Reply #16: WAIT! WAIT! WAIT! [View All]

[IndyOp]

There are several ways that Triad could try to cover its tracks here - by changing the setting on the punch card reader or by changing the labels on the Votomatics.

I emailed Douglas Jones at U of Iowa last week and he said that recounters must demand to see the actual ballot labels used on the votomatics in that precinct so that they can check the holes against the tabulation.

Here is how I understand it: If on election day I am expecting Kerry to get more votes than Bush I put labels on the machine that indicate that voters should punch the first hole for Bush and the second hole for Kerry. I set the card reader so that votes are swapped: Candidate 1 = Kerry and Candidate 2 = Bush. The results are Bush 55% and Kerry 45%.

By recount day I put a new label on the Votomatic that shows that voters should have punched the first for Kerry and the second for Bush or by recount day I have simply 'disappeared' the Votomatics from the precincts and you have to take my word for it that the Votomatics that were there were set up as I say they were.

Here is the email Doug Jones sent me last week:

With all physical ballot systems (punched card, for example), one possible rigging is to tamper with the ballots.

With Votomatics, installing the wrong ballot label for the precinct can make trouble. On the Votomatic, the ballot label puts names by holes in the card. If you tabulate hole one as a Bush hole, but your ballot label says hole one is a Kerry hole, of course, you'll switch votes. So, recounters should demand to see the actual ballot labels used on the votomatics in that precinct and check the holes against the tabulation.

Similar switches are possible in the printing of mark-sense ballots, but during a recount, they will be easy to check because the names are on the ballot instead of the ballot itself just having numbered holes.

I have written it all up, in boring detail, on my web pages. See the tutorials section in <http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/>

Doug Jones
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