The dismissal of the supermarket cashier Barbara E, often referred to as “Emmely”, has provoked broad public indignation in Germany. The 50-year-old... was sacked without notice because she had redeemed store coupons worth €1.30 left by a customer. Her dismissal was upheld both by a Berlin labour court and an appeal court.
The public anger generated by the case is in large measure due to the double standard in the way ordinary workers are treated as compared to the financial elite...For this reason, the World Socialist Web Site characterized the judgement against Emmely as a case of “class justice” in an earlier article.
This provoked an answer from Professor Volker Rieble. The professor for labour and civil law at Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich published a five-page article justifying the judgement against Emmely in the Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW, New Legal Weekly Revue) and referring explicitly to the article by the World Socialist Web Site.
Rieble’s essay attempts to refute the accusation of class justice, but ends up doing the opposite. His aggressive and in part insulting tone, his exaggerated and absurd social prejudices and his partisanship for bankers and managers who have gambled away billions or evaded taxes, only serves to underline the class character of the judgement against Emmely.
Why class justice?
The class character of the judgement against Emmely is not limited to a one-sided interpretation of the law by the courts. It is contained in existing law and legal precedents that are vehemently defended by Professor Rieble.
Thus, in labour law the presumption of innocence does not apply. The mere suspicion of malpractice is sufficient for dismissal, even if that means the “person will never again find a job”, as Rieble writes with satisfaction about Emmely; that is even if dismissal is a lifelong punishment.
Citing judgements of higher courts, Rieble justifies “dismissal on grounds of suspicion”. Such dismissal, he writes, is not a reaction to an offence, but rather a reaction to the loss of confidence arising from the suspicion. In other words: If an employee is suspected of an offence, he or she can be sacked because the mutual trust no longer exists, even if the offence is not proven at all.
This argumentation is grotesque. After thirty years employment, a trifle such as redeeming a coupon worth 1.30 euro is supposed to represent an irrevocable breach of trust. If that is not disproportionate, then what is?
Barbara E. had worked continuously since 1977 for the Kaisers/Tengelmann supermarket chain. Only once, in 2005, did she receive a warning as a result of a customer complaint. The substance of this complaint and the warning are not referred to either in the judgement or by Rieble. Otherwise she has an unblemished record of thirty years...
Rieble justifies his call for prosecution with the fact that Barbara E has publicly opposed the judgement against her — which is her democratic right...What the professor is demanding here is prosecution as retaliation for criticising the courts.
Other yardsticks
As soon as the professor addresses the conduct of bankers and managers he imposes completely different standards than in the case of the cashier. This is particularly obvious in the case of Deutsche Post CEO Klaus Zumwinkel, who had to vacate his post because he had evaded millions in taxes. Here the presumption of innocence applies, and mutual trust suddenly no longer plays a role.
Responding to a reference by the World Socialist Web Site to the extremely mild punishment Zumwinkel received, the professor answers, “Herr Zumwinkel has ‘only’ evaded taxes. Outside the public service this would not form grounds for dismissal on the basis of suspicion and also not on the grounds of fact — since the crucial link to the employer-employee relationship is lacking”.
If mere suspicion of inappropriate behaviour by an employee suffices for dismissal, it is entirely different in the case of a manager worth millions: “Even custody and certainly house searches do not suffice for dismissal on grounds of suspicion”. Rieble states regretfully that under “public pressure” Zumwinkel eventually gave up his job voluntarily “after radio and television were allowed to report on the search of his property”. He received a compensation of 20 million euro, something Rieble does not mention.
It does not even occur to the professor that the “bond of trust” could be destroyed if the boss of a large corporation engaged in evading millions in taxes, in particular when this company belongs to the state. What he regards as self-evident in the case of Emmely — that the redemption of coupons worth 1.30 euro destroys the bond of trust irrevocably — does not apply when the public purse is cheated by millions...
Whether bankers, whose greed for profits make them speculate billions, thereby destroying or endangering millions of jobs, should be held liable in criminal or civil cases, “nobody at present” can judge, maintains Rieble...
A similar argument was also deployed by the house sheet of the Frankfurt stock exchange, the Frankfurter Allgemeine. Referring to the Bochum lawyer Klaus Bernsmann, the paper regards the criminal law altogether as “unsuitable for judging on collective actions like the financial crisis”, and arrives at the conclusion that it is not in the interest of the capitalist free-market economy if those responsible for the financial crisis were summoned before the courts. If the requirements faced by directors became stricter, there was a “danger that harsher laws would produce cowards. Executives would lose the desire to take risks from fear of the courts”...
He calls critics of the Emmely judgement “infuriating social romantics” and — referring to “the authors of the WSWS and taz” — regrets that “freedom of opinion allows non-state organisations to attack the courts and judicial rulings non-objectively and emotionally”.
...His article comes to the conclusion that the Emmely case is “not a case of class justice — but proof that the citizens do not understand their (!) justice system”. That is not because of the justice system, but because “of the readiness of the citizen, free of knowledge and effort, to pass judgement based on their own indignation”.
...Professor Rieble is in reality reacting very sensitively to the fact that the citizens are beginning to understand his justice system... He is not so much concerned about the legal aspects of the Emmely case. Rather he is conducting a campaign that seeks to prevent that the law and official politics from coming under the influence of mounting social discontent and public pressure.
Who is Professor Rieble?
If one investigates Rieble’s background, his views do not come as a surprise. Despite his professorship and university chair he is a paid lobbyist of the employers’ associations.
He draws his salary from the Centre for Labour Relations and Labour Law (ZAAR), whose director he is. ZAAR is funded by a foundation that is financed by big business, and is attached to the Ludwig Maximilians University Munich (LMU). The board of trustees, foundation advisers and foundation board contain exclusively representatives of the employers’ associations and large-scale enterprises, in particular the chemical, metal and electrical industries, as well as Daimler, Bosch and Siemens.
...Despite all its statutory independence, ZAAR and Professor Rieble are in reality nothing more than a lobby and a think tank for employers in the garb of a university institute.
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/aug2009/emme-a24.shtml