The case of the missing California Election Reports

[BevHarris]

This is important. This is not merely a procedural technicality.

One of the most important safeguards for a certain kind of election tampering is hitting the "print" button to get the results from each machine, before they are consolidated elsewhere. In California, this printout must be posted on the door when the polls close. At least, that's what I was told by California election officials, like Julie Rodewald of SLO County, in response to my concerns about tampering with GEMS.

So far, I can't find anyone who found this required printout on the door. Let's look at the implications:

1) The electronic ballot boxes, for both touch screens and optical scan machines, are memory cards. A memory card is the size of a credit card. You can palm it into your sleeve or carry around a stack of replacement "ballot boxes" in your pocket. If you do not run the report before taking the original memory card out of the optical scan or touch screen, you can substitute a different one.

2) Each of the major vendors has a central tabulator. With Diebold, it is called GEMS. They all have it. If you tamper with the tally at the central count, it will show up when you compare it with the printout at the polling place (as long as someone does the comparison). If you don't do that printout, it's much more feasible to tamper with GEMS or the central count without getting caught.

3) Now a word about the timing of running the report: If it is run later, it might be run on substitute or unauthorized memory cards (electronic ballot boxes).

4) And a word about waiting until the next day to post that printout: This blows away the whole reason you do it. If you can get the printout after central tabulation is done, what you are doing is taking the printout AFTER all the shenanigans have a chance to take place.

5) What if they ran the printout on time, but just didn't post it until later? In that case, you have to have a chain of custody over the printout. What's to prevent them from running it, and someone else substituting it? A chain of custody, perhaps, but who is monitoring this?

In short, failure to print the report immediately opens up all kinds of windows for election-tampering, by removing one of the key pieces of auditing evidence.

UPDATE:

I've been on the phone with the legal dept. of the California Elections Division.

So I went looking for the law. Doesn't exist, it appears. If that's the case, the safeguard does not exist either, and the security of the cards and GEMS becomes critical.

I couldn't find any such thing in the California statutes, so I called the Elections Division, and here is their response:

1) This is not in the statutes, but it is in the required procedures set out by the Secretary of State office. But it isn't exactly what I was told. The optical scans may not print a report (though they are certainly capable of it.) He said they don't tabulate until the ballots are run through, but here's the problem with that: I vote on an optical scan. Part of the voting process is: You put your ballot directly through the machine. So yes, it can tabulate and print a report. It's just that they apparently don't use this important safeguard feature.

2) Next, touch screens. He said the Sequoia touch screens do not have a printer in them. (A printer can be attached to the serial port, but okay, they can't print.) The Diebold machines have an internal printer, and they do print a "summary report" but they do not post it; instead they submit it with the memory card.

I asked him about the chain of custody of the memory cards and their accompanying report. A memory card and a piece of paper are much easier to replace than a ballot box and all its ballots. He said he has no idea about the chain of custody procedures.

3) We then discussed the memos. He said that the state of California has looked into them (they were concerned about the memo that says not to have Wyle look at the Windows CE system. He said that is not as it seems. I asked him why, and he explained that Wyle only tests the hardware. I said, the issue is, was this tested by either Wyle or Ciber (it wasn't) but actually, the CE is on the touch screen, and is considered firmware, and it is indeed Wyle that is supposed to test it. Then I asked him what he thought about the memos that refer to intercepting and transmitting votes by cell phone, in Marin and Tulare counties.

That stopped him in his tracks. "That's not certified," he said. Nope. "They haven't done that," he said. Yup, they have. I told him where to find it in the memos. He got very quiet.

I then asked him who compares the summary report from the touch screens with the GEMS report. He said he has no idea.

Do you get the impression that all these audit controls aren't worth a cup of warm spit?

Bev Harris

[BevHarris]

1. Kick -- this is important, as I said.

Dropped off page one in four minutes.

