US Citizens to be Required ''Clearance'' to Leave USA

[BrokenBeyondRepair]

http://sianews.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3023

http://hasbrouck.org/IDP/IDP-APIS-comments.pdf

[aquart]

1. Like in the Soviet Union?

Is the top link not a pdf? (They crash on my pc.)

[ret5hd]

3. Or North Korea.

[Jack Rabbit]

9. It is not a pdf.

It is a website called Friends of Liberty: The Voice of the Right.

I'm a wee bit skeptical of the claim.

[lala_rawraw]

38. oh how nice, to feel like i am back in the old country... n/t

[symbolman]

39. Actually Lala

My wife and I were joking (since we run Takebackthemedia.com) that we've seen more Truth in Pravda than our own media :)

Hope all of your relatives are as fine as can be expected from these fascists, and you aren't taking too many risks yourself..

[ret5hd]

2. Are all those pro-fence people --REALLY-- sure they want one?

[BrokenBeyondRepair]

7. i doubt those ppl have even given this much thought..

it's probably safe to assume that a significant majority of the ppl in the US have lost all critical thinking skills and know just mimic whatever the status quo of the day is..

alive in the grave; very sad

[Cleita]

4. I'm not sure about your sources and I couldn't open the pdf

file, but if this is true, I guess we now have our own Berlin Wall on our southern border.

[BrokenBeyondRepair]

8. i'm not sure either.. hoping replies will provide more info

[readmoreoften]

27. www.papersplease.org has filed a complaint against the government

on this issue. I imagine that lawyers wouldn't bother to litigate against a phantom. This has been all over the news but in tiny fragments that are hard to trace. We're too busy with gay pastors to notice.

[readmoreoften]

28. Sorry it's not litigation, but just a complaint. /nt

[helderheid]

5. you're scaring me!

[Sugar Smack]

13. Y'know, this really doesn't look good.

I have goosebumps over it as well.

[helderheid]

40. when will this begin?

[Mrs.Matcom]

6. I want a MSM source on this or a Gov't doc

on edit: this is Matcom posting under Mrs Matcom's login (sorry)

[ret5hd]

10. i THOUGHT your legs looked awful hairy

[Generic Other]

11. However, he is wearing his wife's underwear

hee hee...

[Viva_La_Revolution]

12. pdf references the docket #

USCBP-2005-0003-0003 and the associated "Regulatory Assessment" published July 18, 2006 on the Web site at http://www.regulations.gov and docketed as USCBP-2005-0003-0005


off to check it out...

[BrokenBeyondRepair]

14. for those w/o pdf readers...

Document ID USCBP-2005-0003-0003 from http://www.regulations.gov/

sorry for the poor format..

Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14, 2006 / Proposed Rules 40035
§ 1653.3 Processing retirement benefits
court orders.
* * * * *
(b) * * * Retirement benefits court
orders should be submitted to the TSP
record keeper at the current address as
provided at http://www.tsp.gov. * * *
* * * * *
7. Amend § 1653.13 by revising the
third sentence of paragraph (b)
introductory text to read as follows:
§ 1653.13 Processing legal processes.
* * * * *
(b) * * * Legal processes should be
submitted to the TSP record keeper at
the current address as provided at
http://www.tsp.gov. * * *
* * * * *
PART 1690—THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN
8. The authority citation for part 1690
continues to be read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 8474.
9. Amend § 1690.1 by removing the
definition of Thrift Savings Plan Service
Office or TSPSO and by revising the
definition of ThriftLine to read as
follows:
§ 1690.1 Definitions.
* * * * *
ThriftLine means the automated voice
response system by which TSP
participants may, among other things,
access their accounts by telephone. The
ThriftLine can be reached at (877) 968–
3778.
* * * * *

BILLING CODE 6760–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection
19 CFR Parts 4 and 122

