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ancianita
ancianita's Journal
ancianita's Journal
October 20, 2023
BREAKING NEWS: Former Trump Lawyer Kenneth Chesebro Takes Plea Deal In Georgia Election
October 20, 2023
Since we know there's no GOP, just trumpcult, we need to officially spell out why trumpcult fails to win inside and outside Washington.
Put to Americans any three of these points at the front and center of every campaign speech after speech:
1. The public knows that Republicans can't run a two-car funeral. They have devolved into governing incompetence (macro) and in-house turf battles (micro). Because they’ve sworn oaths only to trump and party oligarch donors.
2. trumpcult literally try and fail to make House committees and impeachment work.
But even if they saw Democrats' investigation methods and sources, they can’t understand or execute them.
They perform the ‘appearance’ of investigating, oversight & governing as their owners direct them.
3. trumpcult unironically believe that they perform for their owner/donors' money so that they don't look incompetent.
4. trumpcult do not know that they don't know a) how government works, or b) how to do their jobs;
5. The result is: who they have actually proven to be illegitimate is themselves.
6. Washington is NOT broken. It's trumpcult that's broken.
Do not vote for those who can’t even lead themselves, nevermind America or world affairs.
7. Say that whatever 23% of Americans think about this government should be dismissed until they accept the adult constitutional rules of governing America, and our longstanding allies.
8. Since we Americans can walk & chew gum at the same time, after we win, don’t ignore trumpcult, either.
Keep an eye on them & their scheming, grooming oligarchs.
Democrats need to work toward a future where Americans remember these anti-democracy oligarchs, media and trumpcult years as a time when this diseased appendix of the American body politic was finally removed so America could heal & possibly cure itself.
Let’s get on with the politics and work of the planet, to help our descendants future-proof their lives.
What do the Democratic Party adults say to Americans from now on?
Since we know there's no GOP, just trumpcult, we need to officially spell out why trumpcult fails to win inside and outside Washington.
Put to Americans any three of these points at the front and center of every campaign speech after speech:
1. The public knows that Republicans can't run a two-car funeral. They have devolved into governing incompetence (macro) and in-house turf battles (micro). Because they’ve sworn oaths only to trump and party oligarch donors.
2. trumpcult literally try and fail to make House committees and impeachment work.
But even if they saw Democrats' investigation methods and sources, they can’t understand or execute them.
They perform the ‘appearance’ of investigating, oversight & governing as their owners direct them.
3. trumpcult unironically believe that they perform for their owner/donors' money so that they don't look incompetent.
4. trumpcult do not know that they don't know a) how government works, or b) how to do their jobs;
5. The result is: who they have actually proven to be illegitimate is themselves.
6. Washington is NOT broken. It's trumpcult that's broken.
Do not vote for those who can’t even lead themselves, nevermind America or world affairs.
7. Say that whatever 23% of Americans think about this government should be dismissed until they accept the adult constitutional rules of governing America, and our longstanding allies.
8. Since we Americans can walk & chew gum at the same time, after we win, don’t ignore trumpcult, either.
Keep an eye on them & their scheming, grooming oligarchs.
Democrats need to work toward a future where Americans remember these anti-democracy oligarchs, media and trumpcult years as a time when this diseased appendix of the American body politic was finally removed so America could heal & possibly cure itself.
Let’s get on with the politics and work of the planet, to help our descendants future-proof their lives.
October 19, 2023
Dennis Ross, a former special assistant to President Barack Obama, is the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute.
https://archive.ph/bCbrp#selection-573.0-573.51
The Best of Bad Options for Recovering the Hostages
This terrible crisis leaves no good choices—but the U.S. may have more ways to pressure Hamas than Israel does.There is, regrettably, no simple answer. Hamas seized the hostages knowing full well Israel’s history of making trades. On the one hand, the terrorist leaders no doubt hoped the hostages would be a deterrent against Israel’s launching of an all-out war against them. On the other hand, Sinwar and his Hamas allies knew that if they could trade their hostages for a number of militants held in Israeli prisons, they would be heroes among Palestinians who see those held in the Israeli jails as part of the struggle against occupation. Indeed, the spectacle of Hamas gaining the release of prisoners in spite of its killing spree of Israelis would allow its leaders to claim that their way worked. That perception would enable them to promote the idea that, in time, the Hamas-led “resistance” would deliver Israel’s disappearance... And make no mistake, that is the group’s strategic purpose here. Hamas is not about ending the occupation; it is about ending Israel...
One avenue the Biden administration could explore through the Qataris or Turks—or, preferably, the Egyptians, who have no interest in strengthening Hamas—would be a release of women and children in return for an agreement from Israel to permit some deliveries of humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Hamas might agree to this, to improve its international standing, even as it will surely seek to exploit such a deal by infiltrating its fighters into southern Gaza. That is a risk, but Israel, too, has reasons to manage its image—to show that it is fighting Hamas but not punishing the Palestinian people...
In general, President Joe Biden has signaled that there will be no daylight between the U.S. and Israel on this matter. According to a report I have heard, the U.S. has already deployed a hostage-rescue unit to Israel to assist with possible coordination. This suggests that both shared intelligence and possibly joint efforts to conduct rescue operations may follow—especially if Hamas carries out its dire threats to start executing hostages. Typically, rescue operations are attempted only as a last resort. The necessary intelligence gathering takes time, and such operations carry an intrinsically high risk: As likely as they are to succeed and save some hostages, they can also result in the death of others.
This terrible crisis has no straightforward, immediate solution. For now, the best way the White House can help Israel is to continue to call for the hostages’ unconditional release. It should emphasize the terrible damage inflicted on the Palestinian cause by Hamas’s illegitimate attempt to gain leverage through innocent victims. Above all, the U.S. can lean with all its might on those who have some influence with Hamas—and let them know what they have to lose by their association with a cult of death, not life.
One avenue the Biden administration could explore through the Qataris or Turks—or, preferably, the Egyptians, who have no interest in strengthening Hamas—would be a release of women and children in return for an agreement from Israel to permit some deliveries of humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Hamas might agree to this, to improve its international standing, even as it will surely seek to exploit such a deal by infiltrating its fighters into southern Gaza. That is a risk, but Israel, too, has reasons to manage its image—to show that it is fighting Hamas but not punishing the Palestinian people...
In general, President Joe Biden has signaled that there will be no daylight between the U.S. and Israel on this matter. According to a report I have heard, the U.S. has already deployed a hostage-rescue unit to Israel to assist with possible coordination. This suggests that both shared intelligence and possibly joint efforts to conduct rescue operations may follow—especially if Hamas carries out its dire threats to start executing hostages. Typically, rescue operations are attempted only as a last resort. The necessary intelligence gathering takes time, and such operations carry an intrinsically high risk: As likely as they are to succeed and save some hostages, they can also result in the death of others.
This terrible crisis has no straightforward, immediate solution. For now, the best way the White House can help Israel is to continue to call for the hostages’ unconditional release. It should emphasize the terrible damage inflicted on the Palestinian cause by Hamas’s illegitimate attempt to gain leverage through innocent victims. Above all, the U.S. can lean with all its might on those who have some influence with Hamas—and let them know what they have to lose by their association with a cult of death, not life.
Dennis Ross, a former special assistant to President Barack Obama, is the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute.
https://archive.ph/bCbrp#selection-573.0-573.51
October 17, 2023
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
Criminal Action No. 23-257 (TSC)
DONALD J. TRUMP,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth below and during the hearing in this case on October 16, 2023,
the government’s Motion to Ensure that Extrajudicial Statements Do Not Prejudice These
Proceedings, ECF No. 57, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Under binding Supreme Court precedent, this court “must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect [its] processes from prejudicial outside interferences.” Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). The First Amendment does not override that obligation.
“Freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential
requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice. But it must not be allowed to divert
the trial from the very purpose of a court system to adjudicate controversies, both criminal and
civil, in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures.” Id. at 350–
51 (cleaned up); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 n.18 (1984) (“Although
litigants do not surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse door, those rights may
be subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on several occasions this
Court has approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to
ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant.”) (quotation omitted). Here, alternative measures
Page 2 of 3
such as careful voir dire, jury sequestration, and cautionary jury instructions are sufficient to
remedy only some of the potential prejudices that the government’s motion seeks to address.