[nadinbrzezinski]

6. thanks bev

now to the next step, what is next

[zeemike]

2. Sounds to me

Like they have been bullshiting us all along. So what are we to do? Are there any lawyers set to challenge this? Or is this finally a big brother government that cannot be questioned.

[BevHarris]

3. The whole system appears very shaky

All the levels of certification end up (for the central count) sitting on one man's desk, Shawn Southworth, who has not answered any questions to citizens or public interest groups about how he tests or what his credentials are.

All the software flaws, we're told, don't matter because election procedures are in place that prevent tampering.

But the procedures aren't used, and even the state elections division "has no idea" what the procedures are for chain of custody of the electronic ballot box!

[Occulus]

4. Yes.

Have you been able to find any precinct that posted those printouts? If it's not required of them... it should be.

When are the absentee ballots expected to be fully counted? Are they already?

Finally, have you found any disturbing events related to this election? Do you have a reason to suspect fraud in any way at this point?

[Eloriel]

43. Some CA number crunching worthy of note

IMO, anyway,

IRREGULARITIES IN CALIFORNIA RACE!!
http://www.markcrispinmiller.blogspot.com/
Long-shot candidates do startlingly well in Tulare County


Eloriel

[AP]

5. I feel like there was a missed opportunity here.

We should have had a poll watcher at every Diebold precinct and should have taken the count of the roll and should have watched them close down. I've done that for campaigns before. You need credentials, probably, from a party.

[BevHarris]

8. I agree -- kicking myself for missed opportunities

I have a whole list of things we need to do more effectively in the upcoming elections.

Bev

[AP]

12. Bev, I know you're doing a ton of work, but I think one of the missing...

...pieces of the puzzle here is to organize your activism by precinct. You need someone you can trust in each precinct with one of these machines who's willing to watch the polls, take counts, who's armed with a cellphone, maybe a camera, and phone numbers for the media and election lawyers. They can spend every day other than election day trying to do things like get copies of the the contracts and petitioning for the end of theses machines, and they can spend election day keeping an eye on these precincts.

[AP]

13. And here's a poll-watching story unrelated to BBV...

... I poll watched at a chuch once. Every state has a low preventing campaign literature inside the polling place and within, say, 100 yards of the entrance.

Sure enough. Walk in the door. Right there on a podium was the church's voting guide. Look inside. They've endorsed every Republican and no Democrats. So, if you're like me and you want one last look before you vote at who's on the ballot, you look around, pick that up, and you get one last bit of RW spin before you make your decision.

That's the kind of thing poll watchers catch.

[BevHarris]

19. Well, first I have to replace missing pieces

There are about a dozen "missing pieces" who were effective activists that suddenly went quiet, except for quoting the news and issuing generic opinions about public policy. This has hurt the cause. I will be writing about this in the book, and will also be writing about the insidious nature of qui tam, a type of lawsuit which offers legal absolution (and millions of dollars) in exchange for putting information of critical importance to the public interest under seal, out of the hands of the public.

In fact, I have been talking with legislators about this recently. Pretty much everyone agrees that seeking payoffs from qui tam, in exchange for silence, is a way to cripple the legislative reform that is so badly needed.

So yes, we need much more organization. I need to first replace the guts of the organization with honest citizens who will lobby publicly. Attempts to shift everything to MoveOn are nice, and we are working on that from our end also, but in the mean time, we must just get in there and do this thing! We need to beef up the organization. Right now, we're limping, but slowly getting stronger.

We need organizers, and I will be talking with Paranoid Pat about setting up the structure for the nonprofit group. I've been talking with Dennis Kucinich's office, and Marcy Kaptur's office, and making small gains among other legislators, but this still takes all of us.

Your vote is in their hands
RedEagle
God Bush n Cheney
David Allen
Angka
Nostamj
American Stranger
Dan Spillane
Paranoid Pat
Creativelcro
HarmonyGuy
Jim March
Faun Otter
Lynn Landes

Please add your name if I've left you out. I'd like to start publicizing the screen names of people who are still actively investigating for the public interest.

