Reply #85: The penetration of the central tabulators is the easy part... [View All]

[Iceburg]

what is much more difficult is determining how many votes to shift from one column to another while respecting the relative ballot order of each of the 40+ contests, the variance range within a vote location, turnout thresholds, etc. While there "may" have been penetration of the central tabulators, I do not preclude that malfeasance occurred at the precinct level in the punch-card counties via a) mis configuring the machines b) stacking of ballots to be read on other machines.

Why???
The EIRS reports 1) several misconfigured machines in precincts that have escaped the radar in terms of high 3rd party or spoiled votes 2) serer val observations of "stacking the ballots" on the side and not putting them in the ballot box and 3) many observations of non-secured/unlocked ballot boxes.

Further, if it was central tabulator penetration they had little or no understanding of the non-cascading ballot order effect ...hence we see some 50+ precincts (of the non-cascading ballot order class) with extremely high 3rd party and/or spoiled votes ... those my friend are the cigarette butts left at the crime scene. If there are 51 precincts of 398 in that class (IE. 25% of the 1436 precinct in Cuyahoga), how many do you think we will find in the voting locations whose ballot order set classification is "cascading" (in a uni-directional cascade there will be very little left behind in the 3rd party/spoiled columns but there will be other clues left by the vote distributions in the other contest/races)
So if there are approximately 1000 precincts in the cascading class, we might expect to find approximately 200 more precincts whose vote distribution is in error -- if that is, the first set of catches in the other class is an indicator.