In order to safeguard the integrity of these proceedings, it is necessary to impose certain
restrictions on public statements by interested parties. Undisputed testimony cited by the
government demonstrates that when Defendant has publicly attacked individuals, including on
matters related to this case, those individuals are consequently threatened and harassed. See ECF
No. 57 at 3–5. Since his indictment, and even after the government filed the instant motion,
Defendant has continued to make similar statements attacking individuals involved in the judicial
process, including potential witnesses, prosecutors, and court staff. See id. at 6–12. Defendant
has made those statements to national audiences using language communicating not merely that
he believes the process to be illegitimate, but also that particular individuals involved in it are
liars, or “thugs,” or deserve death. Id.; ECF No. 64 at 9–10. The court finds that such statements
pose a significant and immediate risk that (1) witnesses will be intimidated or otherwise unduly
influenced by the prospect of being themselves targeted for harassment or threats; and (2)
attorneys, public servants, and other court staff will themselves become targets for threats and
harassment. And that risk is largely irreversible in the age of the Internet; once an individual is
publicly targeted, even revoking the offending statement may not abate the subsequent threats,
harassment, or other intimidating effects during the pretrial as well as trial stages of this case.
The defense’s position that no limits may be placed on Defendant’s speech because he is
engaged in a political campaign is untenable, and the cases it cites do not so hold. The Circuit
Courts in both United States v. Brown and United States v. Ford recognized that First
Amendment rights must yield to the imperative of a fair trial. 218 F.3d 415, 424 (2000); 830
F.2d 596, 599 (1987). Unlike the district courts in those cases, however, this court has found that
Page 3 of 3
even amidst his political campaign, Defendant’s statements pose sufficiently grave threats to the
integrity of these proceedings that cannot be addressed by alternative means, and it has tailored
its order to meet the force of those threats. Brown, 218 F.3d at 428–30; Ford, 830 F.2d at 600.
Thus, limited restrictions on extrajudicial statements are justified here. The bottom line is that
equal justice under law requires the equal treatment of criminal defendants; Defendant’s
presidential candidacy cannot excuse statements that would otherwise intolerably jeopardize
these proceedings.
Accordingly, and pursuant to Local Criminal Rule 57.7(c), it is hereby ORDERED that:
All interested parties in this matter, including the parties and their counsel, are
prohibited from making any public statements, or directing others to make any
public statements, that target (1) the Special Counsel prosecuting this case or his
staff; (2) defense counsel or their staff; (3) any of this court’s staff or other
supporting personnel; or (4) any reasonably foreseeable witness or the substance of
their testimony.
This Order shall not be construed to prohibit Defendant from making statements criticizing the
government generally, including the current administration or the Department of Justice;
statements asserting that Defendant is innocent of the charges against him, or that his prosecution
is politically motivated; or statements criticizing the campaign platforms or policies of
Defendant’s current political rivals, such as former Vice President Pence.
In addition, the sealed version of the government’s Motion to Ensure that Extrajudicial
Statements Do Not Prejudice These Proceedings, ECF No. 56, is DENIED as moot.
Date: October 17, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
UPDATE 5 -- JACK SMITH DC TRIAL
Many thanks to LetMyPeopleVote for posting this hot off the press. 
Y’all are keeping up with the trial so well that this post on DU is just for the record. 
1.
previous posts:
https://www.democraticunderground.com/100218351149
https://www.democraticunderground.com/100218351073
https://www.democraticunderground.com/100218344987
https://www.democraticunderground.com/100218318549
https://www.democraticunderground.com/100218228229
Here’s the case:
2.
DC Federal — United States v. TRUMP, 1:23-cr-00257, (D.D.C.) March 4 2024
— U.S. Dist.(DC) Judge Tanya S. Chutkan — E. Barrett Prettyman Courthouse
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_prosecution_of_Donald_Trump_(election_obstruction_case)
Lead prosecutors: Jack Smith, Molly Gaston, Thomas P. Windom, James I. Pearce
-- court docket
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67656604/united-states-v-trump/
3.
Judge Chutkan’s ruling on Jack Smith’s Motion 57 for a gag order :
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67656604/105/united-states-v-trump/
OPINION and ORDER as to DONALD J. TRUMP: Granting in part and denying in part the government's 57 Motion to Ensure that Extrajudicial Statements Do Not Prejudice These Proceedings; and denying as moot the government's sealed 56 Motion to Ensure that Extrajudicial Statements Do Not Prejudice These Proceedings. Signed by Judge Tanya S. Chutkan on 10/17/2023.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
Criminal Action No. 23-257 (TSC)
DONALD J. TRUMP,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth below and during the hearing in this case on October 16, 2023,
the government’s Motion to Ensure that Extrajudicial Statements Do Not Prejudice These
Proceedings, ECF No. 57, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Under binding Supreme Court precedent, this court “must take such steps by rule and
regulation that will protect [its] processes from prejudicial outside interferences.” Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). The First Amendment does not override that obligation.
“Freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential
requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice. But it must not be allowed to divert
the trial from the very purpose of a court system to adjudicate controversies, both criminal and
civil, in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures.” Id. at 350–
51 (cleaned up); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 n.18 (1984) (“Although
litigants do not surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse door, those rights may
be subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on several occasions this
Court has approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to
ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant.”) (quotation omitted). Here, alternative measures
Page 2 of 3
such as careful voir dire, jury sequestration, and cautionary jury instructions are sufficient to
remedy only some of the potential prejudices that the government’s motion seeks to address.
In order to safeguard the integrity of these proceedings, it is necessary to impose certain
restrictions on public statements by interested parties. Undisputed testimony cited by the
government demonstrates that when Defendant has publicly attacked individuals, including on
matters related to this case, those individuals are consequently threatened and harassed. See ECF
No. 57 at 3–5. Since his indictment, and even after the government filed the instant motion,
Defendant has continued to make similar statements attacking individuals involved in the judicial
process, including potential witnesses, prosecutors, and court staff. See id. at 6–12. Defendant
has made those statements to national audiences using language communicating not merely that
he believes the process to be illegitimate, but also that particular individuals involved in it are
liars, or “thugs,” or deserve death. Id.; ECF No. 64 at 9–10. The court finds that such statements
pose a significant and immediate risk that (1) witnesses will be intimidated or otherwise unduly
influenced by the prospect of being themselves targeted for harassment or threats; and (2)
attorneys, public servants, and other court staff will themselves become targets for threats and
harassment. And that risk is largely irreversible in the age of the Internet; once an individual is
publicly targeted, even revoking the offending statement may not abate the subsequent threats,
harassment, or other intimidating effects during the pretrial as well as trial stages of this case.
The defense’s position that no limits may be placed on Defendant’s speech because he is
engaged in a political campaign is untenable, and the cases it cites do not so hold. The Circuit
Courts in both United States v. Brown and United States v. Ford recognized that First
Amendment rights must yield to the imperative of a fair trial. 218 F.3d 415, 424 (2000); 830
F.2d 596, 599 (1987). Unlike the district courts in those cases, however, this court has found that
Page 3 of 3
even amidst his political campaign, Defendant’s statements pose sufficiently grave threats to the
integrity of these proceedings that cannot be addressed by alternative means, and it has tailored
its order to meet the force of those threats. Brown, 218 F.3d at 428–30; Ford, 830 F.2d at 600.
Thus, limited restrictions on extrajudicial statements are justified here. The bottom line is that
equal justice under law requires the equal treatment of criminal defendants; Defendant’s
presidential candidacy cannot excuse statements that would otherwise intolerably jeopardize
these proceedings.
Accordingly, and pursuant to Local Criminal Rule 57.7(c), it is hereby ORDERED that:
All interested parties in this matter, including the parties and their counsel, are
prohibited from making any public statements, or directing others to make any
public statements, that target (1) the Special Counsel prosecuting this case or his
staff; (2) defense counsel or their staff; (3) any of this court’s staff or other
supporting personnel; or (4) any reasonably foreseeable witness or the substance of
their testimony.
This Order shall not be construed to prohibit Defendant from making statements criticizing the
government generally, including the current administration or the Department of Justice;
statements asserting that Defendant is innocent of the charges against him, or that his prosecution
is politically motivated; or statements criticizing the campaign platforms or policies of
Defendant’s current political rivals, such as former Vice President Pence.
In addition, the sealed version of the government’s Motion to Ensure that Extrajudicial
Statements Do Not Prejudice These Proceedings, ECF No. 56, is DENIED as moot.
Date: October 17, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
October 17, 2023
During the 2019 impeachment probe into Trump blackmailing Ukrainian President Zelenskyy to fabricate dirt on then-candidate Joe Biden, Jordan helped criminally storm a secure room in the Capitol where evidence against Trump was held, delaying the proceedings by hours.
The stunt prompted cybersecurity concerns because Jordan and Gaetz brought people without security clearances carrying cellphones with cameras into the top-secret secured SCIF, prompting Congressman Eric Swalwell to note:
“They not only brought in their unauthorized bodies, they may have brought in the Russians and the Chinese with electronics into a secure space, which will require that the space at some point in time be sanitized.”
As a reward for Jordan’s loyal service to Trump’s MAGA/Putin cause, in his final weeks as president the Orange Rapist awarded him the rare Presidential Medal of Freedom, an honor established by President Kennedy for people who have given outstanding service to America in the fields of national security and world peace...
