The Egyptian constitution's rulebook for changePosted By Nathan Brown
Thursday, February 3, 2011 - 1:48 PM
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So if Mubarak resigned, there would be three choices:
1.) Follow the constitution and wind up with the regime handpicking a successor after 60 days for a full presidential term. That hardly resolves anything. The procedures are written in such a way that Sulayman could be nominated, but it would break the promise both Mubarak and Sulayman made for constitutional reform. This procedure would not even put lipstick on the regime's current face.
2.) Follow the constitution with the promise that the new president (presumably Sulayman) pick up the constitutional reform process. That puts the crisis on hold for 60 days and offers the opposition promises for reform that might be redeemed later -- and might not be. This would put lipstick on, but not much else, particularly given the toxic lack of trust in the regime's promises.
3.) Suspend the constitution and negotiate a transition between the current regime leaders and the opposition. And then we are in regime change territory, operating outside the existing rules. If the process were successful, it would not produce merely a reconfigured regime but would be moving toward a different kind of political system. The opposition has made clear that it wants such an outcome, but it has not sketched out any vision in detail. The negotiations over transition would be difficult and confusing, demanding that the opposition transform its negative platform (Mubarak must leave) into a positive one.
If Mubarak resigned today, the third option is the only one that offers anything like real political change. It may be the best outcome and it is what the opposition is effectively demanding. It may very well deserve our support, but we should know that when we call for Mubarak to step down, then legally at least this is where we are effectively pushing.
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Link:
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/03/the_egyptian_constitution_s_rulebook_for_change?sms_ss=facebook&at_xt=4d4c4c23fd53fbe3%252C1Update:10:10pm: P.S.A group of leading intellectuals (including my good friend and colleague Amr Hamzawy), former officials, and activists and activists) have hit upon an ingenious constitutional solution. Published in the Egyptian daily al-Shuruq and translated by my home away from home, the Carnegie Endowment, the proposal suggests that Mubarak deputize Sulayman to serve as president. This is constitutionally possible—if the president is unable to serve (in this case presumably because of political ill health) he can hand power over temporarily (in this case until the fall when his term is over) to the vice president.By stopping short of a final resignation, the need for immediate elections is removed and there is enough time to amend the constitution.
As I say, this is an ingenious constitutional solution. But would it work politically? It is a promising effort but also one that rests on hopes that may not be warranted. It works only if Mubarak cooperates and those currently running the country make their peace with a real transition. In other words, it would be a way for the regime to sue for a gentle and orderly peace; it has the added benefit of preserving legal forms (always helpful in a country trying to build the rule of law). But there is no sign that the regime is looking for a gentle transition or even a real compromise with the opposition.
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