If you had to guess how the tabulation fraud was pulled off on Nov. 2..

[roseBudd]

what would you say. Software programmers especially encouraged to speculate.

[Warpy]

1. The ES&S machines in NM

simply failed to record a percentage of Democratic votes for national candidates, but inexplicably recorded them for the judges who were the only local races.

That means to believe the machines were legitimate, you'd have to believe that about 17,000 people left their nice warm houses to vote for a district judge but didn't want to vote for their Congressmen or for the President.

Sort of boggles the mind, doesn't it?

[roseBudd]

3. Since it actually came down to Ohio and Kerry was polling 53% in

OH, and Moss vs. Bush alleges vote flipping especially in SW OH counties AND Warren County barred independent observers from obsevering tabulation citing a bogus Homeland Security threat.

Since the counties in OH had different vendors, does this mean the central tabulator?

What might th esignificance of Warren County be?

The NEP poll servers going down at 11:30 pm?

[berniew1]

101. Fla. had most fraud, but T. S. switching in 16 states &manipulation in 25

documented:

Touch screen machine fraud(switching)documented in many counties of 16 states; other widespread ballot fraud and manipulation documented in many counties of many states; widespread (illegal) systematic dirty tricks, intimidation, and official malfeasance to reduce minority and student vote documented in over 20 states; widespread manipulation of registrations, absentees, provisionals in over 25 states:

http://www.flcv.com/ussumall.html

It all was reported on election day by 50,000 reports to the EIRS election hotline, and documented with specifics down to the precinct and even machine level in many cases. Plus results of other investigations.

[spooked911]

30. Yes. How can everyone not see how blatant the fraud is?

Aaaarrggh.
:mad:

[roseBudd]

39. They will when my parody Behind The Election starts spreading like...

all things funny and mean spirited do. Like the Daily Show it may be "fake" but the Daily Show truly informs. If we don't get a sense of humor and learn how to yada yada our message we won't be able to communicate it.

[Amaryllis]

2. Lock down in Warren Co. I think it was more than one thing...I really

wonder at what level it was masterminded, and how many were involved. There are so many instances of probably fraud.

[librechik]

11. bingo

also, wasn't there something about a computer crash at the exit poll place that night? Or was that 2000?

[Carolab]

18. Mitofsky's computer "crashed" both 2000 AND 2004.

And I've got a bridge to sell ya.

[Amaryllis]

44. Carolab, did you read Votescam yet? Mitofsky has been complicit in

fraud for years according to Collier.

[Carolab]

46. I've read excerpts. Enough to understand the media is behind this all.

The media consortium has been rigging our elections for years. AP doesn't just "tabulate" the votes, they make them up.

[Amaryllis]

47. Yep. Creative vote count reporting. Bad as e-voting. So what do we do?

[Carolab]

48. Kick the media out of the mix.

They don't belong in it in the first place. All they SHOULD do is report what has been independently, publicly and accurately counted--AFTER the fact. This whole thing has been engineered on the premise that we need results fast. Also, I remember reading that the exit polls are faked as well. Probably why it's so hard for Mitofsky, et al to produce real raw data matching the numbers they cite--number of people polled as well as their responses.

[Wilms]

50. I'm wondering if HR 550 would help.

Note what I bolded...

From HAVA:

VOTING SYSTEM DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘voting system’’ means—
(1) the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used—

(A) to define ballots;
(B) to cast and count votes;
(C) to report or display election results; and
(D) to maintain and produce any audit trail information; and...

From Holt HR 550:

(8) PROHIBITION OF USE OF UNDISCLOSED SOFTWARE IN VOTING SYSTEMS.—
No voting system shall at any time contain or use any undisclosed software.Any voting system containing or using software shall disclose the source code, object code, and executable representation of that software to the Commission, and the Commission shall make that source code, object code, and executable representation available for inspection upon request to any person.


So, I'm wondering if this gives the People access to the technology that "display election results". :shrug:

[Carolab]

51. Good question. Can you pose it to someone in Congress or to Conyers?

eom

[Wilms]

52. Deal n/t

[Amaryllis]

70. What's eom?

[Amaryllis]

69. Wilms, you brought this up in my post about the Election News Service. You

may just have a point here. http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x331781
Worth pursuing.

[Wilms]

71. It seems so hopeful that it might be a bill killer.

"eom" = "end of message".

Like, "n/t" means "no text".

[Amaryllis]

72. Wilms, check this out. Just did a search on Voter News Service which

according to the Votescam video which is actually just an interview with Collier, is the name that the Election News Service changed to.

Found this about the 2000 election

January 13, 2003
Voter News Service: What Went Wrong?

By Larry Barrett

In November 2000, a "perfect storm" of vote-counting miscues and polling problems led the major TV networks repeatedly to change their minds as to whether Al Gore or George Bush was the next president. In November 2002, a second storm whipped through the networks' election broadcasts.

Unfinished and mismanaged efforts to update the computer systems used by Voter News Service forced executives at the consortium's owners—ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox News, NBC and the Associated Press—to abandon the use of exit polling data before it even got all collected. Indeed, by mid-January the failures led to the disbanding of VNS itself. On Jan. 13, the six organizations said only that they were "collectively reviewing a number of strong options'' to avoid another fiasco in the future.

Back up to Election Day, Nov. 5. The balance of power in Congress was up for grabs. Yet by 10 a.m., the TV networks confirmed what they had feared for months: They couldn't derive any meaningful exit-polling data from a system they had just spent between $10 million and $15 million to overhaul.

Disasters were almost comical. Many of the more than 30,000 temporary workers collecting exit-poll information were disconnected from VNS' new voice-recognition system before they could finish inputting data over the phone. Some poll workers were unable to access the system at all. Live operators weren't always a help, as the phone system periodically crashed under the crush of callers dialing in.

More: http://www.baselinemag.com/print_article/0,3668,a=35729,00.asp

[Wilms]

74. I know what you're saying.

We need to understand that the tabulators are going to bite us.

[Amaryllis]

84. According to this article, the ELection News Service is no more???

[Wilms]

86. But they've been replaced by something as evil, no?? n/t

[Amaryllis]

88. Thought they'd been replaced by the Voter News Service. But this

article says, "Unfinished and mismanaged efforts to update the computer systems used by Voter News Service forced executives at the consortium's owners—ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox News, NBC and the Associated Press—to abandon the use of exit polling data before it even got all collected. Indeed, by mid-January the failures led to the disbanding of VNS itself."

[Wilms]

89. Yes, yes.

But did we not read in "VoteScam" that VNS was replaced with some new entity that was sort-of a re-constitution of the old one?

What I'm wondering is, other than the exit polling, where did the networks get their info? As each state's BoE gathers and tallies the counties data, where do they report it??

[Bill Bored]

75. Ah, so in HAVA-ese this includes tabulators.

While Holt's office said the bill did not specifically address tabulators, it looks as if they are included. How about posting this in my HR 550 thread? Thanks for digging this up. You are becoming a "go to" guy on HAVA!

We should do a search for the words "voting system" in HR 550 to see where else it might be mentioned. I don't think it's in the auditing clause.

[Wilms]

76. That's the kind of search I did with 550 and HAVA.

Did you see any addressing of tabulation or "voting system" in Clinton's bill???

[sacxtra]

91. "Stop wondering HR 550 won't help."

[Amaryllis]

68. Mitofsky is as complicit as the media. Read Votescam.

[PATRICK]

34. It was too important to "mastermind"

They scrammed the election with everyone pitching in for fraud- thinking that the joint effort was needed by each individual to pull it off. In reality they provided mainly smoke and a boost and a wall of protection for the calculated adjustable and final tally fraud absolutely needed to seal the deal.

That Kerry was painfully close in the polls enabled ALL the above. If he could possibly have locked down a mighty poll lead we would have seen something REALLY interesting that night if the tiny frauds backed down in the face of inevitability.

We have not received yet a taste of exactly how far the GOP crime syndicate will go despite the smorgasbord of fraud and the piece de non-resistance of computer secret counting. We also missed seeing the Congress in 2000 being forced to steal the election for the putative loser. The advantages and fixing that benefited the GOP kept their sticky fingers within reach to the prize- also thanks to the meek naivete of the DNC and their humble search for parity among 2% of the voting population.

Both parties from the top down should be treated to a public horsewhipping. it does not take a genius or expert to see what they are doing. It takes someone with a megaphone to inform the brainwashed masses they have been openly tricked.

In each battleground state and in the control of the counting and news releases they simply engineered the final tally behind whatever backdoor was available with very few people involved in the computer end compared to the purposeful chaos and suppression in the precincts. the mess- not decisive- lent adequate smoke for the most outrageous manipulation of the counts as evidenced by the exit polls. None of the small stuff could have won Bush even a shot at winning- and those in the know were confident. The other fix of course was a media and a public denial of reality that enabled to play the criminal fraud of open suppression as small potatoes to the great media theory of the Bush Cultic Coalition multiplying like loves and fishes in fishy ways in the midst of an honest sanity breaking out.

The kind of guesswork we are stuck with is the powerless and accommodating acquiescence of the Democrats who got snookered so that even the question of investigating the obvious is out of bounds, nearly banished from the collective imagination. This is true of all the other crap as well. Sometimes our guesses are too complex and give too much credit or lack a lot of key information it would take dozen honest grand juries and prosecutors to drag to light. Political accountability? Journalistic investigation? Too pitiful to discuss which leaves it to the Common Sense of the people.