RIN 1651–AA62
Passenger Manifests for Commercial
Aircraft Arriving in and Departing From
the United States; Passenger and Crew
Manifests for Commercial Vessels
Departing From the United States
AGENCY: Customs and Border Protection,
Department of Homeland Security.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: This rule proposes to amend
existing Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection regulations concerning
electronic manifest transmission
requirements relative to passengers,
crew members, and non-crew members
traveling onboard international
commercial flights and voyages. Under
current regulations, air carriers must
transmit to the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), passenger
manifest information for aircraft en
route to the United States no later than
15 minutes after the departure of the
aircraft. This proposed rule implements
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 requirement that
such information be provided to the
government before departure of the
aircraft. This proposed rule provides air
carriers a choice between transmitting
complete manifests no later than 60-
minutes prior to departure of the aircraft
or transmitting manifest information on
passengers as each passenger checks in
for the flight, up to but no later than 15
minutes prior to departure. The rule
also proposes to amend the definition of
‘‘departure’’ for aircraft to mean the
moment the aircraft is pushed back from
the gate. For vessel departures from the
United States, the rule proposes
transmission of passenger and crew
manifests no later than 60 minutes prior
to departure of the vessel.
DATES: Written comments must be
received on or before August 14, 2006.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by docket number USCBP–
2005–0003, by one of the following
methods:
(1) Federal eRulemaking Portal:
http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
(2) Mail: Comments by mail are to be
addressed to the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection, Office of Regulations
and Rulings, Regulations Branch, 1300
Pennsylvania Ave., NW. (Mint Annex),
Washington, DC 20229.
(3) Hand delivery/courier: 799 9th
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20220.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Charles Perez, Program Manager, Office
of Field Operations, Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection (202–344–2605).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Supplementary Information section is
organized as follows:
I. Public Participation
II. Background and Purpose
III. Proposed Rule
A. Change Regarding Definition of
‘‘Departure’’ for Aircraft
B. Proposed Options for Transmission of
Manifest Data by Air Carriers
1. APIS 60 (Interactive Batch
Transmission) Option
2. APIS Quick Query (Interactive Real-
Time Transmission) Option
3. System Certification; Delayed Effective
Date
4. Carriers Opting Out; Non-Interactive
Batch Transmission Process
C. Proposed Change for Transmission of
Manifests by Departing Vessels
IV. Rationale for Change
A. Terrorist Threat
B. IRTPA
V. Impact on Parties Affected by the
Proposed Rule
VI. Regulatory Requirements
A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review)
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
F. National Environmental Policy Act
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
H. Signing Authority
I. Privacy Statement
I. Public Participation
Interested persons are invited to
participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written data, views, or
arguments on all aspects of the
proposed rule. CBP also invites
comments that relate to the economic,
environmental, or federalism effects that
might result from this proposed rule.
Comments that will provide the most
assistance to CBP in developing these
procedures will reference a specific
portion of the proposed rule, explain the
reason for any recommended change,
and include data, information, or
authority that support such
recommended change.
Instructions: All submissions received
must include the agency name and
docket number for this rulemaking
(USCBP–2005–0003). All comments
received will be posted without change
to http://www.regulations.gov, including
any personal information provided.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Submitted
comments may also be inspected at the
Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, 799 9th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20220. To inspect
comments, please call (202) 572–8768 to
arrange for an appointment.
II. Background and Purpose
The Advance Passenger Information
System (APIS) is a widely utilized
electronic data interchange system
approved by DHS for use by
international commercial air and vessel
carriers to transmit electronically to CBP
certain data on passengers, crew
members, and non-crew members, as
required under CBP regulations. APIS
was developed by the former U.S.
Customs Service (Customs) in 1988, in
cooperation with the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:53 Jul 13, 2006 Jkt 208001 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\14JYP1.SGM 14JYP1 jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL
40036 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14, 2006 / Proposed Rules
(INS) and the airline industry. Although
initially voluntary, APIS participation
grew, making it nearly an industry
standard. Requirements governing the
electronic transmission of passenger,
crew member, and non-crew member
(cargo flights only) manifests for
commercial aircraft and/or vessels
involved in international travel
operations were established in
accordance with several statutory
mandates, including, but not limited to:
section 115 of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA;
Public Law 107–71, 115 Stat. 623; 49
U.S.C. 44909), section 402 of the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act of 2002 (abbreviated
here to Enhanced Border Security Act or
EBSA; Public Law 107–173, 116 Stat.
557; 8 U.S.C. 1221), and certain
Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) laws and regulations (49 U.S.C.
114; 49 CFR 1544, 1546, 1550). A more
detailed description of the histories of
electronic manifest information
requirements, and of these authorities,
is set forth in a final rule published by
CBP on April 7, 2005 at 70 FR 17820.
The information transmitted by
carriers using APIS consists, in part, of
information that appears on the
biographical data page of travel
documents, such as passports issued by
governments worldwide. Many APIS
data elements (such as name, date of
birth, gender, country of citizenship,
passport or other travel document
information) have been collected
routinely over the years by governments
of countries into which a traveler seeks
entry (by requiring the traveler to
present a government-issued travel
document). CBP uses this biographical
data to perform enforcement and
security queries against various multiagency
law enforcement and terrorist
databases in connection with, as
appropriate, international flights to,
from, continuing within, and overflying
the United States and international
voyages to and from the United States.
Current CBP regulations require air
carriers to electronically transmit
passenger arrival manifests to CBP no
later than 15 minutes after the departure
of the aircraft from any place outside the
United States (19 CFR 122.49a(b)(2))
and passenger departure manifests no
later than 15 minutes prior to departure
of the aircraft from the United States (19
CFR 122.75a(b)(2)). Manifests for crew
members on passenger and all-cargo
flights and non-crew members on allcargo
flights must be electronically
transmitted to CBP no later than 60
minutes prior to the departure of any
covered flight to, continuing within, or
overflying the United States (19 CFR
122.49b(b)(2)) and no later than 60
minutes prior to the departure of any
covered flight from the United States (19
CFR 122.75b(b)(2)) (a covered flight
being one covered by these regulations).
Current CBP regulations require
vessel carriers to electronically transmit
arrival passenger and crew member
manifests at least 24 hours and up to 96
hours prior to the vessel’s entry at a U.S.
port or place of destination, depending
on the length of the voyage (for voyages
of 24 but less than 96 hours,
transmission must be prior to departure
of the vessel from any place outside the
United States) (19 CFR 4.7b(b)(2)). Also,
a vessel carrier must electronically
transmit passenger and crew member
departure manifests to CBP no later than
15 minutes prior to the vessel’s
departure from the United States (19
CFR 4.64(b)(2)).
These CBP regulations, referred to as
the ‘‘APIS regulations’’ (19 CFR 4.7b,
4.64, 122.49a–122.49c, 122.75a, and
122.75b), established a framework for
requiring that manifest information for
passengers, crew members, and noncrew
members, as appropriate, be
electronically transmitted for these
arrivals and departures, and for
requiring crew and non-crew member
manifest information for flights
continuing within and overflying the
United States. These regulations serve to
provide the nation, the carrier
industries, and the international
traveling public, additional security
from the threat of terrorism and enhance
CBP’s ability to carry out its border
enforcement mission.
The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA); Public Law 108–458, was
enacted on December 17, 2004. Sections
4012 and 4071 of the IRTPA require
DHS to issue regulations and procedures
to allow for pre-departure vetting of
passengers onboard aircraft arriving in
and departing from the United States
and of passengers and crew onboard
vessels arriving in and departing from
the United States. This proposed rule is
designed to implement these important
IRTPA requirements and to further
enhance national security and the
security of the air and vessel travel
industries in accordance with the ATSA
and EBSA (both of which formed the
statutory basis for the APIS regulations).
This proposed rule would require
transmission of, as appropriate,
passenger and/or crew member
information early enough in the process
to prevent a high-risk passenger from
boarding an aircraft and to prevent the
departure of a vessel with such a
passenger or crew member onboard.
CBP’s purpose in proposing this change
is to place itself in a better position to:
(1) Fully vet passenger and crew
member information with sufficient
time to effectively secure the aircraft or
vessel, including time to coordinate
with carrier personnel and domestic or
foreign government authorities in order
to take appropriate action warranted by
the threat; (2) identify high-risk
passengers and prevent them from
boarding aircraft bound for or departing
from the United States; and (3) identify
high-risk passengers and crew members
to prevent the departure of vessels from
the United States with a high-risk
passenger or crew member onboard.
Achieving these goals would permit
CBP to more effectively prevent an
identified high-risk traveler from
becoming a threat to passengers, crew,
aircraft, vessels, or the public and
would ensure that the electronic data
transmission and screening process
required under CBP regulations
comports with the purposes of ATSA,
EBSA, and IRTPA.
III. Proposed Rule
Under the manifest transmission time
requirements of the existing APIS
regulations, which mandate
transmission of passenger manifests no
later than 15 minutes after departure of
an aircraft en route to the United States,
CBP has the ability to fully vet
commercial aircraft passenger
information after the aircraft has
departed. The identification of a highrisk
passenger soon after the aircraft
becomes airborne may result in the
diversion of the aircraft to a U.S. port
other than the original destination or the
return of the aircraft to the port of
departure (referred to as a ‘‘turnback’’).
This action could prevent the hijacking
of the aircraft and the potential use of
the plane as a weapon of mass
destruction against U.S. or other targets,
and would enable CBP to detain, or
arrange for the detention of, the highrisk
passenger. The same results could
be obtained with respect to aircraft
departing from the United States when
identification of a high-risk passenger
occurs after the aircraft is airborne. This
post-departure identification could
occur since the APIS regulations require
the transmission of manifests only 15
minutes prior to departure.
However, high-risk passengers
allowed to board before they have been
fully vetted may pose a security risk for
aircraft en route to or departing from the
United States. A boarded high-risk
passenger would have the opportunity
to plant or retrieve a disassembled
improvised explosive device or other
weapon. The detonation of an explosive
device could have devastating
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14, 2006 / Proposed Rules 40037
consequences, both in terms of human
life and from an economic perspective
(damage to aircraft and airport
infrastructure and any ripple effects on
the airport’s and the carrier’s business
and across the U.S. economy). Thus,
requiring the collection and vetting of
passenger information before the
boarding of passengers on flights en
route to or departing from the United
States would allow CBP to identify high
risk passengers before such passengers
could pose a threat to fellow passengers
or to the aircraft and airport.
Therefore, CBP has concluded that the
prevention of a high-risk passenger from
boarding an aircraft is the appropriate
level of security in the commercial air
travel environment. Manifest data
received and vetted prior to passenger
boarding will enable CBP to attain this
level of security. Further, this vetting of
passengers on international flights
should eliminate the need for passenger
carriers to conduct watch list screening
of these passengers, upon publication
and implementation of a final rule.
Accordingly, with this proposed rule,
CBP is proposing two transmission
options for air carriers to select from at
their discretion: (i) the submission of
complete manifests no later than 60
minutes prior to departure or (ii)
transmitting passenger data as
individual, real-time transactions, i.e.,
as each passenger checks in, up to but
no later than 15 minutes prior to
departure. Under both options, the
carrier will not permit the boarding of
a passenger unless the passenger has
been cleared by CBP.
With respect to the commercial vessel
travel environment, CBP has determined
that the appropriate level of security for
departing vessels is to prevent vessel
departures with a high-risk passenger or
crew member onboard. Thus, the
proposed rule requires vessel carriers to
transmit complete manifests no later
than 60 minutes prior to departure. An
alternative procedure based on
individual passenger/crew transactions,
as is provided in the air travel
environment to address a need for
flexibility, is not offered given the
generally less time-critical nature of the
commercial vessel travel environment.
Finally, with this rule, CBP also is
proposing to change the definition of
‘‘departure,’’ as discussed immediately
below.
A. Change Regarding Definition of
‘‘Departure’’ for Aircraft
Under the existing APIS regulations,
the departure of an aircraft occurs at the
moment an aircraft is ‘‘wheels-up,’’
meaning that the landing gear is
retracted into the aircraft after liftoff and
the aircraft is en route to its destination
(19 CFR 122.49a(a)). In practice, wheelsup
can occur as much as 15 to 25 or
more minutes after an aircraft leaves the
gate (which is referred to as ‘‘pushback’’).
This meaning of ‘‘departure,’’
applied under either the existing
regulations or the proposed regulations,
would result in CBP receiving manifest
data later in the process than is
sufficient to perform full vetting and
prevent high-risk boardings. CBP
believes that departure for aircraft, as
applied to manifests for passengers,
crew members, and non-crew members
under the APIS regulations, should
mean the moment when an aircraft
pushes-back from the gate. This change
would assist in providing CBP with
sufficient time to complete the full
vetting process. Therefore, this rule
proposes to revise the definition of
‘‘departure’’ in 19 CFR 122.49a(a)
accordingly (which will be applicable to
other APIS aircraft provisions as well:
19 CFR 122.49b, 122.75a, 122.75b).
B. Proposed Options for Transmission of
Manifest Data by Air Carriers
To provide maximum flexibility for
the air travel industry and aircraft
passengers while improving the ability
of DHS to safeguard air travel, CBP is
proposing two options for the electronic
transmission of manifest information by
air carriers. The two transmission
options proposed in this rule differ to
some degree in timing, programming,
and procedures. Nevertheless, both are
equally effective in obtaining the
advance information needed to achieve
the appropriate level of security
necessary for aircraft (prevent a highrisk
boarding) and thereby to ensure that
the purposes of the governing statutes
are met. An air carrier’s election of
either option would depend on the
individual carrier’s particular
operations and its capability to
electronically transmit the manifest data
to CBP. CBP also notes that the current
APIS regulations providing for
electronic transmission of manifest data
60 minutes prior to departure for crew
and non-crew on flights to, from,
continuing within, and overflying the
United States are unchanged (19 CFR
122.49b and 122.75b).
Under one option, air carriers would
transmit all required passenger data to
CBP in batch form (all passenger names
and associated data at once) no later
than 60 minutes prior to departure of
the aircraft. This option, known as APIS
60, is similar to the current electronic
transmission process to the extent that
manifest data would be transmitted in
batch form and CBP would perform
security vetting against all data at once.
Under the other option, known as APIS
Quick Query (AQQ), air carriers would
transmit required passenger data to CBP
individually as each passenger checks
in for the flight, from the beginning of
the check-in process up to 15 minutes
prior to departure. CBP would perform
its security vetting as it receives the
data.
The electronic transmission system
employed under these options would be
‘‘interactive,’’ allowing the carrier to
electronically receive return messages
from CBP that can be sent within
seconds or minutes, as opposed to the
capability of the APIS manifest
transmission process as implemented
under the current regulation where any
communication by CBP with the carrier
is performed by telephone. Thus, the
term ‘‘interactive’’ is used in this
document to refer to or describe the
electronic communication system
employed under the APIS 60 option and
the AQQ option described further
below.
CBP believes that both APIS 60 and
AQQ provide sufficient time to achieve
the appropriate level of security sought
in the commercial air travel
environment, i.e., to prevent a high-risk
boarding. These options are offered
because the unique ‘‘just in time’’ nature
of the commercial air travel
environment, characterized by busy
airports, tight arrival and departure
schedules, the carriers’ need to
minimize time aircraft spend at the gate,
and the immense focus on timeliness as
a performance measure, justifies
flexibility in this environment.
CBP anticipates that both options will
be well-utilized, and the comment
period is expected to provide an
indication of which option the carriers
are likely to select. However, CBP
expects that the AQQ option would be
selected by those carriers that have preexisting
reservations control systems,
whereas smaller or charter carriers may
be more likely to use the APIS 60
option. A subset of air carriers would
not be able to adopt either option; this
is discussed further below.
Throughout the period that these
proposed amendments were in
development, CBP consulted with
various industry associations and
considered their comments concerning
the impact various manifest
transmission alternatives would have on
business processes, operating costs, and
legitimate passengers who might
experience travel delays and miss
connecting flights. The dual-option
approach for air carriers described
above is responsive to those comments
and is designed to balance the security
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40038 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14, 2006 / Proposed Rules
and facilitation goals of government
with the needs of the industry.
CBP submits that these options, if
adopted in a final rule, will result in
CBP and the air carriers achieving a far
higher success rate in keeping high-risk
passengers from boarding aircraft than is
possible under the current regulations.
With this change, instances of
diversions and turnbacks will be greatly
reduced, if not eliminated, due to the
increased effectiveness of the process.
Further, the impact on the industry will
be substantially less than would be the
case with other alternatives due to the
greater flexibility provided by the dualoption
approach.
CBP notes that there is a subcategory
of air carriers that would be unable to
adopt either the APIS 60 option or the
AQQ option as described in this
document. These carriers, typically
unscheduled air carrier operators that
employ eAPIS (Internet method) for
manifest data transmission, such as
seasonal charters, air taxis, and air
ambulances, would not be able to adopt
the interactive communication
functionality that the APIS 60 and AQQ
options employ. Consequently, CBP
would manually (i.e., by e-mail or
telephone) communicate vetting results
to these carriers. These carriers,
however, would be bound by the
requirement proposed in this rule to
transmit passenger manifest data no
later than 60 minutes prior to departure.
The proposed regulation treats these
carriers as a subset of air carriers that
will transmit complete manifests, as
opposed to carriers that will transmit
manifest data per individual passenger
as passengers check in for the flight.
This document discusses primarily the
two major options that will be available
to the air carriers that will employ an
interactive communication system for
manifest data transmission, as set forth
in this section (Section B of Part III) (but
see subsection (4) of this section further
below).
1. APIS 60 (Interactive Batch
Transmission) Option
APIS 60 would apply as one option to
transmit passenger manifests prior to
departure for aircraft arriving in and
departing from the United States, and as
the sole requirement for transmitting
passenger and crew manifests for
vessels departing from the United States
(see Section C of this part for these
vessels). The APIS 60 procedure is, with
some exception relating to transmission
time requirements and interactive
communication between carriers and
CBP, similar to the APIS procedure
currently employed to implement the
current APIS regulations. For arriving
and departing aircraft, air carriers would
be required to transmit passenger
manifests in batch form (all names and
associated data at once) to CBP no later
than 60 minutes prior to departure of
the aircraft (as defined under this
proposed rule) at which time the vetting
process would begin.
Under APIS 60, the vetting of aircraft
passenger data would be performed in
two stages. The first would be an initial
automated vetting of passenger data
against appropriate law enforcement
(including terrorist) databases. The
second would be the further vetting of
names identified as a match or possible
match during the initial automated
vetting stage, as well as names
associated with incomplete or
inadequate transmitted data.
When the initial automated vetting
process identifies a match between an
individual passenger’s data and data on
a terrorist watch list, a close possible
match, or an incomplete or inadequate
passenger record, CBP would send by
electronic return message a ‘‘notcleared’’
instruction to the carrier
within minutes of CBP’s receipt of the
manifest data (CBP return messages
relative to not-cleared instructions
based on an inadequate record would
also instruct the carrier to retransmit
complete/corrected data). Since
boarding usually commences 30 to 45
minutes prior to departure (as defined
in this proposed rule), a not-cleared
instruction relative to a match or
possible match, or an inadequate record,
would ensure, in most cases, that the
associated passenger will not be allowed
to board the aircraft (subject to the
occasional instance of unexpected
results due to error, technical anomaly,
etc., or a carrier beginning the boarding
process outside the 60-minute vetting
window.) The manifest transmission
requirements under the current
regulations—no later than 15 minutes
after departure for flights en route to the
United States and no later than 15
minutes prior to departure for flights
departing from the United States—do
not achieve this critical result (even if
departure were defined as push-back).
An aircraft en route to the United States
is already airborne before CBP even
receives the manifest. For flights
departing from the United States, no
manifest information is received by CBP
until—at the earliest—15 minutes, and
often 30 minutes or more, after boarding
begins (CBP notes that under the current
procedure, only a passenger who is a
match or possible match would be
subject to further vetting).
The further vetting of passengers who
generate a not-cleared instruction
during the initial vetting stage would be
handled by an analyst with access to
additional data resources. During this
stage, CBP would be able to confirm or
correct matches and resolve possible
matches and incomplete or inadequate
passenger records, enabling most
passengers who are eventually cleared
to make their flights. CBP would notify
a carrier by return message where the
results of further vetting clear a
passenger for boarding.
When the initial automated vetting
procedure results in CBP’s returning
not-cleared instructions to the air
carrier, the carrier’s personnel would
have to ensure that the identified
passenger is not permitted to board with
other passengers and that the
passenger’s baggage is not loaded onto,
or is removed from, the aircraft. In rare
instances, the carrier may have to
remove the passenger from the aircraft
(which may occur in the case of an
oversight or other error in the boarding
process or should a carrier begin the
boarding process outside the 60-minute
vetting window). When further vetting
confirms a not-cleared passenger as
high-risk, the next step in the process
would include CBP communicating to
the appropriate authorities the results of
the vetting and any action to be taken
to secure the confirmed high-risk
passenger. In some circumstances,
during the further vetting process, either
the carrier, CBP, or other appropriate
domestic or foreign government official
would have to interview the passenger
to complete the confirmation (or further
vetting) process, a step that would take
additional time.
The further vetting process, the
communication step that follows, and
the taking of appropriate action are the
steps that, together, would consume the
most time under the APIS 60 procedure.
With passenger data being transmitted
in a batch, CBP could have several
names that require further vetting. Each
query pursued in further vetting is
unique and some queries will take more
time than others. Further, the
communication and appropriate action
steps of the process are subject to
additional complexities, especially
when foreign carriers or government
personnel are involved or an interview
is required. Thus, the full process and
related steps described above require
more time than the current regulation
provides to meet the appropriate level of
security sought.
While the not-cleared instruction after
the initial automated vetting stage
would prevent a high-risk or potential
high-risk passenger from boarding the
aircraft when the carrier begins the
boarding process, thereby achieving
CBP’s security goal, completion of the
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further vetting process is necessary to
make a final determination regarding
the passenger subject to the not-cleared
instruction. This final resolution is
especially critical with respect to
possible matches and incomplete or
inadequate passenger records. A
required transmission time frame of 60-
minutes prior to departure would
provide the time necessary to
accommodate this process and thereby
effectively achieve the appropriate level
of security. CBP notes that further
vetting, in most cases, would be
completed in time for the passenger to
make his intended flight; however, in
some circumstances, further vetting
could take longer than normally
expected, resulting in the passenger
having to be rebooked on a later flight
(if ultimately cleared for flight by CBP).
As a final step in the process, the air
carrier would have to transmit to CBP a
list, referred to as a close-out message,
consisting of a unique passenger
identifier for each passenger who
checked in for the flight but was not
boarded for any reason. The close-out
message must be transmitted as soon as
possible after departure and in no
instance later than 30 minutes after
departure.
CBP is committed to having the APIS
60 option for pre-departure interactive
electronic transmission fully available
for industry use prior to publication of
a final rule.
2. APIS Quick Query (Interactive Realtime
Transmission) Option
Under the AQQ option, which is
applicable only to aircraft arrival and
departure passenger manifests, air
carriers would transmit passenger data
to CBP in real time, i.e., as individual
passengers check in, up to but no later
than 15 minutes prior to departure of
the aircraft; data received by CBP less
than 15 minutes prior to departure
would not meet the requirement.
Under the AQQ procedure, the carrier
would be able to transmit data relative
to a passenger as soon as passengers
begin checking in for the flight, as early
as 2 hours or more prior to departure (as
defined in this document). Since
passengers on international flights are
routinely advised to arrive as much as
2 hours before departure for check-in,
manifest data for most passengers would
be transmitted to CBP well before
departure of the flight. Moreover, fewer
names and associated data would be
transmitted to CBP at one time than
would be the case with the batch
transmissions made under the APIS 60
procedure. Under APIS 60, over 200
passenger records may be included in
one batch transmission, while under
AQQ, a transmission would contain the
name and data for one passenger (or up
to 10 passengers traveling on one
itinerary).
Also, under AQQ, the messaging for
CBP vetting results could be returned
directly to the carrier’s reservation
system, reducing the time needed for
human intervention. Thus, CBP would
be able to respond within seconds of the
carrier’s transmission of data. Carriers
then would have to return a message to
CBP confirming receipt of any notcleared
instructions and would not
issue a boarding pass to any passenger
unless cleared by CBP. As with the APIS
60 option, any passenger data generating
a match, possible match, or inadequate
record would be forwarded to an analyst
for further vetting. CBP would
electronically notify the carrier as soon
as possible if, upon additional analysis,
a change to the not-cleared instruction
is warranted (such as would be the case
if a match or possible match was
determined during further vetting to be
cleared for boarding).
At its discretion, a carrier would be
able to use a dedicated telephone
number provided by CBP to seek a
resolution of a not-cleared instruction
by providing additional information
relative to the not-cleared passenger if
available, such as a physical
description. CBP would consider the
additional information as it proceeds
with the further vetting of the passenger
already in progress. In some instances,
CBP would instruct the carrier to
retransmit data (as in the case of
inadequate data). In any case, CBP
would return a message to the carrier to
clear a passenger for boarding if
warranted by the results of additional
analysis.
Where CBP is unable to complete its
additional analysis prior to departure,
the carrier would be bound by the notcleared
instruction and would not be
permitted to issue a boarding pass for
that passenger. This could result in a
passenger not making his flight and
having to be rebooked should the notcleared
instruction eventually be
corrected and the passenger be cleared
for flight. Alternatively, and at its sole
discretion, the carrier could delay the
flight until CBP could clear the
passenger for boarding. Finally, as with
the APIS 60 option, the carrier would
have to transmit to CBP, no later than
30 minutes after departure, a close-out
message consisting of a unique
passenger identifier for each passenger
who checked in for the flight but was
not boarded for any reason.
Under the AQQ procedure, carrier
real-time manifest data transmission
would provide sufficient time for CBP to
perform an effective vetting of the
passengers. Most passengers check in
well before departure of international
flights, so very late arrivals are likely to
be comparatively few. These facts
enable CBP to propose a transmission
time frame that some carriers will find
more compatible with their business
operations.
For passengers checking in early,
there generally would be ample time for
completion of the vetting process. For
the few passengers checking in late, CBP
would be able to quickly vet the data in
most instances. Thus, CBP expects that
no identified high-risk passenger will
receive a boarding pass and, for most
flights, any passengers subject to further
vetting and cleared for flight will make
the flight. Also, more connecting
passengers would be able to check in, be
vetted, and make their flights than is
anticipated under the APIS 60
procedure. This is a major advantage
over the APIS 60 procedure for air
carriers with connecting flight
operations.
Accordingly, AQQ would achieve the
appropriate level of security sought in a
way that some airlines may prefer to the
APIS 60 method. In addition, this
procedure would prevent a high-risk
passenger from gaining access to the
security area, since access for domestic
and most international airports is
restricted to those with boarding passes.
Also, a high-risk passenger’s baggage
would not be loaded onto the aircraft
which avoids the necessity of having it
removed, as may sometimes be
necessary under the APIS 60 procedure.
There is, however, one exception to
the foregoing: connecting passengers
arriving by aircraft at the departure
airport, for a flight en route to or
departing from the United States, who
were issued boarding passes (for the
flight to or from the United States) prior
to arrival at that departure airport and
whose data was not previously
transmitted to CBP for vetting. These
passengers will already be within the
security area as they transit the airport
from the gate they arrived at to the gate
of the connecting flight. For this unique
group of passengers, CBP, in
implementing AQQ, would consider the
boarding passes they possess as