An Ohio newspaper warns that putting Jordan in the Speaker’s position, two heartbeats away from the presidency, will create an “Axis of Evil” between Trump, Jordan, and the other Putin-aligned MAGA Republicans in that body.
The Cleveland Plain Dealer’s former Editorial Director wrote:
“Placing second in the line of presidential succession, a man willing to besmirch everything America stands for in service of Trump by rights should prove too risky for many of the House’s 221 Republican members.”
Truer words were never spoken. Jim Jordan represents a real and existential threat to democracy in our country, the rights of women and minorities, and peace in the world.
Jim Jordan Lies -- here's the list.
https://archive.ph/4dBhmDuring the 2019 impeachment probe into Trump blackmailing Ukrainian President Zelenskyy to fabricate dirt on then-candidate Joe Biden, Jordan helped criminally storm a secure room in the Capitol where evidence against Trump was held, delaying the proceedings by hours.
The stunt prompted cybersecurity concerns because Jordan and Gaetz brought people without security clearances carrying cellphones with cameras into the top-secret secured SCIF, prompting Congressman Eric Swalwell to note:
“They not only brought in their unauthorized bodies, they may have brought in the Russians and the Chinese with electronics into a secure space, which will require that the space at some point in time be sanitized.”
As a reward for Jordan’s loyal service to Trump’s MAGA/Putin cause, in his final weeks as president the Orange Rapist awarded him the rare Presidential Medal of Freedom, an honor established by President Kennedy for people who have given outstanding service to America in the fields of national security and world peace...
An Ohio newspaper warns that putting Jordan in the Speaker’s position, two heartbeats away from the presidency, will create an “Axis of Evil” between Trump, Jordan, and the other Putin-aligned MAGA Republicans in that body.
The Cleveland Plain Dealer’s former Editorial Director wrote:
“Placing second in the line of presidential succession, a man willing to besmirch everything America stands for in service of Trump by rights should prove too risky for many of the House’s 221 Republican members.”
Truer words were never spoken. Jim Jordan represents a real and existential threat to democracy in our country, the rights of women and minorities, and peace in the world.
October 17, 2023
Soon as Trump said he'd appeal the gag order, Jack Smith added James Inman Pearce to his team.
James Pearce has covered all appeals for the Jan 6 trials. With zero overturns on appeal by the DOJ so far, Pearce will handle Trump’s DC appeals.
Politico reports that appeals court judges raise doubts about the strength of the DOJ's 200+ obstruction convictions that aren't attached to any actual assault on police on Jan 6. We might see the SCOTUS take one of those appeals cases, and overturn one obstruction convictions, thus the rest of them, but being a layman, not a constitutional lawyer... anyway, all the Jan 6 obstruction counts were part of multiple law violations, so the DOJ overall conviction rate will still stand at 99%
https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/07/january-6-obstruction-ruling-00091034
Pearce comes out of the DOJ Criminal Division’s Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section, provides expert legal and technical advice & training. He's a trial lawyer who provides prosecutors elite-level digital investigative analysis, advises on and litigates in support of the lawful collection of electronic evidence.
According to Neal Katyal, Trump and his legal team are going nowhere.
October 17, 2023
With every fiber of his being he FIGHTS for democracy and freedom for Israel and Ukraine.
There's no one in the world stronger than President Biden.
Beau Biden knew it.
Joint Chiefs General Brown knows he is.
NATO definitely knows it.
Ukraine knows without a doubt.
Our troops feel it.
Israel now knows it.
God Bless President Biden, the best of America and the Free World. :
Grateful, proud of the greatest Commander-in-Chief & Leader of the Free World in our lifetime!
President Biden doesn't just talk democracy. No.With every fiber of his being he FIGHTS for democracy and freedom for Israel and Ukraine.
There's no one in the world stronger than President Biden.
Beau Biden knew it.
Joint Chiefs General Brown knows he is.
NATO definitely knows it.
Ukraine knows without a doubt.
Our troops feel it.
Israel now knows it.
God Bless President Biden, the best of America and the Free World. :
October 16, 2023
It's a due process court procedure that allows both counsels to decide on redactions, though, being a layman, I'm not sure why that procedure exists. So the transcript won't likely be available through media, either.
There is no publicly available court transcript of today's DC hearing. And not for a while.
According to the docket, the Main Document IS there, but is not linked there, and only will be available from PACER,.
Scroll down here to # 103 for Oct 16 2023 -- notice that "Main Document" isn't highlighted as are other docket documents.
Here's the court filing stating that it won't allow transcript publication for 90 days for the following reasons:
TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING in case as to DONALD J. TRUMP before Judge Tanya S. Chutkan held on October 16, 2023; Page Numbers: 1-86. Date of Issuance: 10/16/2023. Court Reporter: Bryan A. Wayne.
Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order FormFor the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi-page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty-one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 11/6/2023. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/16/2023. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/14/2024.(Wayne, Bryan) (Entered: 10/16/2023)
Main Document
Buy on PACER
Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order FormFor the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi-page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.
NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty-one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov. Redaction Request due 11/6/2023. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/16/2023. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/14/2024.(Wayne, Bryan) (Entered: 10/16/2023)
Main Document
Buy on PACER
It's a due process court procedure that allows both counsels to decide on redactions, though, being a layman, I'm not sure why that procedure exists. So the transcript won't likely be available through media, either.
October 16, 2023
-- making or reposting any statements publicly targeting Smith or
-- his staff and the court or staff,
and prohibited statements about
-- witnesses or
-- their expected testimony.
Chutkan said Trump can
-- continue to campaign for the Republican nomination and
-- say he believes the case is politically motivated,
but Trump is not allowed to
-- “launch a pretrial smear campaign” to
-- intimidate or discredit witnesses or staff...
Other back-and-forth counsel statements leading up to the above limited gag order:
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2023-10-16/judge-grants-gag-order-in-trump-2020-election-case
More on the gag order, since there is no "SO ORDERED" Main Document filed on the docket yet.
Chutkan prohibited all parties in the case, including Trump, from-- making or reposting any statements publicly targeting Smith or
-- his staff and the court or staff,
and prohibited statements about
-- witnesses or
-- their expected testimony.
Chutkan said Trump can
-- continue to campaign for the Republican nomination and
-- say he believes the case is politically motivated,
but Trump is not allowed to
-- “launch a pretrial smear campaign” to
-- intimidate or discredit witnesses or staff...
Other back-and-forth counsel statements leading up to the above limited gag order:
Lauro said that prosecutors haven’t shown that any witness has been intimidated.
Chutkan noted that Smith has presented evidence of the effect of Trump statements on witnesses in other matters.
Most recently Trump suggested that former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley deserves to be put to death.
“This guy turned out to be a Woke train wreck who, if the Fake News reporting is correct, was actually dealing with China to give them a heads up on the thinking of the President of the United States,” Trump wrote on his social platform Truth Social. “This is an act so egregious that, in times gone by, the punishment would have been DEATH! A war between China and the United States could have been the result of this treasonous act.”
“We both know that the tweet or whatever it was about Gen. Milley was a threat and it was meant as a threat,” prosecutor Molly Gaston said...
...Lauro complained that President Biden would not be subject to a gag order. Chutkan responded that “Joe Biden is not a party to this case. He is not under release conditions.”
Gaston noted that the Justice Department isn’t asking that Trump not be able to campaign.
“He could criticize President Biden to his heart’s content, Your Honor, because President Biden is not a party to this case,” Gaston said...
...When Chutkan, who has repeatedly been the subject of Trump’s criticism on social media, questioned whether she should impose a similar order preventing Trump from targeting her or her staff, Lauro said that he would pass along her admonishment to Trump, and said that such a post would not be made in this case.
“The court’s instructions and admonition is heard by all,” Lauro said.
Gaston disagreed, saying a gag order is necessary and that there has already been a criminal threat to the court...
Chutkan noted that Smith has presented evidence of the effect of Trump statements on witnesses in other matters.
Most recently Trump suggested that former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley deserves to be put to death.
“This guy turned out to be a Woke train wreck who, if the Fake News reporting is correct, was actually dealing with China to give them a heads up on the thinking of the President of the United States,” Trump wrote on his social platform Truth Social. “This is an act so egregious that, in times gone by, the punishment would have been DEATH! A war between China and the United States could have been the result of this treasonous act.”
“We both know that the tweet or whatever it was about Gen. Milley was a threat and it was meant as a threat,” prosecutor Molly Gaston said...
...Lauro complained that President Biden would not be subject to a gag order. Chutkan responded that “Joe Biden is not a party to this case. He is not under release conditions.”
Gaston noted that the Justice Department isn’t asking that Trump not be able to campaign.
“He could criticize President Biden to his heart’s content, Your Honor, because President Biden is not a party to this case,” Gaston said...