So the people still believe Kennedy was victim of a conspiracy- and UFO's- and Bush cheated. So what? Anyplace it counts it cannot be investigated or discussed at all. Piecing together who had to know and push the buttons(the machine companies and their executive chain that disappeared into need-to-know murk among indifferent technocrats thinking they are doing some other job. Actual crooks to actually press the buttons and change the numbers(THESE guys are a rewarded, protected, disreputable barrier), Cheney's gang, the Bush boys who played this game as governors, some bought people, convicts, some GOP planners like Gingrich(the most sown up e-fraud state), and especially Rove who makes sure that if the eyes are not blind they participate in blindsiding the rest of the world.

My concern here is that as simple and as removed from public debate this crime is one is thinking too small. MANY world leaders know the machines are rigged. Democracy and voting is "spreading" in odd places. Where the machines go in, liberal parties go out. Bush is marketing tyranny on a grand scale, I think and we neglect the open advance of these machines into every black deal and crooked alliance the new Empire is making. One would think the whole world could not be that stupid, but apparently Americans are not alone at least in not being able to confront the naked truth.

[seaclyr]

63. I have to agree with you...

<In reality they provided mainly smoke and a boost and a wall of protection for the calculated adjustable and final tally fraud absolutely needed to seal the deal.>
Yes, a lot of people are thinking way too small.

[gumby]

4. Good Question

When I said that the election was stolen by electronic voting machines, my friend scoffed at my "conspiracy theory." He said that such a vast conspiracy would have to entail thousands of people and that such a large number of people would not be containable. Therefore, someone would have come forward and exposed the crime by now.

[Stevepol]

8. wouldn't require more than a handful of people.

Probably the central tabulators were used along with a natural tilt built into the machines themselves. Of course, nobody can know for sure except the people doing it, but I think that's basically how it's done. The built-in bias works all the time everytime, but when that bias isn't enough to change the result, then the technician or troubleshooter steps in and changes the totals at the central tabulator level. This wouldn't require more than a handful of people, though it would require a lot of people willing to trust these guys, i.e., the elections people who usually don't know beans about computers have to trust the so-called technicians or the company or the guys who come in to troubleshoot.

What is beyond doubt is that the fraud happened. Precisely how it happened is not clear to anybody. We're mostly just dancing in the dark.

[bailey77]

25. Could be done easily with one person

on both Diebold and Sequoia.

Black Box Voting, along with two other research cohorts, recently demonstrated this in a real elections office setting, using the real system.

Altered 100,000 votes, left not a trace.

Documented it meticulously, this hack calls 40 million votes into question. Reported it to the House Judiciary Committee and Conyers office. So far, the response is only the sound of crickets chirping.

Is it that they don't want to truly unravel the garment, or that they do not understand the significance of a lone hacker altering an election using the real software in a real location, without leaving a trace?

One would hope that they have the courage to deal with the elephant in the room, rather than investing time only in vote suppression and punch cards (and a few magic bullet theories not yet supported by paper or videotaped evidence).

The hacking of the central tabulators can be achieved by one person with Diebold (proven, not theoretical) and by one person with Sequoia (using real software, but not yet proven in real setting).

Watch for new documents on the Black Box Voting forum DOCUMENT ARCHIVE for ES&S and Sequoia this weekend. The BBV team is heading back from a productive research and public teaching trip in California.

[roseBudd]

36. The majority of OH ballots were tabulated by ES&S and Triad...

because 70% of OH ballots were punch card.

[bailey77]

42. Update, Conyers' staffers have requested info on the hack

Now that it has been documented using real software and in a real location, using the exact setup used in Nov. 2004, and this is a significant development. Corrine Brown's staffers also asked for more info today.

This isn't just about Ohio. And when you think about it, why would it be about just one state? I don't think it's just about swing states either. And it's not just about the presidential race.

Election manipulation has been chugging along, unchecked, enabled through a local network of corruption. Most investigators who have been at this awhile know that we are looking at an electoral system more fundamentally broken than just Ohio, tabulators, swing states, Republicans, touch-screens, or the Bush family.

We've been working up to this problem for 50 years, because no one paid any attention. It ramped up quickly in the 1980s when the CIA required the biggest voting machine companies to provide their software, and BRC went on an acquisition binge, consolidating the mom & pop election industry vendors into a larger conglomerate.

Then in the 90s, ES&S bought BRC, and the SEC stopped the sale based on antitrust grounds (monopoly) but in a bizarre twist, "solved" the problem by having ES&S share the software and hardware with Sequoia Voting Systems.

There are reports back to at least 1992 of Triad coming in and diddling with the punch card tabulators right before elections (see Lexis-Nexis or Factiva, for an elections worker making those allegations while running for office against the supervisor of elections in a Triad county, 1992). Daniel Hopsicker did an expose of Sequoia shortly after the 2000 election that indicated possible mob ties going back well into the 90s -- then it cleaned up with an acquisition by Jefferson Smurfit and then, later, by De La Rue.

The point being: This is not new, not limited to John Kerry, not limited to Ohio, and by now almost every facet of the system has been penetrated.

Little attention has been paid to the DIMS system, purchased by Diebold in 2003 and implemented in Cuyahoga County, OH just weeks before the election. It is another flawed piece of software, which robs people of their voter registration.

[Bill Bored]

5. Diebold GEMS allows importing of votes

in comma separated variable (CSV) format. That's the easy way. You can also do a Bev Harris and just change the totals in Access. Also easy.

The hard way is to hack in via the phone network using a spare (or stolen) Accutvote TS or OS machine configured to match legitimate machines and spoof the tabulator with false precinct totals. You'd need to know the tabulator's phone number(s), password, etc. but in theory it could be done unless there is some unique identification of the Accuvote hardware that can't be changed. I don't know the answer to that yet, but I'm working on it.

See my letter to Congressman Rush Holt about improving HR 550.

<http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x337682>

[bailey77]

24. Black Box Voting, working with another expert, has some answers

There is an additional level of authentication beyond what was originally reported by Black Box Voting last November.

Black Box Voting has reported new information to the House Judiciary committee, and to other congresspersons including Conyers' office, Cynthia McKinney's office, and Corrine Brown's office. So far, no followup by any congressperson has been done on any of the new reports from BBV, which provide information learned in February specific to the hacking (this time, not editing like Harris showed Howard Dean, but actual hacking of the votes). This was done on live Diebold systems in real locations, set up exactly as they were during the 2004 election.

The additional level of authentication is a handshake needed in order to simulate votes going into the GEMS program. It also appears to be easily crackable, and further experimentation will provide the specifics. BBV has also recently experimented, with permission of the proper officials, on other remote access configurations. There is more than one way in, but some of the original concepts, published by Black Box Voting last fall, did not work due to layers of security that were not publicly known at the time.

What happened in King County Washington during the primary, where the GEMS audit log was erased, showed evidence immediately before the erasure which exactly matches the sequence of events needed to hack the system through telephone lines.

Harris met with Donna Frye, the mayoral candidate in San Diego who won with 165,000 write-in votes, but whose election was then taken from her on a technicality. Harris asked Frye to see if she can set up a videotaped demo of hacking the San Diego GEMS system. It will be interesting to see what happens there.

Black Box Voting recently met with researcher Jeremiah Akin, who demonstrated that the audit logs in Sequoia tabulators are even easier to delete than Diebold's. The vote-shaving mentioned above was apparent in poll tapes from New Mexico, and could be enabled easily with local access or with a patch from Sequoia, simply by adjusting the stored business logic in WinEDS.

[passy]

59. How about using something like this?

http://www.digi.com/products/wireless/digiconnectwangsm.jsp
I really like this bit " the ability to traverse firewalls, and the ability to move the connection virtually anywhere."
Now something like this could be hardwired into tabulating machines or simply plugged in by a technician and later removed.

[roseBudd]

65. How would someone who understood networking say this if they

were bragging that they had done it? And what would be the significance of different vendors in the process, say you had 3 counties that were ES&S, tow punch card, one optiscan, one county triad punch card.

[Bill Bored]

6. Ohio Ballot Order

In any Kerry-heavy precinct in which the ballot rotation was such that Kerry votes could be shifted to Bush and vice versa, even a random shuffling of ballots would favor Bush because more votes would shift to Bush than to Kerry. There were many such precincts in OH.

[slackmaster]

7. They must be doing something to silence potential whistle-blowers

It's amazing that nobody has come forward to rat out the conspiracy.

[passy]

60. What if they were pardoned prisoners?

Risking jail or worse if they talked?

[roseBudd]

9. The reason I ask is I am doing a parody of Behind The Music called

Behind the Election. The beauty of parody is I can claim anything. I do have Rove standing in a room with young male hackers toiling over laptops. In his speech bubble Rove is bragging about his nick name being "Mighty Mouse Finger Guy"



The narrator Shallow Throat introduces this photo illustration by saying something like:


Election day was looking really bad for the idiot in chief. We had major suppression efforts in Ohio and Florida with our poll challengers but Kerry was still ahead. Luckily we had listened to Rove and O'Dell when they told us how important computers would be. Our hackers took out the National Election Poll servers around 11:30...
The hayseeds in Warren County, Ohio fell for the terror alert bullshit and...


See the entire parody site here:

http://www.edwardsdavid.com/uploader/indexx.html

[roseBudd]

10. kick for more ideas: was the election poll servers going down at...

11:30 pm on Nov. 2 significant and orchestrated?

If Hamilton and Butler Counties were ES&S punch card, Clermont optscan and Warren Triad punch cards how were kerry votes flipped to Bush in those counties as alleged in Moss vs. Bush? Computer experts please weigh in.

[Bill Bored]

13. In any 2 precincts that favored Kerry in any county,

where the ballot orders were such that a vote for Kerry on one ballot, would be counted as a vote for Bush on a machine set up to read the other ballot, all you have to do is shuffle the ballots randomly such that they are read randomly by the wrong machines. Because Kerry would be ahead in these precincts, more of his votes would be switched to Bush than the other way around. Kerry's lead would therefore be reduced and Bush would gain votes. This is assuming a random mixing of the ballots, which would be the easiest one to arrange. A more targeted approach could yield even more vote switches.

Picture this:

Poll worker Lucy Ricardo walking down the hall with 2 armfuls of ballots. She slips on a banana peel, placed there by her boss Mr. Blackwell after lunch. The ballots go flying every which way. She scrambles to pick them all up with her best friend Ethyl, each making sure that the total ballot counts match the poll books for each precinct. But of course, half of them end up being inserted into the wrong counting machines and the Kerry votes go disproportionately to Bush. When she gets home, her husband Ricky, who of course has been on the road for months campaigning for Kerry with his mamba band, asks her how the election went. She says "Fine dear." and they turn on the TV to relax, only to find that Bush has won the state! You finish the story.

If you wanted to make the system less prone to fraud, you would mix the ballot orders so that Bush and Kerry votes would move to third party candidates in the event the ballots were mixed up. Large numbers of third party votes would immediately be a red flag that something was amiss. But according to those who've looked at this in detail the ballot orders were arranged so that Bush and Kerry votes could be easily interchanged.

[roseBudd]

14. Arnebeck stated he believed Kerry votes were flipped to Bush

in certain OH Counties. They were very specific which counties in OH. The biggest chunks of vote flipping were in 4 counties in SW OH. They had different vendors. Giving the wrong precinct punch card to be voted in the wrong punch card machine would involve lowly poll workers and involve too many people. Look at Moss vs. Bush, Butler, Warren, Clermont and Hamilton is where the majority of votes were flipped. Those 4 counties gave Bush his winning margin.

[Number_6]

21. Triad

Did those counties all get added into the big Fraud Total
via tabulation machines? The brand of fraud that Blackwell
is aware of must be done primarily by computer. Because his
main tactic in trying to thwart investigation is to say that
any fraud that extended very far, beyond this or that bad
precinct, had to require complicity of an ungodly number of
both Dem and Rethug local BOE officials. Hence, he is trying
to divert attention from computer fraud above the individual
BOE level. As is often stated, your average BOE official
doesn't know beans about computers...there are an ungodly
number of such BOE humans, both Dem and Rethug.

[Kip Humphrey]

22. Nov 2, 8:39 PM: Rove & Bush arrive at Oval Office "Election War Room"

The scene:

The White House Oval Office. 6 rectangular folding tables are set up in three rows with a center aisle. PCs and communications equipment are set up: two PCs per table, staffed by RNC employees. Karl Rove directs the action while Bush sits behind his desk watching as RNC employees manipulate tabulator votes via modem and/or Internet access.

This was shown and reported (all except for the manipulating votes part) on CNN and MSNBC on 11/3. Photos were courtesy of the White House.

This scene was obliquely referenced by an anonymous (fearing for his safety) RNC IT employee who claimed to have manipulated the votes in 6 states on election night and described the algorithm employed. The algorithm coincided with statistical conclusions of the vote swing that occurred after the polls closed in five of the six states mentioned by the RNC employee.

Did this happen? Using a Randi Rhodesism, "I saw it right there, on the TeeVee". As for the anonymous RNC employee, no one here on DU believed him (too bad - with support, this guy might have gone public).

If anyone can find the White House photos shown on CNN and MSNBC (and probably other networks)on Nov 3rd, please post the link or send to [e-mail]

[chorti]

26. I think that is a weak link in the moss/arnebeck case

They are basing that partly on the judge (Connally) results. But they failed to take into account sufficiently that the judge race was non-partisan.

If you look at where the exit polls did not match the results - yes, it was in SW Ohio, but also in many other parts of the state - far northern Ohio, Cuyahoga, Mahoning, counties just south of Columbus ...

Here is my best guess on Ohio for the major problems:

1. In all of the e-voting counties, the machines were callibrated to favor Bush, i.e. default = Bush and its hard to change to Kerry. This probably switched 2 to 5 percent of all votes in these counties. Anything more would be detectable. Especially affected was Mahoning. Would only need one or two persons to carry out.

2. Voter suppression by lack of machinery. (Not exactly fraud but can't be separated from fraud.) Especially affected were low-income, African-American, Latino and college precincts. See Columbus, Kenyon College, etc. This involved more people at the ground level and may be the best, first place to nail some people's xxx-es.

3. Programmer controlled switching of votes by hacking into tabulators. I believe that this happened in most but not all Triad and ES&S counties. Probably affected 2 to 5 percent of vote being switched in these counties. Anything more would be detectable. I think Hamilton and Butler (ES&S) were especially impacted by this, but it impacted more than 50 counties. A little bit of switching in most precincts is much harder to detect than a lot of switching in a few counties/precincts. You only have to ensure that you pre-select the right precincts to re-count if there is any 3% recount. And that happened in almost every county - after consulting with Triad or ES&S, they almost always preselected the precincts to be used in the 3% recount. Does not necessarily assume local knowledge of fraud.

4. Clever planning (on the part of Repugs) and benign neglect/ignorance (on the part of Dems) in allowing multiple precincts (with different candidate orders) to vote in one location in punch-card counties, causing thousands of votes to be thrown out or mis-votes. This was exacerbated by a lot of local shenanigans on the part of Repugs, but hard to prove - such as moving ballots from one precinct to the other in locations with multiple precincts. Probably impacted 5,000 Kerry votes in Cuyahoga alone.

[roseBudd]

28. I live in SW Ohio and this is why I do not believe it was a weak link...

In Butler & Warren, heavy repug counties, justice Moyer had yard signs everywhere in yards where there were also Bush Cheney signs. In addition the Cincinnati Enquirer endorsed Moyer the incumbent. As an incumbent his name would be familiar. C. Ellen Connaly had no commercials, no yard signs, not even in Cincinnati which is 43% African American did I see any C. Ellen Connaly signs or campaign literature. That is because C. Ellen Connaly had no money to spend. Supreme Court was a down ticket race, to believe that Bush voters accidently picked an SC justice they had never heard of is suspect. DU member Lizzieforkerry is a Warren County resident and she observed repugs with their straight GOP cheat sheets. Lizzieforkerry is the person who told me about the Moyer yard signs being everywhere. She also was the Kerry campaign contact for Warren and has stated emphatically that there i sno way Kerry did no better than Gore in Warren.

[chorti]

38. i'm not convinced

I still think that at most, 70 percent of Bush voters would have been dedicated enough to know that they should vote for Moyer in the judges race. A judge, even an incumbent with yard signs and endorsements, will simply not be known by everyone. He was not listed as a Republican. Nor was Connaly listed as a Democrat. So the other 30 percent of Republicans might guess - going 50/50 between the two. This would make it totally explainable that Bush could get 65% of the vote and Moyer 55%, for example. I would guess that many people, if they know nothing about the 2 candidates but their names, would more often than not vote for a female candidate over a male candidate. I know that I do that.

The opposite happened in highly Democratic areas of Cincinnati and other places. Moyer had way more votes than Bush in those places. How do you explain that? I would say it is the same effect.

As far as Kerry doing better than Gore in Warren, I would agree with you and Lizzie on that one. I do think something happened in Warren, I just don't think the Moyer/Connally results are very good proof.

[roseBudd]

40. Not when you consider SC was the last race on the ballot and

many have quit voting by then. Connaly got 12,000 more than Kerry in Warren in a county that is sparsely populated.

[roseBudd]

15. Punch card have precinct codes pre punched. The only way to finesse that

is to hand the wrong precinct punch card to the voter and have them vote at the wrong punch card machine. Ohio has rotating ballot position. That would put lowly elderly poll workers in the loop.

The only precincts with suspicous 3rd party tallies were in Cuyahoga and the numbers were insignificant compared to the 118,000 margin.

[Bill Bored]

31. Thank you for clearing that up.

I was wondering if they had the precincts pre-coded, which would make sense. Do the OpScans work the same way?

However, you are assuming that the machines are actually programmed to read these codes correctly. What if the hack involved disabling this feature? Then you could mix up the ballots before or after the voting and no one would know.

Also, in Cuyahoga, with the long lines and presumably some chaos, voters could have easily been directed to the wrong collocated precincts. Wherever the shorter lines were, the voters would happily go. We would need some witnesses to testify that this had occurred. Maybe some voters did it on their own, not knowing that it would affect the results??? But imagine being on a long line and someone apparently in authority telling you you could cast your ballot on a shorter line. After hours of waiting, most of us would jump at the chance, unless we knew the vote wouldn't count! We do know that voters were told their provisionals would count even if cast at the wrong precinct and this was totally false. It's a small step to suggest that regular ballots could have been misdirected exactly the same way.

As far as programming touch screens, most of that is done via GEMS in the case of Diebold. I don't know about other vendors, although as I said GEMS allows importation of data, which means GEMS is multi-vendor compatible! But since the ballots are downloaded to each touch screen from the server, you could mess up every machine in the county with just one configuration change on the server. I am looking to see if it's possible to actually program a default candidate, etc. without a hack.

Oh, and what if the server configuration is changed AFTER the ballots have been downloaded to the DREs, to hide the bad configuration?