Litigation is very important, by the way. It needs to be public litigation, though, and not for the purpose of personal gain, but for the purpose of shining light on the problem and obtaining injunctions and legal remedies and recovering taxpayer monies through product liability suits and civil rights cases.

Legislation is also of critical importance, and to support legislation, every bit of the investigation needs to remain in the public domain, and should never be put under seal.

The above people have stayed true to the cause. Add names to the list. Please join them. E-mail me at [e-mail] if you are willing to volunteer to do anything at all, and tell me what you LIKE to do, and what you're good at.

Bev

[Bushfire]

70. I've posted this in Activism for Indy DU'ers

for an event on Oct 4th & Oct 14th. Total lack of interest it seems right now, but maybe after the Gropenator fiasco people will start to realize don't take your vote for granted in the hands of complacent/corrupt election officials. Public display of new machines just south of Indy. Can any Indy DUers put up out of state people over night? Maybe people don't care in Indiana...

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=106&topic_id=2687

[TNOE]

7. Kicking

For Bev - thanks for keeping on this. It's all too much for my brain right now.

[grasswire]

10. It ain't too much for my brain...

....but I sure don't know what to do about it.

If Dem candidates don't get on this issue soon.......

Bev, are you talking to any reporters in CA on this?

[BevHarris]

11. Yes. Talking to reporters

They are too darn cavalier about these critical audit functions.

[arcane1]

14. "boring" computer stuff doesn't sell ad time, sadly...

we need the Sec of State in bed, literally, with Diebold before they will care

You're doing a great job, Bev, of preventing me from sleeping at night :-)

it is curious, when you view the county-by-county tallies, which areas voted yes and which did not...


this ain't over

[ElsewheresDaughter]

9. bev can this info/thread be sent out to some Knight Ridder papers?

here is the @ to a list and all of their contacts @ddy...Anthony Ridder was on C-Span this morning and it seems that he would be interested in this issue..BBV

papers addresses
http://www.kri.com/papers/addresses.html

contacts & reporters addresses
http://www.kri.com/papers/voices.shtml

[nolabels]

15. Good morning Bev!!!!!

I noticed you were posting late last night, thought I would give a shout out to such a dedicated person. Just from the point of being able to help people with understanding of all the pitfalls of what is or could be going on, you are a hero. Thanks again :kick:

[ibegurpard]

16. Hey get back up there!

:kick:

[MissB]

17. kick again

[shirlden]

18. We all want to hear from Bev

so keep kicking for those who work daytime.

:kick:

[Solomon]

20. Bump. Serious stuff.

We do need to devise a way to neutralize what they are doing.

[BevHarris]

21. Yo, Solomon! I lured you into my thread!

Always read your threads, even if I don't always respond.

[Terwilliger]

22. I'm in Alameda county...what should I do?

Can I verify my vote? Do you think we'll ever see printouts from all 1010 precincts?

[BevHarris]

23. Hi, Terwilliger! Here are some things you can do

And among other things, report the stonewalling you get.

1) Ask for the polling place totals. Every one of them should be available for Alameda County. It is called the "summary report" and it is supposed to be printed before they take the memory cards to the county.

Compare the summary reports to the official reports. You need one more piece of information: Number of absentee and provisional voters.

Now, my guess is they'll give you blank stares and the runaround, but candidates and citizens should be entitled to that information, because it is part of the evidence.

2) Ask where they post the zero reports. We have one report already of a citizen who got hold of the zero report (the required report that is supposed to prove there are zero votes in the computer before the election starts) -- this citizen discovered the zero report was printed after 9 a.m., two hours after the polls opened! The zero report should also have the version of the software used.

3) The version number is important for several reasons. First, because it tells us if they at least say they are using the certified version. Second, because we can then compare the version number to known bug reports.

