A patrol highlights the difficulty in turning over security to Iraqis...
Two years after U.S. troops assaulted this mostly Sunni Muslim city of 300,000 in the heart of Iraq's violent Anbar province in a major offensive to retake it from insurgents, Iraqi units are responsible for patrolling two-thirds of Fallujah and often do it well, their U.S. advisers say. But the Americans - and the Iraqis themselves - are frustrated that the Iraqis still can't fight on their own.
They don't have heavy weapons, such as tanks. They struggle to get supplies.
Most importantly, there just aren't enough Iraqi troops to secure the city properly or, on some days, even to mount foot patrols.
The Iraqi unit working in Fallujah, the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, is 750 men short of its full strength of 2,450, and only two-thirds of those are available at any given time because of the army's generous leave policy.
Lt. Col. James Teeples, who oversees the teams of U.S. military trainers living and working with the Iraqi troops in Fallujah, said Iraqi soldiers faced a long list of problems that were sapping morale. They include corruption among senior leaders, an inefficient pay system that's left some unpaid for months and a Byzantine promotion system that leaves good leaders, such as the brigade's second in command, languishing in lower posts.
http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/15838257.htmThe McClatchy piece goes on to report about bribery, the inability of Iraqis to get their own ammo and theft of Iraqi equipment. "The supply-chain problem alone is so serious that it could make U.S. help necessary for years, Teeples said."
From the NYT:
The Government is Lying to You, orIraqi Realities Undermine the Pentagon’s Predictions
On paper, Iraq has substantial security forces. The Pentagon noted in an August report to Congress that Iraq had more than 277,000 troops and police officers, including some 115,000 army combat soldiers.
But those figures, which have often been cited at Pentagon news conferences as an indicator of progress and a potential exit strategy for American troops, paint a distorted picture. When the deep-seated reluctance of many soldiers to serve outside their home regions, leaves of absence and AWOL rates are taken into account, only a portion of the Iraqi Army is readily available for duty in Baghdad and other hot spots.
...
A quarter or so of a typical Iraqi unit is on leave at any one time. Since Iraq lacks an effective banking system for paying its troops, soldiers are generally given a week’s leave each month to bring their pay home.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/25/world/middleeast/25assess.html?_r=1&hp&ex=1161748800&en=b6f7a78ce40b23a3&ei=5094&partner=homepage&oref=slogin