graphics explain difference between VVPB and VVPAT

[garybeck]

Howdy folks, I've been spending the last several days talking with a lot of people, some of them experts, about the pending legislation and the key issue of VVPBs vs VVPATs.

After going through it many times in emails and phone calls, and lying in bed for hours not being able to fall asleep over it, I came to the conclusion that this is best conveyed with some visuals.

So I spent the last few hours on these two graphics which show the difference between a Voter Verified Paper Ballot (VVPB) and a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT).

I'm working on an artcle that accompanies the graphics and explains some more details and how the difference relates to the pending legislation. But I wanted to put out these graphics right away.

This one is the VVPAT system



This one is the VVPB system




I hope these graphics make the point...


peace out
gary

[blogbear]

1. I Like The Idea and Believe You Are On The Right Track But..

Brace For An Attack..I Can See Somebushie Claiming That Votes Will Be Counted Twice..Things Never Seem To Add Up With Them And They Get All Hot And Bothered Ya Know!

[garybeck]

5. they can say what they want, I'm just talking facts about the bills

bring 'em on. the graphics display the truth about the bills.

[AtLiberty]

2. Are these graphics on SolarBus?

If so, where?

[garybeck]

6. not yet

i don't want to release them to the "rest of the world" without an article accompanying the graphics to explain it a little more. coming soon.

[berniew1]

3. In VVPAT what does voter and system actually get?

What type of paper trail is there if an audit or recount is needed?

[garybeck]

7. it's a piece of paper that the voter looked at and verified.

check the first graphic. that piece of paper, although not used in the first count, is called the VVPAT. The voters has looked at their VVPAT and they are sure it matches their intent. It is not counted in the first count. It sits in a box in case there is a recount.

The distinguishing characteristic of the VVPAT is that it is on paper and that the voter can verify it is correct.

[msongs]

4. Please read our California proposal for a paper ballot ---->

paper ballot is the ballot of record, hand counted in public at the precinct level and posted in public before results can be forwarded to a central tabulating center:

www.msongs.com/vvpb.htm

thanks and gracias and merci

Msongs

read our paper ballot proposal for CA
www.msongs.com/vvpb.htm


PS - have not gotten any response on our proposal from any elected dem to whom we have sent it, nor from the greens, libertarians, etc. we will keep trying tho.

[garybeck]

8. GOOD LUCK! we have real VVPB law in Vermont

however optiscans and central tabulators are still permitted here. But at least the paper is used in the first count. I think that's key.

[garybeck]

9. That is great! Is it going to be a "prop" referendum on the ballot?

I wish we had referendums in every state. VT doesn't.

Read your thing and it looks great. I wish someone would propose something similar on the national scale. Why do they think that a VVPAT will solve the problem? Until they mandate recounts for all states, a VVPAT is all bark and no bite.

[msongs]

10. not getting any response from elected dems in CA.....................

sent emails on this proposal to quite a few disparate parties and individuals but not much of a response. sorry to say.

Msongs
www.msongs.com/liberaltshirts.htm

[garybeck]

15. do you need dems support to create a Ballot Initiative?

Citizen based Ballot Initiatives always interest me. We don't have them here in VT. Don't you just have to get a certain amount of signatures to get it on the ballot? Seems like that would be doable with a grassroots effort and in CA it could be done. Might be the only way to keep DREs out of CA.

I'm wondering if you're working with any other organizations? Voters Unite lists the California Voter Foundation. I'll bet there are others.

don't give up

gary

[msongs]

22. how initiatives work in CA ---->

anybody can write one, keeping it to one specific subject, cannot be something that rambles all over the place. then it is submitted to the state officials (not sure who, SoS?) who reviews if it meets the legal requirements (not judged for content, just if it meets the requirements), and if it does, you can start gathering the correct amound of signatures in the correct time frame. then the sigs are certified and if the total is high enough, it goes on a ballot.

here in CA there have been few initiatives where sigs were gathered just by people who believe in the idea. most sigs are gathered by one of two companies who take money from you to go out and get sigs in public places. the whole gathering issue is a sea of political prostitution
as gatherers are paid by the signature, as much as $5 per sig for some of arnold's issues.

some gatherers have a dozen different issues they are getting signed, and they do not believe in any of them, just the $$. of course they promote the ones that pay them the most per sig. so mostly these people do not care if the sig is valid cuz they are paid anyway, and they do NOT want to discuss the various issues. it is sickkkkkkkkkkkk.