...When Chutkan, who has repeatedly been the subject of Trump’s criticism on social media, questioned whether she should impose a similar order preventing Trump from targeting her or her staff, Lauro said that he would pass along her admonishment to Trump, and said that such a post would not be made in this case.
“The court’s instructions and admonition is heard by all,” Lauro said.
Gaston disagreed, saying a gag order is necessary and that there has already been a criminal threat to the court...
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2023-10-16/judge-grants-gag-order-in-trump-2020-election-case
October 16, 2023
She'll rule on a partial gag that strictly adheres to the facts and arguments presented these two Jack Smith motions below.
10/16/2023 -- 10:00 AM hearing on the Smith's filed #57 Protective Order
MINUTE ORDER as to DONALD J. TRUMP:
The court hereby schedules a hearing on the government's 57 Motion to Ensure that Extrajudicial Statements Do Not Prejudice These Proceedings on October 16, 2023 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 9.
The requirement of Defendant's appearance is waived for this hearing.
Signed by Judge Tanya S. Chutkan on 9/29/2023. (zjd)
Here is the more detailed Motion 64 to support Motion 57, which the Judge is also considering:
(However, 9/29/2023 Docket Entry # 64 no longer found on the court listener docket page, but still exists, and is reprinted here, including my bolding )
REPLY in Support by USA as to DONALD J. TRUMP re 57 MOTION to Ensure that Extrajudicial Statements Do Not Prejudice these Proceedings (Gaston, Molly)
The need for the proposed order is further evidenced by a review of the defendant’s
prejudicial statements in the weeks since the Government initially filed its motion on September
5. See ECF No. 47-3. Since that date, the defendant has continued to make statements that pose
a substantial likelihood of material prejudice to this case and that fall within the narrowly tailored
order proposed by the Government. These include:
• On September 5, shortly before the Government filed its motion, the defendant posted an
article on the social media platform Truth Social, on which the defendant has more than 6
million followers, making claims about the Court with the sarcastic caption, “Oh, I’m sure
she will be very fair” and an article circulating a false accusation against a Special
Counsel’s Office prosecutor with the caption, “Really corrupt!” 3
• On September 6, on Truth Social, the defendant issued two posts attacking the former Vice
President, a witness identified in the indictment, in relation to this case, saying that he had
seen the Vice President “make up stories about me, which are absolutely false,” and that
the witness had gone to the “Dark Side”; 4
• In an interview aired on NBC’s Meet the Press on September 17, 5 the defendant answered
questions for more than an hour, and said, among other things:
o That the Georgia Secretary of State, a witness identified in the indictment, recently
said things that he had not, including that the defendant “didn’t do anything wrong”
during a phone call constituting an overt act in the indictment;
o That another witness identified in the indictment, the former Attorney General,
“didn’t do his job” during the charged conspiracy because he was afraid of being
impeached;
3
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111013216116097929;
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111013180388667397.
4
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111019762094553476;
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111019761485786681.
5
https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/transcripts/full-transcript-read-meet-the-press-
kristen-welker-interview-trump-rcna104778
page 10 of 22
• On September 22, on Truth Social, the defendant falsely claimed that the retiring Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a witness cited in the indictment, had committed treason and
suggested that he should be executed: 6
• On September 23, on Truth Social, the defendant re-posted with the caption “What a
mess!” the false claim that the Georgia Secretary of State “knew [of tens of thousands of
fraudulent votes in Georgia in 2020] and covered it up”; 7 and
• On September 26, on Truth Social, the defendant posted a link to an article singling out a
specific prosecutor in the Special Counsel’s Office and claiming that the SCO is a “team
of Lunatics that are working so hard on creating Election Interference . . . ” 8
The defendant’s baseless attacks on the Court and two individual prosecutors not only
could subject them to threats—it also could cause potential jurors to develop views about the
6
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111111513207332826.
7
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111112757748267246.
8
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111133017255697239.
page 11 of 22
propriety of the prosecution, an improper consideration for a juror prior to trial. See Fieger, 2008
WL 474084 at *3-6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2008) (magistrate judge imposing an order, adopted in
relevant part by district court, preventing defendant from publicizing, including through
commercials, his claims of improper, selective, or vindictive prosecution because they “create the
danger that potential jurors will associate the content of these commercials to this criminal
prosecution of Defendant Fieger. The commercials therefore are substantially likely to materially
prejudice a fair trial even though this pending criminal action is not explicitly mentioned.”);
Scrushy, 2004 WL 848221, at *4-*6 & n.5 (N.D. Ala. April 13, 2004) (ordering all trial
participants, including the defendant, to “remove from their existing webpages . . . allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct,” and ordering the defendant not to use “his morning television show
. . . to make statements about the case that his lawyers would be precluded from making by the
Rules of Professional Conduct”).
Likewise, the defendant’s continuing public statements about witnesses are substantially
likely to materially prejudice a fair trial. In his opposition, the defendant makes light of some of
his previous attacks on witnesses—some of whom are federal and state government figures in their
own right—by stating that such witnesses do not “sh[y] away from a hearty public debate with
[the defendant]” and were not intimidated by the defendant, or by implying that government
officials somehow have asked for his attacks because they “have made politics, for all its discord
and discourse, a large part of their lives.” ECF No. 60 at n.7. Even assuming that certain witnesses
are not intimidated by the defendant’s statements, other witnesses see and may be affected by what
the defendant does to those who are called to testify in this case. And regardless of whether certain
witnesses are intimidated by the defendant’s extrajudicial statements, the defendant should not be
Page 12 of 22
permitted to attack or bolster the credibility of any witness in a manner that could influence
prospective jurors.
In addition, the defendant’s argument essentially concedes that he is trying this case in the
public sphere, not in the courtroom, which is precisely the harm that Rule 57.7(c) is designed to
prevent. The defendant is publicly maligning witnesses and very intentionally commenting on the
specific topics of their potential testimony at trial. In the context of a pending criminal case and
trial, it is not the solution to the defendant’s improper and prejudicial statements to encourage a
“hearty public debate” in the media regarding witnesses and the merits of the case—it is the
problem. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351 (“legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the
use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper” and “freedom of discussion . . . must not be
allowed to divert the trial from the very purpose of a court system to adjudicate controversies . . .
in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures”) (internal citations
omitted). From the defendant’s statements, potential jurors may form improper views about
various witnesses’ reputations, veracity, or what they will say at trial. The Court can and should
prevent such improper dissemination of information about the substance of this case. Id. at 363;
see also Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (prejudice arising from jurors’
exposure to evidence from extrajudicial sources can be particularly acute because “it is then not
tempered by protective procedures.”); United States v. Lindh, 198 F. Supp. 2d 739, 743 (E.D. Va.
2002) (“Defendant has no constitutional right to use the media to influence public opinion
concerning his case so as to gain an advantage at trial. No such right inheres in either the Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial, or the public’s First Amendment right to a free press.”).
Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the Government is not trying to “unconstitutionally
silence” the defendant, ECF No. 60 at 2, and the proposed order would have no such effect. Since
Page 13 of 22
the Government’s initial filing, beyond the prejudicial examples cited above, the defendant has
made a large volume and wide variety of public statements—through social media posts,
interviews, and speeches—that would be unaffected by the proposed order. If the Court entered
the proposed order, it would in no way hinder the defendant’s ability to campaign and publicly
maintain his innocence. All it would limit is the defendant’s use of his candidacy as a cover for
making prejudicial public statements about this case—and there is no legitimate need for the
defendant, in the course of his campaign, to attack known witnesses regarding the substance of
their anticipated testimony or otherwise engage in materially prejudicial commentary in violation
of the proposed order.
ii. The Defendant’s Opposition Misstates the Facts
The defendant’s opposition makes no attempt to address most of the factual record that the
Government submitted to the Court regarding the defendant’s history and current practice of using
public statements to target individuals, see ECF No. 57 at 2-13, and instead advances conclusory
statements that the Government’s claims are baseless. That is because he cannot explain away the
obvious intent and well-known effect of his words. The single statement that the defendant does
address—in a footnote—is the threatening Truth Social post that he issued on August 4, the day
after his arraignment in this case: “IF YOU GO AFTER ME, I’M COMING AFTER YOU!” The
defendant complains that the Government’s motion did not note that after public outcry—given
the objectively reasonable understanding of the defendant’s post as a threat related to this case—
a spokesperson issued a statement claiming that the defendant had issued the threat “in response
to . . . special interest groups and Super PACs.” ECF No. 60 at n.8. But the spokesperson’s after-
the-fact explanation is implausible on its face. The truth is clear: the defendant was caught making
a public threat and then had a spokesperson issue an excuse. As the Court has stated, “even
page 14 of 22
arguably ambiguous statements from parties or their counsel, if they could reasonably be
interpreted to intimidate witnesses or to prejudice potential jurors, can threaten the process.”
