that's where all the software ends up being the same..
one other good point. I just got a copy of the GA Diebold contract.. here is the listing on my website..
GEORGIA DIEBOLD CONTRACT:... read it and weep.. full of pricing, etc.
http://www.countpaperballots.com/dieboldorlivefree/DieboldContract50.htma lawyer doing DRE vendor lawsuits who is chasing Sequoia says there are lots of the same Appendices , meaning it looks like the same technology is being used by Sequoia....
One other key thing.. the criminal programmer for Diebold is a guy named Jeffery Dean, who's to say they didn't share this guy
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Jeffrey Dean, not Jeff King. He was based in King County, Washington.
He later ran a ballot printing company that worked for Diebold. He was then hired by Diebold, given a seat on the board of directors and named senior programmer of their Diebold GEMS software that is used to operate their central tabulators.
I got this off off an Andy Stephenson radio interview.
Jeffrey Dean was not hired by Diebold. He did become the owner of Spectrum Print & Mail, a printing company shortly after he got out of prison. This company got the contract to print King County Washington's ballots.
Global Election Systems (a Canadian company founded by stock market manipulators and felons) got the contract to supply voting machines for King County in 1998.
Global Election Systems acquired Jeff Dean's company, Spectrum Print & Mail, in 2000 shortly before the presidential election. Jeff Dean was given the position of chief programmer and was also given a seat on the board of directors of Global Election Systems.
In January 2002, Diebold acquired Global Election Systems. The sale was consummated on Jan. 23, and Jeff Dean was no longer a director and was taken off as an employee and put on as a consultant.
He continued until April 2002, and rumor has it he still is on the payroll somehow, but that has never been confirmed.
According to Bev Harris's research, their are three copies of the database. The election results are written to the first one, then copied to the second with whatever modifications deemed "necessary". The election officials only can see the second database and these are the results that are printed out.
Not exactly. The election results are written to the first one and also to the second one. The election results with precinct-by-precinct results come from the first one, and the summary results come from the second one. By doing some very simple sleight of hand, it is possible to manipulate the second one and leave the first one intact. This allows the overall results to be changed, yet even a hand count of randomly selected precincts will always match the precinct-by-precinct report.
Apparently, Bev also found that they are equipped with remote control emitter/receivers. During one California primary, the results were shown in real time at a Diebold site. The only way this could have been done would have been through direct wireless access to the machines.
No. Bev Harris and Kathleen Wynne interviewed some of the people who order parts and assemble the Diebold machines, last July, in McKinney Texas and elsewhere. All of them said that wireless was ordered for the machines but they differed on whether it was to be installed in the past or the future.
You are probably thinking of the San Luis Obispo problem, which you can find documented in Chapter 13 of the Black Box Voting book, online for free at
http://www.blackboxvoting.org .
That problem was initially thought to be a case of voting machines in the field calling home via telephone modems (not wireless). Then it was determined that the votes were absentee and early votes, though the accounting and reporting had some anomalies.
The vote file did show up on a Diebold FTP site, and it appears to have been saved at 3:30 p.m. on election day, a violation of California law. No one at the elections office or Diebold will admit to copying the vote file out of the San Luis Obispo County GEMS computer, nor to placing it on the Internet.
The file is tagged with a password ("sophia") and a Diebold tech named Sophia Lee was at San Luis Obispo that day, but she denies taking the file.
A Diebold memo also indicates that less than 24 hours before the election, the San Luis Obispo GEMS system was tabulating votes incorrectly.
A lot of this info disappeared, when Bev's site was hacked just after the election.
This is correct, but the hacking took place shortly before and just after the election, and the database containing the story files on this was corrupted and is now unusable.
However, you can still find the details on this, thoroughly documented, in the Black Box Voting book. Primary researchers on the San Luis Obispo story were Harris and one of the directors of Black Box Voting, Jim March.
Looks like we should also insist that the votes be counted at the precinct level before transmission.
Yes. But most places are moving away from this. When you count at the precinct, the vulnerability is the attack point during transfer of the data, or ballots, to a central point. However, if you post the precinct count publicly, you have at least some checks and balances.
When you count at a central point, as is done with all mail-in systems, punch card systems, and absentee votes, you get into the dog and pony show where it is relatively easy to do a snow job on observers.
The poll tapes, which should be signed by poll workers at the polling place and should contain both the zero report (beginning of election day) and the results (end of election day) are a good check for this, but if no one signs them, or they go missing, or chain of custody is weak, it is not difficult to game the system.
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