Msongs
www.msongs.com/political-shirts.htm

[Bill Bored]

11. You have made this very clear Gary

but the term VVPB has been bandied about so much that I don't think it has this meaning in common usage, do you? For example, Andy Stephenson who is no stranger to this issue has said that all legislation should use the VVPB terminology but he has also not raised objections to Op Scan counting of these ballots, which is still a machine count.

To me the idea of a VVPB with an e-voting machine such as a DRE is ludicrous because the machine does nothing except print the ballot. Why spend $5000 each for a 100 MHz PC and printer? Save the taxpayers' money!

If the system has already been bought and paid for, that's one thing, and there are groups lobbying to "turn off" the DRE feature and just print VVPBs, but if you're going to start from scratch, why buy DREs in the first place?

Thanks for clarifying this. I hope your interpretation catches on.

[garybeck]

13. Bill,

Please see my comments below (yours in bold):

but the term VVPB has been bandied about so much that I don't think it has this meaning in common usage, do you?

It doesn't matter what meaning it has in common usage. The important thing is understanding what the bills require and what they don't require. All the bills only require a VVPAT, not a VVPB.

Andy Stephenson who is no stranger to this issue has said that all legislation should use the VVPB terminology but he has also not raised objections to Op Scan counting of these ballots, which is still a machine count.

I can't speak for Andy, but I'm willing to bet that one of the main reasons he likes to use the phrase VVPB is because the VVPB system does not allow DREs. I agree with that completely. VVPB systems are better and that's why we should all support them. The only problem is that none of the federal bills require VVPB.


To me the idea of a VVPB with an e-voting machine such as a DRE is ludicrous because the machine does nothing except print the ballot. Why spend $5000 each for a 100 MHz PC and printer? Save the taxpayers' money!



There is no such thing as a VVPB with a DRE. By definition a DRE machine must cast the vote. Thus the "Direct Recording" part of the DRE. The vote cast in the first count of the election is cast by the machine directly. A DRE machine can not exist if there is a VVPB. It can exist if there is a VVPAT. That is the difference I tried to explain in the diagrams.

If a machine is printing a ballot and not casting a vote, as you suggest, it agreeably can be done with a PC and a printer. But it is not a DRE machine. There are a couple different names for this. Some people call them a "computerized ballot printer". It is also called a "ballot marking device". This is not a DRE because it is not casting the vote. You are 100% correct that this could be done with a generic $350 computer. This is one reason opti-scan systems are so much cheaper than DRE systems.


Thanks for clarifying this. I hope your interpretation catches on.

Thanks Bill. I want to reiterate though, that this is not my interpretation. The diagrams are correct and they show what the bills in congress still allow. The PPVAT required by all bills including Holt's is not a ballot, it is only a backup as shown in the diagram.

I should add, as it is indicated in the VVPB diagram, VVPB doesn't get rid of computers completely. Optiscan systems can be a part of VVPB systems and there are still computers usually keeping track of the county and statewide totals. So the issue of VVPAT vs VVPB is not the entire issue of e-voting. But it is significant because VVPB systems remove computers from one very vulerable segment of the process, AND they ensure that the voter verified piece of paper is actually used in the first count, not just a recount or audit.

My purpose in making these diagrams is not to show the whole process. It is to shine a light on what I consider to be a flaw in the legislation. Because they call for VVPAT and not VVPB, they really fail to address the issue of verifying a vote. They only make recounts possible.

In fact, it is the absolute truth that in a VVPAT system, the voter is not verifying their vote. They are only verifying their "Paper Audit Trail" which in all likelihood will never be counted.

Gary

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[Wilms]

12. A congressional staffer said there is confusion among bill authors

And I don't think they're beyond adopting terminology to help clarify.

That said, Gary, the staffer also said that the trouble they had was with HAVA's definitions of the word 'ballot'.

Please have a look at that if you can.

But it seems that you are adding adjectives to describe, discern, and differentiate between what are indeed, various uses of the term "ballots" that have been introduced as a result of law and technology. That can't be anything but good.

[garybeck]

14. yes, there is confusion, but their wording is clear

They all say clearly in their wording that they are requiring a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail, not a Voter Verified Paper Ballot.

And, if you read all the details of what is allowed and what is not, it confirms the correct use of their terminology.

I'm really not interpreting anything or adding any adjectives. I'm only restating what is generally accepted as fact by the folks at Verified Voting. Even though they strongly support Holt's bill, they openly acknowledge that the bill still permits DRE machines to cast unverified electronic votes. The voter verified paper is only for backup in the case of an audit or recount.

If they intend to use any of these bills to make DRE machines illegal, then they would have to completely rewrite the entire thing, including the title.

I really don't think it's that confusing. If there are staffers or even bill writers that don't understand the difference between a VVPAT and a VVPB then they should find new employment.


Thanks for suggesting I go back and reread HAVA on this, I just did. I don't believe HAVA has an actual "definition" of the word ballot at all.

The main section where they talk about the ballot, it is about requiring that a person be able to verify their vote is correct before it is cast, and change it if it appears wrong. It has been said that DRE machines are already illegal because the voter can't verify their vote.

The bottom line is, that the new legislation does not say anything about the voter verifying their vote, in the case of electronic voting. They all talk about verifying their "paper audit trail" which is not used in the first count and will likely never be counted. If anyone wants to call this a ballot, they're going to have to rewrite the dictionary. And I have not heard anyone say that it is a ballot.

I think this may clear something up. I'm talking about what the bills ALLOW. I'm not saying that every person will be voting on a DRE machine with a paper trail that never gets counted unless there's a recount. What I'm saying is that the bills ALLOW this type of technology to be used. That is not interpretation or opinion.

It is my opinion that because they still allow DRE/VVPAT systems, they miss the boat in a very important way. If they would actually require a VVPB they would be much more effective in preventing fraud.

I'm making a big point of this because there is a lot of confusion about the bills. People think they call for a paper ballot and they don't. You will find in most cases that the sponsors and experts do not use the word ballot when they speak publicly about the bills, but occasionally they do call it a ballot by accident. On more than one occasion I have spoken afterwards with the person when I've heard this, and they admit they made a mistake and that the bills do not require a paper ballot.

I feel it is important to get people to use the correct terminology so that we can minimize confusion over the bills and let people know what we're really getting.

Perhaps I shouldn't have posted the diagrams without the accompanying article I'm working on. Most of the issues that you and others have brought up are addressed in the article. Stay tuned. Thanks for engaging on this important issue.

Gary

[Wilms]

17. Agreed. "...they are requiring a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail..."

Re:,

"If they intend to use any of these bills to make DRE machines illegal, then they would have to completely rewrite the entire thing, including the title."

I really don't think any of these bills ever intended to eliminate DRE's, or even ever pretended to do so.


Re:

"If there are staffers or even bill writers that don't understand the difference between a VVPAT and a VVPB then they should find new employment."

In part it's not whether one "understand the difference between a VVPAT and a VVPB", as 'things'. Rather, the it's the terms that are used when referring to them. This confusion of terms is evidenced on this board, by the work of various groups, the press, legislation, and law.


Re:

"The main section where they talk about the ballot, it is about requiring that a person be able to verify their vote is correct before it is cast, and change it if it appears wrong. It has been said that DRE machines are already illegal because the voter can't verify their vote."

Glad you made that exact reference. I was told that the image before you on the touch-screen is, by HAVA's definition, the, or at least, a ballot. Please don't get mad at me, I'm just tellin' you what I heard!
Ya gotta admit, that alone would go a long way to explain all the confusion.

Perhaps, HAVA could benefit from a refinement of terminology, LIKE what (as I suggested) you are doing.

Beyond that I agree with all the points and distinctions and observations you've shared.

[garybeck]

19. one slight disagreement

you said:

"This confusion of terms is evidenced on this board, by the work of various groups, the press, legislation, and law. "

I agree that there is confusion in the groups and the press. but I do not see any confusion in the laws or legislation.

all the legislation (bill or law) that calls for Audit Trials uses that wording appropriately. As well, the manufacturers of the voting machines, who are now introducing printers with their DRE machines are calling them Audit Trail printers, not Ballot printers. Holt's bill and all the others correctly refer to paper audit trails, not paper ballots. State legislation that requires paper ballots actually use the term paper ballot, also correctly.

the confusion is not in the bills or laws, and it's not with the voting machine companies.

it's only with the people who are writing and talking about the legislation.

I've scoured Holt's bill, Hava, and Clintons too. I find zero incorrect useage of the term Audit Trail, Paper Ballot, etc...

however I find many such incorrect usage on websites, in articles, and on forum posts. I'm doing what I can to correct these mistakes, because calling any of the bills a "paper ballot bill" is incorrect and it leads to much misconception of what they do and don't require.

People have called them "trojan horse" bills... I'd just say that there is a danger of people developing a false sense of security in thinking that if the bill passes, we have paper ballots.

We should be stressing what the bills DON'T do just as much as what they DO do, so that everyone is well aware of what we're getting. I'm finding a lot of people and websites praising these bills, and often calling them "paper ballot bills" without explaining what they really do.

The fact remains... if all the legislation passed, it would still be perfectly legal for a DRE machine to cast an unverified electronic ballot. the voter is not verifying their ballot, they are verifying their audit trail and there is a big difference.

Gary

[garybeck]

20. one slight disagreement

you said:

"This confusion of terms is evidenced on this board, by the work of various groups, the press, legislation, and law. "

I agree that there is confusion in the groups and the press. but I do not see any confusion in the laws or legislation.

all the legislation (bill or law) that calls for Audit Trials uses that wording appropriately. As well, the manufacturers of the voting machines, who are now introducing printers with their DRE machines are calling them Audit Trail printers, not Ballot printers. Holt's bill and all the others correctly refer to paper audit trails, not paper ballots. State legislation that requires paper ballots actually use the term paper ballot, also correctly.

the confusion is not in the bills or laws, and it's not with the voting machine companies.

it's only with the people who are writing and talking about the legislation.

I've scoured Holt's bill, Hava, and Clintons too. I find zero incorrect useage of the term Audit Trail, Paper Ballot, etc...

however I find many such incorrect usage on websites, in articles, and on forum posts. I'm doing what I can to correct these mistakes, because calling any of the bills a "paper ballot bill" is incorrect and it leads to much misconception of what they do and don't require.

People have called them "trojan horse" bills... I'd just say that there is a danger of people developing a false sense of security in thinking that if the bill passes, we have paper ballots.

We should be stressing what the bills DON'T do just as much as what they DO do, so that everyone is well aware of what we're getting. I'm finding a lot of people and websites praising these bills, and often calling them "paper ballot bills" without explaining what they really do.

The fact remains... if all the legislation passed, it would still be perfectly legal for a DRE machine to cast an unverified electronic ballot. the voter is not verifying their ballot, they are verifying their audit trail and there is a big difference.

Gary

[Bill Bored]

16. The laws are being written to conform to HAVA

What they did was add the words "voter verifiable" to whatever HAVA had originally, which was not "paper ballot."

I know that Holt and the rest do not prohibit DREs, but I had not considered this to be a function of the distinction between a "VVPB" and a "VVPAT." However Gary makes this clear.

I realize the VVPAT is not the first count. Neither is VVP-Record necessarily, which is another term. But there are these people in CA and GA where they're stuck with DREs who simply want to TURN OFF or ignore the DRE part of the machine and have it print ballots that will be hand counted, as I understand it. Am I wrong?

It's clear that we are in deep shit!

If half the stuff in the GEMS manual can be done, it's quite hopeless really. However, I still haven't found any documentation that says votes can be switched without the voter seeing it. That requires the Clint Curtis modification and perhaps, some tin foil. I would argue that neither are really necessary to swing a close election on these machines though. It's the CONFIGURATION STUPID!

[garybeck]

18. one clarification

VVPAT is the same as VVP-Record. I don't think there is a difference between an audit trail and a record.

In regards to the people in CA and GA... There are people everywhere who want all sorts of things. There are even people who want more DREs!

If thepeople want to use the DRE machines they already have (and have paid for?) to print ballots that are counted elsewhere, I see nothing wrong with that. As long as the voter gets to verify the paper and it's used to count the first count, then you have a $5000 machine that's doing what a $300 machine could do, but those ballots are good ballots. The question is who is going to count them - man or machine? And what is going to happen with the totals after that? I know there are some in GA at least who want all paper handcounts, and there are some in CA as well.

As I said, I was only shining the spotlight on one part of the voting process and what the bills say about it.

If we want to turn the spotlight on to the optiscans and the central tabulators, let's do it. I think that most of the bills, if not all, allow optiscans and central tabs, but most require open source code.

Personally I'm not sure if there's such a thing as open source code, or how you can prevent someone from updating a program after it's been certified. Ideally i'd like to take all the computers out of the system.

But it often occurs to me that if I could only take one thing out of the system, it wouldn't be the computers, it would be partisan and dishonest people. You can put all kinds of roadblocks in place, but if you have dishonest people making the machines and running the elections, they'll find a way, even if there are no computers.

Gary

[berniew1]

21. Is there any movement towards developing initiative petition in some state

states?

[Bill Bored]

23. A poster called eaglenetsupport was supposed to be working on this.

He sounded like an attorney.

[Bill Bored]

24. There are bills aimed at dishonest people

I think Holt has some language about that and so do Conyers and Boxer if memory serves me.

As a techie sort, I can see how digital signatures could be used to verify the expertly inspected code running on every machine at any time, even during the election, at random intervals, after every vote is cast, etc. There are no bills that mandate this though, and sooner or later someone may find a way around it anyway.

Meanwhile, there is the configuration of the machines, which has nothing to do with altering the source code. It's just point-and-click stuff which people who don't know anything about computers call "programming." But it's not programming, it's configuration, i.e., just selecting from the available options provided by the existing code at the user interface. I believe that there are enough abuses possible through improper DRE configuration (which has actually occurred), that I am now of the opinion that these machines are just about beyond redemption.

I also see the wisdom of the "transparency" issue, which actually would solve the machine configuration AND the dishonest people issues too, which digital signatures and other security enhancements would not solve.

So the combination of these two issues (the possibility of improper machine configuration and the lack of transparency) are enough to get me to stop trying to reform DREs. The configuration thing is what really pushed me over the edge though. These machines have got to go or they must be audited after each election, until such time as it's mathematically impossible for any discrepancies between the VVPATs and the machine count to affect the outcome of the election.

I hope people appreciate this because it's not so easy to explain!

[feelthebreeze]

25. NIce work, and thank you garybeck!

I have sent it out and hope it spreads.

[Wilms]

26. Keep an eye out for Gary's update.

This is a work in progress.

[skids]

27. To be fair.

...If you are going to say "most likely will not be used or counted" for VVPAT, wou should also say "most likely will not be hand counted" to VVPB.

Or to distill things further there are only two things that VVPB offers over VVPAT:

The first is the opportunity, however rarely excercised, to perform the first count by hand.

The second is that by it's very nature, since the paper ballot is a "ballot," you don't need extra language to state that they are the official record. In the case of VVPAT, you have to say "these are the official record and will override the electronic numbers during a recount" explicitly.

If a fraud operation thinks they can get away with altering the electronic results in VVPAT simply by avoiding an audit, or if they think they can meddle with the audit trail between the time an audit is requested and when it is actually pursued, then they will have every opportunity to do the very same thing by hacking the VVPB machine count.

There is only a shade of difference.

[garybeck]

28. I disagree

there is more of a difference. The VVPB is counted in the first count. Yes it is true, there is no guarantee that the VVPB is counted by hand. It can be counted by machine or by hand, unless the legislation also specifies something about the counting.

However, because the VVPB is used for the first count, it means that the DRE machine can not cast the vote. It closes off one place where fraud can occur.

there are essentially 3 places where fraud can occur in relation to computerized voting: the casting of the ballot, the counting of the ballots, and the totaling of the votes.

By eliminating one of the three places, which is what VVPB does, it significantly reduces the opportunity for fraud.

DRE machines, with or without VVPAT printers are very vulnerable to fraud because anyone can walk up to the machine, and while they look like they're voting, they could be doing something fishy. This is what the program that Clint Curtis wrote enables.

By passing VVPB legislation, the possibility of this would be greatly reduced, if not made impossible. The ballots are printed already. There is no way someone could walk up to a voting machine and alter the ballots. Experts have said that the DRE is the most vulnerable spot.

So I agree that VVPB systems can still use computers to count votes, but I disagree that because of that fact the difference between VVPAT and VVPB is minimal.

Gary

[Bill Bored]

29. The 50,000,000-vote question is this:

Does the touch screen Ballot Text actually have to correspond to the Candidate Record in the DRE?

If the answer is No, Clint Curtis is out of the vote swapping biz!
(And so is Bev Harris, BTW!)

Why? Because the voters would just do it themselves.

[Wilms]

30. Please explain. n/t

[garybeck]

31. What is a Candidate Record? n/t

[Bill Bored]

32. See this thread:

<http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x344605>

[Andy_Stephenson]

33. Perfect!

Can I use this?

[garybeck]

34. yes!

Andy please use it any way you can.

Also please be aware that there's an article associated with the graphics here:

http://www.solarbus.org/election/articles/0313-ballots.shtml

you are welcome (and encouraged) to take the graphics and use them any way you want, or to link to the article, or anything else you can come up with.

I hope you're feeling well,

peace out,
gary