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This is very very scary - so it's great it is getting out. Our soldiers - who don't speak Arabic - will by involved with the Iraqi soldiers trying to go after Shiites militias, Sunnis insurgents and foreign insurgents.
Stolen from a SFRC Q &A thread in JK group:
KERRY: Do you see the political process in place to resolve the fundamental differences between an Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and a Muqtada al-Sadr? Between the interests of the militias, the warlorders that Mr. Said just referred to? The Sunni reluctance to participate, the Sunni desire to re-emerge as the people who run the country, the interests of certain individuals with respect to Iran, the Persian- Arab divide. And all of these things are, it seems to me, so huge, so historically and culturally deep in this issue that as it further disintegrates into this morass of individual interests, our troops can't pull that back together, can they Mr. Said?
SAID: No, troops, alone, can never resolve this. Well, there's one caveat to that, of course. If you sent 500,000 troops to Iraq you may be able to steamroll the situation without there being a political consensus. But there's neither the resources nor the will to do that. So, given the lack of the possibility to mobilize the necessary troops, the troops need to come on the back of political consensus, on the back of a political settlement that is internationally mediated, that is supported by Iraq's neighbors as well as the various communities in Iraq.
KERRY: I want to get your answer, too, Mr. Pillar. But as you do, because time runs so fast, could you just touch on the question of to what degree the presence of the American troops delays the willingness of people to resolve those issues and acts as a cover for people's other interests to be able to play out to see who's on top and who's on the bottom?
PILLAR: I think there's a strong sense, both among Iraqis and with the regional players, the subject of Senator Lugar's question, that as long as the United States is doing the heavy lifting, however much in the interest that they have in eventually resolving the situation, they are not the one's in the front having to do it. There is an issue of having to concentrate the lines.
KERRY: Do you want to come back, Mr. Pillar? You said something about the Green Zone state that struck me, "The Green Zone state might fall." Isn't the fact that it is only a Green Zone state kind of fundamental to this question of legitimacy and of resolving these larger political differences?
PILLAR: I think that was your question.
KERRY: And would you, as you touch on that, tell me, if the troops start going after the militia -- and I'm reading that they're talking about an evenhandedness in the application of this, what is the Muqtada al-Sadr response to that, and where do the Badr Brigade and the Jaish al-Mahdi come out in that conflict?
SAID: It's speculative at this point to judge what the troops are going to do. The Iraqi government security plan, although it declares that all the militias will be attacked, but also in the same breath, states that they view Sunni violence is the primary objective. So on the back of this security plan, the surge of U.S. troops can be seen as taking sides in the ongoing sectarian conflict.
The United States may declare that it will go differently, but at this point, the agreement, since the meeting in Amman between the prime minister and the president, seems to have been to go for one last push in support of the elites that have emerged out of this current political process and against their enemies. And this could contribute if mishandled. And especially if no protection is offered to all communities, to all Iraqi communities, this could embroil the United States in a new role in Iraq as being a party in the conflict.
KERRY: My time is up here, but none of you answer the question, maybe you will as you go along here, of what happens if this fails.
SAID: It will make the negotiations even harder. I mean, we have a window of opportunity today and maybe passing for a negotiated settlement including the regions. Further blood, more blood, and if it's seen as one-sided, will make negotiations even harder down the road.
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