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Edited on Sun Nov-12-06 10:40 PM by realpolitik
First, The biggest problem we face in Iraq right now is the nature of Iraq. This is the same problem Saddam faced, and frankly, some sympathy for the devil might be in order here. Saddam succeeded for the most part at holding the so called nation together *and* fighting a major war with Iran. It is to be noted that some of his bloodletting was as reprisal to uprisings initially urged by GHWB. The problem is the macaroni nature of Iraq, poly-faithed, poly-cultural, poly-glot. Oh yeah, and not everyone got the oil.
But the problem suggests the options.
The options are -- Unity government with high authoritarian mechanisms, like Yugoslavia under Tito. -- Federation, with a low authority central government and strong regions with highly different systems, like Yugoslavia under Milosevic -- Partition, giving pieces of, or all of Iraq to neighboring states.
Oh, yeah, and anarchic withdrawal.
To be equally brief, Unity government is not going to work. The effort is beyond the potential of Iraq to become one nation under anyone's god...and that's part of the problem.
Federation would require equitable division of resources and responsibility... and a degree of stability and economic viability that Iraq is not capable of right now.
Partition raises challenges akin to Yalta. Who gets what, and how much. The big loser in this game would be... well the Iraqis. The new owner might not be as well disposed to the former Iraqis as their resources.
Ok, here is my best option right now. Three federated states under the protection of the UN. The oil revenues of all three states divided per capita equally. The opening of an American university in Baghdad, free to Iraqi (or indeed any) students who could qualify on TOEFL testing. I would even recommend a 10% stipend from Iraqi oil revenues for the UN to defer costs.
as a fall back-- Regional talks with Turkey regarding the impact of a Kurdish state or even the inclusion of Kurdistan as an autonomous region of Turkey. The same issue exists between the southern Iraqi Shiia and the Iranians. But I suspect the Iraqi Shiia would not respond monolithically in that situation.
A redistribution of contracts to at least 65% domestic contracting. A military withdrawal with a UN force phase in over six months.
But get the jobs in the hands of Iraqis and give them something to hope for. A person generally does not blow up something he or she built the day before.
Oh yeah, and anarchic withdral stands a strong chance of working no worse in the end than what we are doing now. But it is far from what I would call an optimal solution.
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