Protective Order Hr’g 72-10. The defendant should not be permitted to obtain the benefits of
his incendiary public statements and then avoid accountability by having others—whose messages
he knows will receive markedly less attention than his own—feign retraction. 9 Likewise, no other
criminal defendant would be permitted to issue public statements insinuating that a known witness
in his case should be executed; this defendant should not be, either.
The defendant’s opposition also makes the self-serving claim that rather than address the
source of the material prejudice—the defendant’s inflammatory statements—the Court should
employ alternatives to a Rule 57.7(c) order, such as change of venue, postponement of trial, voir
9
The defendant recently was caught potentially violating his conditions of release, and
tried to walk that back in similar fashion. In particular, on September 25, the defendant’s campaign
spokesman posted a video of the defendant in the Palmetto State Armory, a Federal Firearms
Licensee in Summerville, South Carolina. The video posted by the spokesman showed the
defendant holding a Glock pistol with the defendant’s likeness etched into it. The defendant stated,
“I’ve got to buy one,” and posed for pictures with the FFL owners. The defendant’s spokesman
captioned the video Tweet with the representation that the defendant had purchased the pistol,
exclaiming, “President Trump purchases a @GLOCKInc in South Carolina!” The spokesman
subsequently deleted the post and retracted his statement, saying that the defendant “did not
purchase or take possession of the firearm” (a claim directly contradicted by the video showing
the defendant possessing the pistol). See Fox News, Trump campaign walks back claim former
president purchased Glock amid questions about legality (Sept. 25, 2023),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-campaign-walks-back-claim-former-president-
purchased-glock-amid-questions-about-legality (accessed Sept. 26, 2023). Despite his
spokesperson’s retraction, the Defendant then re-posted a video of the incident posted by one of
his followers with the caption, “MY PRESIDENT Trump just bought a Golden Glock before his
rally in South Carolina after being arrested 4 TIMES in a year.”
The defendant either purchased a gun in violation of the law and his conditions of release,
or seeks to benefit from his supporters’ mistaken belief that he did so. It would be a separate
federal crime, and thus a violation of the defendant’s conditions of release, for him to purchase a
gun while this felony indictment is pending. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).
page 15 of 22
dire, or jury instructions. ECF No. 60 at 14. But such alternatives are not adequate because they
would not address the source of the prejudice: the defendant’s repeated efforts to try this case in
the media. The Court’s duty here is to implement “measures that will prevent the prejudice at its
inception,” Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363, and so long as the defendant persists in making materially
prejudicial statements on social media, in interviews, and in speeches, the defendant will continue
to affect the potential venire for this trial. In addition, the defendant’s statements have such broad
reach that as long as he makes them, he will taint potential jurors anywhere in the country. See
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075 (even “[e]xtensive voir dire may not be able to filter out all of the effects
of pretrial publicity, and with increasingly widespread media coverage of criminal trials, a change
of venue may not suffice to undo the effect of [trial participants’] statements”); Brown, 218 F.3d
at 431 (jury instruction may fail to address threat of “carnival atmosphere” around trial). Finally,
the alternatives that the defendant suggests the Court consider would have the perverse incentive
of encouraging, rather than curbing, the defendant’s prejudicial statements. The defendant has,
for instance, already stated publicly that he intends to seek a change of venue in this case. See
ECF No. 57 at 7-8. He should not be permitted to pollute the jury pool in this District with his
prejudicial statements and then seek a change of venue based on the complaint that the venire is
tainted.
The defendant seeks to deflect responsibility for his own prejudicial statements by claiming
that the indictment in this case was “false and derogatory” and that the Special Counsel’s brief
statement upon its unsealing was prejudicial because it ascribed to the defendant responsibility for
the events of January 6, 2021—which, according to the defendant’s opposition, the indictment
does not allege. ECF No. 60 at 19-20. The defendant is wrong. First, the indictment, filed in
court, does what indictments are supposed to do: set forth the criminal charges against the
page 16 of 22
defendant and give notice of the factual allegations that underpin them. The defendant provides
no support for his claim that the indictment can be a source of unfair prejudice here—because there
is no such support. And second, the indictment does in fact clearly link the defendant and his
actions to the events of January 6. It alleges—and at trial, the Government will prove—the
following:
• The defendant’s criminal conspiracies targeted, in part, the January 6 certification and
capitalized “on the widespread mistrust the [d]efendant was creating through pervasive
and destabilizing lies about election fraud,” ECF No. 1 at ¶4.
• In advance of January 6, the defendant “urged his supporters to travel to Washington
on the day of the certification proceeding, tweeting, ‘Big protest in D.C. on January
6th. Be there, will be wild!,’” id. at ¶87. He then “set the false expectation that the
Vice President had the authority to and might use his ceremonial role at the certification
proceeding to reverse the election outcome in [his] favor, id. at ¶96.
• Then, despite his awareness “that the crowd [ ] on January 6 was going to be ‘angry,’”
id. at ¶98, on the morning of January 6, the defendant “decided to single out the Vice
President in public remarks,” id. at ¶102, and “repeated knowingly false claims of
election fraud to gathered supporters, falsely told them that the Vice President had the
authority to and might alter the election results, and directed them to the Capitol to
obstruct the certification proceeding and exert pressure on the Vice President to take
the fraudulent actions he had previously refused,” id. at ¶10d.
• Finally, on the afternoon of January 6, after “a large and angry crowd—including many
individuals whom the [d]efendant had deceived into believing the Vice President could
and might change the election results—violently attacked the Capitol and halted the
proceeding,” the defendant exploited the disruption in furtherance of his efforts to
obstruct the certification, id. at ¶10e.
In short, the indictment alleges that the defendant’s actions, including his campaign of knowingly
false claims of election fraud, led to the events of January 6.
The defendant’s motion also attempts to downplay defense counsel’s clear violations of
Rule 57.7(b), and appears to suggest that the defendant’s attorneys reserve the right to violate that
Rule in the future. See ECF No. 60 at 19-22. But it is uncontroverted that, on multiple occasions
in the week following the unsealing of the indictment, defense counsel appeared on media
page 17 of 22
programs and talked extensively about this case, including on topics that Rule 57.7(b) prohibits
attorneys from discussing. See ECF No. 57 at 16 (citing Rule 57.7(b) and linking to lead counsel’s
appearances). The defendant’s opposition then complains that the Court would render his
attorneys inadequate if it were to restrict them from further public statements through the
Government’s proposed 57.7(c) order, but fails to recognize that most of its terms mirror existing
restrictions on all attorneys practicing in this District under Local Criminal Rule 57.7(b). Compare
Local Criminal Rule 57.7(b) (prohibiting attorneys from making extrajudicial statements
regarding, among other things, the “identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses”)
with ECF No. 57-2 (same, with prohibition on “disparaging and inflammatory or intimidating
statements” about parties, witnesses, attorneys, court personnel, or potential jurors).
Finally, the defendant’s opposition makes faulty claims about the scope and applicability
of the proposed order. In addition to making inaccurate claims about the proposed order’s breadth,
see ECF No. 60 at 17, the defendant suggests that the Government seeks to prevent the defendant
from “redress[ing] the unfairness of this proceeding through legitimate means” including “for
example, filing motions with the Court.” ECF No. 60 at 10-11. But nothing in the proposed order
prevents the defendant from doing so—rather, it explicitly states that he can. See ECF No. 57-2
at 1-2 (order “does not preclude the defendant or his attorneys, agents, or others acting on his
behalf from (a) quoting or referring without comment to public records of the court in the case”).
Similarly, the defendant’s opposition states that “the prosecution seeks only to bar [the defendant]
from speaking.” ECF No. 60 at 13. Not so. The proposed order applies to all parties—including
the Government. But the defendant’s allegation here is telling, in that it highlights that the
defendant—and no other party—is making materially prejudicial public statements in this case…
the Government has proposed that the Court enter an order with five
reasonable conditions:
(1) any party—whether the Government or the defendant—must notify the
Court ex parte before the party or “any individual or entity acting at the party’s direction or under
the party’s control undertakes any jury study in the District of Columbia;”
(2) the notice must include a brief description of the intended methodology, all questions to be asked, and the expected
Page 19 of 22
number of participants;
(3) the party cannot begin the jury study, or use any results from it, absent
the Court’s approval, which may be conditioned on editing or removing portions of the intended
jury study that threaten to materially prejudice the jury pool;
(4) the jury study must be completed
30 days before the start of jury selection; and
(5) the party must maintain the names and addresses
of the study participants and provide that information to the Court at least two weeks prior to jury
selection. See ECF No. 57-3. The defendant objects to every one of these provisions. 10
First, the defendant posits that “jury studies and polling have almost no chance of
influencing the jury,” noting that “Washington D.C. has almost 700,000 residents” and “[a]
statistically significant sample size would ordinarily include only a few hundred people.” ECF
No. 60 at 23. But the size of the jury pool is immaterial; indeed, the Government’s motion cites
to a standing order on jury studies in a Division of the Eastern District of Texas with a population
exceeding that of this District. See ECF No. 57 at 19 (citing Judge Clark’s standing order in the
Beaumont and Lufkin Divisions); https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-by-state/texas-
population-change-between-census-decade.html (estimating the 2020 population of the counties
comprising the Division to be approximately 832,000). In addition, nothing would prevent the
defendant from creating and implementing a biased jury study and then publicizing its results—or
answers to specific, slanted questions—on a widespread basis to the entire potential jury pool. The
Court should exercise its discretion to protect against such prejudice by taking the simple step of
reviewing the proposal ex parte.
