for years. What is new is that you do have, I think, a much more effective mechanism, or at least a more promising mechanism for dealing with them, because the people who have direct leverage, the people who can turn the spigots economically and politically, are now fully engaged and invested in this. That was not the case in the 1990s; it was not the case earlier in this decade; it is the case now.

Q But, Tony, results -- I'm trying to get you to focus on results. You invaded a country that had no nuclear weapons and all the while a country further developed their nuclear capacity.

MR. SNOW: You may have better intelligence than I do. You're --

Q It's not a question of me. I think the intelligence is not as unclear as you're projecting it as.

MR. SNOW: No, I think it is. People have been trying to assess. ... The North Koreans have proceeded. Absolutely right; given. But now what has happened is that the people, again, who are most directly capable of influencing their decisions have stepped up and said, you know what, the old policy of appeasing these guys apparently isn't going to work anymore. So you have to look prospectively now, and say, okay, what is going to be happening in the future that we think is going to enable us to modify the behavior of the North Koreans?

Q Just one more, I just want to be clear. You're suggesting the Clinton approach was appeasement?

MR. SNOW: No, what I'm saying is that in the past what has happened is the attempt to say to the North Koreans -- because I think the Clinton administration, again, tried something and it was worth trying, which is to say, okay, we're going to give you a bunch of carrots: You guys renounce; we're going to try to give you a light-water breeder reactor, we'll give you incentives. And the North Koreans took it and ran away with it. What has also happened is that in response to bad behavior in the past, people have said, you know, what we'll do is we'll increase aid, we'll increase trade.

So rather than using the term "appeasement," what I will say is that you had primarily a carrots-oriented approach. Now you've got carrots and sticks. ...

Q And your belief is that the march to war against Iraq in no way limited this administration's ability to dissuade North Korea from developing nuclear weapons?

MR. SNOW: Absolutely right, absolutely right, absolutely right. The two are, in fact, separate issues that are worked on by separate people. ..."

[ProgressiveEconomist]

12. FINALLY, a Democrat gets the talking points right, but he's a "ringer'.

William Perry, former Secretary of Defense and former Special Adviser to President Clinton on NK, knows more than just about anybody in the world about NK's nuclear capacity. He wrote a definitive 1999 report to Clinton about it, still online at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/991012_northkorea_rpt.html .

Yesterday, the Washington Post published an op-ed piece of his that Bill Richardson and others who have exhibited ignorance on cable TV this week should study:

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From http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/10/AR2006101001285.html :

"In Search of a North Korea Policy; By William J. Perry

Wednesday, October 11, 2006; Page A19

North Korea's declared nuclear bomb test ... demonstrates the total failure of the Bush administration's policy toward that country. For almost six years this policy has been a strange combination of harsh rhetoric and inaction. President Bush, early in his first term, dubbed North Korea a member of the "axis of evil" and made disparaging remarks about Kim Jong Il. He said he would not tolerate a North Korean nuclear weapons program, but he set no bounds on North Korean actions.

The most important such limit would have been on reprocessing spent fuel from North Korea's reactor to make plutonium. The Clinton administration declared in 1994 that if North Korea reprocessed, it would be crossing a "red line," and it threatened military action if that line was crossed. The North Koreans responded to that pressure and began negotiations that led to the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework did not end North Korea's aspirations for nuclear weapons, but it did result in a major delay. For more than eight years, under the Agreed Framework, the spent fuel was kept in a storage pond under international supervision.

Then in 2002, the Bush administration discovered the existence of a covert program in uranium, evidently an attempt to evade the Agreed Framework. This program, while potentially serious, would have led to a bomb at a very slow rate, compared with the more mature plutonium program. Nevertheless, the administration unwisely stopped compliance with the Agreed Framework. In response the North Koreans sent the inspectors home and announced their intention to reprocess. The administration deplored the action but set no "red line." North Korea made the plutonium."