http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=an_end_to_the_long_warAn End to the "Long War"
The current Quadrennial Defense Review underscores the stark contrast between Obama's and Bush's visions for U.S. military engagement.
Robert Farley | February 3, 2010 | web only
President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates walk from the Oval Office, May 18, 2009. (White House Photo/Pete Souza)
On Monday, the Obama administration released a pair of critical documents indicating the path it intends to take on military and defense issues. One of these documents was the budget for fiscal year 2011, which calls for an increase in defense spending as well as the restructuring of a couple of major weapons programs. The other document was the Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR. Every four years, the Department of Defense reports to Congress on its long-term strategic and procurement plans. The QDR gives the White House the opportunity to both lay the tracks of future equipment procurement and to make a statement about its strategic orientation.
Developed under the supervision of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the 2010 QDR eschews grand strategic theory in favor of a concrete approach to fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead of developing a vision for the application of U.S. military power and weaving a narrative around it, the 2010 QDR concentrates on the lessons learned in recent conflicts and on the maintenance of the standing force. Gates' QDR would prefer to finish our current wars before thinking about the next.
The 2006 QDR was very much the product of Donald Rumsfeld's Pentagon -- the document provided him with the first opportunity to set forth his long-term strategic plan for the U.S. military. Rumsfeld became secretary of defense in the immediate wake of the 2000 QDR release, which was written during the Clinton administration. Because of the Bush administration's unhappiness with the draft, the QDR was substantially revised and re-released by the Department of Defense in late September 2001, although most of the work was done prior to the September 11 attacks that reshaped the strategic landscape.
By 2005, the Bush administration had invaded two countries and embarked upon a profoundly new strategic path. The objective of the 2006 QDR was to make sense of the previous five years. The motivating concept behind the 2006 QDR was the "Long War," a unifying thread that tied together all U.S. military actions and preparation across the world. The QDR defined the Long War as an irregular conflict against "dispersed, global terrorist networks that exploit Islam to advance radical political aims." The concept seamlessly integrated the Iraq War and the war in Afghanistan into the same ideational framework, sidestepping arguments that the former was neither necessary for nor to the benefit of the latter. But problematically, the Long War concept subsumed U.S. military intervention in East Asia, Latin America, and Africa under the same rubric as the "hot wars" in the Middle East. This perspective implies that no potential intervention can be judged on its own merits, as each use of military force is weighed in terms of its contribution to the Long War. But because the Long War is sufficiently amorphous and vaguely defined to include almost anything, it provides a poor guide to the wisdom of specific interventions.
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Understood within the context of his tenure, the 2010 QDR is evocative of the pragmatic approach that Gates has taken to virtually every defense issue since he took the helm of the Department of Defense in late 2006. The document is indicative of why Obama retained Gates as secretary of defense and of how easily Gates has fit into the administration. The pragmatism and modesty of this QDR stands in contrast to the grandeur of Rumsfeld's 2006 document. Instead of waging a long-term, identity-defining civilizational struggle against the forces of barbarism, the United States is fighting -- quite plainly and unromantically -- wars. Wars against people, not heathens. This rhetorical approach fits very comfortably into a White House that prides itself on pragmatic, competent, non-ideological policy-making and execution.