Fear can affect the belief systems of self-described liberals to make them act as authoritarians. Or they may act like authoritarians to
not be fearful.
Who do you think was most supportive of laws like the PATRIOT Act which sacrifice freedoms to aid FBI terrorism investigations?
Self-described Liberals.
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=103&topic_id=582516&mesg_id=582750I wrote a paper on this topic for a class I had. Here is part of the lit review:
“Behavior results from a process that involves, or functions as it entails, conscious
choice” (Monroe & Maher, 1995). These choices are developed through a method by which the
actor’s preferences are ordered and evaluated to determine which will provide the greatest utility
and what course of action should be taken to achieve them (Monroe & Maher, 1995). These
preferences include a predilection for survival (Chatterjee, 1972; Monroe & Maher, 1995).
Established and uniform, these preferences are shaped through the acquisition of information
(Jost et al., 2003) from opinion leaders whose function is to attach idea-elements together
(Converse, 1964).
This process of acquiring information from authoritative sources to satisfy preferences
which include survival is described as laying the foundation for a belief system (Converse, 1964;
Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, 1999b as cited in Jost et al., 2003; McGuire, 1985, as cited in
Jost et al., 2003). Converse (1964) and Kunda (1990, as cited in Jost et al., 2003) suggest that
this belief system is regulated by multiple constraints. The constraints offer a probability that a
specific attitude held in a belief system will result in certain other attitudes being held (Converse,
1964). These constraints are identified as logical, psychological, and social (Converse, 1964).
Jost et al. (2003) further expand on the concept by describing these constraints as existential
(fear, curiosity), epistemic (authoritarian, liberal), and ideological (group dominance,
egalitarianism). According to Jost et al. (2003), belief systems fulfill psychological needs.
Within the constraints, belief systems provide a principled doctrine by which new
information obtained is compared to prior associations in order to choose a course which
provides the greatest utility (Jost et al., 2003). However, these belief systems do not operate in a
vacuum; uncertain conditions and numerous variables can influence personal motivations by
invoking emotional responses, leading to a reformulation of logic that while not syllogistically
sound, is principled nonetheless (Jost et al., 2003).
Information gathering in early childhood requires the formation of relationships (Weber
& Federico, 2007). Attachment theory states that relationships are sought in order to reduce
anxiety and provide a sense of security (Sroufe & Waters, 1977, as cited in Weber & Federico,
2007). Successful proximity-seeking efforts create a secure attachment style, inspiring selfconfidence,
curiosity and an openness to new experiences (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007). Failed proximity-seeking efforts result in anxiety
stemming from the lack of security, compounded by distress over the failure to establish a
relationship (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, as cited in Weber and Federico, 2007). Recurring
failure or inconsistency (Ainsworth et al., 1978, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) in
proximity-seeking efforts creates two insecure attachment styles;
anxious and
avoidant (Weber &
Federico, 2007).
Anxious attachment style is associated with fixations on proximity-seeking and emotional
support (Weber & Federico, 2007).
Avoidant attachment style abandons proximity-seeking and
instead relies on self-dependence to control anxiety (Weber & Federico, 2007). Brennan, Clark,
& Shaver (1998, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) have determined that anxious and avoidant
attachment styles in adults manifest themselves as either elevated states of arousal with a fixation
on close relationships, or as an emotional disconnect with an aversion to close relationships,
respectively.
Duckitt (2001, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) proposes that childrearing practices
lead to the development of personality traits which endorse world views that form ideology.
Children who have attained a secure attachment style are open to new information more than
those with either of the two insecure attachment styles (Cassidy, 1986, as cited in Weber &
Federico, 2007), as well as being less dogmatic and less reliant on ethnic stereotypes
(Mikulincer, 1997, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007). Additionally, Mikulincer & Florian
(2000, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) have shown that secure attachment styles “mitigate
the effect of mortality salience on the denigration of moral transgressors” (p. 394).
It has been demonstrated that children who have attained insecure attachment styles later
as adults develop Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) ideologies, in which the world is viewed as a
dangerous place (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003, as cited by Weber & Federico, 2007),
or Social Dominance Order (SDO) ideologies, in which the world is viewed as a competitive
jungle (Duckitt, 2001, as cited by Weber & Federico, 2007). RWA’s are defined by a deference to
authority figures, an endorsement of severe punishment by authority figures, and a high degree
of conventionalism (Altemeyer, 2006). SDO’s differ from RWA’s in that rather than embracing
authoritarianism as a means of protection against an out-group which threatens society, SDO’s
feel that society has already fallen and that only the strong shall survive, prompting group
domination, punishment, and humiliation against out-groups (Altemeyer, 1998). Altemeyer
(1998, as cited in Jost et al., 2003) and Pratto, Sidanious, Stallworth & Malle (1994, as cited in
Jost et al., 2003) have shown that SDO’s correlate with Republican party identification.
In response to criticism that scales of authoritarianism neglected left-wing personalities,
Rokeach (1960, as cited in Jost et al., 2003) developed a scale of dogmatism which included
measures of logically contradictory beliefs and denial of contradictions in belief systems.
According to Rokeach:
All belief-disbelief systems serve two powerful and conflicting sets of
motives at the same time: the need for a cognitive framework to know
and to understand and the need to ward off threatening aspects of
reality. To the extent that the cognitive need to know is predominant
and the need to ward off threat is absent, open systems should
result. . . . But as the need to ward off threat becomes stronger, the
cognitive need to know should become weaker, resulting in more
closed belief systems (p. 67, as quoted in Jost et al., 2003, p. 346).
Thus, closed belief systems reduce ambiguity-induced anxiety by satisfying the need to know
(Rokeach, 1960, as cited in Jost et al., 2003).
Understanding of issues and concepts is dependent upon the strength of the connotation
associated with them, as well as effectiveness of the constraints by which the referred issues and
concepts operate (Converse, 1964). In his research, Converse tests the hypothesis that if
one idea-element in the belief system should change, an individual must either change his
position on the issue or change his position on the party. Examination reveals a majority of the
population sampled are unable to express an understanding of the constraints affecting political
parties and issues without being prompted by political elites. Furthermore, the
majority of the population view the treatment they and other groups received from political
parties as their primary means of identifying parties.
Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other “authoritarian personality.”
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 47–92.
Altemeyer, B. (2006).
The authoritarians. Manitoba: University of Manitoba.
Chatterjee, P. (1972). The classical balance of power theory.
Journal of Peace Research, 9(1), 51-61.
Converse, P. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. Apter (Ed.),
Ideology and discontent (pp. 206–261). New York: Free Press.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.
Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339-375.
Monroe, K.R. & Maher, K.H. (1995). Psychology and rational actor theory.
Political Psychology, 16(1), 1-21.
Weber, C., & Federico, C. M. (2007). Interpersonal attachment and patterns of belief.
Political Psychology, 28(4), 389-416.
On edit: This is a cool site about brain structure and political views:
www.neuropolitics.org
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