A Look at Judge Alito and some of his rulings.

[bluedawg12]

By way of an FYI.


http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050719/19alito.htm

Samuel Alito Jr.
Posted 7/19/05
By Bret Schulte


Nicknamed "Scalito" for views resembling those of conservative Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito Jr. is a favorite son of the political right. Appointed in 1990 by George H.W. Bush to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Alito has earned a reputation for intellectual rigor and polite but frequent dissent in a court that has been historically liberal.

A New Jersey native, the 55-year-old Alito received a bachelor's degree from Princeton and graduated from Yale Law School. He worked in the solicitor general's office during the Reagan administration and was a U.S. attorney for the District of New Jersey when George H.W. Bush nominated him to the Third Circuit. His 15 years on the bench have been marked by strong conservatism on a case-by-case basis that avoids sweeping opinions on constitutionality.

http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2005/10/alito.html

Notable opinions:

A majority opinion in ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1999), holding that the Establishment Clause was not violated by a city hall holiday display that contained a creche, a menorah, secular symbols of the season, and a banner proclaiming the city's dedication to diversity.

A majority opinion in Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993), holding that an Iranian woman seeking asylum could establish that she had a well founded fear of persecution in Iran if she could show that compliance with that country's "gender specific laws and repressive social norms," such as the requirement that women wear a veil in public, would be deeply abhorrent to her. Judge Alito also held that she could establish eligibility for asylum by showing that she would be persecuted because of gender, belief in feminism, or membership in a feminist group.

A majority opinion in Saxe v. State College Area School District, 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001), striking down as contrary to the First Amendment a public school district anti-harassment policy that extended to nonvulgar, non-school-sponsored speech that posed no realistic threat of substantial disruption of school work.

A majority opinion in Shore Regional High School Board of Education v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2004), holding that a school district did not provide a high school student with a free and appropriate public education, as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, when it failed to protect the student from bullying by fellow students who taunted the student based on his lack of athleticism and his perceived sexual orientation.

A majority opinion in Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2003), granting a writ of habeas corpus to an African-American state prisoner after state courts had refused to consider the testimony of a witness who stated that a juror had uttered derogatory remarks about African Americans during an encounter in the courthouse after the conclusion of the trial.

A dissenting opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), arguing that a Pennsylvania that required women seeking abortions to inform their husbands should have been upheld. As Judge Alito reasoned, "he Pennsylvania legislature could have rationally believed that some married women are initially inclined to obtain an abortion without their husbands' knowledge because of perceived problems--such as economic constraints, future plans, or the husbands' previously expressed opposition--that may be obviated by discussion prior to the abortion." Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent from the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision striking down the spousal notification provision of the law quoted Judge Alito's dissent and expressed support for Judge Alito's reasoning.


A dissenting opinion in Homar v. Gilbert, 89 F.3d 1009 (3d Cir. 1996) arguing that that a state university did not violate the procedural due process rights of a campus policeman when it suspended him without pay and without a prior hearing upon learning that he had been arrested and charged with drug offenses. The Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded the case on other grounds, agreed with Judge Alito's reasoning that no hearing was required prior to the suspension because the drug charges showed that the suspension was not baseless.

A dissenting opinion in Sheridan v. Dupont, 74 F.3d 1439 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) arguing that a plaintiff in a sex discrimination case should not inevitably be able to survive summary judgment simply by casting doubt on the employer's proffer of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment decision.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1046288236052

The Mild-Mannered Scalia
Samuel Alito Jr., 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals

Shannon P. Duffy
The Legal Intelligencer
03-03-2003


Perhaps Alito's most memorable dissent came in 1996 in Sheridan v. Dupont, a sex discrimination suit that forced the 3rd Circuit to tackle fundamental questions about the plaintiff's burden of proof. ..More specifically, the question was how the 3rd Circuit should interpret the 1993 Supreme Court decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, which held that once an employer offers legitimate reasons for its conduct, the presumption of discrimination is "rebutted" and "drops from the case."

After Hicks, the federal circuits split, with a few creating what came to be known as the "pretext-plus" standard, meaning plaintiffs must do more than merely cast doubt on an employer's explanation to have the case go forward.

In Sheridan, a 12-judge en banc panel rejected the pretext-plus theory, saying it was "within the province of the jury" to decide when discrimination had occurred.

Alito, the lone dissenter, argued that his colleagues were going too far by allowing plaintiffs to get their case to a jury whenever they managed to cast any doubt on the employer's version.

"If the majority had merely said that ... a defense motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law must generally be denied, I would agree," Alito wrote.

But, he said, his colleagues had established a "blanket rule" against summary judgment that was legally "unsound."
.................

[bluedawg12]

1. kick the info. in case any one wants a quick glance. n/t