http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/12/washington/12ticktock.html<snip>
One senior official involved in the discussions said that Mr. Bush’s instinct toward the start of the review process — and that of others — was to consider a withdrawal from Baghdad, allow Iraqi-vs.-Iraqi fighting to settle itself, and dedicate United States forces to focus on pursuing Qaeda fighters. “As you peel that back and look at it, it just doesn’t war-game out for you,” said the official. “You’re supposed to go flying through Baghdad looking for Al Qaeda, and when you see ethnic cleansing going on look the other way?”
In the end, the official said, Mr. Hadley’s teams concluded that an American withdrawal from Baghdad would “crater the government.”
Another option discussed was to try to steer the Iraqi government toward a political realignment that would essentially depose Mr. Maliki, and put a stronger figure in place. By elimination, those discussions led Mr. Bush’s top advisers back to the idea of a troop increase. According to an account by one senior official, General Pace traveled to Crawford, Tex., to meet with Mr. Bush after Christmas and took with him a recommendation calling for two more American brigades in Baghdad, with three more American brigades on call, along with two additional American battalions for Anbar.
According to a senior administration official, Vice President Dick Cheney was among those who wanted a bigger force. Ultimately, Mr. Bush concluded that General Pace’s initial request was too small and should be augmented by three more American brigades for Baghdad. General Pace said that General Abizaid, who is retiring this year, had opposed the idea of a troop increase. But General Abizaid came around, General Pace said, when he saw that the additional American combat forces would be accompanied by a “political and economic surge.”
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(1000+ posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