The version number applies to GEMS (version number will be something like 1.18.17) and also to the touch screen, called the ballot station program (version number will be something like 4.3.9)

I found it very interesting that the SAIC report on Diebold security redacted the version number, which is public information. Are they or are they not using certified software? If they are, they should be able to tell us the version number, which we can look up in the NASED certification list.

4) Look for bad math. Last night, many citizens found math errors. GB&C found a discrepancy of 5,000 votes in the San Luis Obispo totals.

5) Look for strangeness. There is a very good report elsewhere on DU about strangeness in Tulare County (also Diebold) which handed lots of votes to unknown candidates who were not local.

Report it here if you like, but anything you find may have a longer shelf life if you report it to [e-mail] or [e-mail] or to http://www.BBVreport.org

Thanks very much. This is how machine miscounts are caught, not by interviewing people to find out if it was easy to vote.

Bev

[angka]

24. "audit controls aren't worth a cup of warm spit"

'everything went so smoothly,' that they evidently didn't feel these basic controls were necessary.

isn't it interesting how these non-electronic checks and balances are precisely what they point to as the reason we can trust these black box electronic systems? how could they just flake them off then?

although it probably wouldn't have changed the outcome of this propaganda circus of an election, this bears looking long and hard at. another chapter in a manufactured fait accompli...

[BevHarris]

25. Compare and contrast this response

An official from the California Elections Division (who told me I am "not allowed" to use his name, although I was passed from person to person and apparently he's near the top of the feeding chain) says he has no idea what the chain of custody is for the memory card and accompanying report.

Imagine this: You have paper ballots. You have them in sealed ballot boxes. You ask the official from the California Elections Division, "What is the chain of custody of the ballots and the ballot box?" He knows. Everybody knows.

The chain of custody issue with the electronic ballot box is identical. So how come no one professes to know what it is?

Don't you find that bizarre?

[angka]

26. such ambiguity conceals one of two things:

incompetence or corruption.

or maybe #1 just enables #2...

[punpirate]

47. Someone in CA...

... in Alameda County, for example, needs to find a few pollworkers and quiz them on what happened at that level. What did they do with the cards, how were they actually handled, and who gave them to whom. Did they upload, and when, etc.

That would be a start to determining the _actual_ chain of custody. But, I'm flabbergasted that this isn't delineated by law.

Cheers.

[Junkdrawer]

27. What we are seeing here is "therory vs. practice"....

When anyone attends a meeting about the safety and auditability of ANY voting method, they are presented "The Theory". The Theory sounds great and it becomes hard (but not impossible) to imagine ways in which the system could be hacked if The Theory were in place.

In Practice, the absolute minimum that allows for a transmitted result is done. Zero Value and Summary Reports are not run because you can transmit results without them. And proof of this is when a citizen asks for copies of the reports - they're just not there.

The result of all this is that rigging elections becomes child’s play. In fact, GEMS seems to me to be purpose-built to accommodate such a scenario. And here's the hell of it: Without these reports it is impossible to prove that any fraud has occurred.

Why, I seem to remember even our friend TinfoilHatProgrammer agrees that without the reports, elections are easily hacked. His respose, if I remember correctly, was: "Well, how is that the fault of Diebold? The reports are there. If people don't run them, it's not Diebold's fault."

[BevHarris]

28. Exactly. This is found in many businesses, actually

You hear the theory of safety, but in practice, it's not followed.

The problem is, when you bypass the safety mechanisms for the vote, people will know -- and election tampering is almost guaranteed.

Thanks, JunkDrawer.

Bev

[Junkdrawer]

29. I was think of just that...

Look at the directions on a can of pesticide. Almost no one does what the directions suggest: They pop the lid a spray where they think they should and about as much as they think they should. The directions are there to protect the manufacturer from lawsuits. "Well, sir, if you read the directions, your cat will still be alive, wouldn't it!"

[SharonAnn]

41. And in business, when they're bypassed, people embezzle.

people figure out that the controls aren't being used so they start trying things and sometimes they can steal a LOT of money.

