http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/061126/nysu007.html?.v=101NEW YORK, Nov. 26 /PRNewswire/ -- American soldiers who patrol Moqtada al-Sadr's turf in Baghdad understand the extent of his power, which isn't obvious to the untrained eye. They can spot his men. "They look like they're pulling security," First Lt. Robert Hartley, tells Newsweek in the current issue's cover story about the Shiite cleric. Hartley plays cat and mouse with Mahdi Army in the Iraqi capital. The Sadrists use children and young men as lookouts. When GIs get out of their Humvees to patrol on foot, one of the watchers will fly a kite, or release a flock of pigeons. Some of Sadr's people have even infiltrated top ranks of the Iraqi police. Captain Tom Kapla says he knows who they are: "They look at you, and you can tell they want to kill you."
More than anyone, Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army, personifies the dilemma Washington faces: If American troops leave Iraq quickly, militia leaders like Sadr will be unleashed as never before, and full-scale civil war could follow. But the longer the American occupation lasts, the less popular America gets -- and the more popular Sadr and his ilk become. In the December 4 Newsweek cover, "The Most Dangerous Man in Iraq" (on newsstands Monday, November 27), a team of correspondents profile Sadr, examining his background and how he grew to be as popular -- and dangerous -- as he is today in Iraq.
Newsweek reports that the story of the U.S. confrontation with Moqtada al-Sadr is, in many ways, the story of American folly in Iraq. It's a story of ignorance and poor planning, missteps and confusion. Key policymakers often disagreed about the importance of Sadr and about how to deal with him. The result was half-measures and hesitation. But the story isn't just about past failures. It also contains lessons -- and warnings -- about the future.
In August 2003, there was a plan to arrest Sadr, after an Iraqi judge had secretly issued a warrant for him in connection with the murder of an Iraqi exile who had helped the U.S. "The pivotal moment was Aug. 19, 2003," Dan Senor, a senior official in the Coalition Provisional Authority at the time, tells Newsweek. "We were down to figuring out the mechanisms of ensuring that the operation was seen as Iraqi, executed on an Iraqi arrest warrant. I remember it was late afternoon and we had just received a snowflake from
Rumsfeld ... with nine different questions, rehashing how we were going to do this, to make sure it was not seen as an American operation." (A "snowflake" was a Rumsfeld memo.)