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Edited on Fri Apr-01-11 05:35 PM by howard112211
off of my interpretation of the writings of Sun Tsu, combined with some of the stuff that General Clark and Secretary Gates have said, which suggest that they are thinking along the same lines.
Basically, there a quite a few historic strategists who would agree that the best strategy is always to achieve victory without engaging in actual battle. A party that is operating from a position of strength can often choose to not engage in actual combat, simply because the mere threat of being hit with overwhelming force can get an enemy to yield to ones demands. That, and also of course the insight that battle is always messy and will involve losses, which one wants to avoid.
If one is in posession of the means to completely overwhelm the enemy, then the enemy is likely to yield to the demands, whatever they may be. Or, another angle of course is, maybe it is possible to reach a diplomatic solution all together and avoid conflict in such a way. This option should always be pursued to the fullest.
The second best strategy, if the first one is not applicable, is to weaken the enemies position by undermining/destroying his alliances. An enemy with no allies cannot operate efficiently, and will soon lose support even from his loyalists. I suppose we are seeing a little bit of that in the Libya case.
The third best strategy is the first one which involves actual combat: It is destroying/immobilizing the enemies army. If the army of the enemy cannot be attacked directly, because the terrain is difficult or the enemy is holed up in his stronghold, this is not good. Furthermore this strategy can already be considered "not good" in itsself because it is messy and potentially involves a lot of losses on both sides. If one engages in this strategy, then the best thing to do is to achieve a complete and indisputable victory in as short a time as possible (duh), to minimize losses on both sides. Furthermore, all calculations, in terms of the actual amount of force required, should have been previously. This has been quoted poetically by Sun Tsu in the form of "The successfuly general wins, and then enters battle. The unsuccessful general enters battle and then tries to win." and also "If you know your strengths and weaknesses, and your enemies strengths and weaknesses, you will not be in danger. If you don't know these things you will be in danger." All facts should be clear beforehand: What the mission is. What plans are in place for all scenarios. What amount of force will be required to achieve these goals, and so on.
The fourth best, or second worst strategy is to attack enemy strongholds/cities. This will always be messy. Collateral damage happens, and the enemy is on sound terrain to mount his defense, so losses on both sides will be great. Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to do this without producing collateral damage.
The worst strategy of all is to besiege an enemy fortress. It is clear from the outset that such an act will always consume tremendous amounts of resources, and is unlikely to yield a decisive victory for one side, so over time the damage that both sides suffer will be great, with potentially no gain for either side.
What we are seeing in Libya is an army (the rebels) which are now operating from a position of weakness (no chain of command, no discipline, no equipment, and so on) facing off an enemy who is operating from a position of relative strength. Compared to NATO and the US he is weak, but compared to the rebels he isn't. If the rebels could have been able to gain large popular support quickly, could have tremendously have changed the outlook. But judging from the current state of things, it did not happen, at least not to the degree necessary to achieve victory.
The strategy of NATO has been to try to "level the playing field". I think this is a terrible strategy because what it means is moving from a scenario where one side wins decisively, to a scenario where that same side still wins, but at larger cost for both sides. In such a context, giving arms and aid to a side which will lose anyway, does not help any. It actually makes things worse, because the conflict will take longer, produce more fatalities, more collateral damage, and so on.
Actually, it seems like NATO has now pushed it to a stalemate, which is equivalent to the "worst strategy": A permanent state of besiegement of strongholds.
What this means is that it is probably a good idea to simply call the whole thing off, and reach a diplomatic solution. Even though that means the goal of "ousting Ghaddafi" will not be reached.
So, IMO, NATO has essentially two options now: Either negotiate a cease-fire agreement, or send a massive amount of ground troops to take Ghaddafi down, which would still amount to "second worst strategy" because it will involve attacking strongholds and thus produce a tremendous amount of collateral damage. Simply giving arms to the rebels, IMO, is a deeply stupid thing.
The problem at hand here however is: There are many interest groups who actually benefit from a negative outcome. The military industrial complex makes money not from quick victories, but from prolonged conflicts. So there are strong political incentives here to choose bad strategies.
Hope I making a little bit of sense. A lot of people will probably discover flaws in this reasoning. Just my 2 cents.
I may, of course, also be simply wrong and Ghaddafi will step down next week on his own. That would be fortunate.
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