Anytime that embezzlement occurs and is caught, then the auditing controls get put back in place to prevent it from happening again.

[BevHarris]

42. Exactly.

When you start removing the safeguards, the chances of stealing approach 100%. I am quite sure the same is true for elections.

[juajen]

54. Bev

I think the only way we can get safeguards built into the voting machines is to pray hard for a dem-hacker, who preferably lives across the ocean, to prove in the 2004 presidential election that these votes can be stolen, maybe by making Ralph Nader the next President of the United States. Would only work, IMO, if the vote was for a third party candidate. I think then you would have the attention of Congress.

I have tried to think of any way that I could help you. I'm not deficient in brains, but will never come close to understanding the technicalities of which you speak. I am an expert typist, grammarian, editor and writer and am at home almost all of the time because of health issues. Please feel free to let me know here if you want me to email you my email address. I know that's limited help, and I apologize upfront.

[gristy]

30. I've always felt that posting precinct totals on the door of each precinct

is a key aspect of any election audit. Wouldn't surprise me if most states haven't made such rules the law.

[BevHarris]

31. It is a key aspect, and it USED to be the law, but seems to be gone

It's more important than ever now, but for some reason, like the paper ballot, we're dropping this part of the audit.

[imax2268]

32. A kick for Bev

:kick:

[BevHarris]

33. BlackBoxVoting soon to publish a report on zero report problem

The "observers" weren't allowed to watch the whole test and the observers were required to sign off before the test was completed.

We have an extensive report that is another indication that safeguards aren't being followed.

[Clete]

34. In San Luis Obispo County,

or more precisely at the Chamber of Commerce in Arroyo Grande, in which several precincts were housed for the election there was nary a report posted as of 10:30 this morning the earliest I could go look. The building was locked. I peeked through glass panels in the door and in the foyer although the signs with the precinct numbers were still up there wasn't anything else posted on very bare walls and doors. Now I don't know how long they need to have these posted, but it would seem they would need at least 24 hours.

[Junkdrawer]

35. They're supposed to be printed BEFORE results are transmitted

and they're supposed to be posted election night. But then, the machines are supposed to give an honest count.....

[laylah]

36. Keep this going!

:kick:

[realFedUp]

37. kick

[4dog]

38. It's VoteScam all over again.

The more you look, the more you see that the system we thought was trustworthy has evolved into one where hardly anything can be trusted. It's going to take a lot of work to fix it, but we have at least a growing consciousness of the problem.

(a wordy kick)

[RedEagle]

39. Let Everyone Know

Start with your county commissioners or whoever helps auditors select voting equipment.

Make known that you expect them to support voter-verified paper ballots.

Not a paper trail.

Not a verifiable ballot (which does not imply it needs to actually be verified, just that it can)

But a voter-verified paper ballot.

Then go to your auditor.

Get on an elections committee.

Get on the state legislators.

Then go to the federal ones. I'm going to get a chance at mine this Saturday. }( He told me months ago that he wasn't going to make this his issue. Let him explain that to the crowd. :mad:

[4dog]

40. The criminal level of "carelessness" with voting procedures.

Time to Recall E-Vote Machines?

by Kim Zetter, wired.com

http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,60713,00.html

As Californians head to the polls on Tuesday, voters in at least one county will cast their ballots electronically on machines that have been shown to be flawed.
Election officials around the country have been switching to new computerized polling machines with the hope of avoiding a repeat of the Florida debacle over punch-card voting that marred the 2000 presidential election.

But a training session for poll workers in Alameda County suggests problems other than hanging chads could surface this time around.

<more to this article, also others rarely posted at DU>

[Mari333]

45. Kick for this thread

for the late nighters
:kick:

[jimmynochad]

44. Bev, here is the law in question

Hope no one has duplicated this....

CA Code 19370 says:
As soon as the polls are closed, the precinct board, in the
presence of the watchers and all others lawfully present, shall
immediately lock the voting machine against voting and open the
counting compartments, giving full view of all counter numbers. A
board member shall in the order of the offices as their titles are
arranged on the machine, read and distinctly announce the name or
designating number and letter on each counter for each candidate's
name and the result as shown by the counter numbers. He or she shall
also in the same manner announce the vote on each measure.
If the machine is provided with a recording device, in lieu of
opening the counter compartment the precinct board shall proceed to
operate the mechanism to produce the statement of return of votes
cast record in a minimum of three copies, remove the irregular
ballot, if any, record on the statement of return of votes cast
record. The irregular ballot shall be attached to the statement of
result record of votes cast for the machine and become a part
thereof. One copy of the statement of return of votes cast for each
machine shall be posted upon the outside wall of the precinct for all
to see. The statement of return of votes cast for each machine for
the precinct shall constitute the precinct statement of result of
votes cast.

It says here in plain english that a copy of the statement of return for each machine must be posted on the wall at the close of polls.

You must have talked to someone who hasnt been around long enough to have read all of the law.

JNC

[BevHarris]

46. JimmynoChad, as usual, you come through with the goods!

That is an excellent find. I shall look it up myself tomorrow -- and by the way, now, why is it that every single elections official I spoke with at the Secretary of State office (I spoke with three) said there was nothing of the kind?

This is exactly what I was looking for!

[jimmynochad]

48. The link to find any California Code

www.leginfo.ca.gov/calaw.html

Select the Elections check box and leave the search engine box blank and the table of contents for that section is shown.

I would imagine that the people left minding the store were not that experienced. The most experienced people were sent out to watch for problems. Plus remember that most of the higher level Shelley people are new to elections having only been there for a few months.

[frank frankly]

49. kick

:kick:

[nofurylike]

50. thank you, Bev

keep on

imo, we need a separate forum for this issue, immediately. clearly, this is going to get bigger and bigger in the next year.

heroic courage, yours

peace

[BevHarris]

51. Two new forums up shortly -- but at BBV site

One is up right now, and it's quite active -- called BBVreport.org, focuses on exactly the kind of thing we're discussing here.

The other I want to tweak a little bit, it is on blackboxvoting.com -- isn't really the way I want it.

Yes, it would be great to have one at DU but really, the issue is not just democratic, it is for every American, so that limits some participants (like Jim March) from participating.

Bev

[nofurylike]

52. i had almost added the 'even though there is one: bbv'

and i just happen to have bbv reports forum open in another window as i write this.

there is so much there!!

so, i get what you're saying, yes.

still, the issue is so big here, and i see your threads being kicked longer and longer, then replaced by next ones, as if to eventually become constant. because it MUST be! this is so important!!

and it's just beginning, with 2004 election closing in.

i know you must be overwhelmed - you work so hard!! but maybe DU could do this for all of us?

either way, we'll be following. and please feel the strength pouring in to you from everywhere!!

Gratitude!!

[ParanoidPat]

53. Bev, A friend who worked the polls called this afternoon.....

.....and I mentioned the requirement to post precienct totals. She said that requirement was not in the instructions given to the poll workers. I asked if she had a copy of the instructions and low and behold.....:)

I'll scan and e-mail the package as soon as I see her! :evilgrin:

[BevHarris]

60. Yips! Way to go Pat

Paranoid Pat -- One of the most prolific and diabolically clever of the Black Box Activists --

And for any of you who want to join the informal and loosely knit but (as you can see) very effective group of BBV activists, email [e-mail]

I will be organizing the plan of action for this group this weekend, so it may be a day or two before you hear anything. Here is my basic approach, though:

I believe in much the same form of activism as that written about by progressive author Naomi Klein -- the swarm theory. By that I mean the organization is quite loose, and each activist often doesn't know precisely what the other 10,000 activists are doing -- the activist pods each have their own brain and do things in very different ways, sometimes stumbling over each other, but oh well. This is an advantage in David & Goliath fights, because it is impossible to behead the swarm.