provisional and would require that
carriers obtain required data from these
passengers in a manner compatible with
their procedures and transmit such data
to CBP as required. The carrier would be
required to wait for CBP to clear any
such passengers before validating the
boarding passes or permitting the
passengers to board the aircraft.
CBP currently is developing user
requirements for the programming
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necessary to implement the AQQ
transmission procedure. CBP will have
to make adjustments to its automated
systems to offer this data transmission
option to the carriers, as will carriers
who elect to use this option. CBP will
consider these factors, as well as others
identified during the comment period,
in structuring an implementation plan
and schedule that coincides with the
readiness of CBP’s IT infrastructure to
support the AQQ option. CBP is
committed to having the AQQ option for
pre-departure interactive electronic
transmission fully available for industry
use prior to publication of a final rule.
3. System Certification and Delayed
Effective Date
Prior to a carrier’s commencement of
manifest transmission using either of
the above-described APIS 60 or AQQ
options, the carrier would receive a
‘‘system certification’’ from CBP
indicating that its electronic
transmission system is capable of
interactively communicating with CBP’s
APIS system as configured for these
options. Carriers already operating
under the APIS procedure (under the
current APIS regulation which requires
batch manifest transmission but under
different time requirements and a less
interactive process) who opt to employ
the APIS 60 option for their manifest
transmissions would obtain certification
only for new functionalities (relating to
system interactivity) and would not
undergo a full system certification.
To accommodate carriers who choose
the interactive system for manifest
transmission under either the APIS 60
option or the AQQ option, CBP, in this
rule, is proposing that the effective date
of a final rule be delayed for 180 days
from the date of its publication. This
should provide all such carriers
sufficient time to make any necessary
program changes or system
modifications and to obtain system
certification and implementation. CBP
strongly encourages carriers to begin
efforts to obtain system interactivity and
certification by contacting CBP as soon
as possible.
4. Carriers Opting Out; Non-Interactive
Batch Transmission Process
As stated previously, some carriers,
notably those currently using the eAPIS
Internet method of transmitting required
manifest data (typically, small,
unscheduled air carrier operators, such
as seasonal charters, air taxis, and air
ambulances), may not be able to adopt
either the APIS 60 option or the AQQ
option. These carriers do not seek an
interactive electronic communication
method to make transmissions, as such
a system does not fit their operations,
technical capabilities, or budgets.
Nonetheless, these carriers would be
bound by a requirement to transmit
manifest data no later than 60 minutes
prior to departure, as proposed in this
rule. The proposed rule contains a
subparagraph that accommodates these
carriers as transmitters of batch manifest
data without interactive electronic
communication capability. These
carriers would not have to seek system
certification. CBP will employ a manual
process using email or telephone
communication (by which CBP would
send not-cleared messages) to
accommodate these carriers. This
manual procedure may slow the vetting
process to some extent, but CBP believes
that the goal of preventing a high-risk
boarding would be achieved, as carriers
would not board passengers subject to a
not-cleared instruction unless cleared
by CBP.
C. Proposed Change for Transmission of
Manifests by Departing Vessels
Typically, vessel carriers allow
boarding several hours (typically 3 to 6
hours) prior to departure. Thus, a
manifest transmission requirement
designed to prevent the possibility of a
high-risk vessel-boarding likely would
require substantial adjustments to the
carriers’ operations. This would
frustrate CBP’s intent, and the purpose
of various requirements governing
Federal rulemaking, to achieve the
agency’s goal (enhanced security)
without imposing an unreasonable
burden on affected parties.
CBP believes that, under this
circumstance, the appropriate level of
security sought in this scenario is to
prevent the departure of a vessel with a
high-risk passenger or crew member
onboard. The change proposed in this
rule is designed to achieve this level of
security for vessels departing from the
United States and to thereby meet the
purposes of the governing statutes.
Thus, for vessels departing from the
United States, the proposed amendment
provides for transmission of passenger
and crew manifests 60 minutes prior to
departure. CBP notes that the electronic
system for transmission of required
vessel manifest data (arrival and
departure) is the U.S. Coast Guard’s
(Internet based) eNOA/D system. This is
not an interactive system, and, unlike
air carriers operating under the APIS 60
or AQQ options described above, vessel
carriers would not have to obtain system
certification.
After transmission of the manifest
data, the initial automated vetting
would result in a not-cleared instruction
for matches, possible matches, and
incomplete/inadequate passenger
records or crew data. Carriers would
attempt to prevent the boarding of such
persons if it had not already occurred
due to the very early boarding allowed.
CBP notes that a not-cleared message
returned to the carrier by CBP for an
inadequate record would instruct the
carrier to retransmit complete/corrected
data.
During further vetting, passengers and
crew for whom not-cleared instructions
were sent during the initial automated
vetting procedure would be either
confirmed as high-risks or resolved and
cleared. CBP would communicate with
the carrier where further vetting
resulted in the clearing of a passenger.
In some instances, CBP would
communicate with the carrier and other
CBP personnel to take necessary action
to verify (by conducting an interview if
necessary) the high-risk status of
passengers or crew and, as needed,
secure a confirmed high-risk passenger
or crew member. In this process, a
confirmed high-risk passenger or crew
member likely would have to be located
and removed from the vessel before
departure, in which case his baggage
would be removed as well. Whether a
further search of the vessel is warranted
would be determined by CBP on a caseby-
case basis. (The carrier would be free
to undertake a further search at its
discretion.)
The current requirement for batch
manifest transmission no later than 15
minutes prior to a vessel’s departure
does not provide enough time to fully
vet passengers or crew members or
allow, where necessary, for the removal
of a confirmed high-risk passenger or
crew member from a vessel prior to
departure. In contrast, the proposed
APIS 60 procedure is expected to
provide CBP the time it needs to fully
vet not-cleared passengers and crew
members and to remove those
confirmed as a high-risk from the vessel
prior to departure. The APIS 60
procedure therefore would achieve the
appropriate level of security sought by
CBP.
In addition to preventing a high-risk
departure, this procedure would
enhance CBP’s capability, in some
circumstances (where carriers allow
already checked-in passengers to board
within 60 minutes of departure), to
prevent high-risk vessel boardings, as
compared to what is achievable under
the current regulation. An alternative
option (such as AQQ or something
similar) is not as necessary, given the
less time-critical nature of the
commercial vessel travel environment.
For vessels departing from foreign
ports destined to arrive at a U.S. port,
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CBP is retaining the requirement to
transmit passenger and crew manifest
data at least 24 hours and up to 96 hours
prior to a vessel’s entering the U.S. port
of arrival. This requirement is consistent
with the U.S. Coast Guard’s ‘‘Notice of
Arrival’’ (NOA) requirements. (Under 33
CFR 160.212, arriving vessel carriers
transmit manifest data to the U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG) to meet its NOA
requirement. The data is then forwarded
to CBP, permitting additional
compliance with CBP’s APIS
requirement with the one carrier
transmission.) Moreover, the threat
posed by a high-risk passenger or crew
member once onboard a vessel is
different from that posed by a high-risk
passenger onboard an aircraft. A
hijacked vessel’s movements over the
water and its range of available targets
could be more readily contained than
those of an aircraft, thus reducing the
opportunity for a terrorist to use the
vessel as a weapon against a U.S. port
or another vessel.
IV. Rationale for Change
A. Terrorist Threat
In proposing this rule, as discussed
above, CBP points to the primary
impetus for this entire rulemaking
initiative (including the April 7, 2005
final rule and previous rulemaking
efforts as explained in the final rule): to
respond to the continuing terrorist
threat facing the United States, the
international trade and transportation
industries, and the international
traveling public since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Under
the governing statutes and regulations,
DHS and the air and vessel carrier
industries must take steps to alleviate
the risk to these vital industries and the
public posed by the threat of terrorism,
while also increasing national security.
Ensuring security is an ongoing process,
and CBP is endeavoring to put in place
a regulatory scheme that includes
electronic information transmission and
pre-departure transmission time
requirements. Together, these
requirements are intended to serve as a
layer of protection against high-risk
travelers while facilitating lawful travel.
While progress has been made, CBP
continues its efforts to achieve the level
of security mandated by Congress
(under ATSA, EBSA, and IRTPA). CBP
notes that this rulemaking initiative also
would enhance CBP’s ability to carry
out its more traditional, but equally
important, border enforcement mission.
With regard to commercial aviation,
the terrorist threat has been a constant
presence on the international stage since
the hijackings of the 1970s. More
recently, Al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups have shown a consistent interest
in exploiting civil aviation both as a
potential target and as a means of attack.
This interest has been highlighted in
advanced planning, such as the
thwarted plot of former Al Qaeda leader
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to explode
12 commercial airliners over a 48-hour
period in 1996, as well as other
attempted and successful attacks. Al
Qaeda’s interest in attacking civil
aviation came to grim fruition in the
attacks of September 11, 2001—the most
costly terrorist attack in U.S. history.
Even after September 11, 2001, terrorists
continue to demonstrate an interest in
attacking civil aviation. In August 2003,
specific credible intelligence led DHS to
suspend the Transit Without Visa
(TWOV) program due to concerns that it
might be exploited to conduct a terrorist
attack. See 68 FR 46926 (Aug. 7, 2003);
68 FR 46948 (Aug. 7, 2003). About four
months later, during the 2003 holiday
period, international flights destined for
the United States faced cancellations
and delays based on threat information.
The necessity of this rule is underscored
further by repeated instances of higher
threat levels over time, such as the
higher alerts announced during the
summer of 2004 for financial centers in
New York City and Washington DC, and
during the period prior to the 2004 U.S.
Presidential election. It is noted also
that terrorists seek targets of opportunity
and, as such, the terrorist threat extends
beyond civil aviation, as evidenced by
past terrorist acts against passenger
vessels. Therefore, efforts made to
increase security for commercial vessels
also would contribute to foreclosing an
opportunity for terrorist exploitation.
It is important to note that the threat
from terrorist activity is not just to
human life, but also to the economic
well-being of the commercial air and
vessel carrier industries—two industries
of great importance to the U.S. and
world economies. Since the Fall of
2004, there have been several instances
when the identification of a high-risk
passenger by CBP or the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) after
departure of an aircraft en route to the
United States resulted in the diversion
of the aircraft to a different U.S. port or
a turnback (the return of the aircraft to
the foreign port of departure). Those
security measures, while necessary to
safeguard the passengers on the aircraft
as well as national security, are costly
to the affected carriers. Accordingly,
CBP proposes to collect and vet required
APIS passenger data before passengers
board aircraft bound for or departing
from the United States, and to collect
and vet earlier than is permitted under
existing regulations required passenger
and crew APIS data in order to achieve
the maximum ability reasonably
attainable for detecting high-risk
persons before they can perpetrate a
terrorist act.
B. IRTPA
With the passage of IRTPA, Congress
expressly recognized the need to fully
perform vetting of manifest information
prior to the departure of commercial
aircraft and vessels traveling to and
from the United States. Section
4012(a)(2) of IRTPA directs DHS to issue
a proposed rule providing for the
collection of passenger information from
international flights to or from the
United States and comparison of such
information with the consolidated
terrorist watch list maintained by the
Federal Government before departure of
the aircraft. Section 4071(1) of IRTPA
requires DHS to compare vessel
passenger and crew information with
information from the consolidated
terrorist database before departure of a
vessel bound for or departing from the
United States. Section 4071(2) permits
DHS to waive (based on
impracticability) the requirement of
section 4071(1) for vessels bound for the
United States from foreign ports. CBP
has determined that requiring the data
comparison before departure of such
vessels is impracticable because the
requirement would conflict, in some
instances, with the current APIS
manifest data transmission requirements
for vessel arrivals (which are to be
retained in the regulations)(cited
previously) and the current USCG NOA
requirements (cited previously).
Accordingly, DHS has elected to
implement the waiver provided for in
this section for arriving vessels.
The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)
and use of the consolidated terrorist
watch list required by IRTPA provide
the means to vet passenger and crew
manifest data for known and suspected
terrorists, including for flights to and
from the United States and for cruise
vessels subject to this regulation.
V. Impact on Parties Affected by the
Proposed Rule
Should the proposed rule become
final and effective, large air carriers (i.e.,
those with over 1,500 employees) will
bear the greatest percentage of the
regulatory burden of the proposed rule
due to the number of international
travelers these entities carry and their
method of transmitting APIS data.
If carriers exercise the APIS 60 option,
it is anticipated that any adverse impact
on passengers would fall
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disproportionately on connecting
passengers (those arriving from a foreign
airport and continuing on to a foreign
destination and those making a
connecting foreign flight en route to the
U.S.), rather than on originating
passengers.
Passengers conducting foreign travel,
either coming to or leaving the United
States, are instructed to check in for
international flights well in advance,
usually at least 2 hours prior to
departure. Thus, 60 minutes prior to
departure, most originating passengers’
APIS data will have been collected and
verified by the carriers and could thus
be transmitted. Connecting passengers,
however, may not have a full 2 hours
between flights. Partnering airlines will
likely share APIS information for an
entire trip, but non-partner airlines may
not. We believe, therefore, that under
the APIS 60 option, a small number of
connecting passengers may not make
their flights, will be delayed, and will
have to be rerouted. Alternatively, if
large carriers use the AQQ option,
delays to travelers will be minimized,
but carriers will need to develop and
implement their systems to support
AQQ.
Under the proposed rule, small
carriers may still use ‘‘eAPIS,’’ a webbased
application designed to
electronically transmit manifests
between small carriers and CBP. CBP
does not believe that small carriers will
develop and implement AQQ because
they will not find it cost effective given
their operations and their current
utilization of eAPIS. Thus, small
carriers will probably choose the APIS
60 option rather than the AQQ option.
While large carriers have connecting
flights where affected passengers could
face short layover times, small air
carriers operate predominantly on
charter schedules and make point-topoint
trips without connecting flights.
Accordingly, very few passengers
traveling on small carriers will be
delayed or rerouted as a result of this
proposed rulemaking.
CBP does not know which carriers
will choose which regulatory option.
The Regulatory Assessment,
summarized below in the ‘‘Executive
Order 12866’’ section, presents two
