The Mumbai attacks represent a scenario that few Western police and security forces have dared envision. Fewer still have prepared for it.
http://www.nationalpost.com/opinion/story.html?id=1002827The basic strategy: use a large number of attackers to overwhelm a target city's ability to respond, and then suddenly switch focus to high value targets and seize hostages.
The terrorists first diverted the attention of security forces through a range of incidents involving gunmen all over the city; then, as police attempted to react, they were themselves ambushed. The death of the commander of the Mumbai Counter-Terror Team and two of his principal lieutenants was no accident. To heighten the confusion, at least one group of gunmen ranged around the city in either a stolen or counterfeit police van.
The attack on a Mumbai hospital was also a disturbing detail. Terrorists love to create mass-casualty events -- but to attack a hospital? Jihadist chat rooms have often entertained the idea of a hospital attack, but we've never seen it used yet. This tactic will probably become a new standard practice for terrorists.
Authorities in the United States have long been anxious about al-Qaeda discussions focused on acquiring surplus emergency vehicles and using them for attacks on hospitals -- a scenario that came up in their Internet chats in 2003-04, and which prompted some attempts to buy old ambulances in several U. S. cities
Another nightmare situation involves a further refinement to the strategy behind the 2004 seizure of a school in Beslan, North Ossetia-Alania, and the 2002 attack on a Moscow theatre, both by Chechen terrorists. In these two notorious attacks, a large force of gunmen seized large groups of hostages (including many children) in public buildings.
The Chechens' intentions were not to negotiate for some advantage, but to prepare a murderous deathtrap for any rescue force, while rigging explosives to guarantee the deaths of all hostages. A
premature assault in Beslan (in which hundreds of anxious parents joined) saved many hostages, while the Bolshoi Theatre incident was addressed by the over-use of a disabling chemical agent -- which served to subdue the terrorists, but also killed many of the hostages.
Hotels, office towers and apartment buildings represent large concentrations of people with few access points. They have all been favourite targets for truck bombs for many years, but some counter-terror officers have often wondered how long it would be before some group of gunmen tried to control these buildings rather than destroy them. This is the future face of terrorism.
Ask any infantryman or SWAT-trooper about how much they would like to hunt through a high rise for terrorists who are holding hostages: not much. Buildings soak up manpower (and munitions); and every confrontation tends to be at point-blank ranges. Clearing and securing such sites cannot be quick, easy or risk-free; and the terrorists have the time to do what they want with their captives.
When "red-teaming" potential attacks inside Western Europe and North America, counter-terror officials have often refused to even contemplate attacks like this. Mumbai-type attacks are seen as too complicated to war-game in training exercises. Moreover, the idea of a hostage situation with a gang of gunmen in a high-rise has been seen as too "Hollywood" ( Die Hard, to be more specific) to be tackled seriously.
This week's Mumbai attacks should change this thinking. Our police and emergency responders have new standards that they will have to learn to meet -- or else the same kind of tragedy could unfold here.
-John C. Thompson is director of the Mackenzie Institute, a Canadian think-tank concerned with organized violence and political instability.
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