There are only so many hours in the day to look at this stuff. I'm sure others have already figured it out (I mean others on our side) but I'd rather see it for myself. That said, if anyone has documentation that shows how to do this, please post.

[roseBudd]

35. Yes Cuyahoga definitely had some voters sent to wrong punch card

machine/precinct.

I believe the bulk of the stolen votes to have been tabulation fraud and I believe SW OH was chosen for the bulk of it because of of it's heavy GOP reputaion would not raise eyebrows. People just assumeed Warren went 71% for Bush, therefore the fraud was beleivable.

They needed hard numbers and guaranteed results and all the other methods, suppression, provisional ballot mix ups, etc would have been good for the GOP but involved guess work and the risk of coming up short.

Since OH was 70% punch cards I really recommend Dr. Chuck Jones of the Univ. of Iowa's chad page.

[Iceburg]

41. Machine Configuration Malfeasance on a Grand Scale

There is compelling evidence that
a) hundreds of machines were configured incorrectly by design in Cuyahoga county; and
b) ballots were collected in stacks in Kerry strongholds to be deployed for use/counting in other precincts.

I know there are several documented cases of voters taking their ballots to the wrong machines or dropping them in the wrong ballot box, but this alone would not account for the huge discrepancies nor the non-random profile of the anomalies.

My focus has been on the machine configuration cases. I have identified more than 100 precincts that appear to have been set-up not only with the wrong ballot order but with a ballot order that funnels the vote to Bush's column leaving little or no trace in the 3rd party/Spoiled columns. 100 precincts represents approximately 7% of the precincts in Cuyahoga. The most obvious cases of configuration error (which have been documented numerous times by various sources) present themselves by way of very high number of third party votes and/or high number of spoiled votes. They are the easy catches.

The remaining catches involve a complex analysis of many factors. Some of which include :

1) the classification of presidential ballot order collections (the set of unique presidential ballot orders within a vote location). In simple terms, the ballot order collection can be "cascading" or "Non-Cascading". It gets a bit more complex when we discuss "cascade degrees".

2) Establishing thresholds for each candidates' and turnout based on non-parametric statistics (percentiles, etc). Note: it is a mistake for any statistician to use parametric-based statistics on the data from Cuyahoga because very little of the data (uncorrected) satisfies the criteria for a normal distribution. Outliers must be removed before any reasonable analysis cab begin.

3) Variance of candidate vote distribution "within a voting location"

4) Ballots cast per voting machine within a vote location

5) Whether or not additional machines were installed in a precinct after the voting period began(The presence of an additional machine appears to have a significant correlation with questionable vote allocations)

6) Comparative analysis to other races using regression techniques. My current model examines the US Senate, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and State Rep 7th District

7) Collaborating case reports from the VoteProtects EIRS database.

I have constructed a modeling tool that examines all of these factors.

While it is too early to say with any certainty, at this point with respect to the punch-card counties, I am leaning to a machine configuration malfeasance over tabulation malfeasance for the following reasons:

a) The machine configuration setup errors need only involve a very small number of people -- one or two. Even though over 8000 voting machines were used in Cuyahoga (250 additional machines distributed on voting day) it is possible that 1 person alone could have been responsible for the configuration of the machines in error. If I were a forensic scientist/detective ... I would be looking for a punch-card configuration specialist and somebody in charge or involved with machine distribution planning.

b) Any discovery of switches can be blamed on incompetence

c) Requires no special computer skills aside from setting up the machines

d) There are several case reports of the machines punching the wrong holes in the EIRS (these cases are outside of the obvious switches mentioned above)

However, as I stated ... I believe it is too early to say with confidence that the anomalies are:
a) machine configuration fraud; or
b) tabulation fraud; or
c) both a) and b).


PS. Yes, Dr Jones has posted excellent punch-card machine info at:
Dr. Douglas W. Jones , U of Iowa
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/

[roseBudd]

43. My mom was a poll worker for years and she said they set up

their machines themselves. Each precinct has 4 mostly elderly poll workers most of whom have been doing it for decades. I do not believe average people, the type who sign up for precinct worker would be safe to approach for this type of cheatibg. Punch cards are pretested to see if they yield the races punched.

Especially since after 2000 everyone knew to hold their punch cards up to see if their chads were punched out. There were commercials, door hangers and windshield flyering in OH to tell us to inspect our punch cards. Kerry was #4 and I knew to look to see if the #4 hole was punched. If an African American precinct went 50% for Bush it would have rung alarm bells. They had to flip white Kerry voters to Bush in places like Warren, Butler, Clermont and Hamilton so as not to look suspicous.

[Bill Bored]

49. Iceburg, check out this thread too:

<http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x269763>

[Iceburg]

55. Thanks Bill ... I know the topic very well...

It is at the core of my research. Some call it the crawl, others the Caterpillar effect. I actually was one of the first to post on the "uniqueness of ballot order" theorem pertaining to ballots sets at vote addresses. This then led me to a taxonomy of ballot set classification for vote addresses

Any collection of ballot orders at a given vote address (1 or more precincts voting there) can be described as either :
a)Homogeneous b) Non-Cascading or b) Cascading

In essence the Homogeneous class is just a special case of Non-Cascading whose UBO (unique ballot order class) =1 . That is, there is one and only one ballot order at that location even though there may be many precincts assigned to that location.

The Non-Cascading class describes the set of ballot orders at a location, whose UBO=2, and ballot orders are such that Kerry's position on the ballot pair never coincides with Bush's position on the ballot pair. Thus if votes from one ballot order are shifted to
the other ballot order they present themselves as either very high third party votes or high number of spoiled votes. There are approximately 35 such cases in the Cuyahoga dataset ... these are the easy catches. Beyond providing concrete evidence that configuration or tabulation or ballot mixed-ups (call it what you wish) did occur and were never corrected by the BOE they serve as useful benchmarks when performing any advanced statistical modeling on the not-so-apparent cases.

With respect to the Cascading Class, these addresses can be further classified by levels or degrees of cascadeness.

Examples: (Here x=disqualified, y=Peroutka, z=Badnarik, B=Bush, K=Kerry ... I use these designations because many people get the bBd mixed up)

Example 1 - Cascading Degree/Level 2
*
B K x y z
z B K x y

Example 2 - Cascading Degree/Level 3
B K x y z
z B K x y
y z B K x

Example 3 - Cascading Degree/Level 4
B K x y z
z B K x y
y z B K x
x y z B K


Example 4 - Non-Cascading
B K x y z
x y z B K


Non-Cascading sets may have either 1 or 2 unique ballot orders
1 Unique Ballot Order: essentially a homogeneous ballot order at all precinct voting at a specific vote address.

Example 4 - Non-Cascading UBO=2
B K x y z
x y z B K

Using a complex set of algorithms and factors (described briefly in an earlier post) I have been able to identify at least 100 precincts that give all appearances of having large quantities (multiples of what an average machine would cast in one day) of votes switched to the Bush column.

[Bill Bored]

58. I thought you might!

I posted the link in the event you wanted to collaborate with some of the other posters on that thread, in case you hadn't seen it.

I like your nomenclature. It's very clear. Useful in court proceedings and such!

To my mind, the simple fact that there were so many of the cascading types is a red flag. Why invite fraud? So how many net votes do you estimate were switched to Bush?

Of course, a hand recount would catch all this, and that never actually occurred.

So are you working with CASE OH?

Good luck!

[Iceburg]

61. BB -- you raise very good questions

such as why so many cascading types, why invite fraud? I think you know the answer to most of those questions.

I have collaborated a bit with a few of the posters (jmknapp) and occasionally chip in on a few discussions but I found it was taking too much time away from my research focus -- documenting and estimating the number of votes stolen in "hard-to-catch" classes.

No, I am not working with CASE Ohio (although I do intend to send them my next paper/set of findings). I am a Canadian election/technology consultant working out her frustrations with the past two US elections.

Re: estimating the number of votes stolen... ask me next week.

[Iceburg]

77. Are you certain that they are pre-punched and not ink-stamped?

Can you provide other sources that support your assertion?

[roseBudd]

79. It has been a couple months since I researched punch cards...

I think the punched precincts are needed so that the tabulator knows what precinct it is reading. The punch card readers probably don't see writing. This is why write ins are counted manually.

A great place to contact for punch card questions is http://cardamation.com as they repair/rent and sell what is essentially legacy equipment. And Dr. Doug Jones of the University of Iowa.

The how of tabulation fraud with punch cards could involve a trigger, such as a certain time, a sequence of highly unlikely votes, which would then trigger the software to count fraudulently. This could certainly not be noticed in pre-election testing.

[roseBudd]

80. a picture of a punch card

I do know that Dayton Legal Blank had the contract for the whole state of Ohio for ballots. They would probably be your definitive answer on the precinct numbers.

The punch card I used was yellow, folded over and the write in candidate went on the back of the fold over. I believe the write in portion is torn off and then the punch card is tabulated by a tabulator at a central location.



If you visit http://cardamation.com you will se there are card readers, card sorters and card punchs. If tabulation fraud has occured I do believe they can replicate the cards they would need to match the output by programming a card punch to create punched cards. These cards would have no fingerprints and likely would differ from stylus punched cards.

[Iceburg]

82. rosebud, I cut my teeth on the BCD-H key-punch character set

I know how punch cards work.

My problem is with your assertions as a statement of fact. You have stated that in Ohio the precints are pre-punched on the ballots without knowing with certainty that they are. Many others on this board who voted in Ohio have stated that the precinct number/label was stamped on the back. Perhaps both techniques were in place depending on the type of machinery deployed. (Note: there was more than one type of punch card machine used in Ohio)

Again rosebud, can you point me to a repubable link that supports your assertion that the Ohio puch cards had the precint number pre-punched on the ballot?

[roseBudd]

87. I approached the punch card question from a tabulation fraud perspective..

I found very little information on punch cards. I corresponded with Dr. Doug Jones and a pre-election certification volunteer from Indiana with specific questions, but they related to covering up tabulation fraud. I was trying to figure out how a county such as Warren might be able to cover their tracks in the event of a hand recount. I determined that Kerry voted ballots could be culled and replaced with machine punched Bush ballots. In fact some recount volunteers for other Ohio counties stated they saw ballots that had been sorted and held together with rubber bands.

I approached the idea of a stolen election in OH from the tabulation angle because I knew that Arnebeck and CASE-Ohio believed that Kerry votes had been flipped to Bush in reliably GOP counties, especially in SW Ohio, where the assumption is that these majority white counties are almost all Bush voters and would be less likely to arouse suspicion. I do consider the C. Ellen Connaly vote anomaly to be very suspicous. But that is because I live here, and was immediately in contact with a Warren County Kerry campaign volunteer, who expressed her suspicions directly to me based on her election day experience in Warren. I also found the Warren County lockdown highly suspicous. The Kerry campign lawyer was eventually allowed in on election night, but he did have to split his time between 2 rooms. I did also inspect poll books in Warren County and I definitely could tell the BoE employees did not like it one bit.

I can visit the Hamilton County BoE on my lunch break tomorrow and inquire as to whether the tabulator knows what precinct it is tabulating, or whether an operator has to tell the tabulator which program to use to interpret the ballots based on precinct. I found the woman I spoke to at the Hamilton county BoE shortly after the election to be very helpful and forthcoming.

[Iceburg]

92. Rosebud, I do discount neither the possibility nor the probability

that central tabulators may have been involved in the final manipulation of votes. However, there is overwhelming evidence in both punch card counties and DRE counties that machine level manipulation/”configuration problems” (call it what you wish) in the precinct was taking place. If you go through the EIRS case reports you will find numerous first-hand reports of callers witnessing/observing problems with the machine configuration. In the case of punched card counties, many observers noted :

a) Poll workers stacking cards (i.e. Poll workers not placing the ballots in the ballot box but rather setting them aside)

b) Machine configuration problems (machines not set-up as per the ballot page/template)

C) ballot-boxes with broken seals or unlocked

In the case of DRE counties, there are many documented reports of the machines flipping the vote to Bush after they had selected Kerry. In most cases, it would take three attempts before the machine appeared to have recorded the vote correctly.

From these reports we can assume that as a minimum, precinct-level machine manipulation took place. That doesn’t mean it didn’t also take place at the central tabulator level but it does indicate that some (we don’t know exactly how much) manipulation took place at the remote/machine level.

Speaking as a former programmer and election technology specialist (albeit non-American elections) I can safely say that it would be much more difficult and risky to manipulate the vote at the central tabulator level for several reasons:

a)The tabulator is the first place investigators would look.

b) While it is relatively easy to penetrate the network and central tabulators programmatically, it would be much more difficult (although not impossible) to write a program to manipulate the votes in such a way that:

1) The ballot orders for all races would be respected and thereby leaving little or no trace

2) The threshold of other boundaries was not violated (turnout, registered voters, number of poll book signatures etc) in such away that left no trace

3) The intrusion and the code changes could not be detected with readily available system utilities

4) The card deck could be run thru multiple time with little variance in the outcome

In contrast, not every machine in every precinct would be a candidate for manipulation. Thus an investigator would have to examine many machines before he/she found one that had been manipulated. Further, once a machine had been found to be mis-configured, it could easily be blamed on incompetence of the staff responsible for the initial configuration. With respect to ballot order for other races, since there are typically only 2 candidates in the other races, the switching of a deck of cards or a mis-configuration of the machines means that the perpetrator would have a 50% chance of getting the ballot orders correct thereby reducing the traceability of the change by 50%. Since the switch happens at the precinct/voting address level, the other thresholds/limits that must be respected in order to minimize detection (like number of registered voters, turnout, number of signatures in the poll book etc) are more or less self-managed since the switch is intra-vote location.

To summarize: While I do argue strongly that vote-manipulation did take place at the vote address level, I have not discounted that some manipulation may have taken place on the central tabulators.

With respect to your offer to “visit the Hamilton County BoE on my lunch break tomorrow and inquire as to whether the tabulator knows what precinct it is tabulating, or whether an operator has to tell the tabulator which program to use to interpret the ballots based on precinct. visit the Hamilton County BoE on my lunch break tomorrow and inquire as to whether the tabulator knows what precinct it is tabulating, or whether an operator has to tell the tabulator which program to use to interpret the ballots based on precinct.”
I would greatly appreciate it if you could find out the answer to the question. In addition, see if you can find out who is responsible (county employee or vendor) for setting up/configuring and testing the punch card machines before they arrive at the precinct on Election Day. It would also be useful to know whether the same persons are responsible for the ad-hoc requests for machines on Election Day. It is important to note that many of the precincts having been tagged as having had their votes switched also had an extra machine added (by request) on election day. Thus it would be important to know who on Election Day was responsible for responding to those requests on Election Day. By “responding” I do mean – set-up/configure and test. Since there are dozens of permutations and combinations of ballot orders when you consider all races/contests they could not possibly have set them up in advance of election day ...they had to have been configured upon request.

Thanks.

[roseBudd]

99. Will inquire at Hamilton County BoE, just read that Ohio African

American Bush support was 16%. That statistic is very suspicous to me. Has anyone identified precincts that might have contributed to such a high number?

Edited to ask:

What do you think is the significance is of the underfunded unknown down ticket Supreme Court dem candidate getting 275,000 more votes than Kerry? The counties with the biggest anomaly in this marker are Butler, Warren, Clermont and Hamilton, all in SW OH.

What might Warren County have been doing behind closed doors, unobserved by independent observers, on the night of Nov. 2? A small sparsely populated county whose tabulation results were last to report, even after Cuyahoga the biggest county in OH.

[Land Shark]

12. 50 million with motive

Months prior to the election,

Everyone knew Who needed help (their favorite prez candidate)
What he candidate needed (votes)
When he needed votes (November 2)
Where he needed votes (battleground states)
and Why he needed votes (electoral college).

Answer: a stolen happens in lots of relatively little bites. No single bite is "enough the change the result". No coordination or "conspiracy" is needed (though it is certainly possible). In particular, no order from the top is needed nor desirable from the standpoint of one who wishes to benefit from election cheating.

1. Independent actors cheat, because control of the world is at stake, and 50 million people have motive (times 2, in the US alone)
2. Results are quickly certified, while "winners" "naturally" stall, guilty or not...
3. More likely than not the candidate himself is kept out of the loop entirely (assuming there is an overall plan at all) because that way impeachment can be argued to be "unfair" to the candidate who did not instruct or condone any cheating by anyone....

[Wilms]

16. I'd like to nominate your post. But DU ain't set up for that. n/t

[roseBudd]

29. This is a hypothetical, the reason I need a best guess scenario...

is because I am trying to write believable dialog for the Shallow Throat character in the parody for the domain name bushcheated04.com, Behind The Election. Knowing the tone that Shallow Throat uses in his dishing the dirt narration may help. Once I have this one paragraph finished this site is ready to go live and hopefully spread among people who will never read the Conyers report or any of the statistical analysis. This will be the "Daily Show" version of election fraud. Please take a momemt to view http://edwardsdavid.com/uploader/indexx.html to get a feel for Shallow Throat and Karl Rove's manner of speaking.

The beauty of parody is I can say anything, I just want to phrase it right.

[On Par]

17. Kerry Went From 15% to a 2% Margin in 4 hours in PA.

From the main campaign HQ, we received two insider emails at our HQ, as we had our people conducting exit polling behind the independent exit pollers. At 4pm, Kerry had a 9pt lead. At 6pm, Kerry's lead increased to 15pts over Bush.

At 8pm, when the polls closed, we watched for immediate confirmation from the networks. Nothing. Some voting had been extended due to a shortage of provisional ballots. So, no call by anyone. Nothing again at 9pm, and our stomach's began to flip like pancakes. We knew something was wrong. But we couldn't find it. Finally, at 10pm, the networks gave Pennsylvania to Kerry, but by the smallest of margins, 2%. There was no conceivable way that two sets of exit polling could have been that wrong from between 6-8pm when the poll's closed.

Our interior polling also showed a 4pt to 5pt lead in both Ohio and Florida at 6pm.

I know we won the election.

OP

[Bill Bored]

32. So why did he concede so soon?

I'm not totally against that decision, but if you had what seems to be good evidence of anomalies, why not bring it to the attention of the public and let events take their course?

Was there any correlation in PA to machine type? They are still 50% lever machines, aren't they? Do you know how those lever votes are tabulated?

[On Par]

33. I Don't Think Kerry Should Have Conceded As Early As He Did

If for no other reason than to give time for the media to come in and do some checking. There was money set aside just for such a contested situation. I continue to hear the same argument of not wanting to appear to be a sore loser. It continues to ring hollow.

At this time, our local Dems are formulating the questions you, and we, are asking, to the election commissioner for our county.

OP

[berniew1]

19. Touchscreen fraud documented in 15 states and ...

widespread systematic dirty tricks and malfeasance to reduce minority votes; widespread manipulation of registrations, absentees, and provisionals in over 25 states
http://www.flcv.com/ussumall.html

[berniew1]

20. Note that the documentation on Ohio has been updated/added to

see Ohio EIRS cases(with additional documentation from Votersunite.com

http://www.flcv.com/ussumall.html

[indianaleft]

23. central tabulator fraud would only require 4-5 people

If the nationally distributed software to run the GEMS software were pre-hacked before the election, only the hacker and his bosses would have to know. That could include the head of GEMS and Rove, and that might be all who would need to know. The program could be set to kick in at a certain time, or to flip votes from Kerry to Bush in some kind of patterned but very hard to see method. This would mean that while Blackwell et al were doing the oldfashioned vote theft on the ground, the real action would be happening within the tabulators, so that if the election were close enough, Bush would win anyway. My guess is that this might have been done nationally, giving Bush a comfortable margin in the popular vote, but that it became panic time late in the evening on Nov. 2 because Kerry was still winning enough states to pull of the Electoral College margin.

Thus, in swooped Rove and his computer room.

Ever since Florida 2000 when the networks cheerfully reported that Bush was "working the phones" at 2 a.m., and I wondered, with the polls closed, who exactly is there to call? -- it's been a long, hard consciousness-lowering into the world where we now live. Why would Rove even have a computer room?

So I do not believe there has to be a thousand-person conspiracy, because that could too easily become unraveled. The GEMS tabulator counted 80% of the votes, regardless of what kind of machine cast them.

If the programmer of the tabulator doesn't confess, we'll probably never know, unless some computer wizard on our side figures out how to trace it.

[demodonkey]

27. GEMS is a Diebold Program. Did Diebold really do counts for other vendors?

What we need is a good going-over of who counted what and where, especially if there is information which goes beyond the published data (by published data I mean the maps which show which vendors handle which counties in Ohio and PA, etc); who is linked to what and how (for example the AP, Blackwell's intra-net or whatever it is connecting SOS to the counties in OH, etc.

[chorti]

37. and don't forget CBOSS

And don't forget that CBOSS helped to count/live-post the votes of 8 Ohio counties as well as a couple Pennsylvania counties and Rhode Island (which was way off the exit poll).
<http://www.electionohio.com/>
<http://www.indybay.org/news/2004/11/1705577.php>

[passy]

62. Using this would help gain remote access!

http://www.digi.com/products/wireless/digiconnectwangsm.jsp

I already posted the link in a previous reply but I thought you might miss it.
I hope you find it interesting.

[roseBudd]

81. Does each state have a central tabulator?

I would think each county tabulates results that are then transmitted to a state location.

[lauralei]

45. Most of us used punchcards

in Ohio. There were some optical scanners. I think that in addition to the extraordinarily long lines and wait times, that the votes were switched after the left the precincts. There is just no way that * won!

[Iceburg]

53. There is compelling evidence both statistically

and through first hand reports that systematic diversion of
the votes took place :

Some of the First hand reports from Vote Protect's EIRS
database (Cuyahoga):


a)the machines were configured incorrectly
--------------------------------------------------
   Case Number:  50558
   Vote address: 1117 EAST 105TH STREET
   Description: "Mixed up machines configured for 
                different precincts despite workers'
                complaints; site director 
		disregarded warnings."



b) poll workers were advertising machines as either
   "Republican or Democrat" machines 
---------------------------------------------------

   Case Number: 51294
   Vote address:14780 SUPERIOR ROAD
   Description: Voters being told there are 
                "Republican" machines 
		and "Democratic" machines and that 
                Democrats can't vote on Republican
                machines even though there is no 
		one using them.



c)ballots were stacked and put aside and not put 
  in the ballot box as mandated by law:
-------------------------------------------------

   Case Number:  40497
   Vote address: 1675 ANSEL ROAD
   Description: "When she handed he completed ballot 
                to the poll worker, he took it out of 
                the envelope and shook it.  
                He said he was doing this to make sure 
		all the chads were off.  He was also 
                stacking ballots on the table saying he 
                was going to shake them off later.  
                A supervisor was there doing nothing.
                She called and spoke to Shannon 
		at the BOE Command Center who told 
                her they would take care of it.

   Case Number:  42140
   Vote address: 14780 SUPERIOR ROAD
   Description: "poll monitors reports that a voter said
                 the poll workers are stacking the ballots 
                 instead of placing them in voting box"

   Case Number:  40637
                 Poll worker took ballot out of sleeve 
                 to "check chads" then put it aside 
                 with several others.  When voter 
                 protested,worker threatened to call
                 police. She demanded to have her ballot
                 placed in ballot box.

   Case Number:  46715
                 Poll working shaking off ballots then 
                 setting them aside not in ballot box 
                 but on the table.  Told that we was 
                 gong to get :chads off" and then put 
                 them in ballot box.  Voter called BOE 
                 they were gong to check out the problem


d) Other Ballot-Box incidents:
---------------------------------
   Case Number:  45194
   Vote address: 14780 SUPERIOR ROAD
   Description:  1M--line almost 1 hour.  Confusion on 
                 which line is for which precinct. 
                 Ballot boxes are not labeled by precinct,
                 Confusion on which box the voter 
                 should put the ballot into. 
    
    Broken seals or unlocked Ballot Boxes:
    Case Number:  42454 Address: 1264 EAST 123RD STREET
    Case Number:  32125 Address: 1865 GARFIELD ROAD
    Case Number:  34317 Address: 11815 LARCHMERE BLVD
    Case Number:  34868 Address: 6901 SUPERIOR AVENUE
    Case Number:  35202 Address: 1865 GARFIELD ROAD
    Case Number:  45032 Address: 27000 ELINORE AVENUE
    Case Number:  51658 Address: 1000 LAKEVIEW ROAD
    Case Number:  51785 Address: 1264 EAST 123RD STREET
    Case Number:  51850 Address: 1264 EAST 123RD STREET
    Case Number:  45194 Address: 17100 HARVARD AVENUE
    Case Number:  53237 Address: ?


These first hand reports merely support the gathering
statistical evidence that that the voters' intent was
corrupted via malfeasance or gross incompetence. Because of
the non-random nature of the statistical findings, gross
incompetence alone cannot account for the significant variance
found in over 100 precincts.

[roseBudd]

54. The assumption is that punch cards deter tabulation fraud...

because they are a paper trail. But the risk of a hand recount is so low that tabulation fraud is worth the risk. as we saw in Ohio whether fraud or just human nature avoiding extra work, all parties wanted to avoid a hand recount.

In addition chain of evidence is such that new ballots could be machine punched by a punch card punching machine and put into the Nov. 2 ballots after culling a certain percentage of the Kerry voted punch cards. A punch card punching machine can be rented or bought at http://cardamation.com I don't think anyone thinks ballots are stored in a bank vault.

[Iceburg]

57. Rosebud can you please point me to any on-line documents

that support your mother's claim(as stated in an earlier post) that the poll workers (and NOT a technicain) set-up/configure the machines in the precinct?

I find it quite hard to believe that elderly poll workers with seemingly little or no training could set-up a the punch-card machines for all contests (up to 42 contest/races/issues in many cases) and test all scenarios to ensure the machine was configured correctly.

[roseBudd]

64. I do not believe that they tested the punch cards, but she told me

she remembered putting the legs on, unfolding the machines. Punch cards are quite low tech apparatus. She was not untrained, they did attend training prior to the election. Testing a punch card in it's simplest form entails, running 1 card for every ballot position to see if they punched true. What it would not do is run combinations that might trigger an if then scenario in the tabulation. I would think testing of the machines would have to occur days in advance at the BoE.

What precinct workers would have to know is which machines belong to which precinct in a multi precinct polling location. The book that attachs to the punch card apparatus had number positions. If you checked your punch card after voting you should see the correct hole punched.

[Iceburg]

73. In other words, the machines were configured and tested

and assigned to precincts by BOE techs not by the poll workers -- which is my original premise.

[roseBudd]

78. I don't know, but if you want to contact the Hamilton County BoE...

I found the woman I spoke to, to be very easy to talk to and forthcoming. She told me that Hamilton County had been using provisional ballots way before HAVA and that they counted as long as they were in the right county. Blackwell went to court multiple times so as to be able to disqualify as many provisionals as possible. In Hamilton County there were 500 wrong precinct/right polling place disqualifications. That literally means wrong side of the room.

Dr. Doug Jones of the University of Iowa would be a good person to contact regarding punch card tabulation testing.

[Junkdrawer]

56. ..and those punchcards were counted by computers running Triad software...

We need paper ballots hand counted.

We need private companies out of the process.

[roseBudd]

66. Not just Triad, if you look at Moss vs. Bush the biggest vote flips

were Butler (ES&S) Warren (Triad) Clermont (ES&S) Hamilton (ES&S)

Does this mean ES&S & Traid were complicit or does it mean central tabulator?

[roseBudd]

67. Has anyone thought to try contacting hackers for insight?...

I don't think I've ever heard anyone on DU claim to be a hacker...

[sacxtra]

83. HERE'S HOW! GOD DAMN IT!

http://sacxtremetv.com/sacxtra/Hacked.pdf
http://sacxtremetv.com/sacxtra/hax0rd.html

[Iceburg]

85. The penetration of the central tabulators is the easy part...

what is much more difficult is determining how many votes to shift from one column to another while respecting the relative ballot order of each of the 40+ contests, the variance range within a vote location, turnout thresholds, etc. While there "may" have been penetration of the central tabulators, I do not preclude that malfeasance occurred at the precinct level in the punch-card counties via a) mis configuring the machines b) stacking of ballots to be read on other machines.

Why???
The EIRS reports 1) several misconfigured machines in precincts that have escaped the radar in terms of high 3rd party or spoiled votes 2) serer val observations of "stacking the ballots" on the side and not putting them in the ballot box and 3) many observations of non-secured/unlocked ballot boxes.

Further, if it was central tabulator penetration they had little or no understanding of the non-cascading ballot order effect ...hence we see some 50+ precincts (of the non-cascading ballot order class) with extremely high 3rd party and/or spoiled votes ... those my friend are the cigarette butts left at the crime scene. If there are 51 precincts of 398 in that class (IE. 25% of the 1436 precinct in Cuyahoga), how many do you think we will find in the voting locations whose ballot order set classification is "cascading" (in a uni-directional cascade there will be very little left behind in the 3rd party/spoiled columns but there will be other clues left by the vote distributions in the other contest/races)
So if there are approximately 1000 precincts in the cascading class, we might expect to find approximately 200 more precincts whose vote distribution is in error -- if that is, the first set of catches in the other class is an indicator.

[sacxtra]

90. Iceburg YES! YOUR DEAD ON. BUT WE ARE BEING IGNORED

I love it.

You've taken it farther than I have.

I'm no guru,

But GIVE ME LEGAL access to ANY Points, or Parts of a DIGITIZED DATA system (such as the one I drew below) and I WILL FUCK THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION.

[pat_k]

93. Look at the residual rates

At the Voting in 2004 forum sponsored by Common Cause and other organizations (on or about December 7, 2004), one of the speakers on the voting machine panel said something I found very notable. I believe he was the one who presented the MIT project findings – the problems and successes with the machines. One major success he noted was that the residual rate was lowered beyond all expectations. At the time it struck me as very odd. Anything out of line with MIT predictions sounded like something that should be looked at VERY closely.

I am nearly positive that there are at least a couple well-documented cases where a machine used in the Election was "mis-calibrated" to default to Bush. A default choice would certainly reduce the residual rate. Even if there are only one or two confirmed cases, you can be sure there were others. Since few machines have been examined, we currently don't know how many were "mis-calibrated" in this way.

So, one place to look it at is the residual rate. Examine those precincts where machines were used and where the residual is surprising low. Averages across state are not sufficient. I believe it must be a precinct-by-precinct analysis.

I poked around a bit, hoping to find transcripts of the Voting in 2004 event. Perhaps they are out there, but if they are, I haven't come across them. It shouldn't be too difficult to get the name of the speakers from that panel though.

The Caltech/MIT folks do have a couple analysis of residual rates out: RESIDUAL VOTE IN THE 2004 ELECTION working paper and a 2001 report, Residual Votes Attributable to Technology.

The central finding of the 2001 report was that "paper ballots that are either hand counted or optically scanned have the lowest average incidence of residual votes in presidential elections." The DREs had a surprisingly high residual rate. And since the machines don’t allow overvotes, the machines in fact exhibited a significant increase in undervotes relative to other system.

Oddly, the most "stunning" (their word, see the conclusion) improvements reported in the 2004 paper were in states that upgraded wholesale to DREs (FL, GA, and ??). The paper does not seem to explain why the machines would perform so much better in 2004 than 2000.

A couple excerpts from, and comments on, the "Residual Vote in the 2004 Election" working paper: \

Definition of Residual:

The residual vote rate in a county is the percentage of all ballots cast that did not record a vote for president. In a mechanical sense, a vote can fail to be counted either because there was no vote for president on an individual’s ballot (an “undervote”) or multiple marks (an “overvote”).

According to their analysis, 1/2 to 2/3 of the reduction in residual rates is attributed to "non-machine factors."

Changing voting machines and changing election administration practices often went hand-in-hand. One-half to two-thirds of the reduction in residual vote rate over the past four years appears can be attributed to non-machine factors, including increased electoral competition in "battleground states" and statewide reform efforts.

One half to two-threes attributable to "non-machine factors"? That sounds awfully high. This means that only 1/3 to 1/2 is attributable to "machine factors." Sounds to me like this needs to be looked at. Are the "non-machine" factors the authors cite to explain 1/2 to 2/3 of the reduction in the residual well supported? Or are they just rationalizations to explain reduction that might actually be due to "machine" factors that are not seen consistently across the DRE counties? Factors that could be explained by certain types of errors or fraud?

The residual vote rate declined more between 2000 and 2004 in counties that gave Albert Gore a large percentage of the vote in 2000.

These counties bear looking at. Sure it might be that up through 2000, there has been so much spoilage in Democratic counties that it is those counties that you would see the most improvement, but I still think precinct-by-precinct examination is needed.

The hypothesis to test: Were machines calibrated to default to Bush to drive up Bush totals (and consequently drive down residual rates) in Democratic counties? I have long assumed that Democratic strongholds like New York and California are places to look for corruption. Even in heavily Democratic counties, there are municipalities that Republicans control. The point would not be to "steal" the state or county for Bush, but rather to drive up his popular vote totals in places that few Democrats would be looking at.

Florida and Georgia saw the biggest decreases in the residual vote rate, by 2.5% and 3.1%, respectively.

Of the 38 states for which the authors had 2000 turnout data, six had residual rates of 2.5 or more (NM, FL, GA, ID, IL, SC, NC). Florida and Georgia are only two that reduced that rate to under 0.5% in 2004. (Only 4 states, FL, GA, MD, and NV had residual rates under 0.5% in 2004).

In fact, the residual vote rate fell more in the battleground states than in the others. Of the thirty-five states in our sample, seven were battleground states --- Florida, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oregon. The overall reduction in residual vote rate among these states was 1.2%, compared to 0.7% among the remainder.

This sounds to me like a rationalization. You could also conclude that more machines were calibrated to default to Bush in the battleground states than in the other states, resulting in a lower overall residual in those states.

[pat_k]

94. Pattern for missing turnout data in the 2004 working paper?

According to Table 1 of the Residual Vote in the 2004 Election working paper (referenced in previous post), 15 states are missing turnout data:
10 of the 15 are states that Bush won by more than 10 points.
1 of the 15 is a state that Kerry won by more than 10 points.

Seem a little skewed to you?

3 of the 6 states with the smallest margin of victory in the election went to Kerry. Two of those states are missing turnout data:
WI- the smallest margin of victory in the entire election
PA - which was the 6th smallest margin of victory

Here are the states I assume were not included in the analysis due to missing data.

Oklahoma
No turnout data 2000 or 2004
2000 Margin Bush 21.88%
2004 Margin Bush 31.14%
Bush 65.57%, Kerry 34.43%, Other 0.00%

Kansas
No turnout data 2000 or 2004
2000 Margin Bush 20.80%
2004 Margin Bush 25.38%
Bush 62.00%, Kerry 36.62%, Other 1.37%

Texas
No turnout data 2000 or 2004
2000 Margin Bush 21.32%
2004 Margin Bush 22.86%
Bush 61.09%, Kerry 38.22%, Other 0.69%

Mississippi
No turnout data 2000 or 2004
2000 Margin Bush 16.91
2004 Margin Bush 19.72
Bush 59.44%, Kerry 39.72%, Other 0.83%

South Carolina
No turnout data 2004
2000 Margin Bush 15.93
2004 Margin Bush 17.08
Bush 57.98%, Kerry 40.90%, 1.12%

Louisiana
No turnout data 2000 or 2004
2000 Margin Bush 7.68%
2004 Margin Bush 14.51%
Bush 56.72%, Kerry 42.22%, Other 1.06%

Arkansas
No turnout data 2000
2000 Margin Bush 5.44%
2004 Margin Bush 9.76%
Bush 54.31%, Kerry 44.55%, Other 1.15%

Missouri
No turnout data 2000 or 2004
2000 Margin Bush 3.34%
2004 Margin Bush 7.20%
Bush 53.30%, Kerry 46.10%, Other 0.60%

Colorado
No turnout data 2000
2000 Margin Bush 8.36%
2004 Margin Bush 4.76%
Bush 51.71%, Kerry 47.94%, Other 1.25%

Wisconsin
No turnout data 2000 or 2004
2000 Margin Gore 0.22%
2004 Margin Kerry 0.38%
* Smallest Margin of Victory
Bush 49.32%, Kerry 49.70%, Other 0.98%

Pennsylvania
No turnout data 2000 or 2004
2000 Margin Gore 4.17%
2004 Margin Kerry 2.50%
* Ranks 6th on the "smallest margin" list. The most populous of the 10 "smallest margin" states.
Bush 48.42%, Kerry 50.92%, Other 0.65%

Minnesota
No turnout data 2000 or 2004
2000 Margin Gore 2.40%
2004 Margin Kerry 3.48%
Bush 47.61%, Kerry 51.09%, Other 1.30%

Delaware
No turnout data 2004
2000 Margin Gore 13.06%
2004 Margin Kerry 7.59%
Bush 45.75%, Kerry 53.35%, Other 0.90%

Maine
No turnout data 2000 or 2004
2000 Margin Gore 5.11%
2004 Margin Kerry 9.00%
Bush 44.58%, Kerry 53.57%, Other 1.85%

Rhode Island
No turnout data 2004
2000 Margin Gore 29.08%
2004 Margin Kerry 20.75
Bush 38.76%, Kerry 59.42%, Other 1.91%

[Iceburg]

95. Very interesting pat, but the theory only applies to

non-punch card counties. In Ohio, 70% of the counties used punch cards. That said there is a statistically signficant difference in the number of spoiled votes in Cuyahoga county (punch card) when one compares the non-cascading ballot order group to the cascading ballot order group (the group in which most of the votes are believed to have been shifted).

Most reputable articles on the residual theories wrt punch cards machines that I have read attribute the bulk of the % residuals to human factors ranging from machine maintenance procedures, ballot design to literacy of the voter.

[pat_k]

96. ???

I'm not following how your comments relate. I'm not talking specifically about Ohio. And the reductions in residual are not simply due to a change from punchcards to another system. That is clear from the analysis in the working paper cited.

I found it notable that the residual rate in many states (and counties within states) appears to be MUCH lower than expected (researchers don't often use the word "stunning") and the phenomenon is not adequately accounted in the analysis as far as I can tell.

A "stunning" reduction in residual could be achieved if
1) Your state employed DREs for some portion of the vote, and
2) some percentage of those DREs were programed to "default to Bush" (i.e., no undervotes because undervotes are assigned to Bush).

It would not surprise me if there were attempts across the country to drive up Bush's popular vote total, and to do it in ways, and in states, that don't typically get much scruntiny (i.e., states that lean strongly for one party or the other).

I think it may be worthwhile to take a finer grained look at the residual rates by voting system type in every state. (I'd sure like to see a ranking of precincts by residual within machine type to see what kind of variance we're looking at). And to find out why we don't have turnout or residual calculations from so many states.

[Wilms]

97. Bingo n/t

[many a good man]

98. How Triad hacked

SUMMARY

This paper presents a simple formula that vote tabulation software can employ to steal an election undetected.

I will show that this algorithm is guaranteed to be immune from detection under all conceivable circumstances except one: a full hand recount in a precinct that was hacked. I will also show how the formula can be designed to significantly reduce this risk using publicly-available information. I will highlight some political and procedural ways that this risk factor can be further reduced.

This document is based on information regarding the tabulation software called ElecTab produced by Triad Government Systems, Incorporated. Triad software was used in many counties in Ohio that voted using punch card and optical scan ballots. This algorithm could be adapted to work with many others systems’ tabulation software.

REQUIREMENTS FOR CONCEALMENT

The software used to tabulate ballot counts from punch card readers or optical scan readers have two essential functions:

a) interpret the results from the card reader, e.g. to match up the hole punched on the card with a candidate’s name.
b) total the votes

A third function could be introduced to contain the logic that will alter the outcome based on a simple formula designed to reduce the risk of detection. This formula depends on the inclusion of the following pieces of information within the program code:

1) precinct number
2) expected turnout
3) Yes/No flag indicating whether the precinct is safe to hack

The precinct number is required information that must be present in order to interpret results from the card reader. Expected turnout is used to distinguish whether the current tabulation is a test run or an official vote count. Expected turnout could be predicted ahead of time based on information about past turnouts and current voter registration information.

Defining certain precincts as unsafe to hack will protect against the risk of a full hand recount exposing the discrepancy between the true ballot count and the results generated by the software. It can be shown that the lax enforcement of Ohio recount procedures in combination with an intelligent assessment of precincts likely to be chosen for a hand recount can eliminate the risks of detection.

This information can be inside the compiled code of the tabulation software which is unreadable to the human eye. Only a court can order the software vendor to de-compile the code so others can inspect the source code. Otherwise there will be no other physical evidence on the computer that fraud occurred.

The software must be able to protect itself against detection during an audit. Therefore it must be able to determine whether the current tabulation is a test or the real thing. The test hand counts must always match the machine count. Ohio recount provisions state that actual ballots can not be used to perform the test. Because of this provision, the software will never hack a test count because the precinct information used to interpret the results will never match a precinct on the previously defined “safe” precinct list.

To guard against the possibility that Board of Elections workers will use the ballots from a real precinct in the test, the software can reference the computer’s system date and/or an audit file containing the results of previous tabulations. By incorporating conditions based on previous counts and the system clock the program will succeed in detecting test counts even in the cases where a) the battery-powered system clock is inaccurate; and b) the file containing past tabulations is missing.

Please note that it would not be unexpected for the tabulating computer to have the results of previous tabulations written to a file on the computer’s hard disk. In fact, it may even be required in some places as an auditing mechanism.


THE ALGORITHM

Designing software is a simple logical process. The program receives input and processes it based on clearly defined conditions. The designer must identify which conditions to test and process the input based on the answers. The decision charts shown below can be used to meet all the requirements mentioned above.

The first test shown below can be used if it is found that the system clock is unreliable. The system clock on personal computers is powered by a small battery that lasts up to ten years. Since one of the two algorithms shown below relies on the current date, it is necessary to code for the contingency that the system clock is not set correctly.

The first algorithm therefore depends on the existence of a file containing the results from a previous tabulation. That information can then be combined with the expected turnout number and safe-to-hack precinct flag to determine the results.

Below are the decision charts designed for arriving at the decision to hack or not hack the count in the current run of ballots. The software program will test for the conditions shown in the first three columns. The decision whether to hack the precinct during this tabulation is shown in the fourth column.


PREVIOUS TABULATION
SAVED TO FILE

Is PREVIOUS count close to expected turnout? Is the CURRENT count close to expected turnout? Is this precinct hackable? Hack Decision
N N Y N
N N N N
N Y Y Y
N Y N N
Y N Y N
Y N N N
Y Y Y Y
Y Y N N


If the file containing the previous tabulation numbers is not present OR the hack decision is YES, the program would then proceed to check against the system date to make the final decision whether to alter the results in this tabulation.

CURRENT SYSTEM DATE

Current Date Is THIS count close to expected turnout? Is this precinct hackable? Hack Decision
< Nov 2 N/A N/A N
>= Nov 2 Y Y Y
>= Nov 2 Y N N
>= Nov 2 N Y N
>= Nov 2 N N N


These tests will determine conclusively whether the current tabulation is for a test or for an official count. It will alter the outcome of the individual precinct only if it is an official ballot count and the precinct was pre-identified as one that is “safe” to hack. Additional logic can be included in the program to scientifically determine how many votes to flip in a way that will also help it avoid detection.


CONCLUSION

The programming design illustrated in this document guarantees against detection except in the situation where a full hand recount occurs in one of the precincts that was expected to be “safe” to hack. This design produces tabulation software that a) leaves no physical evidence of fraud; b) can differentiate between test runs and official counts; c) always returns the same results; and d) never needs modifying after the candidate rotation is entered. It can also run on any MS-DOS or Windows operating system released in the past 15 years.

Thus the key to avoiding exposure is to ensure that none of the hacked precincts are chosen for a full hand recount. Lax enforcement of recount guidelines greatly reduces this risk. Risk is reduced even further because many precincts will be not be hacked.

To swing the election in favor of a candidate by 2% percent only requires changing the votes on 1% of the ballots. Due to the small number of voters per precinct, the change would be quite small even in a hacked precinct. The discrepancy can even be small enough to be explained away by under votes or by chads falling off after the first tabulation.

According to published reports, random selection of the precincts for the full hand recount occurred in only one county. Many other irregularities surrounding the recount process have also been reported. Many of the hand counts that were conducted produced results that were slightly different from the machine count.

The design presented here offers a fool-proof method for avoiding detection when the risk of hand counting a known hacked precinct is managed.

[Ellipsis]

100. This post deserves it's own thread. More eyeballs should see this.

... Just an opinion,

you have something here.

[many a good man]

103. This is the hard stuff

I examined specifically Triad GSI's optical scan and punch card tabulators, which counted about half of Ohio's 88 counties. The challenge was to design a system that could run on any common PC manufactured in the last 15 years. That's MS-DOS and all versions of Windows ever commercially released. The software is still written in ancient COBOL.

Touch screen systems use hardware and software that is several generations ahead of the dinosaurs like Triad's Electab. This makes the number of ways someone can hack into the system undetected almost uncountable given with the, ummm, ineffective auditing and security rules that still have not been strengthened.

IOW the old-fashioned paper-based systems are easy enough to defeat but paperless systems are infinitely easier to hack.

[Ellipsis]

104. Thanks for the update. I applaud your efforts. and...

I have a question? I keep hearing the question on Calibrating the Dre's. Do you or anyone know Whats involved in this process?

Here's a couple decent visuals

http://www.cybertouch.com/techno.html
http://www.chassis-plans.com/white_paper_resistive_touchscreen_technology.html

Also, there are 4, 5, and 7 wire etc. All have different operating temperatures/environmental concerns.

Are we talking about capacitive screens or resistive screens or a mixed bag?

[farmbo]

105. Excellent! Must read! But why did Triad send out Techs before the Recount?

Systematically, it appears, Triad sent out "technicians" to "inspect" or "check the batteries" of each county tabulator in the 42 Ohio counties they "served". :grr: In some documented instances, they helpfully "suggested" which precincts should be machine recounted to avoid a hand count.

Why was this done and is it consistent with your thesis?

[berniew1]

102. Several states appear were swung by fraud & manipulation: documentation

As suggested by the Exit Polls, there is a lot of evidence showing how the swing was accomplished in several states


Touch screen machine fraud(switching)documented in many counties of 16 states; other widespread ballot fraud and manipulation documented in many counties of many states; widespread (illegal) systematic dirty tricks, intimidation, and official malfeasance to reduce minority and student vote documented in over 20 states; widespread manipulation of registrations, absentees, provisionals in over 25 states:

http://www.flcv.com/ussumall.html

It all was reported on election day by 50,000 reports to the EIRS election hotline, and documented with specifics down to the precinct and even machine level in many cases. Plus results of other investigations.