endpoints of the likely range of costs.
For the ‘‘high cost estimate,’’ CBP
assumes that all carriers will employ the
APIS 60 regulatory option (the 60-
minute transmission requirement). For
the ‘‘low cost estimate,’’ CBP assumes
that large carriers will employ the AQQ
regulatory option.
The impacts on carriers, travelers, and
others potentially affected by this rule
are examined in detail in the
‘‘Regulatory Assessment’’ which is
available in the docket for this
rulemaking (http://
www.eparegulations.gov; see also
http://www.cbp.gov). CBP is soliciting
comments on the assumptions and
estimates made in the economic
analysis.
VI. Regulatory Requirements
A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review)
This rule is considered to be an
economically significant regulatory
action under Executive Order 12866
because it may result in the expenditure
of over $100 million in any one year.
Accordingly, this proposed rule has
been reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). The
following summary presents the costs
and benefits of the proposed rule plus
a range of alternatives considered. The
complete ‘‘Regulatory Assessment’’ can
be found in the docket for this
rulemaking (http://www.regulations.gov;
see also http://www.cbp.gov). Comments
regarding the analysis may be submitted
by any of the methods described under
the ADDRESSES section of this document.
Summary
Should the proposed rule become
final and effective, air carriers and air
passengers will be the parties primarily
affected by the proposed rule. For APIS
60, costs will be driven by the number
of air travelers that will need to arrive
at their originating airports earlier and
the number of air travelers who miss
connecting flights and require rerouting
as a result. For AQQ, costs will be
driven by implementation expenses,
data transmission costs, and a small
number of air travelers who miss
connecting flights.
CBP estimates a range of costs in this
analysis. For the high end of the range
(i.e., under the APIS 60 procedure), CBP
anticipates that passengers will provide
APIS data upon check-in for their flights
and that all carriers will transmit that
data, as an entire passenger and crew
manifest, to CBP at least 60 minutes
prior to departure of the aircraft. CBP
estimates that this will result in 2
percent of passengers on large carriers
and 0.25 percent of passengers on small
carriers missing connecting flights and
needing to be rerouted, with an average
delay of 4 hours. Additionally, we
estimate that 15 percent of passengers
will need to arrive at the airport an
average of 15 minutes earlier in order to
make their flights. For the low end of
the range (under the AQQ procedure),
we assume that all large air carriers will
implement AQQ to transmit information
on individual passengers as each checks
in. CBP estimates that this will
significantly drive down even further
the percentage of passengers requiring
rerouting on large carriers to 0.5
percent. Travelers will not need to
modify their behavior to arrive at the
airport earlier. The percentage on small
carriers remains 0.25 percent because
we assume that small carriers will not
implement AQQ; rather, they will
continue to submit manifests at least 60
minutes prior to departure through
eAPIS, CBP’s web-based application for
small carriers. Thus, costs for small air
carriers are the same regardless of the
regulatory option considered.
The endpoints of this range are
presented below. As shown, the present
value (PV) costs of the proposed rule are
estimated to range from $612 million to
$1.9 billion over the next 10 years
(2006–2015, 2005 dollars, 7 percent
discount rate).
COSTS OF THE PROPOSED RULE
<$Millions, 2006–2015, 2005 dollars>
High Estimate
(60-minute option)
Low esimate
(AQQ option)
Large
carriers
Small
carriers Total Large
carriers
Small
carriers Total
First-Year Costs ............................................................... $245 $5 $250 $184 $5 $189
Average Recurring Costs ................................................. 268 6 274 66 6 72
10-Year PV Costs (7%) ................................................... 1,865 39 1,904 573 39 612
10-Year PV Costs (3%) ................................................... 2,279 48 2,327 677 48 726
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We estimate four categories of
benefits, or costs that could be avoided,
under the APIS 60 procedure: (1) Costs
for conducting interviews with
identified high-risk individuals upon
arrival in the United States; (2) costs for
deporting a percentage of these
individuals; (3) costs of delaying a highrisk
aircraft at an airport; and (4) costs
of rerouting aircraft if high-risk
individuals are identified after takeoff.
Monetizing the benefits of avoiding an
actual terrorist incident has proven
difficult because the damages caused by
terrorism are a function of where the
attack takes place, the nature of the
attack, the number of people affected,
the casualty rates, the psychological
impacts of the attack, and, perhaps most
importantly, the ‘‘ripple effects’’ as
damages permeate throughout our
society and economy far beyond the
initial target. One limited scenario is
presented below.
The average recurring benefits of the
proposed rule are an estimated $15
million per year. This is in addition to
the non-quantified security benefits,
which are the primary impetus for this
rule. Over the 10-year period of
analysis, PV benefits are an estimated
$105 million at a 7 percent discount rate
($128 million at a 3 percent discount
rate).
Given the quantified costs and
benefits of the proposed rule, we can
determine how much non-quantified
security benefits would have to be for
this rule to be cost-beneficial. The 10-
year costs range from $612 million to
$1.9 billion, and the benefits are an
estimated $103 million (all at the 7
percent discount rate). Thus, the nonquantified
security benefits would have
to be $509 million to $1.8 billion over
the 10-year period in order for this
proposed rule to be cost-beneficial. In
one hypothetical security scenario
involving only one aircraft and the
people aboard, estimated costs of an
incident could exceed $790 million.
This rule may not prevent such an
incident, but if it did, the value of
preventing such a limited incident
would outweigh the costs at the low end
of the range. See the Regulatory
Assessment at http://
www.regulations.gov or http://
www.cbp.gov for details of these
calculations.
Regulatory Alternatives
CBP considered a number of
regulatory alternatives to the proposed
rule. Complete details regarding the
costs and benefits of these alternatives
can be found in the ‘‘Regulatory
Assessment’’ available in the docket for
this rulemaking (http://
www.regulations.gov; see also http://
www.cbp.gov). The following is a
summary of these alternatives:
(1) Do not promulgate any further
manifest transmission requirements (No
Action)—the baseline case where
carriers would continue to submit APIS
manifests for arriving aircraft passengers
15 minutes after departure and, for
departing aircraft passengers, 15
minutes prior to departure. There are no
additional costs or benefits associated
with this alternative. High-risk
passengers would continue to board
aircraft both destined to and departing
from the United States, and instances of
such aircraft departing with a high-risk
passenger onboard would continue. As
explained previously in this document,
these results are inconsistent with the
protective security objectives of ATSA,
EBSA, and IRTPA. Because this is the
status quo, and therefore has no
additional costs or benefits, it is not
analyzed further.
(2) A pre-departure transmission
requirement—this would require
carriers to submit manifests earlier than
is required under the status quo
requirements for flights to and from the
United States. Transmission of manifest
information would be made at least 30
minutes prior to departure. CBP
concludes that 1 percent of passengers
on large carriers would be delayed
while no passengers on small carriers
would be affected. We assume small
carriers would not need to reroute any
passengers under a pre-departure
transmission requirement; accordingly,
this alternative is a no-cost option for
small carriers. We assume that 5 percent
of travelers would need to arrive at the
airport 15 minutes earlier than normal
in order to make their flights.
For large carriers, transmission of
manifest data at this time would not
provide enough of a window for CBP to
respond to a hit on the watch lists,
regardless of the boarding time. Benefits
of this alternative would be largely
negated when compared to the proposed
rule because the ability to intercept a
high-risk individual before the boarding
process begins would be severely
limited. Because in many instances the
high-risk passenger is likely to board
under this alternative, the individual
and his bags would have to be removed
from the plane; in some circumstances,
depending on the level of the threat, all
remaining passengers and bags would
have to be removed and re-screened
and, in particularly urgent
circumstances, the aircraft would have
to be ‘‘re-sterilized’’ prior to re-boarding.
First-year costs are $111 million,
average recurring costs are $122 million
per year, and 10-year present value costs
are $845 million (7 percent discount
rate) and $1.0 billion (3 percent
discount rate).
Benefits are slightly higher than the
No Action alternative because while the
boarding of a high-risk passenger would
not be prevented, a high-risk individual
would be identified prior to the
departure of a flight to or from the
United States in most instances.
Benefits are lower than under the
proposed rule because CBP would be
unable to plan and coordinate a
response before boarding begins, and
thus the high-risk passenger could still
board the aircraft. As explained
previously in this document, these
results would be inconsistent with the
protective security objectives of ATSA,
EBSA, and IRTPA.
(3) A 60-minute transmission
requirement only during periods of
heightened threat conditions—this rule
would require carriers to submit
manifest data 60 minutes prior to
departure only during periods of
heightened threat conditions. For this
analysis, CBP assumes that the threat
level could be elevated twice a year for
3 weeks per instance. Because foreign
travelers coming to the United States
may not be aware of the threat level
prior to entering the country, CBP
further assumes that the impacts of the
alert would extend beyond the return to
the lower threat level. Thus, the effects
would last a total of 2 months a year.
This alternative would probably cause a
great deal of disruption due to the
unanticipated need to provide
information earlier at irregular intervals.
Additionally, the threat of terrorism is
continuous, and specific threat
information on flights may not emerge.
Thus, the risks would not likely be
diminished sufficiently to justify the
costs. Finally, an alternating system of
manifest transmission timing would
likely affect carrier performance, with
performance ratings suffering during the
infrequent, non-routine elevations in
threat level, the more critical period.
In this scenario, the percentage of
passengers delayed on large carriers is
an estimated 10 percent and on small
carriers is 2.5 percent. The average
length of delay is 6 hours. We estimate
that 15 percent of passengers would
need to arrive at the airport 15 minutes
early in order to make their flights.
First-year costs are $225 million,
average recurring costs are $246 million
per year, and 10-year present value costs
are $1.7 billion (7 percent discount rate)
and $2.1 billion (3 percent discount
rate).
Benefits are potentially the same as
the ‘‘No Action’’ alternative most of the
time because a high-risk individual
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could be identified prior to boarding
only during those very limited periods
when the threat level is elevated and the
60-minute requirement is in effect.
Benefits are potentially lower than
under the proposed rule most of the
time because high-risk passengers
would be able to board the aircraft, and
aircraft would depart with a high-risk
passenger onboard, under the status quo
procedure in effect during most of the
year. Again, these results would be
inconsistent with the protective security
objectives of ATSA, EBSA, and IRTPA.
(4) A 60-minute transmission
requirement or implementation of
AQQ—this is the proposed rule, which
requires carriers to elect to transmit, via
an interactive communication system,
passenger data under one of the two
proposed options: by submitting
manifests no later than 60 minutes prior
to departure or, alternatively, by
implementing APIS Quick Query. As
explained previously in this document,
the proposed rule provides sufficient
time for fully vetting travelers, and
achieving the appropriate levels of
security desired, to be consistent with
the protective security objectives of
ATSA, EBSA, and IRTPA.
(5) A 120-minute transmission
requirement—this rule would require
carriers to submit manifests 120 minutes
prior to departure. The costs would be
higher than under the proposed rule
because originating passengers, not just
connecting passengers, would now be
affected. High-risk passengers would be
prevented from boarding aircraft. CBP
would be able to more easily coordinate
and plan a response to a hit on the
watch lists well before the boarding
process began.
This alternative would be quite
disruptive because even though
passengers and carriers would have the
predictability of a pre-determined
transmission time, passenger check-in at
the original departure airport would be
greatly affected. Instead of passengers
checking in 2 hours prior to departure,
carriers would have to advise
passengers to arrive even earlier to
assure timely manifest transmission.
We assume that 20 percent of
passengers on large carriers and 5
percent of passengers on small carriers
will be delayed an average of 6 hours
and will need to be rerouted. We
assume that 30 percent of passengers
would need to arrive at the airport 1
hour earlier than previously. First-year
costs are $3.2 billion, average recurring
costs are $3.5 billion per year, and 10-
year present value costs are $24.2
billion (7 percent discount rate) and
$29.5 billion (3 percent discount rate).
Benefits are higher than the No Action
alternative because a high-risk
individual would be prevented from
boarding or departing on an aircraft
destined to or departing from the United
States. Benefits are slightly higher than
under the proposed rule because in
some instances, the high-risk
passenger’s baggage would not reach the
aircraft. Otherwise, the results achieved
do not change appreciably given the
extra time. Nonetheless, this procedure
would be consistent with the protective
security purposes of ATSA, EBSA, and
IRTPA.
The following table summarizes the
costs and benefits of the regulatory
alternatives:
COMPARISON OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED RULE AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
Pre-departure
requirement
60-minute requirement
only at elevated
alert
Proposed rule
60-minute
requirement AQQ 120-minute
requirement
First-Year Costs ......... $111 million ............... $225 million ............... $250 million ............... $189 million ............... $3.2 billion.
Average Recurring
Costs.
$122 million ............... $246 million ............... $274 million ............... $72 million ................. $3.5 billion.
10-Year PV Costs
(7%).
$845 million ............... $1.7 billion ................. $1.9 billion ................. $612 million ............... $24.2 billion.
10-Year PV Costs
(3%).
$1.0 billion ................. $2.1 billion ................. $2.3 billion ................. $726 million ............... $29.5 billion.
Average Cost per Passenger.
$0.36–$1.55 .............. $0.91–$3.11 .............. $1.37–$3.45 .............. $1.01–1.37 ................ $17.39–$43.81
Benefits Comparison
to ‘‘No Action’’.
Slightly higher (risk
identified prior to
take-off).
Comparable (risk may
be identified prior
to boarding and
take-off if under
elevated alert).
Higher (risk identified
prior to boarding).
Higher (risk identified
prior to boarding).
Higher (risk identified
prior to boarding) .
Benefits Comparison
to Pre-Boarding
APIS Rule.
Lower (high-risk passenger
may still
board aircraft);
CBP cannot coordinate
or plan response.
Lower (high-risk passenger
may still
board aircraft).
Security benefits +
$15 million in costs
avoided annually.
Risk identified prior to
check-in (higher
benefits than 60-
minute option).
Comparable (security
benefits + $15 million
in costs avoided
annually).
CBP requests comments on the above
analysis of the regulatory alternatives.
Accounting Statement
As required by OMB Circular A–4
(available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/
index.html, CBP has prepared an
accounting statement showing the
classification of the expenditures
associated with this rule. The table
provides our best estimate of the dollar
amount of these costs and benefits,
expressed in 2005 dollars, at three
percent and seven percent discount
rates. We estimate that the cost of this
rule will be approximately million
annualized (7 percent discount rate) and
approximately $166.0 million
annualized (3 percent discount rate).
Quantified benefits are $15.0 million
annualized. The non-quantified benefits
are enhanced security.
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ACCOUNTING STATEMENT: CLASSIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES, 2006 THROUGH 2015 (2005 DOLLARS)

