Joint Information Operations Warfare CommandCommander
Major General John C. Koziol, USAF
Mission Statement
The JIOWC plans, integrates, and synchronizes information operations in direct support of Joint Force Commanders' and serves as the USSTRATCOM lead for enhancing information operations across the Department of Defense.
Background
The Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC) was established by the Secretary of Defense in October 1980 and reported to the Joint Staff. In September 1994, the mission was expanded and the organization was renamed the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC). In 1998, as a result of the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI), the JC2WC was realigned from the Joint Staff to US Atlantic Command. The JC2WC mission was further expanded and resulted in redesignation as the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC). In October 1999, the JIOC was realigned as a subordinate command of USSPACECOM. On 1 October 2002, the JIOC was realigned as a subordinate command to USSTRATCOM. The Commander, JIOWC, reports to the Commander, USSTRATCOM. The JIOWC is co-located with the Air Intelligence Agency and the Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) at Lackland AFB, TX.
http://www.stratcom.mil/fact_sheets/fact_jioc.htmlcheck out this article from 'The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection':Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment And let there be no doubt, in the years ahead it is likely that we will be surprised again by new adversaries who may also strike in unexpected ways.-Donald H. Rumsfeld1
In Iskandariyah, Iraq, approximately 30 miles south of Baghdad, a bomb exploded at a police station, killing 50 Iraqis applying for the new police force. U.S. forces conducted operations to seek out and defeat those responsible. Often, U.S. forces are successful in finding, engaging, capturing, or killing insurgents who instigate terrorist attacks. However, this traditional attrition-based approach to counterinsurgency does not adequately address its strategy and secondary effects.
By attacking the police station, Iraqi insurgents hoped to achieve their strategic objectives of influencing Iraqi perceptions about security and safety; contributing to the delay or cancellation of free elections; de-legitimizing an interim Iraqi government; and degrading domestic support for U.S. policy in Iraq. This scenario demonstrates the limitation of U.S. joint information operations (IO) doctrine in addressing a new approach to warfare. Nonstate actors such as terrorists and insurgents will likely be the major threat to U.S. national security and its interests for years to come. Because these actors cannot directly confront the U.S. militarily, they must rely on an information advantage to marginalize U.S. capabilities.
Over the past decade, various high profile terrorist groups have demonstrated a sound knowledge and coordinated use of information operations. Their ability to successfully achieve objectives by shaping their battlespace in the information environment, coupled with willingness to conduct nontraditional warfare, make them a significant threat to the United States.
Although the initial Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, addresses a traditional IO approach against conventional forces such as China or North Korea, it does not sufficiently consider nonstate threats such as terrorists and insurgents.2 The joint staff is currently updating JP 3-13 by incorporating the October 2003 revised Department of Defense (DOD) IO policy, informally known as the secretary of defense's (SECDEF's) "IO Roadmap."3 To succeed in the new security environment, JP 3-13 must provide an IO approach that better defines and shapes operations in the information environment (IE) to enable victories over nonstate actors in the physical environment (PE).
more:
http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/may_2005/5_05_3.htmland this, from the "United States Joint IO Doctrine" :3.
Military Operations and the Information Environmenta. Information is a strategic resource vital to national security. Dominance of the information environment is a reality that extends to the Armed Forces of the US at all levels. Military operations, in particular, are dependent on many simultaneous and integrated activities that, in turn, depend on information, and information systems, which must be protected.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf