HAND-COUNTED PAPER BALLOTS!!!!

[Bill Bored]

OK, now that I've gotten your attention,

How many states or counties are poised to buy paperless DREs RIGHT NOW? And how do we stop them?

To the hand-counted-paper-ballots-true-believer contingent:

OK, so you want to go for the gusto and get rid of ALL the machines.
Great! But this will require either a LAW passed by a LEGISLATURE, or in some states, a REFERENDUM enacted by the PEOPLE. It also has to comply with existing Federal Law, such as HAVA. So it might behoove you to actually get a copy of HAVA and read it.

Now, let's say your state or county is ready to drop a crap-load of money on a paperless e-votin' system, a lot of which comes from Uncle Sam via HAVA, which says you have to make your voting system accessible to people with disabilities and you can't use punch cards anymore.

So now you have a few million bucks to spend on a voting system and you go shopping, what are your choices:

1. Disabled-accessible DREs, with or without a voter-verified paper audit "trail."

2. Paper ballots with a marking device that disabled voters can use.

3. Hand counted paper ballots, with a device similar to the one in 2 above for the disabled.

So presumably you want to use #3. That means you need machine-readable (e.g., Op Scan) ballots, because Op Scan ballots can be marked and read by a machine that the disabled community can use. This includes blind voters who can't SEE the paper to make the little check marks in the boxes on your non-machine-readable, hand-counted paper ballot. The machine can read the ballot to the voter audibly, it can mark the ballot for those who can't see it, or can't physically use a pen or pencil, and it can READ the marks back to the voter so they can verify their vote. I do not claim to be an expert on these devices, but this is generally how they work, and if not they should! It probably violates federal law (HAVA) if they don't.

So now you have the following:

Machine-readable/markable Paper Ballots with some form of reader/marker.

Your at least half-way to precinct count Op Scans already. Do you opt NOT to take the HAVA money and buy them? The only difference is in the counting method, which could be either by hand or by scanner, or by some combination that relies on random hand auditing, testing of the scanners, etc.

So unless you think hand counting would be made illegal by allowing Op Scans at the precinct, I don't see why it's so hard to compromise about the counting and auditing, which is simply a matter of mathematics. I.e., how much random manual auditing is necessary to rule out an incorrect count that affects the outcome of the election? Probably NOT 100% in most cases, but this is ALWAYS AN OPTION!!! You have RECOUNT LAWS to make it so. If they are bad laws, CHANGE THEM!

Now, by INSISTING on NO machines at all, you are not going to get anywhere because, as I understand it, you would be in violation of HAVA. You have to explain the subtleties of Vote Counting vs. Vote Casting to everyone you talk to, including legislators, activists for the disabled and ordinary people. And, I'll tell you what:

I'M NOT HEARING THIS FROM YOU GUYS!

All I'm hearing is "HAND COUNTED PAPER BALLOTS!"

Meanwhile, more paperless DREs are on the way because there are those who don't even get the fact that paperless machines are no damn good.

If you want hand counted paper ballots, you have to frame the debate in the contexts of HAVA, disabled voters and the potential for election fraud. So TRY IT! Maybe you'll LIKE IT, and maybe you can get what you want.

My basic point is this: ballots must be machine-readable because of HAVA. Someone correct me if I'm wrong.

"Hand counted paper ballots", without specifying the TYPE of ballot (e.g., Op Scan) seems to violate the accessibility requirements of HAVA. It disenfranchises disabled voters.

If you are going to argue for a particular counting method or ballot type, try not to be so simplistic as to conveniently ignore existing law and existing voter groups who have been lobbying for independent access to the ballot for years and have finally gotten it. It's counter-productive and you will NOT get what you want.

Hope this helps. Now I'll go put on my flame-retardant suit. :)

[truckin]

1. You are exactly right.

CT is trying to purchase DREs with VVPATs and if it wasn't for a lot of grumbling from a few groups they would probably be getting paperless DREs. Precinct count Op Scan systems with marking systems for the blind are the best realistic option at this time.

[lyonn]

2. Describe Op Scan

Is it the system where you mark a ballot by hand and then put it through a scanning/tabulating machine? I use this type and figure it is fairly safe since they can be hand counted. Wouldn't these be the answer to the handicap issue?

[truckin]

4. Yes, that is Op Scan but it is difficult for the blind to vote on these

systems. However, a system called Automark is being certified that uses audio to mark the ballots for the blind that can be scanned into the machines. This system is relatively safe if the local Op Scan results are not electronically transmitted to a central tabulator and sample manual counts are performed to verify the accuracy of the machines.

[Bill Bored]

6. Keep on Trukin dude!

I know you don't post that often, but you seem to be on top of things!

What else is new in the state of CT???

[truckin]

8. TrueVote CT is staying on top of SB55, a bill that will require a VVPR

for each vote cast in the state. I know we should require a VVPB but the SOTS of our state is obsessed with DREs and other than that the bill is not bad (it includes mandatory manual audits & if there is a question between the electronic vote and the VVPR, the VVPR is the vote of record). We are also trying to get the State to consider OP Scan systems as well as DREs but we are having a hard time doing that. The recent article about Dade County in FL and the events happening in your state should help our cause.

I am a secondary player in the TrueVote CT group and I wish I had more time to devote to this incredibly important issue. However, I am organizing a forum on electronic voting that will take place in Newtown, CT on Wednesday 4/27/05. TrueVote CT has sponsored other forums in other parts of the state, but this will be the first in my neck of the woods.

[Andy_Stephenson]

12. Automark is a good system...and I agree...

tabulating syatems must have no connection to the outside world. Memory cards must be delivered to central count.

[Andy_Stephenson]

11. Agreed!

count em anyway you want. It MUST be called a voter verified paper ballot as ballot of record.

[In Truth We Trust]

3. Paper ballots NOW!!!! Hand counts Now!!!!! n/t

[Wilms]

5. Have a HAVA link.

http://www.demos-usa.org/page14.cfm

[Andy_Stephenson]

13. 2 steps ...step one

get something to count...ie paper ballots.

step 2 everything else.

[Kip Humphrey]

7. How Scanners work and how they can (and did in 2004) work against voters

Scanners:

INTERPRETING THE PAPER BALLOT
Most vote scanner systems (some operate somewhat differently like the Mark-Right? system) operate by overlaying a data map over a scanned in bitmap of the ballot. Every bubble on the ballot has a defined area overlay (usually 1/2" square ((X,Y)(X,Y)) coordinates each which is fully configurable and MUST be configured to each ballot). If a program discerns the number of 0-0-0 pixels (black, but typically some configurable gray-scale range) is sufficient within the defined area (square), then a positive is registered in the program for that square area of the ballot.

If the scanner gets more than one positive from configurable contest groups (president, for example), the program would trigger the scanner to reject the ballot due to over-votes (entirely dependent how the scanner was configured). If the scanner detects no mark within a contest group, the program should reject the ballot or query the user due to an under-vote (again, this is entirely configurable).

The results of the scanner's configurable interpretation are logged (usually in a text file or table) which in turn is exported and loaded into a database, deriving a database data record (picture a row in a spreadsheet). The database program then tabulates the votes based on the interpreted, derived data.

Please Notice: the words "configurable", "program", "interpret", and "derive" in the above description. They represent points of vulnerability for vote tampering or just plain programmer/configurer error.

Check EIRS (Election Incident Reporting System) for optical scan machine-related incidents - there are lots of them.

Scanners, just like DREs, share the requirement of being configured for each ballot layout. Even without intentional fraud, the chance for human error propagated thousands of times just in configuring all of the different ballots in a county or state is HUGE!

HELPING THE DISABLED VOTE:
HAVA requires one device per precinct to accommodate voting with a disability. It does not specify the type of device.

Here's a FACT: there are no DRE's specifically designed to accommodate the disabled. That is not to say voting machines can't be designed specifically for specific disabilities (voice systems, braille readers and translators, ergonomically friendly levers, buttons and controls, etc.). And there are very good companies out there that have the experience and expertise to design effective disabled-specific ballot mark up equipment. The point is, if you or your state truly want to provide the disabled with an intervention-free voting experience, then provide them with machines they can work! Otherwise, the whole disabled discussion is simply a ploy by Die-bold and others to foist their crappy equipment on American voters at exorbitant prices.

If your state or county is stuck with machine contracts and can't or won't renegotiate them, then adapt the machines to mark up paper ballots (add a printer), count the paper ballots BY HAND, and use the elaborate vote processing system to provide quick, preliminary, unofficial vote totals for the press on election night.

NO MATTER WHAT: DO NOT SETTLE FOR HIDDEN BALLOTS OR SECRET COUNTING!

And ask yourself: What could a Kenneth Blackwell-type SoS do with the system to defraud voters?

Finally, answer this: What is simpler to get across to voters, politicians, and election officials? 6 paragraphs explaining how a scanner-based vote processing system works (and we haven't even gotten to tabulators!) or: HAND COUNTED PAPER BALLOTS?

If you want a, simple, direct, easy, reliable, familiar, and cheap voting system, hand count paper ballots.

[Bill Bored]

9. Thank you for bringing up the configuration issues Kip.

This is why the law should say that the ballots must be rejected if there are is an under- or over- vote and the voter shall be given a chance to correct this. This checks both the scanner and the voter.

If in the course of an election, so much as one voter finds that her ballot is correct and the machine is wrong, the scanner could be taken out of service and replaced, or you go on voting on the paper and count the ballots later. This is the next best thing to hand counting, (although hand counting cannot check for over or under votes because the ballot is secret).

With DREs, continued voting is not even an option assuming the voter even realizes the machine is failing.

I think we need a multi pronged approach:

The reality is there are paperless DREs out there that can only be challenged in court. And so they should be.

There are DREs with paper which the voters need to be educated about so they will actually LOOK AT and VERIFY the paper.

There are recount laws that only allow for recounts in the event of a close election. They assume the initial count is nearly correct. They need to be changed. The above court challenges should also be used to engender changes in recount laws.

The credibility of these machines has to be undermined at every opportunity in the courts or through further scientific analysis of their functionality. You don't need to see every line of code to do that.

The EAC, NIST and the independent testing labs should be taken to task as well for not doing their jobs (once there is sufficient evidence that the count cannot be relied upon).

I agree that DREs are not required for the disabled or to meet HAVA requirements. They are not required at all really.

How do Vermont and Oregon intend to comply with HAVA? I am told they are all paper and OR is mail-in.

Or, is it just that you can't get HAVA MONEY unless you comply with it???

[Wilms]

10. kick n/t

[Andy_Stephenson]

15. For everyone that wants to hand count....

King county WA. is the most complex voting jurisdiction in the nation. We can have up to 7000 splits. For those of you that don't understand splits...a split represents, an individual combination of measures and contests on a ballot style. For example in an odd year election King county may have 750 different races with about 50 appearing on each ballot style and none of those 7000 combos will be identical.

Here we vote on school, water, irrigation, sewer, street, sidewalk, drainage, and egg inspector districts (seriously not). There can be up to 7000 different splits. Meaning 7000 different ballot styles. Add to this the sheer number of candidates, initiatives, tax proposals etc etc etc that we typically get and you can see how our elections get complicated quickly. Counting King county by hand would take months to complete. Indeed, It took nearly a month to hand recount just one race, an event that occurred this last December. Hand counting is impractical here. I have no trouble with optical scan machines as long as the paper ballot is the ballot of record. 3.4% random recount/audit of precincts (at least for King County). Stringent controls in-so-far as the central tabulator is concerned and robust accounting procedures throughout the entire tabulation process.

Nothing counts unless, our ballot is counted. Simile means "like" not the same. Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails, Receipts, Records are not legal terms where voting is concerned. They are not the same as a ballot. Those terms seek to take elections further out of your hands.

VoteHere aka VoteWhere? has a defacto seat on the Baker Carter commission with the inclusion of Ralph Munro. Ralph is the Chairman of the Board of Votehere. One of the speakers is John Fund of the Wall Street Journal Editorial board. According to Jim Adler President of VoteHere John Fund Described his system "pretty well". But VoteHere is not the only player represented at the meeting. Baker has close ties to The Carlyle Group which owns Populex Voting systems. Then you have the likes of Jim Dixon and Kay Maxwell who shill for no paper and in the case of Dixon/The NFB a friendly arrangement with Diebold. It is no secret that VoteHere and Diebold have approached Conny McCormak to install VoteHere's crypto solution on the Diebold system in Maryland.

Let me make myself perfectly clear I will not endorse any legislation that does not mandate for voter verified paper ballots as the ballot of record. Nor will I endorse the VoteHere type solutions, which require an interface between the voter and his ballot. It is imperative that we keep or ballot intact and unencrypted.

[eridani]

14. Just one more thing

Make the vote tabulation software and the machine schematics PBULIC! If that's good enough for slot machines, it's damned well good enough for voting machines. Otherwise, agreed 100%