BENEFITS:
Annualized monetized benefits ............................................................................................................................... $15.0 million.
(Un-quantified) benefits .......................................................................................................................................... Enhanced security.
COSTS:
Annualized monetized costs ................................................................................................................................... $179.1 million.
Annualized quantified, but un-monetized costs.
Qualitative (un-quantified) costs.
Seven Percent Annual Discount Rate.
BENEFITS:
Annualized monetized benefits ............................................................................................................................... $15.0 million.
(Un-quantified) benefits .......................................................................................................................................... Enhanced security.
COSTS:
Annualized monetized costs ................................................................................................................................... $178.9 million.
Annualized quantified, but un-monetized costs.
Qualitative (un-quantified) costs.
In accordance with the provisions of
E.O. 12866, this regulation was
reviewed by the Office of Management
and Budget.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
We have examined the impacts of this
proposed rulemaking on small entities
as required by the Regulatory Flexibility
Act. A small entity may be a small
business (defined as any independently
owned and operated business not
dominant in its field that qualifies as a
small business per the Small Business
Act); a small not-for-profit organization;
or a small governmental jurisdiction
(locality with fewer than 50,000 people).
CBP has identified 773 small U.S. air
carriers that could be affected by the
proposed rule. We do not expect these
carriers to experience great economic
impacts as a result of the proposed rule.
Small carriers do not need to modify
their reservation systems nor do they
have many connecting passengers who
may miss their flights and require
rerouting. We estimate that 0.25 percent
of passengers on small carriers will be
affected by this rule annually. In the
April 2005 final rule (70 FR at 17846),
CBP estimated that small carriers each
transport an average of 300 passengers
annually. Thus, less than 1 passenger
per carrier per year will be affected by
the proposed APIS 60 option. We
calculate that the total cost of delay per
passenger is $61.77, and only $4.57 of
this is incurred by the air carrier. The
aggregate costs of this rule’s APIS option
would not exceed $3,500 annually for
each of the 773 small US-based carriers.
We conclude, therefore, that this rule
will not have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
The complete analysis of impacts to
small entities is available on the CBP
Web site at: http://www.regulations.gov;
see also http://www.cbp.gov. Comments
regarding the analysis may be submitted
by any of the methods described under
the ADDRESSES section of this document.
C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), enacted as
Pub. L. 104–4 on March 22, 1995,
requires each Federal agency, to the
extent permitted by law, to prepare a
written assessment of the effects of any
Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in the
expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more
(adjusted annually for inflation) in any
one year. Section 204(a) of the UMRA,
2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal
agency to develop an effective process
to permit timely input by elected
officers (or their designees) of State,
local, and tribal governments on a
‘‘significant intergovernmental
mandate.’’ A ‘‘significant
intergovernmental mandate’’ under the
UMRA is any provision in a Federal
agency regulation that will impose an
enforceable duty upon state, local, and
tribal governments, in the aggregate, of
$100 million (adjusted annually for
inflation) in any one year. Section 203
of the UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which
supplements section 204(a), provides
that, before establishing any regulatory
requirements that might significantly or
uniquely affect small governments, the
agency shall have developed a plan that,
among other things, provides for notice
to potentially affected small
governments, if any, and for meaningful
and timely opportunity to provide input
in the development of regulatory
proposals.
This proposed rule, if adopted as a
final rule, would not impose any cost on
small governments or significantly or
uniquely affect small governments.
However, as stated in the ‘‘Executive
Order 12866’’ section of this document,
CBP has determined that the rule would
result in the expenditure by the private
sector of $100 million or more (adjusted
annually for inflation) in any one year
and thus would constitute a significant
regulatory action. Consequently, the
provisions of this proposed rule
constitute a private sector mandate
under the UMRA. CBP’s analysis of the
cost impact on affected businesses,
summarized in the ‘‘Executive Order
12866’’ section of this document and
available for review by accessing
http://www.regulations.gov; see also
http://www.cbp.gov, is incorporated
here by reference as the assessment
required under Title II of the UMRA.
CBP is requesting information from the
public and the carriers regarding the
costs this rule would impose on the
private sector.
D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
This proposed rule, if adopted as a
final rule, would not have substantial
direct effects on the States, on the
relationship between the National
Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Therefore, in
accordance with Executive Order 13132,
it is determined that this rule does not
have sufficient federalism implications
to warrant the preparation of a
federalism summary impact statement.
E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
This proposed rule meets the
applicable standards set forth in
sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive
Order 12988. That Executive Order
requires agencies to conduct reviews,
before proposing legislation or
promulgating regulations, to determine
the impact of those proposals on civil
justice and potential issues for
litigation. The Order requires that
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agencies make reasonable efforts to
ensure the regulation clearly identifies
preemptive effects, effects on existing
federal laws and regulations, identifies
any retroactive effects of the proposal,
and other matters. DHS has determined
that this regulation meets the
requirements of Executive Order 12988
because it does not involve retroactive
effects, preemptive effects, or other
matters addressed in the Order.
F. National Environmental Policy Act
CBP has evaluated this proposed rule
for purposes of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA; 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.). CBP has
determined that an environmental
statement is not required, since this
action is non-invasive and there is no
potential impact of any kind. Record of
this determination has been placed in
the rulemaking docket.
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
In connection with the final rule
recently published by CBP in April
2005, and discussed in this proposed
rule, a Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
analysis was set forth concerning the
information collection involved under
that rule (see OMB No. 1651–0088).
This proposed rule, which proposes to
amend the regulation as amended by the
April 2005 final rule, has no effect on
that analysis, as it does not impose an
additional information collection
burden or affect the information
collected under the regulation in any
relevant manner. This proposed rule
affects only the timing and manner of
the submission of the information
already required under the regulation.
An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information
unless the collection of information
displays a valid control number. The
collection of information relative to the
provisions of the regulation proposed to
be amended in this proposed rule,
under 19 CFR 4.64, 122.49a, and
122.75a, is recorded with the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) under
OMB No. 1651–0088.
H. Signing Authority
This amendment to the regulations is
being issued in accordance with 19 CFR
0.2(a) pertaining to the authority of the
Secretary of Homeland Security (or his
delegate) to prescribe regulations not
related to customs revenue functions.
I. Privacy Statement
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)
was published in the Federal Register
(70 FR 17857) in conjunction with the
April 7, 2005, APIS final rule (70 FR
17820). As the changes proposed in this
rule do not impact the data collected or
the use and storage of the data, and only
affect the timing of data transmission,
the existing System of Records Notice
(SORN) (the Treasury Enforcement
Communications System (TECS)
published at 66 FR 53029) and the PIA
continue to cover the collection,
maintenance, and use of APIS data. CBP
is preparing a separate SORN for APIS
which will be published before a final
rule is implemented following this
proposed rule.
List of Subjects
19 CFR Part 4
Aliens, Customs duties and
inspection, Immigration, Maritime
carriers, Passenger vessels, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements,
Vessels.
19 CFR Part 122
Air carriers, Aircraft, Airports, Air
transportation, Commercial aircraft,
Customs duties and inspection, Entry
procedure, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Security measures.
Proposed Amendments to the
Regulations
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, parts 4 and 122 of the CBP
Regulations (19 CFR parts 4 and 122) are
proposed to be amended as follows:
PART 4—VESSELS IN FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC TRADES
1. The general authority citation for
part 4 and the specific authority citation
for § 4.64 continue to read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 19 U.S.C. 66,
1431, 1433, 1434, 1624; 2071 note; 46 U.S.C.
App. 3, 91.
* * * * *
Section 4.64 also issued under 8 U.S.C.
1221;
* * * * *
2. Section 4.64 is amended in
paragraph (b)(2)(i) by removing the
words ‘‘no later than 15 minutes’’ and
replacing them with the words ‘‘no later
than 60 minutes’’.
PART 122—AIR COMMERCE
REGULATIONS
3. The general authority citation for
part 122 and the specific authority
citations for § 122.49a and 122.75a
continue to read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 19 U.S.C. 58b, 66,
1433, 1436, 1448, 1459, 1590, 1594, 1623,
1624, 1644, 1644a, 2071 note.
Section 122.49a also issued under 8 U.S.C.
1221, 19 U.S.C. 1431, 49 U.S.C. 44909.
* * * * *
Section 122.75a also issued under 8 U.S.C.
1221, 19 U.S.C. 1431.
* * * * *
4. Section 122.49a is amended by:
a. Revising the definition of
‘‘departure’’ in paragraph (a), and
b. Revising paragraphs (b)(1) and
(b)(2) to read as follows:
§ 122.49a Electronic manifest requirement
for passengers onboard commercial aircraft
arriving in the United States.
(a) * * *
Departure. ‘‘Departure’’ means the
moment at which the aircraft is pushed
back from the gate for the purpose of
commencing its approach to the point of
take off.
* * * * *
(b) Electronic arrival manifest—(1)
General—(i) Basic requirement. Except
as provided in paragraph (c) of this
section, an appropriate official of each
commercial aircraft (carrier) arriving in
the United States from any place outside
the United States must transmit to
Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
by means of an electronic data
interchange system approved by CBP,
an electronic passenger arrival manifest
covering all passengers checked in for
the flight. A passenger manifest must be
transmitted separately from a crew
member manifest required under
§ 122.49b if transmission is in U.S.
EDIFACT format. The passenger
manifest must be transmitted to CBP at
the place and time specified in
paragraph (b)(2) of this section, in the
manner set forth under either paragraph
(b)(1)(ii)(A), (b)(1)(ii)(B), or (b)(1)(iii) of
this section.
(ii) Complete manifest option—(A)
Interactive process. A carrier operating
under this paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A) must
transmit a complete manifest setting
forth the information specified in
paragraph (b)(3) of this section for all
passengers checked in for the flight.
After receipt of the manifest
information, CBP will electronically
send to the carrier a ‘‘not-cleared’’
instruction for passengers identified
during security vetting as requiring
additional security analysis. A carrier
must not board any passenger subject to
a ‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction, or any other
passenger, or their baggage, unless
cleared by CBP. Upon completion of the
additional security analysis, CBP will
electronically contact the carrier to clear
a passenger for boarding should
clearance be warranted by the results of
that analysis. Where CBP is unable to
complete the additional security
analysis or respond to the carrier prior
to departure of the aircraft, the carrier is
bound by the ‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction.
No later than 30 minutes after
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departure, the carrier must transmit to
CBP a unique identifier for each
passenger that checked in but did not
board the flight. Before operating under
this paragraph, a carrier must receive a
system certification from CBP indicating
that its electronic system is capable of
interactively communicating with CBP’s
system for effective transmission of
manifest data and receipt of appropriate
messages.
(B) Manual (non-interactive) process.
A carrier operating under this paragraph
(b)(1)(ii)(B) must transmit a complete
manifest setting forth the information
specified in paragraph (b)(3) of this
section for all passengers checked in for
the flight. After receipt of the manifest
information, CBP will send to the carrier
by a non-interactive manual
transmission method a ‘‘not-cleared’’
instruction for passengers identified
during security vetting as requiring
additional security analysis. A carrier
must not board any passenger subject to
a ‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction, or any other
passenger, or their baggage, unless
cleared by CBP. Upon completion of the
additional security analysis, CBP will
contact the carrier to clear a passenger
for boarding should clearance be
warranted by the results of that analysis.
Where CBP is unable to complete the
additional security analysis or respond
to the carrier prior to departure of the
aircraft, the carrier is bound by the ‘‘notcleared’’
instruction. No later than 30
minutes after departure, the carrier must
transmit to CBP a unique identifier for
each passenger who checked in but did
not board the flight.
(iii) Individual passenger information
option. A carrier operating under this
paragraph (b)(1)(iii) must transmit the
manifest data specified in paragraph
(b)(3) of this section for each individual
passenger as passengers check in for the
flight. With each transmission of
manifest information by the carrier, CBP
will electronically send a ‘‘cleared’’ or
‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction, as
appropriate, depending on the results of
security vetting. A ‘‘not-cleared’’
instruction will be issued for passengers
identified during the initial security
vetting as requiring additional security
analysis. The carrier must acknowledge
receipt of a ‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction by
electronic return message and must not
issue a boarding pass to—or load the
baggage of—any passenger subject to a
‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction or to any
passenger not cleared by CBP. The
carrier, at its discretion, may seek
resolution of a ‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction
by providing additional information
relative to the passenger if available.
Upon completion of the additional
security analysis, CBP will
electronically contact the carrier to clear
a passenger for boarding should
clearance be warranted by the results of
that analysis. Where CBP is unable to
complete the additional analysis or
respond to the carrier before departure
of the aircraft, the carrier will be bound
by the ‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction. No
later than 30 minutes after departure,
the carrier must transmit to CBP a
unique identifier for each passenger
who checked in but did not board the
flight. Before operating under this
paragraph, a carrier must receive a
system certification from CBP indicating
that its electronic system is capable of
interactively communicating with CBP’s
system for effective transmission of
manifest data and receipt of appropriate
messages.
(2) Place and time for submission—(i)
Complete manifests. The appropriate
official specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of
this section (carrier) must transmit the
complete electronic passenger arrival
manifest as required under paragraph
(b)(1)(ii) of this section to the CBP Data
Center, CBP Headquarters:
(A) For flights not originally destined
to the United States but diverted to a
U.S. port due to an emergency, no later
than 30 minutes prior to arrival; in cases
of non-compliance, CBP will take into
consideration whether the carrier was
equipped to make the transmission and
the circumstances of the emergency
situation;
(B) For an aircraft operating as an air
ambulance in service of a medical
emergency, no later than 30 minutes
prior to arrival; and
(C) For all flights not covered under
paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(A) or (B) of this
section, no later than 60 minutes prior
to departure of the aircraft.
(ii) Individual passenger information.
A carrier must transmit electronic
passenger arrival manifest information
as required under paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of
this section as each passenger checks in
for the flight, up to but no later than 15
minutes prior to departure of the
aircraft.
* * * * *
5. Section 122.75a is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2), to
read as follows:
§ 122.75a Electronic manifest
requirements for passengers onboard
commercial aircraft departing from the
United States.
* * * * *
(b) Electronic departure manifest—(1)
General—(i) Basic requirement. Except
as provided in paragraph (c) of this
section, an appropriate official of each
commercial aircraft (carrier) departing
from the United States en route to any
port or place outside the United States
must transmit to Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), by means of an
electronic data interchange system
approved by CBP, an electronic
passenger departure manifest covering
all passengers checked-in for the flight.
A passenger manifest must be
transmitted separately from a crew
member manifest required under
§ 122.75b if transmission is in U.S.
EDIFACT format. The passenger
manifest must be transmitted to CBP, at
the place and time specified in
paragraph (b)(2) of this section, in the
manner set forth under either paragraph
(b)(1)(ii)(A), (b)(1)(ii)(B), or (b)(1)(iii) of
this section.
(ii) Complete manifest option—(A)
Interactive process. A carrier operating
under this paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A) must
transmit a complete manifest setting
forth the information specified in
paragraph (b)(3) of this section for all
passengers checked-in for the flight.
After receipt of the manifest
information, CBP will electronically
send to the carrier a ‘‘not-cleared’’
instruction for passengers identified
during security vetting as requiring
additional security analysis. A carrier
must not board any passenger subject to
a ‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction, or any other
passenger, or their baggage, unless
cleared by CBP. Upon completion of the
additional security analysis, CBP will
electronically contact the carrier to clear
a passenger for boarding should
clearance be warranted by the results of
that analysis. Where CBP is unable to
complete the additional security
analysis or respond to the carrier prior
to departure of the aircraft, the carrier is
bound by the ‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction.
No later than 30 minutes after
departure, the carrier must transmit to
CBP a unique identifier for each
passenger who checked in but did not
board the flight. Before operating under
this paragraph, a carrier must receive a
system certification from CBP indicating
that its electronic system is capable of
interactively communicating with CBP’s
system for effective transmission of
manifest data and receipt of appropriate
messages.
(B) Manual (non-interactive) process.
A carrier operating under this paragraph
(b)(1)(ii)(B) must transmit a complete
manifest setting forth the information
specified in paragraph (b)(3) of this
section for all passengers checked in for
the flight. After receipt of the manifest
information, CBP will send to the carrier
by a non-interactive manual
transmission method a ‘‘not-cleared’’
instruction for passengers identified
during security vetting as requiring
additional security analysis. A carrier
VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:53 Jul 13, 2006 Jkt 208001 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\14JYP1.SGM 14JYP1 jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL
40048 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 135 / Friday, July 14, 2006 / Proposed Rules
must not board any passenger subject to
a ‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction, or any other
passenger, or their baggage, unless
cleared by CBP. Upon completion of the
additional security analysis, CBP will
contact the carrier to clear a passenger
for boarding should clearance be
warranted by the results of that analysis.
Where CBP is unable to complete the
additional security analysis or respond
to the carrier prior to departure of the
aircraft, the carrier is bound by the ‘‘notcleared’’
instruction. No later than 30
minutes after departure, the carrier must
transmit to CBP a unique identifier for
each passenger who checked in but did
not board the flight.
(iii) Individual passenger information
option. A carrier operating under this
paragraph (b)(1)(iii) must transmit the
manifest data specified in paragraph
(b)(3) of this section for each individual
passenger as passengers check in for the
flight. With each transmission of
manifest information by the carrier, CBP
will electronically send a ‘‘cleared’’ or
‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction, as
appropriate, depending on the results of
security vetting. A ‘‘not-cleared’’
instruction will be issued for passengers
identified during the initial security
vetting as requiring additional security
analysis. The carrier must acknowledge
receipt of a ‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction by
electronic return message and must not
issue a boarding pass to—or load the
baggage of—any passenger subject to a
‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction or to any
passenger not cleared by CBP. The
carrier, at its discretion, may seek
resolution of a ‘‘not-cleared’’ instruction
by providing additional information
about the passenger, if available. Upon
completion of the additional security
analysis, CBP will electronically contact
the carrier to clear a passenger for
boarding should clearance be warranted
by the results of that analysis. Where
CBP is unable to complete the
additional analysis or respond to the
carrier before departure of the aircraft,
the carrier will be bound by the ‘‘notcleared’’
instruction. No later than 30
minutes after departure, the carrier must
transmit to CBP a unique identifier for
each passenger who checked in but did
not board the flight. Before operating
under this paragraph, a carrier must
receive a system certification from CBP
indicating that its electronic system is
capable of interactively communicating
with CBP’s system for effective
transmission of manifest data and
receipt of appropriate messages.
(2) Place and time for submission—(i)
Complete manifests. The appropriate
official specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of
this section (carrier) must transmit the
complete electronic passenger departure
manifest as required under paragraph
(b)(1)(ii) of this section to the CBP Data
Center, CBP Headquarters, no later than
60 minutes prior to departure of the
aircraft from the United States, except
that for an air ambulance in service of
a medical emergency, the manifest must
be transmitted to CBP no later than 30
minutes after departure.
(ii) Individual passenger information.
The carrier must transmit electronic
passenger departure manifest
information as required under
paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of this section as
each passenger checks in for the flight,
up to but no later than 15 minutes prior
to departure of the aircraft.
* * * * *
Deborah J. Spero,
Acting Commissioner, Customs and Border
Protection.
Approved: July 11, 2006.
Michael Chertoff,
Secretary.