Sometimes part of the swarm breaks off and forms its own swarm, which makes two swarms. Sometimes a swarm that was attacking something else comes and swarms with us for a day, or a week, or the whole fight.

My approach is to tap into the passions and strengths you bring -- if you are a poet, write poetry and perform it. If you are a computer tech, help us with that. If you are an organizer, help organize the more traditional approaches. If you understand legislative activities, help us with that. If you are a good researcher, we've got a critically important research arm that's being set up. If you like to use a word processor and follow instructions, we've got that need too.

Pat, as you can see, is a driving force. If you'd like to work with people like him, and RedEagle, and David Allen, and me, please send that e-mail.

Bev

[juajen]

55. And, a great, big

:kick:

[Wednesdays]

56. Kick

:kick:

[bearfan454]

57. KICK !

[noiretextatique]

58. another kick for alameda

:bounce:

[Liberator_Rev]

59. Thanks a million, Bev, and everybody who supports you!!!

kick

[hedda_foil]

61. Get back up there!

[hang a left]

63. let's get those vote stealing rat bastards!!!!!!

and a kick

[cosmicdot]

62. kick

:dem:

[lostnfound]

74. kick

[Wednesdays]

64. If you all haven't already,

check out Faun Otter's new info, over at:
http://bartcopnation.com/dc/dcboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=2&topic_id=249977

I posted excerpts of that thread on:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=104&topic_id=497395

[BevHarris]

66. Faun Otter's findings: Heavily recommended,

worth the mental effort for those (like me) who do not love stats or math. This is a potential smoking gun.

And I'm already hearing the question: What with cell phone vote transfers, failing to follow the law on audit/safeguard procedures, and anomalies, how can California certify this election?

[PATRICK]

65. And once more, the Democrats

seem part of the problem and co-conspirators in their own destruction.

I know how frustrated the squeezed out third parties are in our state, but the Dems? A lot of posts on vote analysis seem to be missing the exit polls done by the Dem pros. I think ONCE after 2000 the party publisjhed the fishy numbers in the fishy states and down the rabbit hole it went.

I am betting they did some moderate exercises here that will be nothing compared to what will happen should California come anywhere within ten percent reach of Bush in 2004. He WANTS a mandate.

So far I think it is on track as much as it was for Nixon's second term.
All they have to do is trip up our selection process and same old, same old to sow up the nation in a digital vise.

I also note that the march on Iran, Syria and NK continues unabated, despite the current trends.

I think a simple people's stategy has to be employed to actively STOP the spread of Diebold-style fixes. Beyond the figures and the technical horrors they must draw a line in cyberspace and keep the votes from crossing over.

Once duped people will not want to believe they were duped. It has to be stopped with the full force of people's opinion in each voting district. Too bad the party is not leading on this issue. Instead in New York they are doing chamber maneouvers on page 22 of the papers with Pataki just humming along with his push for all Diebold all the elections. I post to an elections reform meetup and find I am the only one in a region of a million voters(maybe two others?).

It is plain that vote crime is politically protected, ignored or lost in massive neglect except in special circumstances determined by some "elected" officials. The whole nation has become an *.

[Eloriel]

67. Pataki ... Diebold ... but of course

Okay, folks. I've posted this a number of times already. Here it is again.

Arnold announced on Friday, Aug. 15, that he would run for Davis's seat in the Recall election.

On MONDAY, August 11, a column appeared in the Washington Times that "Bush campaign sees California, New York as ripe for taking."
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030811-123908-4908r.htm

It's still there.

That was the backstory.

I said that if Arnold won CA (or McClintock or any other Repug) the following would happen:

1. Bush would go to CA often for photo-ops. (A visit by Bush is scheduled for next week, before Arnold even takes his oath of office.)

2. Bush would lavish federal largesse on CA. (Arnold has already said that he would be asking Bush "for lots and lots of favors," and the words "federal aid" have also been used.)

3. There would be polls coming out showing Bush is "popular" or the election between the Dem nominee and Bush is "close." (We'll have to wait a while for these developments. Too early yet. Number 1 and 2 above have to kick in a little.)

4. Come election day and slightly before they'd kick in all the vote suppression and vote fraud techniques they can think of, and given FL 2000, that's a bunch.

If we don't stop Diebold and other companies, Bush WILL take California in 2004. I'm not a betting woman, but I'd bet a LOT on this one.

VOTE SUPPRESSION: It occurs to me that maybe some people don't understand what I mean by this term. There are many, many vote suppression techniques. A few of them:

* Butterfly ballots or other ballots that thwart the proper recording of voter's intent. (Disclaimer: I don't know if FL's infamous "butterfly ballot" was an intentional vote suppression technique, but I sure as hell don't necessarily believe anymore that it was an unfortunate mistake. YMMV.)

* Moving pollin places without adequate (or any) notice.

* Late opening polls.

* Not enough ballots on hand; not enough foreign language ballots on hand.

* Poorly functioning machines, causing frustration, long lines, etc.

* Tossing legal voters off the rolls

* Too few lines to headquarters to handle problems and questions in a timely way.

* No provisional ballots on hand, or too few.

* Traffic stops near a polling place (esp. effective in black or other minority areas)

* Posting armed law enforcement people in or outside polling places.

* Circulating flyers claiming that people need more ID than they legally do in order to vote, or that their records will be checked, or that whether or not their rent is up to date will be checked, etc.

* Posting flyers, "Don't forget to vote on ___(Wrong date)___."

* Failing to send out absentee ballots when requested, or sending them out very late. (This actually happened to me once -- my absentee ballot was requested in plenty of time but it was postmarked the day AFTER the election. Knowing what I know now, I'd raise holy hell. My candidate won without me, but still ... )

* Etc. Vote suppression techniques are limited only to the imagination of those who would suppress our vote -- and believe me, it IS "our votes" which are being thwarted.

Eloriel

[cosmicdot]

73. kick

[Wednesdays]

68. Keep this kicked, and does Mike Malloy know about this?

If not, somebody please call his show tonight. I had to work last night while he was on, and have to work again tonight.

[Lorien]

69. kick

:kick:

[RedEagle]

71. Suits to Follow?

I'm getting suggestions from other corners of the house that people of California can file suit against the Secretary of State and State and local election officials for not following the process outlined in law and for negligence.

That will take Californian's to do.

Meanwhile, I'm rethinking a trip I was not going to do to a meeting in a county that uses the Diebold optical scan. It's an all day thing to sit in an audience and ask a few questions, but now I think it might be worth it. Was hoping/though I'd be part of a panel discussion.

Hey folks, you can find out from your state SOS page, usually, what kinds of voting systems are used in your county. If it's Diebold, I think it's time to gather all this informtion and start making a fuss. Demand the state decertify all Diebold equipment. Write the newspapers and get those letter to the editors in there. You have to get the populace questioning what's going on before you can get them begin moving on the issue.

Our state officials are NOT all on the up and up with this and those that intend to be are BADLY misinformed. I find clerks at the county level who have been taught out and out lies by state officials. You have to start shaking things up and challenging what's being put out there.

[ParanoidPat]

76. Perhaps it's not Arnold that we should be talking about.....

.....recalling! :evilgrin:
We should focus on a recall of Secretary of State Kevin Shelley and State Election Chief John Mott-Smith for incompetence!
It would be a great way to send a message to the other SoS's. :)

[4dog]

72. Do any election officials in the US follow the rules and laws?

You get the impression that perhaps the majority of elections are illegal.

[BevHarris]

75. looks like the wild west of voting needs more sheriffs

That's why we're organizing, folks. (Email [e-mail] to volunteer)

[TorchTheWitch]

77. kick

boink