I'm withholding judgment on Gates

[tpsbmam]

As is my usual practice, I started researching Gates when Bush named him. This is from a Council on Foreign Relations task force that Gates co-chaired. While I understandably mistrust anyone who is affiliated with Shrub, I'm going to wait and see with Gates. This is at least better than the PNAC approach that Rumsfeld endorsed!

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Iran_TF.pdf

ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States’ long lack of direct contact with, and presence
in, Iran drastically impedes its understanding of Iran’s domestic,
as well as regional, dynamics. In turn, this reduces Washington’s
influence across the Middle East in ways that are manifestly
harmful to its ultimate interests. Direct dialogue approached candidly
and without restrictions on issues of mutual concern would
serve Iran’s interests. And establishing connections with Iranian
society would directly benefit U.S. national objectives of enhancing
the stability and security of this critical region.
Dialogue between the United States and Iran need not await
absolute harmony between the two governments.Throughout history,
Washington has maintained cordial and constructive relations
with regimes whose policies and philosophies have differed
significantly from its own, including, above all, in its relationship
with the Soviet Union. By its very definition, diplomacy seeks to
address issues between nations, and so it would be unwise (and unrealistic)
to defer contact with Tehran until all differences between
the two governments have evaporated.
Conversely, however, any significant expansion in the U.S.
relationship with Tehran must incorporate unimpeachable progress
Task Force Report
<41>
toward a satisfactory resolution of key U.S. concerns. Political and
economic relations with Iran cannot be normalized unless and until
the Iranian government demonstrates a commitment to abandoning
its nuclear weapons programs and its support for terrorist groups.
However, these demands should not constitute preconditions for
dialogue.
In launching any new relationship with Iran, it is important that
expectations on both sides are realistic and that U.S. ones are clearly
communicated to the Iranians as well as between the various
players in the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy. A “grand bargain”
between Iran and the United States is not a realistic or achievable
goal. A quarter century of enmity and estrangement are not easily
overcome, the issues at stake are too numerous and complex,
and the domestic political contexts of both countries are too difficult
to allow the current breach to be settled comprehensively
overnight. Moreover, even the most far-reaching rapprochement
between the United States and Iran could not re-create the close
alliance that existed prior to the revolution in 1979. Were the
most serious U.S. concerns about Iranian behavior to be resolved,
significant differences between worldviews and strategic priorities
would remain. Instead, we envision a relationship through which
the two countries pragmatically explore areas of common concern
and potential cooperation, while continuing to pursue other
incompatible objectives at the same time.
For these reasons, we advocate that Washington propose a
compartmentalized process of dialogue, confidence building, and
incremental engagement. The United States should identify the
discrete set of issues on which critical U.S. and Iranian interests converge
and must be prepared to try to make progress along separate
tracks, even while considerable differences remain in other areas.
Instead of aspiring to a detailed road map of rapprochement,
as previous U.S. administrations have recommended, the executive
branch should consider outlining a more simple mechanism
for framing formal dialogue with Iran. A basic statement of principles,
along the lines of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué signed
by the United States and China, could be developed to outline the
Iran:Time for a New Approach
<42>
parameters for U.S.-Iranian engagement, establish the overarching
objectives for dialogue, and reassure relevant domestic political
constituencies on both sides. The effort to draft such a
statement would give constructive focus and substance to a serious
but realistic bilateral dialogue. Should that effort reach stalemate,
dialogue should still move forward on specific issues.
In engaging with Iran, the United States must be prepared to
utilize incentives as well as punitive measures. Given Iran’s pressing
economic challenges, the most powerful inducements for
Tehran would be economic measures: particularly steps that
rescind the comprehensive U.S. embargo on trade and investment
in Iran. Used judiciously, such incentives could enhance U.S.
leverage vis-à-vis Tehran. One particularly valuable step, which should
be made conditional on significant progress in resolving one or more
of the chief concerns with respect to Iran, would be the authorization
of executory contracts—legal instruments that permit U.S. businesses
to negotiate with Iranian entities but defer ultimate implementation
of any agreements until further political progress has
been reached. Commercial relations represent a diplomatic tool
that should not be underestimated or cynically disregarded.Ultimately,
the return of U.S. businesses to Tehran could help undermine
the clerics’ monopoly on power by strengthening the nonstate
sector, improving the plight of Iran’s beleaguered middle class, and
offering new opportunities to transmit American values.
In dealing with Iran, the United States should relinquish the
rhetoric of regime change. Such language inevitably evokes the problematic
history of U.S. involvement with the 1953 coup that
unseated Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. For
these reasons, propounding regime change simply invites nationalist
passions that are clearly unconstructive to the cause such a
policy would seek to serve.Rather,Washington’s positions and policies
must clearly communicate to the government and citizens of
Iran that the United States favors political evolution: the long-range
vision is an Iran that ushers in democracy itself in a meaningful
and lasting manner.
Task Force Report
<43>
Nuclear Programs
Iran’s history of maintaining clandestine programs suggests that
a radical change in its strategic environment would be the only enduring
way its nuclear weapons programs could be thwarted. In
dealing with a state determined to maintain a nuclear option, counterproliferation
efforts can only succeed in escalating the time and
cost associated with such programs. A permanent solution must
address the catalyst that drives Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons:
its persistent sense of insecurity vis-à-vis both regional rivals and
its paramount adversary, the United States.Ultimately, only in the
context of an overall rapprochement with Washington will there
be any prospect of persuading Iran to make the strategic decision
to relinquish its nuclear program.
Short of such a fundamental breakthrough in Iran’s own stance,
the International Atomic Energy Agency process offers a viable
path for managing Iran’s nuclear efforts, provided that there is close
multilateral coordination and firm U.S. leadership. A strong
European role is essential in marshalling an effective combination
of pressure and incentives. But there must be direct U.S. engagement
in the process to maintain vigilance and persuade Tehran of
the potential costs of noncompliance. The United States should
intensify its engagement with its allies on this issue. Although enhanced
international scrutiny of Iran’s weapons programs cannot permanently
neutralize Iran’s nuclear aspirations, the IAEA can play an
active role in retarding these programs and in generating a coordinated
multilateral stance.To this end, the United States should
continue to press the agency to enforce the Nonproliferation
Treaty’s Additional Protocol and pursue snap comprehensive
inspections of Iranian facilities. Iran will provide an important test
case for this verification instrument. In addition, the United
States should work with the Europeans and with the IAEA to identify
a set of “red lines”—conditions that, if Iran failed to fulfill, would
trigger a referral of Iran’s case to the United Nations Security Council.
Tehran must clearly understand that unless it demonstrates real,
uninterrupted cooperation with the IAEA process, it will face
Iran:Time for a New Approach
<44>
the prospect of multilateral sanctions imposed by the Security
Council.
Further, the Task Force recommends that the United States work
with its allies and the IAEA to outline a detailed framework
agreement that would seek to outline a more durable solution to
the nuclear issue. The basic parameters of such an agreement would
institute ongoing rigorous constraints on Iran’s nuclear program
in exchange for continued access to peaceful technology and
international markets. Iran would be asked to commit to permanently
ceasing all its enrichment and reprocessing activities, subject
to international verification. In return, the international
community would guarantee access to adequate nuclear fuel supplies,
with assurances that all spent fuel would be returned to the
country of origin, and to advanced power generation technology
(whose export to Iran is currently restricted). These commitments
would permit the continuing development of a peaceful Iranian
nuclear power program and provide multilateral guarantees of
access to nuclear technology, as long as Iran abides by its nonproliferation
obligations defined broadly to include cessation of
uranium enrichment.
Iran will inevitably resist such a proposal, as it has vocally proclaimed
its sovereign rights to nuclear technology and to all those
activities not specifically prohibited by the Nonproliferation
Treaty. For this reason, the framework agreement should incorporate
a new combination of carrots and sticks to persuade Tehran
to reconsider its course. In particular, the United States should be
prepared to commit to opening a bilateral dialogue with Iran on
enhancing political and economic relations that would take place
in parallel with the Islamic Republic’s established negotiations with
the European Union on trade, terrorism, proliferation, the Middle
East peace process, and human rights.
A viable framework agreement with Iran on the nuclear issue
would demand more effective cooperation between Washington
and its allies to make clear to Iran both the potential rewards for
its cooperation as well as the possible costs of its continuing
Task Force Report
<45>
obstructionism. Although the United States must take a leadership
role, the involvement of its allies and multilateral institutions
will be essential to provide leverage vis-à-vis Iran.The United States
should carefully calibrate any approach to garner the widest consensus
and a firm commitment to a coordinated set of steps. For
example, the United States should focus its dialogue with Russia
not on pressuring Moscow to abandon its involvement with the
construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, but on persuading
it to intensify its efforts to reach an agreement on the return of spent
fuel from that facility. For its part, the European Union must be
willing to consider curtailing economic relations with Tehran
should Iran be unwilling to adopt greater controls on its nuclear
programs.
Given the potential threat that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons
could pose, the full range of alternatives—including military
options—for confronting Tehran must be examined. Yet the use
of military force would be extremely problematic, given the dispersal
of Iran’s program at sites throughout the country and their
proximity to urban centers. Since Washington would be blamed
for any unilateral Israeli military strike, the United States should
make it quite clear to Israel that U.S. interests would be adversely
affected by such a move. In addition, any military effort to eliminate
Iranian weapons capabilities would run the significant risk
of reinforcing Tehran’s desire to acquire a nuclear deterrent and
of provoking nationalist passions in defense of that very course.
It would most likely also generate hostile Iranian initiatives in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Regional Conflicts
From the perspective of U.S. interests, one particular issue area appears
particularly ripe for U.S.-Iranian engagement: the future of Iraq
and Afghanistan. The United States has a direct and compelling
interest in ensuring both countries’ security and the success of their
post-conflict governments. Iran has demonstrated its ability and
readiness to use its influence constructively in these two countries,
Iran:Time for a New Approach
<46>
but also its capacity for making trouble. The United States should
work with Tehran to capitalize on Iran’s influence to advance the
stability and consolidation of its neighbors. This could commence
via a resumption and expansion of the Geneva track discussions
with Tehran on post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq.
Such a dialogue should be structured to obtain constructive Iranian
involvement in the process of consolidating authority within
the central governments and rebuilding the economies of both Iraq
and Afghanistan. Regular contact with Iran would also provide a
channel to address concerns that have arisen about its activities and
relationships with competing power centers in both countries.These
discussions should incorporate other regional power brokers, as well
as Europe and Russia—much like the “Six Plus Two” negotiations
on Afghanistan that took place in the years before the Taliban were
ousted. A multilateral forum on the future of Iraq and Afghanistan
would help cultivate confidence and would build political and economic
relationships essential to the long-term durability of the new
governments in Baghdad and Kabul.
Critics have argued that Iran should be denied any formal
role in the reconstruction of Iraq due to the propensity of some
Iranian factions to pursue destabilizing policies there. In the
aftermath of the June 28, 2004, handover of sovereignty to the
interim Iraqi administration, however, the United States is no longer
in a position to implement such a veto, nor should it endeavor to
do so. Convincing Iran that it has a direct stake in the successful
transition of its former adversary represents the most effective means
of thwarting any attempts by hard-line elements in Iran to undermine
Iraq.
Over the longer term, U.S. interests in achieving peace and stability
in the Persian Gulf would be best served by engaging Iran
and each of its neighbors in a dialogue aimed at establishing an
effective organization to promote regional security and cooperation.
Such an organization could be structured to provide a forum
for regional dialogue, confidence-building measures, economic
cooperation, conflict prevention, and crisis management.
Task Force Report
<47>
Settling the al-Qaeda issue must remain a high priority for the
United States.Through direct dialogue with Afghanistan via a renewed
Geneva track, the outlines of a reciprocal arrangement should be
negotiated. In private discussions, the Iranian government has already
suggested the outlines of an agreement that would trade al-Qaeda
detainees for members of an Iraqi-based opposition group, the
Mojahideen-e Khalq, which has long perpetrated terrorist activities
against Iran. Such an explicit trade is not possible, however,
due to the impossibility of ensuring fair adjudication in the Iranian
system. Rather, the Task Force recommends that the United
States press Iran to clarify the status of all al-Qaeda–related
detainees and to extradite those who can be identified as persons
pursued by other governments. At the same time, the United States
should work with the interim Iraqi government to ensure that
Mojahideen facilities are conclusively disbanded and that its leaders
are brought to justice for their role in violence against both Iraqis
and Iranians under Saddam’s regime.
Iran’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a pernicious
factor in an already debilitating conflict. Ultimately, the
most effective strategy for extracting Iran from the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict would be resuming a robust peace process buttressed
by a sustained U.S. commitment to lead the effort and a broad regional
consensus in support of the negotiating parties and the ultimate
agreements. Should leading Arab states such as Saudi Arabia
and Egypt actively support and facilitate a peace process between
Israelis and Palestinians, Iran would be likely to acquiesce to this
process. Iranian hostility toward the peace process is not immutable—
a lonely struggle against an emerging regional consensus on behalf
of radical Palestinian forces is not likely to be the path chosen by
Tehran.
Long-Term Relations with Iran
Washington should work to ensure that its rhetoric and policies
target Iran’s objectionable policies rather than its population.
Attempting to isolate the Iranian people does not serve the cause
Iran:Time for a New Approach
<48>
of democracy in Iran or the region.The most appropriate and effective
mechanism for contributing to Iran’s slow process of change
would be to intensify the political, cultural, and economic linkages
between its population and the wider world. Specifically, this
should entail gradually incorporating Iran into the activities of the
U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative and other regional reform
programs and issuing a blanket license to authorize the activities
of U.S. nongovernmental organizations in Iran. The administration
should also take care to ensure that its message—that the
United States desires a dialogue on mutual interests and that the
resumption of relations will require a positive response from Iran
regarding U.S. concerns—is crystal clear to both the government
and the people of Iran.
Successive U.S. administrations have centered their policy
toward Iran on the persuasive power of economic sanctions to change
the country’s positions and conduct.The comprehensive and unilateral
nature of the U.S. embargo, however, ultimately deprives
Washington of leverage: both the influence that comes with a government’s
ability to make trade ties conditional on improved
political relations and the more diffuse impact business relations
can have on changing political culture. The Task Force ultimately
concludes that economic relations between the United States
and Iran must be conditioned upon improvements in the diplomatic
relationship between the two countries. Small steps, such
as the authorization of trade between U.S. entities and Iran’s
relatively small private sector, should be contemplated as
confidence-building measures that would create new constituencies
within Iran for a government that is fully integrated
into the international community. In addition, the United States
should relinquish its efforts to prevent Iranian engagement with
international financial institutions, as these efforts are inherently
counterproductive to the objective of promoting better governance
in Tehran. Permitting Iran to begin accession talks with the
World Trade Organization will only intensify pressure on Tehran
for accountability and transparency, and may help facilitate Iran’s
evolution into a state that respects its citizens and its neighbors.
<49>
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS
I wish to stress that support for dialogue and diplomatic and
economic relations between Iran and the United States does not
imply acquiescence in the violation by the Iranian government of
the civil rights and liberties of its own citizens. Some Iranians understandably
fear that relations with the United States will reinforce
the status quo and therefore regime durability in Iran. In fact, any
study of Iranian history over the last century and more suggests
that interaction with the outside world greatly accelerates, rather
than hinders, the pace of internal political change. I believe
enmeshing Iran with the international community, expanding
trade, and improving economic opportunity and the conditions for
the growth of the middle class will strengthen, not weaken, the
democratic forces in Iran.
Shaul Bakhash
While I agree with the main thrust of the report I do not agree
that the U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan may offer Iran
new incentives to open a mutually beneficial dialogue. On the contrary,
I believe Iran has few incentives for dialogue. They are
convinced we intend to overthrow them, and they believe we are
bogged down in Iraq and have lost what support we had in the
Arab world. From their perspective, it is better to wait and let us
stew in our own juice.Overtures on our part, under these circumstances,
are likely to be interpreted as a sign of weakness and be rebuffed.
Frank Carlucci
Iran:Time for a New Approach
<50>
The Task Force report offers sound and insightful analysis of the
evolution of the Islamic Republic’s internal politics, its foreign policy,
and the range of U.S. interests at stake in America’s relationship
with Iran. However, I must take exception with the report’s
conclusion that a “grand bargain” between the United States and
Iran is not a realistic goal. Indeed, I believe that a grand bargain
may be the only realistic option for breaking out of the current impasse
in U.S.-Iranian relations, which is increasingly dysfunctional for
U.S. interests.
We have had considerable experience, over the years, with
incremental or issue-specific approaches to seeking an improved
U.S.-Iranian relationship. In Lebanon, Bosnia, and, most recently,
in Afghanistan, U.S.-Iranian cooperation has been important to
the achievement of U.S. policy goals in challenging environments.
Yet, this cooperation has never been able to serve as the catalyst
for more fundamental and strategic improvement in the
U.S.-Iranian relationship. Disagreements over other critical
issues—especially terrorism and nonproliferation—have always undermined
the strategic potential of U.S.-Iranian tactical cooperation.
I see no reason, in the current climate, to believe that the kind of
approach recommended in the report is more likely to succeed in
improving the overall nature of the U.S.-Iranian relationship
than earlier exercises in incremental, issue-specific cooperation.
I have assumed for some years that the biggest problem the United
States faces in trying to get the Iranian government to change
its approach toward proliferation and support for terrorism is
that most Iranian citizens have heretofore had no clear reason to
“connect the dots” between their government’s ending its support
both for Hezbollah and for nuclear weapons development and having
U.S. economic sanctions lifted as a result. If such a connection
were made, you might find the majority of Iranians demanding
good behavior by their government on these issues because the vast
majority wants a better relationship with the United States, as they
believe that a normalized relationship with the United States is
in their own economic and social self-interest.
Additional and Dissenting Views
<51>
Finally, the United States should make certain that the Iranian
people clearly “hear” this offer of a grand bargain.We should
make this offer to the Iranian government (I would suggest
through Hassan Rohani, secretary general of Iran’s Supreme
National Security Council), but also broadcast it directly to the
Iranian people. I believe the “conservatives” in Iran will also see
such an approach as a chance for them to undertake a “Nixon to
China” approach and, potentially achieve a goal that has benefits
both internationally and, more important, domestically as they
attempt to cement their political position long term.
H. P. Goldfield
In consideration of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s
report of July 7, 2004, on Iraq and 9/11, I believe the Council on
Foreign Relations Task Force report on Iran should be very circumspect
on what it concludes is happening in Iran. Until such
time as U.S. intelligence is confirmed reliable, or Americans can
be assured the administration has not distorted the intelligence it
receives, the report should be very cautious on what it recommends
based on the assumption its intelligence is correct.
Furthermore, I would have preferred that the final report dealt
with engagement, beginning with subjects of common interest to
the United States and Iran, rather than suggesting that engagement
selectively deal only with well-known but unconfirmed
contentious subjects. It is certain Iran would have its own list of
similar issues that the United States perceived to threaten its
security. This is not a starting point for effective engagement.
In a relative sense, in the region, I do not agree that Iran is an
unstable country. In fact, it well may be the most stable. Although
not quantified, it appears that those who have long been supported
most aggressively by the United States have a much higher potential
for instability than does Iran.
Iran:Time for a New Approach
<52>
The report’s conclusion that isolation, containment sanctions,
and the like have failed as foreign policy practices by the United
States is welcomed. And the conclusion that the United States should
adopt measures to broaden political, cultural, and economic linkages
with the people of Iran is even more welcomed.
Richard H. Matzke
The report proposes a framework agreement under which Iran would
cease permanently all enrichment and reprocessing activities
under international verification, in exchange for guaranteed access
to nuclear fuel and assured return of spent fuel to the country of
origin. Russia could play a central role in advancing this kind of
approach, having enacted legislation permitting it to import spent
fuel from other countries, with a view to generating substantial
revenues from reactor operators in countries seeking a way to
facilitate the difficult task of managing growing stocks of spent
fuel. It would be in the interest of the United States to engage Russia
in early discussions to negotiate an agreement of peaceful
nuclear cooperation that would permit Russia to import spent fuel
of U.S. origin, to reinforce U.S. efforts to persuade Moscow to conclude
and implement its proposed agreement with Iran for the return
to Russia of the spent fuel from the Bushehr nuclear reactor. It is
worth noting that the nonproliferation benefits of this kind of
approach—essentially providing cradle-to-grave fuel services to
countries that forswear dangerous fuel-cycle activities—could
extend well beyond Iran.
Also, the report properly notes that Iran is permitted to enrich
uranium and engage in other nuclear fuel-cycle facilities under its
international treaty obligations, but it should be remembered
that, according to Article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
the grant of the inalienable right to develop nuclear energy is qualified
by the phrase “for peaceful purposes.” Thus if the international
community should conclude that Iranian efforts to enrich
Additional and Dissenting Views
<53>
uranium or obtain plutonium were intended, in fact, to support
the development of nuclear weapons, then those Iranian efforts
would not be permissible under its international treaty obligations.
Daniel B. Poneman

[HiFructosePronSyrup]

1. Why?

He's a Bush pick, so you know he's a rotten crook.

[gfnrob]

2. Just one thing...Iran-Contra!!! (Ortega is back as well)

[acmavm]

3. Go research Iran/Contra. That's Gates.

[tpsbmam]

6. I'm very familiar with Iran Contra. n/t

[BootinUp]

4. I'll read this a bit later. My guess though is that Gates has a

much more realistic view of the world and what can and can't be accomplished by foreign policy and the military and covert operations, nore realistic than the neocon view that is.

[tpsbmam]

5. We shall see......

I realize he's Iran-Contra. Look, this is Shrub we're talking about. He's not going to pick someone who WE think is top of the line. But based on what is said in this task force report, he has the potential to be a hell of a lot better than Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld was just itching to start another war and, despite even the PNAC crowd saying they'd screwed up everything, he was PNAC plan all the way.

Gates may, with MAY being the operative word, insert a little (relative) sanity when it comes to Shrub's foreign policies.