10
The defendant objects to the Government’s proposal, but “has no objection to informing
the Court of the dates and sample sizes of his polling in the District of Columbia.” ECF No. 60 at
23. The defendant’s alternative, however, would not address the potential tangible harm—
materially prejudicing the jury pool—posed by inappropriate studies.
Page 20 of 22
Second, the defendant suggests that no Court regulation is needed because “the purpose of
polling and jury studies is not to influence respondents, but to get a true read on the community’s
opinions or feelings on certain issues.” ECF No. 60 at 23. But in practice, jury studies, like other
polls, may be skewed to influence the participants or shape the results. See Ellen Kreitzberg &
Mary Procaccio-Flowers, Jury Selection: The Law, Art & Science of Selecting a Jury § 3:4 (2002)
(“Providing respondents with a misleading description of the facts may produce responses that are
pleasing to the client, but will be useless in providing insight into the reactions of the jurors who
will hear the whole truth during trial.”). 11 Because skewed studies could influence potential jurors,
the questions should be subject to review by the Court. See Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC,
601 S.W.3d 704, 726 (Tex. 2020) (“A campaign of disinformation, in whatever form, undermines
the sanctity of the judicial process and is inimical to the constitutional promise of a fair and
impartial jury trial.”).
Third, the defendant objects to a requirement that any jury study be concluded 30 days
before trial because “polling is most valuable if conducted close to trial.” ECF No. 60 at 24. Yet
at the status hearing one month ago, defense counsel suggested the defendant would “likely need
to do it sooner rather than later,” Transcript of Status Hearing, at 59 (Aug. 28, 2023), in reference
to polling for a Rule 26 motion, the filing deadline for which is October 9, 2023. See ECF No. 39
at ¶2 (setting deadline for “[a]ll other pre-trial motions, excluding motions in limine”). In any
11
While in office, the defendant provided an example of one type of distorted polling the
proposed order seeks to prevent: “A poll should be done on which is the more dishonest and
deceitful newspaper, the Failing New York Times or the Amazon (lobbyist) Washington Post!
They are both a disgrace to our County, the Enemy of the People, but I just can’t seem to figure
out which is worse?” See Trump Tweet, June 16, 2019, 9:39:22 EST, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2023).
page 21 of 22
event, the proposed 30-day limit creates a reasonable buffer that would reduce the potential impact
of any jury study on the venire. See Brewer, 601 S.W.3d at 726.
Fourth, relying on Blankenship v. Fox News Network, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00236, 2020 WL
7225765, at *1 n.3 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 8, 2020), the defendant contends that “polls and jury studies
commissioned by defense counsel are work product and some parts, if not all, are attorney-client
privileged.” ECF No. 60 at 23. That inapposite case, though, dealt with a civil subpoena seeking
“all documents and communications that underlie these investigations as well as analyses carried
out on Plaintiff’s behalf and documents and communications between Plaintiff and his attorneys
and [the jury consulting company] pertaining to the criminal trial.” Id. at *2. Here, the proposed
order addresses a far more limited set of information—“a brief description of the intended
methodology. . . all questions that will be asked. . . [and] the expected number of participants,” as
well as the participants’ names and addresses. ECF No. 57-3 at 1-2. Assuming any privileges
applied to such information, they would dissipate when the “questions to be asked” were actually
asked of the participants. In other words, the parties cannot shield from the Court, on privilege
grounds, the questions they intend to broadcast to hundreds, if not thousands, of District residents.
page 22 of 22
The rationale for the proposed order is to protect the integrity of the trial and the jury pool,
and the regulations it would impose are modest. The defendant’s complaints are unfounded, and
the Court should exercise its discretion to enter the order.
III. Conclusion
Through both of its proposed orders, the Government seeks appropriate processes for
protecting the jury pool in this case and the integrity of this proceeding. The Court should grant
the Government’s motion and enter them.
Respectfully submitted... Smith, Gaston, and Windom
10/16 2023 Court's In Session -- while we wait...
a review of Motions 57 & 64 that Judge Chutkan rules on today.She'll rule on a partial gag that strictly adheres to the facts and arguments presented these two Jack Smith motions below.
10/16/2023 -- 10:00 AM hearing on the Smith's filed #57 Protective Order
MINUTE ORDER as to DONALD J. TRUMP:
The court hereby schedules a hearing on the government's 57 Motion to Ensure that Extrajudicial Statements Do Not Prejudice These Proceedings on October 16, 2023 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 9.
The requirement of Defendant's appearance is waived for this hearing.
Signed by Judge Tanya S. Chutkan on 9/29/2023. (zjd)
Here is the more detailed Motion 64 to support Motion 57, which the Judge is also considering:
(However, 9/29/2023 Docket Entry # 64 no longer found on the court listener docket page, but still exists, and is reprinted here, including my bolding )
REPLY in Support by USA as to DONALD J. TRUMP re 57 MOTION to Ensure that Extrajudicial Statements Do Not Prejudice these Proceedings (Gaston, Molly)
The need for the proposed order is further evidenced by a review of the defendant’s
prejudicial statements in the weeks since the Government initially filed its motion on September
5. See ECF No. 47-3. Since that date, the defendant has continued to make statements that pose
a substantial likelihood of material prejudice to this case and that fall within the narrowly tailored
order proposed by the Government. These include:
• On September 5, shortly before the Government filed its motion, the defendant posted an
article on the social media platform Truth Social, on which the defendant has more than 6
million followers, making claims about the Court with the sarcastic caption, “Oh, I’m sure
she will be very fair” and an article circulating a false accusation against a Special
Counsel’s Office prosecutor with the caption, “Really corrupt!” 3
• On September 6, on Truth Social, the defendant issued two posts attacking the former Vice
President, a witness identified in the indictment, in relation to this case, saying that he had
seen the Vice President “make up stories about me, which are absolutely false,” and that
the witness had gone to the “Dark Side”; 4
• In an interview aired on NBC’s Meet the Press on September 17, 5 the defendant answered
questions for more than an hour, and said, among other things:
o That the Georgia Secretary of State, a witness identified in the indictment, recently
said things that he had not, including that the defendant “didn’t do anything wrong”
during a phone call constituting an overt act in the indictment;
o That another witness identified in the indictment, the former Attorney General,
“didn’t do his job” during the charged conspiracy because he was afraid of being
impeached;
3
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111013216116097929;
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111013180388667397.
4
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111019762094553476;
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111019761485786681.
5
https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/transcripts/full-transcript-read-meet-the-press-
kristen-welker-interview-trump-rcna104778
page 10 of 22
• On September 22, on Truth Social, the defendant falsely claimed that the retiring Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a witness cited in the indictment, had committed treason and
suggested that he should be executed: 6
• On September 23, on Truth Social, the defendant re-posted with the caption “What a
mess!” the false claim that the Georgia Secretary of State “knew [of tens of thousands of
fraudulent votes in Georgia in 2020] and covered it up”; 7 and
• On September 26, on Truth Social, the defendant posted a link to an article singling out a
specific prosecutor in the Special Counsel’s Office and claiming that the SCO is a “team
of Lunatics that are working so hard on creating Election Interference . . . ” 8
The defendant’s baseless attacks on the Court and two individual prosecutors not only
could subject them to threats—it also could cause potential jurors to develop views about the
6
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111111513207332826.
7
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111112757748267246.
8
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111133017255697239.
page 11 of 22
propriety of the prosecution, an improper consideration for a juror prior to trial. See Fieger, 2008
WL 474084 at *3-6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2008) (magistrate judge imposing an order, adopted in
relevant part by district court, preventing defendant from publicizing, including through
commercials, his claims of improper, selective, or vindictive prosecution because they “create the
danger that potential jurors will associate the content of these commercials to this criminal
prosecution of Defendant Fieger. The commercials therefore are substantially likely to materially
prejudice a fair trial even though this pending criminal action is not explicitly mentioned.”);
Scrushy, 2004 WL 848221, at *4-*6 & n.5 (N.D. Ala. April 13, 2004) (ordering all trial
participants, including the defendant, to “remove from their existing webpages . . . allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct,” and ordering the defendant not to use “his morning television show
. . . to make statements about the case that his lawyers would be precluded from making by the
Rules of Professional Conduct”).
Likewise, the defendant’s continuing public statements about witnesses are substantially
likely to materially prejudice a fair trial. In his opposition, the defendant makes light of some of
his previous attacks on witnesses—some of whom are federal and state government figures in their
own right—by stating that such witnesses do not “sh[y] away from a hearty public debate with
[the defendant]” and were not intimidated by the defendant, or by implying that government
officials somehow have asked for his attacks because they “have made politics, for all its discord
and discourse, a large part of their lives.” ECF No. 60 at n.7. Even assuming that certain witnesses
are not intimidated by the defendant’s statements, other witnesses see and may be affected by what
the defendant does to those who are called to testify in this case. And regardless of whether certain
witnesses are intimidated by the defendant’s extrajudicial statements, the defendant should not be
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permitted to attack or bolster the credibility of any witness in a manner that could influence
prospective jurors.
In addition, the defendant’s argument essentially concedes that he is trying this case in the
public sphere, not in the courtroom, which is precisely the harm that Rule 57.7(c) is designed to
prevent. The defendant is publicly maligning witnesses and very intentionally commenting on the
specific topics of their potential testimony at trial. In the context of a pending criminal case and
trial, it is not the solution to the defendant’s improper and prejudicial statements to encourage a
“hearty public debate” in the media regarding witnesses and the merits of the case—it is the
problem. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351 (“legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the
use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper” and “freedom of discussion . . . must not be
allowed to divert the trial from the very purpose of a court system to adjudicate controversies . . .
in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures”) (internal citations
omitted). From the defendant’s statements, potential jurors may form improper views about
various witnesses’ reputations, veracity, or what they will say at trial. The Court can and should
prevent such improper dissemination of information about the substance of this case. Id. at 363;
see also Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959) (prejudice arising from jurors’
exposure to evidence from extrajudicial sources can be particularly acute because “it is then not
tempered by protective procedures.”); United States v. Lindh, 198 F. Supp. 2d 739, 743 (E.D. Va.
2002) (“Defendant has no constitutional right to use the media to influence public opinion
concerning his case so as to gain an advantage at trial. No such right inheres in either the Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial, or the public’s First Amendment right to a free press.”).
Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the Government is not trying to “unconstitutionally
silence” the defendant, ECF No. 60 at 2, and the proposed order would have no such effect. Since
Page 13 of 22
the Government’s initial filing, beyond the prejudicial examples cited above, the defendant has
made a large volume and wide variety of public statements—through social media posts,
interviews, and speeches—that would be unaffected by the proposed order. If the Court entered
the proposed order, it would in no way hinder the defendant’s ability to campaign and publicly
maintain his innocence. All it would limit is the defendant’s use of his candidacy as a cover for
making prejudicial public statements about this case—and there is no legitimate need for the
defendant, in the course of his campaign, to attack known witnesses regarding the substance of
their anticipated testimony or otherwise engage in materially prejudicial commentary in violation
of the proposed order.
ii. The Defendant’s Opposition Misstates the Facts
The defendant’s opposition makes no attempt to address most of the factual record that the
Government submitted to the Court regarding the defendant’s history and current practice of using
public statements to target individuals, see ECF No. 57 at 2-13, and instead advances conclusory
statements that the Government’s claims are baseless. That is because he cannot explain away the
obvious intent and well-known effect of his words. The single statement that the defendant does
address—in a footnote—is the threatening Truth Social post that he issued on August 4, the day
after his arraignment in this case: “IF YOU GO AFTER ME, I’M COMING AFTER YOU!” The
defendant complains that the Government’s motion did not note that after public outcry—given
the objectively reasonable understanding of the defendant’s post as a threat related to this case—
a spokesperson issued a statement claiming that the defendant had issued the threat “in response
to . . . special interest groups and Super PACs.” ECF No. 60 at n.8. But the spokesperson’s after-
the-fact explanation is implausible on its face. The truth is clear: the defendant was caught making
a public threat and then had a spokesperson issue an excuse. As the Court has stated, “even
page 14 of 22
arguably ambiguous statements from parties or their counsel, if they could reasonably be
interpreted to intimidate witnesses or to prejudice potential jurors, can threaten the process.”
Protective Order Hr’g 72-10. The defendant should not be permitted to obtain the benefits of
his incendiary public statements and then avoid accountability by having others—whose messages
he knows will receive markedly less attention than his own—feign retraction. 9 Likewise, no other
criminal defendant would be permitted to issue public statements insinuating that a known witness
in his case should be executed; this defendant should not be, either.
The defendant’s opposition also makes the self-serving claim that rather than address the
source of the material prejudice—the defendant’s inflammatory statements—the Court should
employ alternatives to a Rule 57.7(c) order, such as change of venue, postponement of trial, voir
9
The defendant recently was caught potentially violating his conditions of release, and
tried to walk that back in similar fashion. In particular, on September 25, the defendant’s campaign
spokesman posted a video of the defendant in the Palmetto State Armory, a Federal Firearms
Licensee in Summerville, South Carolina. The video posted by the spokesman showed the
defendant holding a Glock pistol with the defendant’s likeness etched into it. The defendant stated,
“I’ve got to buy one,” and posed for pictures with the FFL owners. The defendant’s spokesman
captioned the video Tweet with the representation that the defendant had purchased the pistol,
exclaiming, “President Trump purchases a @GLOCKInc in South Carolina!” The spokesman
subsequently deleted the post and retracted his statement, saying that the defendant “did not
purchase or take possession of the firearm” (a claim directly contradicted by the video showing
the defendant possessing the pistol). See Fox News, Trump campaign walks back claim former
president purchased Glock amid questions about legality (Sept. 25, 2023),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-campaign-walks-back-claim-former-president-
purchased-glock-amid-questions-about-legality (accessed Sept. 26, 2023). Despite his
spokesperson’s retraction, the Defendant then re-posted a video of the incident posted by one of
his followers with the caption, “MY PRESIDENT Trump just bought a Golden Glock before his
rally in South Carolina after being arrested 4 TIMES in a year.”
The defendant either purchased a gun in violation of the law and his conditions of release,
or seeks to benefit from his supporters’ mistaken belief that he did so. It would be a separate
federal crime, and thus a violation of the defendant’s conditions of release, for him to purchase a
gun while this felony indictment is pending. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).
page 15 of 22
dire, or jury instructions. ECF No. 60 at 14. But such alternatives are not adequate because they
would not address the source of the prejudice: the defendant’s repeated efforts to try this case in
the media. The Court’s duty here is to implement “measures that will prevent the prejudice at its
inception,” Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363, and so long as the defendant persists in making materially
prejudicial statements on social media, in interviews, and in speeches, the defendant will continue
to affect the potential venire for this trial. In addition, the defendant’s statements have such broad
reach that as long as he makes them, he will taint potential jurors anywhere in the country. See
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075 (even “[e]xtensive voir dire may not be able to filter out all of the effects
of pretrial publicity, and with increasingly widespread media coverage of criminal trials, a change
of venue may not suffice to undo the effect of [trial participants’] statements”); Brown, 218 F.3d
at 431 (jury instruction may fail to address threat of “carnival atmosphere” around trial). Finally,
the alternatives that the defendant suggests the Court consider would have the perverse incentive
of encouraging, rather than curbing, the defendant’s prejudicial statements. The defendant has,
for instance, already stated publicly that he intends to seek a change of venue in this case. See
ECF No. 57 at 7-8. He should not be permitted to pollute the jury pool in this District with his
prejudicial statements and then seek a change of venue based on the complaint that the venire is
tainted.
The defendant seeks to deflect responsibility for his own prejudicial statements by claiming
that the indictment in this case was “false and derogatory” and that the Special Counsel’s brief
statement upon its unsealing was prejudicial because it ascribed to the defendant responsibility for
the events of January 6, 2021—which, according to the defendant’s opposition, the indictment
does not allege. ECF No. 60 at 19-20. The defendant is wrong. First, the indictment, filed in
court, does what indictments are supposed to do: set forth the criminal charges against the
page 16 of 22
defendant and give notice of the factual allegations that underpin them. The defendant provides
no support for his claim that the indictment can be a source of unfair prejudice here—because there
is no such support. And second, the indictment does in fact clearly link the defendant and his
actions to the events of January 6. It alleges—and at trial, the Government will prove—the
following:
• The defendant’s criminal conspiracies targeted, in part, the January 6 certification and
capitalized “on the widespread mistrust the [d]efendant was creating through pervasive
and destabilizing lies about election fraud,” ECF No. 1 at ¶4.
• In advance of January 6, the defendant “urged his supporters to travel to Washington
on the day of the certification proceeding, tweeting, ‘Big protest in D.C. on January
6th. Be there, will be wild!,’” id. at ¶87. He then “set the false expectation that the
Vice President had the authority to and might use his ceremonial role at the certification
proceeding to reverse the election outcome in [his] favor, id. at ¶96.
• Then, despite his awareness “that the crowd [ ] on January 6 was going to be ‘angry,’”
id. at ¶98, on the morning of January 6, the defendant “decided to single out the Vice
President in public remarks,” id. at ¶102, and “repeated knowingly false claims of
election fraud to gathered supporters, falsely told them that the Vice President had the
authority to and might alter the election results, and directed them to the Capitol to
obstruct the certification proceeding and exert pressure on the Vice President to take
the fraudulent actions he had previously refused,” id. at ¶10d.
• Finally, on the afternoon of January 6, after “a large and angry crowd—including many
individuals whom the [d]efendant had deceived into believing the Vice President could
and might change the election results—violently attacked the Capitol and halted the
proceeding,” the defendant exploited the disruption in furtherance of his efforts to
obstruct the certification, id. at ¶10e.
In short, the indictment alleges that the defendant’s actions, including his campaign of knowingly
false claims of election fraud, led to the events of January 6.
The defendant’s motion also attempts to downplay defense counsel’s clear violations of
Rule 57.7(b), and appears to suggest that the defendant’s attorneys reserve the right to violate that
Rule in the future. See ECF No. 60 at 19-22. But it is uncontroverted that, on multiple occasions
in the week following the unsealing of the indictment, defense counsel appeared on media
page 17 of 22
programs and talked extensively about this case, including on topics that Rule 57.7(b) prohibits
attorneys from discussing. See ECF No. 57 at 16 (citing Rule 57.7(b) and linking to lead counsel’s
appearances). The defendant’s opposition then complains that the Court would render his
attorneys inadequate if it were to restrict them from further public statements through the
Government’s proposed 57.7(c) order, but fails to recognize that most of its terms mirror existing
restrictions on all attorneys practicing in this District under Local Criminal Rule 57.7(b). Compare
Local Criminal Rule 57.7(b) (prohibiting attorneys from making extrajudicial statements
regarding, among other things, the “identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses”)
with ECF No. 57-2 (same, with prohibition on “disparaging and inflammatory or intimidating
statements” about parties, witnesses, attorneys, court personnel, or potential jurors).
Finally, the defendant’s opposition makes faulty claims about the scope and applicability
of the proposed order. In addition to making inaccurate claims about the proposed order’s breadth,
see ECF No. 60 at 17, the defendant suggests that the Government seeks to prevent the defendant
from “redress[ing] the unfairness of this proceeding through legitimate means” including “for
example, filing motions with the Court.” ECF No. 60 at 10-11. But nothing in the proposed order
prevents the defendant from doing so—rather, it explicitly states that he can. See ECF No. 57-2
at 1-2 (order “does not preclude the defendant or his attorneys, agents, or others acting on his
behalf from (a) quoting or referring without comment to public records of the court in the case”).
Similarly, the defendant’s opposition states that “the prosecution seeks only to bar [the defendant]
from speaking.” ECF No. 60 at 13. Not so. The proposed order applies to all parties—including
the Government. But the defendant’s allegation here is telling, in that it highlights that the
defendant—and no other party—is making materially prejudicial public statements in this case…
the Government has proposed that the Court enter an order with five
reasonable conditions:
(1) any party—whether the Government or the defendant—must notify the
Court ex parte before the party or “any individual or entity acting at the party’s direction or under
the party’s control undertakes any jury study in the District of Columbia;”
(2) the notice must include a brief description of the intended methodology, all questions to be asked, and the expected
Page 19 of 22
number of participants;
(3) the party cannot begin the jury study, or use any results from it, absent
the Court’s approval, which may be conditioned on editing or removing portions of the intended
jury study that threaten to materially prejudice the jury pool;
(4) the jury study must be completed
30 days before the start of jury selection; and
(5) the party must maintain the names and addresses
of the study participants and provide that information to the Court at least two weeks prior to jury
selection. See ECF No. 57-3. The defendant objects to every one of these provisions. 10
First, the defendant posits that “jury studies and polling have almost no chance of
influencing the jury,” noting that “Washington D.C. has almost 700,000 residents” and “[a]
statistically significant sample size would ordinarily include only a few hundred people.” ECF
No. 60 at 23. But the size of the jury pool is immaterial; indeed, the Government’s motion cites
to a standing order on jury studies in a Division of the Eastern District of Texas with a population
exceeding that of this District. See ECF No. 57 at 19 (citing Judge Clark’s standing order in the
Beaumont and Lufkin Divisions); https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-by-state/texas-
population-change-between-census-decade.html (estimating the 2020 population of the counties
comprising the Division to be approximately 832,000). In addition, nothing would prevent the
defendant from creating and implementing a biased jury study and then publicizing its results—or
answers to specific, slanted questions—on a widespread basis to the entire potential jury pool. The
Court should exercise its discretion to protect against such prejudice by taking the simple step of
reviewing the proposal ex parte.
10
The defendant objects to the Government’s proposal, but “has no objection to informing
the Court of the dates and sample sizes of his polling in the District of Columbia.” ECF No. 60 at
23. The defendant’s alternative, however, would not address the potential tangible harm—
materially prejudicing the jury pool—posed by inappropriate studies.
Page 20 of 22
Second, the defendant suggests that no Court regulation is needed because “the purpose of
polling and jury studies is not to influence respondents, but to get a true read on the community’s
opinions or feelings on certain issues.” ECF No. 60 at 23. But in practice, jury studies, like other
polls, may be skewed to influence the participants or shape the results. See Ellen Kreitzberg &
Mary Procaccio-Flowers, Jury Selection: The Law, Art & Science of Selecting a Jury § 3:4 (2002)
(“Providing respondents with a misleading description of the facts may produce responses that are
pleasing to the client, but will be useless in providing insight into the reactions of the jurors who
will hear the whole truth during trial.”). 11 Because skewed studies could influence potential jurors,
the questions should be subject to review by the Court. See Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC,
601 S.W.3d 704, 726 (Tex. 2020) (“A campaign of disinformation, in whatever form, undermines
the sanctity of the judicial process and is inimical to the constitutional promise of a fair and
impartial jury trial.”).
Third, the defendant objects to a requirement that any jury study be concluded 30 days
before trial because “polling is most valuable if conducted close to trial.” ECF No. 60 at 24. Yet
at the status hearing one month ago, defense counsel suggested the defendant would “likely need
to do it sooner rather than later,” Transcript of Status Hearing, at 59 (Aug. 28, 2023), in reference
to polling for a Rule 26 motion, the filing deadline for which is October 9, 2023. See ECF No. 39
at ¶2 (setting deadline for “[a]ll other pre-trial motions, excluding motions in limine”). In any
11
While in office, the defendant provided an example of one type of distorted polling the
proposed order seeks to prevent: “A poll should be done on which is the more dishonest and
deceitful newspaper, the Failing New York Times or the Amazon (lobbyist) Washington Post!
They are both a disgrace to our County, the Enemy of the People, but I just can’t seem to figure
out which is worse?” See Trump Tweet, June 16, 2019, 9:39:22 EST, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2023).
page 21 of 22
event, the proposed 30-day limit creates a reasonable buffer that would reduce the potential impact
of any jury study on the venire. See Brewer, 601 S.W.3d at 726.
Fourth, relying on Blankenship v. Fox News Network, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00236, 2020 WL
7225765, at *1 n.3 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 8, 2020), the defendant contends that “polls and jury studies
commissioned by defense counsel are work product and some parts, if not all, are attorney-client
privileged.” ECF No. 60 at 23. That inapposite case, though, dealt with a civil subpoena seeking
“all documents and communications that underlie these investigations as well as analyses carried
out on Plaintiff’s behalf and documents and communications between Plaintiff and his attorneys
and [the jury consulting company] pertaining to the criminal trial.” Id. at *2. Here, the proposed
order addresses a far more limited set of information—“a brief description of the intended
methodology. . . all questions that will be asked. . . [and] the expected number of participants,” as
well as the participants’ names and addresses. ECF No. 57-3 at 1-2. Assuming any privileges
applied to such information, they would dissipate when the “questions to be asked” were actually
asked of the participants. In other words, the parties cannot shield from the Court, on privilege
grounds, the questions they intend to broadcast to hundreds, if not thousands, of District residents.
page 22 of 22
The rationale for the proposed order is to protect the integrity of the trial and the jury pool,
and the regulations it would impose are modest. The defendant’s complaints are unfounded, and
the Court should exercise its discretion to enter the order.
III. Conclusion
Through both of its proposed orders, the Government seeks appropriate processes for
protecting the jury pool in this case and the integrity of this proceeding. The Court should grant
the Government’s motion and enter them.
Respectfully submitted... Smith, Gaston, and Windom
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