Reply #53: Even more interesting: [View All]

[Equinox]

It will be remembered of course that Yossi Beilin negotiated an analogous draft document with Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) in 1995 when he was working for then Israel Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. However, in the current negotations, the Israeli negotiators are all opposition figures and do not speak for the government. Since the memorandum was not negotiated by government representatives, it has only symbolic value, though ideas in this document may no doubt find their way into subsequent formal agreements. The draft agreement has been attacked by both PM Ariel Sharon and former Labor party PM Ehud Barak, though Beilin claims that Barak knew of the negotiations. Predictably, Palestininian extremists representing the Right of Return lobby, such as the BADIL group have slammed the agreement as well. Badil and Al-Awda are opposed to any compromise that would leave the state of Israel intact as a Jewish state. Likewise, other extremists have rallied round the naysayers.

The Oslo agreements should have taught us several lessons. One of them is that peace cannot be made solely by signing agreements. The agreements must reflect the sentiments of the people. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by deep fault lines and deeply entrenched positions. Israelis will not necessarily give up Jerusalem or Ariel just because Yossi Beilin signed a paper saying they would. Though such concessions may have been conceivable in 2000, it is unlikely that many Israelis would support them after several years of violence.

It is not known to what extent Palestinians will be willing to give up claims over all of Israel, and it is very unlikely that Palestinian refugees will give up right of return. The Al-Awda group was formed expressly for the purpose of preventing the Palestinian Authority from wavering on this issue. Until recently, public opinion polls had indicated that over 80% of Palestinian refugees would never give up the right to return to their homes in Israel, which they claim is guaranteed to them under UN General Assembly Resolution 194. A recent (June 2003) poll by Dr. Khalil Shikaki showed that most refugees would not really exercise that right in fact. Shikaki was subject to a campaign of intimidation and threats but stood by his findings.

The value of this agreement is that it can be both a source of ideas for the future as well as an instrument in educating the public and preparing them to make the necessary compromises on key issues. Both sides have made difficult compromises. Perhaps that is part of the rationale: leaders of each side can show their constituents that they have won real concessions. No longer can Palestinian extremists insist that right of return to Israel is a rock solid part of the Palestinian consensus, if key Fatah and PLO leaders have agreed to give it up. Israeli settler partisans can no longer insist that Efrat is part of the national consensus, since leaders well within the Zionist mainstream have agreed to give up Efrat for peace. The draft document brings us a small step closer to acceptance of a peaceful compromise by both the Palestinians and the Israelis

From: MidEast Web (Same site with Tinnypriv's maps)