BILLING CODE 9111–14–P
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
40 CFR Part 52

Approval and Promulgation of Air
Quality Implementation Plans;
Pennsylvania; Additional NOX
Emission Reductions To Support the
Philadelphia-Trenton-Wilmington One-
Hour Ozone Nonattainment Area, and
Remaining NOX SIP Call Requirements
AGENCY: Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: EPA is proposing to approve
State Implementation Plan (SIP)
revisions submitted by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. These
revisions pertain to additional nitrogen
oxides (NOX) reductions that are
required for the Commonwealth to
support its approved attainment
demonstration for the Philadelphia-
Trenton-Wilmington one-hour ozone
nonattainment area (the Philadelphia
Area); NOX reductions from stationary
internal combustion (IC) engines
required to meet the NOX SIP Call Phase
II (Phase II); and NOX reductions from
cement kilns to meet the NOX SIP Call.
The revisions also include provisions
for emission credits for sources that
generate zero-emission renewable
energy. This action is being taken under
the Clean Air Act (CAA or the Act).
DATES: Written comments must be
received on or before August 14, 2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Marilyn Powers (215) 814–2308, or by email
at [e-mail].
ADDRESSES: Submit your comments,
identified by Docket ID Number EPA–
R037–OAR–2005–0549 by one of the
following methods:
A. http://www.regulations.gov. Follow
the on-line instructions for submitting
comments.
B. E-mail: [e-mail]
C. Mail: EPA–R03–OAR–2005–0549,
Makeba Morris, Chief, Air Quality
Planning Branch, Mailcode 3AP21, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency,
Region III, 1650 Arch Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.
D. Hand Delivery: At the previouslylisted
EPA Region III address. Such
deliveries are only accepted during the
Docket’s normal hours of operation, and
special arrangements should be made
for deliveries of boxed information.
Instructions: Direct your comments to
Docket ID No. EPA–R03–OAR–2005–
0549. EPA’s policy is that all comments
received will be included in the public
docket without change, and may be
made available online at http://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided, unless
the comment includes information
claimed to be Confidential Business
Information (CBI) or other information
whose disclosure is restricted by statute.
Do not submit information that you
consider to be CBI or otherwise
protected through www.regulations.gov
or e-mail. The www.regulations.gov
website is an ‘‘anonymous access’’
system, which means EPA will not
know your identity or contact
information unless you provide it in the
body of your comment. If you send an
e-mail comment directly to EPA without
going through www.regulations.gov,
your e-mail address will be
automatically captured and included as
part of the comment that is placed in the
public docket and made available on the
Internet. If you submit an electronic
comment, EPA recommends that you
include your name and other contact
information in the body of your
comment and with any disk or CD–ROM
you submit. If EPA cannot read your
comment due to technical difficulties
and cannot contact you for clarification,
EPA may not be able to consider your
comment. Electronic files should avoid
the use of special characters, any form
of encryption, and be free of any defects
or viruses.
Docket: All documents in the
electronic docket are listed in the
www.regulations.gov index. Although
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[Viva_La_Revolution]

16. link to USCBP-2005-0003-0005

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main

there's a pdf link there, but I don't know how to copy from it :(

[BrokenBeyondRepair]

18. link 2 pdf

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648019da96&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf

[Cessna Invesco Palin]

20. what?

You mean the rantings of a delusional unmedicated shithat on the internets isn't enough to make you GO CALL YOUR CONGRESSMAN RIGHT NOW?

Shit, when the detention camps start up, you'll be first against the wall when the revolution starts to control the weather with the satellites and the laser-based holographic killer robots coming to get your mark-of-the-beast RFID tag.

IT'S THE TRUUUUUUUUUUTH!

[readmoreoften]

31. Wow, too bad people were able to give PDFs to the docket.

Apparently there is something to worry about.

[readmoreoften]

30. And a response filed regarding the issue.

http://hasbrouck.org/IDP/IDP-APIS-comments.pdf

[cascadiance]

37. John Gilmore has long been a driving force in the Electronic Frontier Foundation

and has fought in the past fights against the Clipper chip, the "Communications Decency Act", etc. and used to be at Sun not too long before was when I was there many years back. He's long been a hero and a fighter for our causes, even if he is a Libertarian rather than a Democrat.

Here's his home page, which refers to the issues mentioned on this page:

http://www.toad.com/gnu/

[HockeyMom]

15. Read my post on passport questions

Yes, the pieces are being put into place. The agent, who I submitted the form to, did say something to me about new "regulations" being put into effect at end of January. He did not elaborate.

[Cessna Invesco Palin]

17. What the fuck is sianews?

whoever writes it is so obviously unhinged that I can't possibly fathom why in God's name you'd use that site as a reference for anything.

[BrokenBeyondRepair]

21. have no clue what sianews is; more interested in the content..

which is consistent w/ current actions to abolish the bill of rights

Document ID USCBP-2005-0003-0003
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648019da96&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf

[Cessna Invesco Palin]

22. I've read the document.

The sianews gibberish bears little or no resemblance to the document. Nor does his/her gibberish about why the US Constitution is a bad idea bear any resemblance to reality.

And GHWBush didn't kill JFK either.

That whole site is a monument to everything great about the internet. I love it when schizophrenics go off their meds.

[ProgressiveEconomist]

19. Here are a couple of much more respectable LINKS

The proposed DHS rule was described in 28 pages of the July Federal Register.

From my reading of the FR summary and an airline analysis, the proposed rule change merely may affect the TIMING of information airlines already must send to the Feds.

Airlines say "the devil is in the details" of the proposed changes in the operation of the already-implemented "APIS" system.. The details haven't yet been spelled out, so panic is now premature, though wariness and close scrutiny seem justified.

From http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/06-6237.htm :

From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection

19 CFR Parts 4 and 122 RIN 1651-AA62

Passenger Manifests for Commercial Aircraft Arriving in and Departing From the United States; Passenger and Crew Manifests for Commercial Vessels Departing From the United States

AGENCY: Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: This rule proposes to amend existing Bureau of Customs and Border Protection regulations concerning electronic manifest transmission requirements relative to passengers, crew members, and non-crew members traveling onboard international commercial flights and voyages. Under current regulations, air carriers must transmit to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), passenger manifest information for aircraft en route to the United States no later than 15 minutes after the departure of the aircraft. This proposed rule implements the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requirement that such information be provided to the government before departure of the aircraft.

This proposed rule provides air carriers a choice between transmitting complete manifests no later than 60-minutes prior to departure of the aircraft or transmitting manifest information on passengers as each passenger checks in for the flight, up to but no later than 15 minutes prior to departure. The rule also proposes to amend the definition of ``departure'' for aircraft to mean the moment the aircraft is pushed back from the gate. For vessel departures from the United States, the rule proposes transmission of passenger and crew manifests no later than 60 minutes prior to departure of the vessel. ..."

From http://www.crowell.com/ClientAlert/International/Crowell_ITB_All_7-24-06.html :

Airlines Studying Proposed New U.S. Rule Mandating Pre-Departure Submission of Passenger Data.

Sharing of passenger data between airlines and the U.S. government was in the news again last week as the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (�CBPŽ) issued a proposed rule requiring pre-departure submission of passenger manifests for commercial aircraft arriving in and departing from the United States. Most U.S. and foreign airlines are still studying the rule, which is designed to prevent boarding of high-risk passengers, and cautioning that the devil will be in the rule's details. Already, however, some industry groups have predicted the proposed changes will inevitably cause flight delays. The proposed changes to the existing Advance Passenger Information System (�APISŽ) have also generated renewed calls from the aviation industry for harmonization of domestic and international passenger prescreening and data collection.

U.S. and foreign airlines now must transmit electronically to CBP arrival and departure passenger manifests at least 15 minutes after departure of a flight en route to or from the U.S. Manifests for crew members on passenger and all-cargo flights and non-crew members on all-cargo flights must be electronically transmitted to CBP at least 60 minutes before departure of any covered flight to, continuing within or over-flying the U.S., and 60 minutes before the departure of any covered flight from the U.S. CBP's new rule would ..."

[tyedyeto]

23. An earlier thread about this same subject:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=364&topic_id=2568182

Scary

[earth mom]

24. Big Brother U.S. passport questions on this thread here:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=364x2582540

[longship]

25. "Your papers, please"

[Union Thug]

26. Another step closer to revolution. Keep pushing it, assholes. n/t

[mmonk]

29. As long as we are allowed to drive over the Canadian border,

I can catch a plane from there.

[readmoreoften]

32. No, as far as I've heard, this is going to extend to all border checks.

But we'll see. I don't know what the rationalization for needing permission to LEAVE the US by foot or car would be.

[mmonk]

34. Well I'll have to develop a proper strategy.

I plan on buying property either in Ontario, New Brunswick, or my original thought, Nova Scotia as a second home and possible rental. I'm not keen on jumping through hoops over their politics.

[Joanne98]

33. I heard they were trying to tax ex-patriots. But I haven't checked it yet.

[cascadiance]

35. Is this a sign that a draft is right around the corner?

It might be an effort to limit those of us draft age from travelling to Canada... It would kind of make sense, if what Scott Ritter says is true about them planning an invasion of Iran March or April next year. They get this in place in January, a draft shortly after that, and then have enough people to have fodder to go into Iran for the war then. Hopefully a Democratic Congress can stop all of this!

[Laelth]

36. A draft is not likely.

The Repukes no longer need the draft. Their corporate masters make a lot more money renting highly over-priced mercenaries to us for our wars. So long as the country doesn't go bankrupt (a very real possibility), we'll never need a draft again, ever.

-Laelth

[Heywood J]

41. SIANews, whatever that is,

doesn't seem to be a good source. The next document is a diatribe on why the Constitution is a bad idea, has no virtue, and will lead to corruption. The site seems to be Libertarian, carried to the point of stupidity and absurdity. I mean, look at what the site's author is publishing, of which I've included below.

I also don't trust news sources that ask questions like this: "Did you know that they did this in 1787?????" No, I didn't!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Same for when it MAKES POINTS IN ALL CAPITALS FOR EMPHASIS. YOU HAVE MORE AUTHORITY WHEN YOU SHOUT, I GUESS???????


BUT, unless one understands the original intentions of the Founding Scoundrels who met in secret conclave in 1787 to conspire against the freedoms of the American people
Yeah, that enumeration of one's rights and freedoms, that spelling out the roles of government, that's complete shit. They're all bastards who just wanted to take your freedom (to oppress, apparently).

I realize that the Constitution is considered as sacred as the Bible by those who know little of the origins of either and I realize that nothing is ever going to be done to correct all the widely agreed-upon stupidities of our age which will in short order bring civilization once again to its knees.
The Constitution will help bring civilization to its knees. Yeah. You do that, buddy.

He condemned democracy but gave us just that.
"Democracy bad, y'all. Let's just have survival of the fittest."

On the other hand Franklin moved "that the Executive should receive no Salary Stipend or Emolument for the Devotion of his Time to the public Service but that its Expences (sic)should be paid." This was the same scam that Washington pulled as commander in chief which shocked the Congress so that it took upwards of a year to come up with the cash. His wine bill alone might have gone a long way towards supplying Arnold's fighting troops with shoes.
"Hur hur! Washington's a drunk! Public servants should give it up for free! We won't pay them so they can pay the rent or a mortgage and we'll expect the work to be done anyway, but it's still survival of the fittest, baby!"




But seriously, I think this one's the killer:
The idea of another Constitution holds no promise of any rebirth of freedom. It only offers a new set of chains to bind down the people. Only by going back to the Saxon (and earlier) basic ten family political unit (the Tun) and working up from there by appointing - NOT ELECTING - representations to sit in council can a limited government ever be constructed.
Let's appoint our government and live together as family tribes! Not just feudal, but tribal. It's like the writer's slipped back about two thousand years.

This is what a republican FORM of government is all about. The democratic form is suicidal.
Democracy is death!




Yeah, someone who publishes, repeats, or endorses that - mixing in with "news", that's a source I trust for serious news and clear interpretation. Now, where did I put that sarcasm tag...

[FernBell]

42. k&r

[progressoid]

43. Bah, this is just the ravings of an internet loon.

[BrokenBeyondRepair]

44. maybe.. i'm not very concerned w/ the messenger

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648019da96&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf