Iranian combat experiences with AIM-54 Phoenix

[cool user name]

Iranian combat experiences with AIM-54 Phoenix
The factual accuracy of this article or section is disputed.


Little to nothing is known about Iran's use of its seventy-nine F-14A Tomcats (delivered prior to 1979) in most western outlets, the exception being a book released by Osprey Publishing titled "Iranian F-14 Tomcats in Combat" authored by Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop<1>. Most of the following accounts are based on the research contained in this book, possibly the only book devoted solely to the topic of Iranian F-14s.

Reports of use of the 285 missiles supplied to Iran <2> during the Iran-Iraq War, from 1980–88 vary. US technical personnel report that they sabotaged the aircraft and weapons before they left the country following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, making it impossible to fire the missile. However, the IRIAF was able to repair the sabotage and the damage only affected a limited number of planes; not the entire fleet.

Some western sources claim that it is unlikely that the Phoenix was used operationally. First, as difficult as the missile and fire control systems were to operate, Iran had hired many American technicians. Upon leaving, they took most of the knowledge about how to operate and maintain these complex weapon systems with them. Also, without a steady supply of engineering support from Hughes Aircraft Missile Systems Group and corresponding spares and upgrades, even a technically competent operator would have extreme difficulty fielding operational weapons. Iran had, indeed, aggressively pursued spares for their planes in the years following the revolution.

Most less informed sources claim that the primary use of the F-14 was as an airborne early warning aircraft, guarded by other fighters.

However, in reality the IRIAF used the F-14s actively as a fighter-interceptor and at times escort fighter with the AIM-54 scoring 60-70 kills. F-14s were often used to protect IRIAF tankers supporting strike packages into Iraq, and scanned over the border with their radars, often engaging detected Iraqi flights. Also, some F-14s were modified into specialized airborne early warning aircraft.

Supporters of these claims point to the fact that, in the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi fighter pilots consistently turned and fled as soon as American F-14 pilots turned on their fighters' very distinctive AN/AWG-9 radars, which suggests that Iraqi pilots had learned to avoid the F-14. The counter-argument is that virtually all Iraqi fighters turned and fled when confronted, regardless of the type of aircraft facing them, although the USAF had much better success engaging Iraqi fighters with their F-15 Eagles in the same vicinity where Tomcats operated.

During the entry of the F-14 and AIM-54 into Iranian service, the Shah ordered live-firing exercises with AIM-54s. The exercise was targeted against the Soviet Union, who was flying MiG-25 recon sorties over Iran. Five AIM-54s were shot at AQL-34 target drones, two flying Mach 2 at 60.000 feet. Four missiles hit the targets. After the exercise the Soviets approached Iran and both sides reached agreement, that allowed the tensions to de-escalate, avoiding further conflicts between the two states.

On 16th September 1980, Iranian F-14s were vectored against a fast-moving contact, approaching Khark oil terminals at Mach 3. The MiG-25 was shot down by an AIM-54. This was the first confirmed kill by F-14 against MiG-25s.

On the same day, another MiG-25RB was shot down in extremely hard conditions. The MiG-25 was approaching fast and was already within 113 km, yet the F-14 RIO was unable to acquire the target. A positive lock-on was made at a distance of only 70 km, almost inside the minimum range for this type of look-up shot against a high-speed target. A single AIM-54 was launched in snap-up engagement mode at 64 km. The missile worked perfectly and the MiG was downed.

On 2nd December 1980 one of the closest range shoot=downs by AIM-54 occurred. Captain F. Dehghan of the 8th TFS was flying on patrol covering Khark Island oil teminals, when a number of approaching bogies were detected. Lock-on was attained only from a distance of 10 miles, too close to the minimum range of the missile. The F-14 had to use the Phoenix, though, as otherwise the plane would have been too heavy for dogfighting. The Phoenix was launched in short-range active mode and it managed to hit a MiG-21.

At 20th November 1982, two Iraqi generals boarded an Mi-8 helicopter to visit the front lines. The Mi-8 was escorted by two other Mi-8s, an Mi-25, four MiG-21s and four MiG-23s, that were replaced by additional fighters when they ran low on fuel. The formation was spotted by two Iranian Tomcats escorting an IRIAF KC-707 tanker, which was waiting for an Iranian F-4 strike to refuel. The F-14s were flying a race-track pattern, scanning over the front line with their AWG-9 radar. Captain Khosrodad spotted a large number of targets approaching slowly from the west, already within AIM-54 range. Khosrodad ordered his wingman to keep with the tanker and attacked, first firing two AIM-54s, then two AIM-7E-4s some 10 seconds later. According to Iraqi reports, one MiG-21 and two MiG-23s were shot down within a minute, forcing the Iraqi generals to abandon their mission.

On 20th February 1987, an IRIAF F-4 lured an Iraqi strike force into a trap, which was ambushed by two F-14s of the 81st TFS. An AIM-54 was launched at very long range, hitting the lead Mirage flown by IrAF Brig. General Hekmat Abdul-Qadr. The Iranian listening posts recorded the leader of the accompanying Su-22 flight scream "F-Arba-Ashara! Yalla! Yalla!" with the seven remaining fighters turning and fleeing. In English the leader had called "F-14! Run! Run!"

During late 1987, the Soviet Union supplied Iraq with MiG-25BM "Wild Weasel" aircraft. The planes tested the ECM systems against Iranian Tomcats and attacked Iranian targets with new anti-radar weapons. The MiG-25BMs proved they could operate with impunity at up to 69,000 ft, until on the night of 11th November a MiG-25BM was intercepted by an F-14. The Tomcat fired a single AIM-54 in Home-On-Jam mode. The missile guided flawlessly but failed to detonate. Yet, the missile clipped the MiG-25's fin and forced the pilot to bail out.

During March 1988, Iraq launched a major attack against Iranian oil exports. On 19th March, at 0100, the first wave of Iraqi Tu-22B heavy bombers and Mirage fighters, attacked Khark island and the tankers. Half an hour later, a second wave arrived without losses. The Iranian F-14s had arrived on scene for the third wave, though. The US Navy warships patrolling on the area recorded several AIM-54 launches, with at least one Tu-22B bomber and a MiG-25RB being destroyed. According to the US Navy, it is probable that other Iraqi bombers were shot down as well.

During the ending phase of the Iran-Iraq war, a mini war developed between the Iraqi Mirage F1 EQ-5/6 units and the Iranian F-14s between February and July 1988. The F1 pilots hunted the Tomcats aggressively and attacked the Iranians at any occasion. The F1EQ-6s were equipped with good ECM systems, and the Iraqi pilots could deny the F-14s from using their AIM-54 missiles. For example on 19th July 1988 four Mirages attacked two F-14s and downed both, suffering no losses.

The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force was able to keep its F-14 fighters and AIM-54 missiles in regular use during the whole of the Iran-Iraq war, though periodic lack of spares grounded at times large parts of the fleet. - At worst, during late 1987, the stock of AIM-54 missiles was at its lowest, with less than 50 operational missiles available. The missiles needed fresh thermal batteries that could only be purchased from the USA. Iran managed finally to find a clandestine buyer that supplied the Iranians with batteries - though those did cost up to 10,000 USD each. Iran did receive spares and parts for both the F-14s and AIM-54s from various sources during the Iran-Iraq war, and has received more spares after the conflict. Iran started a heavy industrial program to build spares for the planes and missiles, and does not rely anymore on outside sources for keeping the F-14s and AIM-54s operational.

Source = Wikipedia

[jody]

1. Iran's F-14s and AIM-54s are almost certainly useless against US fighters. n/t

[cool user name]

4. Do you have a supporting reason for that assertion?

[jody]

7. Yes. n/t

[cool user name]

9. Well, I'm all ears. n/t

[jmowreader]

5. And the Phoenix was supposedly too complex for Iranians to use

Let me tell you another story about American hubris regarding our wonder weapons. The Stinger manportable SAM is the subject of today's rant.

When this thing came out, it was supposedly so hard to operate that our Air Defense Artillery soldiers were unable to effectively shoot down targets with it. Apparently they were hitting "friendly" as well as "enemy" targets with it, and the weapon's nineteen firing steps (one of them is "put the launcher on your shoulder"; another is "point the launcher at the aircraft you want to destroy") made the weapon unusable by our soldiers. Well...one of the big problems the Army has always had is that its best and brightest really don't want to join the combat arms. As for the soldiers shooting friendly targets with it--the gripstock contains an Identification Friend or Foe system that's supposed to keep you from doing this--the congressional investigators who were screaming about this didn't quite understand that ADA gunners will shoot anything that moves.

Okay, so OUR guys were out there fuckin' up right and left with this frighteningly complex weapon. At the same time, the US-backed Mujahideen soldiers in Afghanistan were blowing Soviet helicopters out of the sky with relative ease. And ya know somethin'? The Muj couldn't even speak English, nor read the English-language field manual that comes with the system. And they'd damn sure never been to Fort Bliss, where the entire Western world sends soldiers to learn to shoot planes down.

How's that relate to the Iranian problem? Real simple. Like the Stinger, we've been told that the Phoenix missile is so complex no one who hasn't attended the Navy's fighter school could use the missile, no one who hasn't been to US Navy Phoenix repair school can pull maintenance on it and the weapon requires technical support from the manufacturer to have a hope of working. But as we see in the OP, the Iranians have completely figured out this weapon system to the point of being able to make more. And I'm going to take a wild stab and assume that ever since Bush decided to send the best modern equipment the US has into combat in Iraq, there's some little Iranian Electronic Intelligence guy sitting there who knows exactly how our newest radars work, and he's told the air force.

Don't count out the Iranian Air Force. If they've got Phoenix missiles, we're in a world of hurt if Bush crosses the border.

[cool user name]

6. Couple that with the Sunburn anti-ship missile and ...

... any other state of the art weaponry that the Russians and Chinese have sold to Iran, and it will NOT be a cake walk.

Thanks for posting, jimowreader.

:hi:

[Solo_in_MD]

11. Sunburn is far from state of the art

and the USN has defenses against them and trains against surrogates.

[Pavulon]

21. We did joint development

with the Russian firm that built that technology. We used it for a TARGET DRONE. Sunburn is an internet blowup. Some article from a BS source cites it as an uber weapon. Janes has a more realistic approach.

[MyNameGoesHere]

27. Your right they said the

same thing about those Exocets that nearly split that ship in half. I am cookoo for coco puffs

[hack89]

26. You overstate the threat of Sunburn.

For two reasons:

1. There is no tactical reason for US carriers to get within range (unless Iran fires the first shot which I doubt)

2. The missile is the least important part when it comes to hitting ships at long range. You underestimate how hard it is to actually detect and track a ship at long range (say 60 miles)and coordinate a missile shot such that you hit the target and not some tanker that was in the area. Don't forget that it is unlikely that the Iranians will have an intact command and control capability.

[leveymg]

32. There's no reason to use carriers, anyway. Look at a map.

If we want to bomb Iran using tactical aircraft, it can be done from US airbases located in any and all of the surrounding countries.

This appointing an Admiral to head CentCom stuff is just another of the big psych-out Bushco is trying to play on Iran and the Democrats to keep everyone off-balance.

I think it's backfiring, though, if Congress repeals or amends the War Powers Act and the IWR.

[jody]

8. My statement is not based on Iranian troops' ability to operate complex weapon systems. It simply

recognizes that Iran has not been able to obtain spare parts to maintain the F-14 weapon system.

[jmowreader]

10. You don't need to be able to "obtain" parts

Certainly you know what an aviation machinist is.

To maintain an F-14 without permission to buy parts from Grumman, you need:

aviation machinists--the Iranian Air Force undoubtedly had some
machine tools--they had some too
metal to make parts from--they had that too, or could get it from SOMEWHERE
and an F-14 to take parts off and copy.

[Solo_in_MD]

12. Its more than just metal part

Electronics has a limited shelf life and some of the part require more than basic machining to make. This is particularly true of engine parts. Then there is the support equipment, almost as complex as the aircraft itself.

[jody]

15. I'm aware of all the things you state and many others. I stand by my statement. n/t

[hack89]

25. Phoenix was always over rated

especially against tactical aircraft. It was designed to shoot down heavily ladened bombers flying at altitude that were threatening carrier strike groups. It would be of limited use against low flying or maneuvering tactical aircraft.

There is a reason the USN retired it well before they retired the F14.

[Rex]

2. Nice record of the military global trade.

Look at all the money made from all that military hardware! And that was back in the 80s! Hell, today there is no greater profit than selling weapons to countries and watching them destroy each others expensive war toys. I'm sure people like Rummy and Cheney could smell the money from halfway across the globe!

[leveymg]

3. There's a key sentence in here to keep in mind about these planes:

"The F1EQ-6s were equipped with good ECM systems, and the Iraqi pilots could deny the F-14s from using their AIM-54 missiles. For example on 19th July 1988 four Mirages attacked two F-14s and downed both, suffering no losses."

That was nearly 20 years ago. The US ECM today is light-years more effective.

More likely, the Iranians have upgraded their avionics and missiles several times based on more recent Russian, Chinese, and perhaps European designs. Still, not nearly good enough.

An attack on Iran won't be a dogfighting war. It'll be a launch on warning use-em-or-lose-em mass missile launch followed by the most ungodly mass casualties on both sides.

That's why it isn't going to happen.

[Solo_in_MD]

13. Key Point : Disputed Accuracy

Hughes Aircraft Radar Systems Group tech reps who were in country have repeatedly stated that they destroyed key components of all the AWG-9s prior to leaving the country. Since those parts are not available outside of USN supply channels, it is doubtful that there was ever Phoenix capability after the revolution. Conceivably they could have been reverse engineered, but it would have taken years. Also there was a tremendous brain drain from Iran during that time frame. The skills required to reverse engineer a state of the art system would have been in short supply.

The F-14 can carry other ordinance, including Sparrow and Sidewinder. Its also a decent dog fighter in the hands of a skilled pilot. Some were observed flying during the Iran/Iraq war, with unknown armaments.

The US assumed that both some of the Tomcats and the Phoenix missiles were later supplied to China and the USSR for evaluation. Upgrades to both were made subsequent to that.

[Selatius]

14. There won't be very many dog fights at all when war comes.

This will primarily be done through a pre-emptive salvo of cruise missiles hitting airbases and knocking out runways, communications nodes, command centers, etc. Then many warplanes will roll in and finish off the few Iranian warplanes that did manage to make it into the air before the runways were cratered.

The biggest threat to US pilots would then be from surface-to-air missiles, and Russia has been selling the Iranians some newer systems. This is likely where the heaviest casualties in the US Airforce will occur, from SAMs.

[bananarepublican]

16. Alas... another "pre-emptive" war! n/t

[HuffleClaw]

17. no need for 'dogfights' at all

in fact i'd say if the iranians use their aircraft at all it will be an anti-ship mission. as for missiles, likely they are gonna go for the big cannoli and hope to bag a stealth bomber. that would be a real coup. the US is NOT going to be able to pull off a 'suprise' attack. not a chance.

[leveymg]

18. The heaviest US losses wil be at the megabases in Iraq that will be hit

by Iranian CBW missiles. Then, there will be the attacks in the "Homeland".

[Selatius]

19. It seems reasonable to expect that, given their mobile missile launchers.

Their mobility guarantees we can't kill them all in one strike. We were not able to destroy more than a few at most of Saddam's mobile scud missile launchers in 1991, and we had satellites and warplanes all over the place.

[leveymg]

20. And, the Iranians - unlike Saddam - really do have chem and bio warheads

It's going to be hell on earth, if this happens.

[Pavulon]

22. ANY use of chem bio

would prompt an immediate counter attack with nuclear weapons. We have defenses against chem bio. Civilians do not. Iran has no defense against a slbm or gravity bomb dropped prom a stealth jet.

[leveymg]

23. Iran is in a use'em or lose'em position - they will launch EVERYTHING

when the first confirmed airstrike comes in. That means there will be hundreds of simultaneous incoming warheads directed at US installations in Iraq, Oman, and Qatar. The second wave, whatever survives, will be directed 12-24 hours later at Israeli nuclear weapons plants and airfields.

The Israelis will destroy Iranian cities. The Syrians will launch. The Pakistanis will launch.

Within 7-10 days, cells inside the US will attempt to attack nuclear and toxic chemical targets, and possibly set off radiological and chem/bio weapons in US cities.

This will escalate uncontrollably, which is why it won't happen.

[maine_raptor]

24. Slim thread to hang on.

In Barbara Tuckerman's book on World War I, she has two German diplomats talking late one night during the war. One said to the other; "How did this war start?" to which the the second diplomat replied;

"Ach, if only we knew."

Let us hope that History does not repeat itself, eh?

[leveymg]

28. Only, if WWIV happens, it won't be any mystery why, or who caused it..

By the way, mutually-assured destruction has worked well for nearly 60 years. No reason to assume it won't continue to function as designed.

[maine_raptor]

29. MAD worked for one reason and one reason only, my friend

On both sides the leaders were sane.

[leveymg]

30. Leaders have been replaced, repeatedly, on both sides.

The sane outnumber the insane. Don't dispair, my friend.

[maine_raptor]

31. Even the sane ones make mistakes.

And in the world of modern warfare, the ladder of escalation can be climbed quickly.

[leveymg]

33. Absolutely correct. Could happen, but not likely.

The guiding principle of strategic planning is to avoid unintended escalation. Scenarios are run and the risks are calculated. The Iranian military and top leadership understand this, and communicate through back-channels with the US to remove uncertainties and errors that might lead to unintended war.

We started doing this with the Russians in the early Cold War. The same process of mutual risk-assessment is conducted with all foreign powers that have sufficient military assets that US strategic planning has been carried out.

The planning document adopted in the early part of the Bush Administration -- while it embarces preemption and first-use -- also requires the US military to carry out extensive internal consultations with the JCS prior to the approval of any strike package. Bush can't just pick up the phone in the middle of the night and order the head of CentCom or StratCom to begin bombing. There has to be a consensus as to what is to be done and how it will be done before we launch.

[maine_raptor]

34. I realize that safeguards are in place, but

what I worry about is one of two possibilities.

First, an unauthorized strike at a US warship in the PG by an Iranian commander. This could happen in several different ways; a US probe of Iranian defenses is perceived as an "attack" by the outpost being probed and launches, or a mis-communication between an field commander and HQ.

My second worry is that some "outside" group will do something stupid (aka, a "Cole" bombing) that will quickly escalate, especially if, on the US side, we have a president that feels pressed politically at home and feels the rightness of his cause.

As for Bush just "phoning it home"; there are "war plans" for many different levels of usage, and one of the problems with "tit for tat" is that sooner or later you have a mighty big "tit" on your hands.

[leveymg]

35. This is the reason that the military have opposed any cross-border

strikes, and there are a minimum number of US surface combatants that transit the Straits. There are no US aircraft carriers inside the Gulf, at present, and frankly it makes no military sense at all for them to operate inside the tight confines of those waters.

As for third-party provocations, that is a matter of mutual concern for US and Iranian intelligence. There has been some cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq on those matters, particularly the so-called foreign fighters, most of whom are from Saudi Arabia and North African states.

The Pentagon is going to let Bushco have as much rope as it takes to hang itself in its (mis)conduct of the Iraq war. Once US forces are committed and hostilities start, the military has precious little leverage over civilian commanders. Once the shooting starts, they have to follow lawful orders. The only alternative is whistle-blowing, and that doesn't come easy. It was a gut-wrenching decision to publicly expose the prisoner abuses, particularly Abu Ghraib, that resulted from this Administration's illegal orders. The actual leak of the photos and recordings was carried out by ranking officers in military intelligence with the concurrance of the highest commanders in the U.S. Army.

That is why the Pentagon and its civilian allies have drawn a clear line around Iran, beyond which American forces can not pass, except to collect intelligence. The mutation and misuse of the military intelligence function has been much discussed, and those who have perpetrated the worst abuses (I speak here of OSP, and officers and civilians who cooperated with Israeli intel to carry out disinformation and espionage) have been prosecuted or moved out. There is an intense commitment within DoD and the NIC to avoid spoiling operations of the kind you describe.

There may be some irrational actors on both sides, and an accident or sabotage is always possible, but it is the job of some smart, patriotic and decent people to foresee, avoid and prepare for such contingencies. Even madness at the top of the Chain of Command is something that's been anticipated, role-played, and safeguarded. Let's hope that one isn't tested.